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A
GRAMMAR
OF THE
English Tongue :

WITH THE
Arts of *Logick, Rhetorick, Poetry, &c.*

ILLUSTRATED with USEFUL

NOTES;

Giving the

FOUNDATIONS and REASONS
OF

Grammar in General.

The Whole making a Compleat SYSTEM
of an ENGLISH EDUCATION.

Published by JOHN BRIGHTLAND,

For the Use of the
SCHOOLS of *Great-Britain and Ireland.*

The EIGHTH EDITION, to which is now added a
Curious NEW PLATE of thirteen Alphabets used in
Writing and Printing.

L O N D O N :

Printed for JAMES RIVINGTON and JAMES FLETCHER, at
the *Oxford Theatre* in *Pater-Noster Row*, 1759.

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THE
APPROBATION
OF

Isaac Bickerstaff, Esq;

THE following TREATISE being submitted to my Censure; that I may pass it with integrity, I must declare, That as GRAMMAR *in general* is on all hands allow'd the Foundation of All *Arts and Sciences*, so it appears to me, that THIS GRAMMAR of the ENGLISH TONGUE has done that Justice to our Language, which, 'till now, it never obtained. The TEXT will improve the most ignorant, and the NOTES will employ the most learned. I therefore enjoin all my Female Correspondents to Buy, Read, and Study this GRAMMAR, that their Letters may be something less *Ænigmatic*: And on all my Male Correspondents likewise, who make no Conscience of *False Spelling* and *False English*, I lay the same Injunction, on Pain of having their *Epistles* expos'd in their own proper Dress, in my *Lucubrations*.

Isaac Bickerstaff, Cenfor.



T O T H E

Q U E E N's

Most Excellent Majesty.

M A D A M,



OUR MAJESTY being Sovereign of all those People who speak the Language for which the following *Grammar* is made, *This Performance* doth naturally claim YOUR MAJESTY's Protection.

A *Grammar* of the *French Language* was the First Labour of that Learned Body the *French Academy*, That being the Foundation of all *Writing*: And as YOUR MAJESTY'S

A

Arms

DEDICATION.

Arms have been Superior to those of *France*, so we hope that, by *Your Royal Influence*, You will give the same Superiority to *Our Arts and Sciences*, which are All built on *This* that is now Presented to YOUR SACRED MAJESTY, by

MADAM,

Your Majesty's most Obedient

and Dutiful Subjects,

The Authors.



T H E P R E F A C E.



THE Publication and Success of the First Edition of this Grammar, we find, stirr'd up the Emulation of Two Gentlemen to give the Town their Performances in this kind: The first is call'd, An Essay towards a Practical English Grammar; the last had the emphatic Title of THE English Grammar; or, An Essay on the Art of Grammar apply'd to, and exemplified in, the English Tongue. We were in hopes that Two such Gentlemen of Letters, whose Time had been devoted to the Instruction of others in the Latin and Greek Grammar, would make some further Progress in, and furnish better Helps, and more easy Methods to, the English Student in his Mother Tongue, than we who never had employ'd our Time in that Way. Had we found what we expected in them, we should not have given ourselves any farther Trouble of Revising our own for a Second Impression; satisfy'd with the Honour of opening a Way for such glorious Improvements. But we are apt to believe, that the very Qualification, from which we expected a more excellent Production, was the Cause of the little Progress they made in a Discovery that had so fairly been laid before them by Dr. Wallis and Ourselves: For Custom has so strong a Force on the Mind, that it passes with the Bulk of Mankind for Reason and Sacred Truth. The Irish thought themselves oppress'd by the Law that forbid them to draw with their Horses Tails, and that because their Ancestors had known no better Way of doing it: And Persons who have not only been Educated themselves, but have bred up others in a particular Method, must have a great Brightness of Soul to discover its Errors and forsake them.

The first Essayist has indeed, partly quitted the old Track, but could not prevail with himself to quit it intirely. The second is so far from parting with a Tittle of the old Greek and Latin Terms that he pours in a new Possie upon us. The first is so full of Ob-

curity and Confusion, for want of Method, that his Book can be of little Use to the Instruction of the Ignorant; and the latter has so little Regard to the English Tongue, that in the Title of his Book he is guilty of an evident Misnomer, it being no more an English Grammar, than a Chinese.

That the first Essayist has no Method, is plain from his very Division of Grammar; for having divided Grammar into four Parts, yet the Parts of Speech (which he unnecessarily makes eight, after the old Way) are plac'd under no one Head of that Division; which is Orthography, Prosody, Etymology, Syntax. 'Tis confess'd that the Author might have shelter'd the Parts of Speech under Etymology, in a Sense, which many Grammarians have given it, but he has cut himself off from that Refuge; for giving the first Chapter of his second Part (when he dispatch'd all his Doctrine of Words) the Title of Etymology, by way of Distinction, it is plain, he understood it in the Sense of Derivation in the Division, or he had forgot the Members of his Division: Both which Ways must of Necessity produce Obscurity and Confusion.

In the next Place, this Essayist has thrown that Part of his Division last in his Book, which in Use, in Nature, nay, and in his own Position, ought to be first: For the Doctrine of Letters is thoroughly to be known before we proceed to Words. But the Conduct of this Author in this particular, being contrary to the Order and Method of Nature, nay, contrary to his own Disposition of the Parts in the Division itself, must necessarily produce Confusion and Obscurity.

Thirdly, He intirely rejects Prosody, tho' voluntarily made the second Member of his own Division. Now, this Division was necessary, or it was not; if it was necessary, it ought all-along to have been observed; if not, it ought never to have been made.

Fourthly, For want of Method, several Parts of Speech are jumbled promiscuously together, the Doctrine of which ought to have been more distinct, for Distinction is a great help to Perspicuity; without which, the Knowledge which we would convey, must be very defective and obscure. But this Author has not been satisfy'd to join the Consideration of these Parts of Speech, which in regard of this Nature and Order ought to have been separate, but scatters the Syntax, or Construction of our Language, through his Discourse of Words; tho' the Doctrine of Words, separately consider'd, and in a Sentence, are Things distinct enough.

We must indeed confess, that we believe, that Dr. Wallis misled him in this particular, as he did us in our First Edition, neither of us considering that the learned Doctor wrote to Men already skill'd in the Latin Grammar, and therefore had no need of treating them as such as were intirely ignorant of Grammar.

Fifthly,

Fifthly, *By affecting the old Terms, and the old faulty Division of the Parts of Speech, he has multiply'd Words many times in long, and oftner in dark Explanations of them by Latin Words, which being entirely unknown to the Learner, can only puzzle (not instruct) him. This Multiplicity of Words is again increas'd, by repeating, at the End of every Chapter, its Contents by way of Question and Answer; by that means heaping a double, though useless Load, on the weak Memory of the young Learner.*

Sixthly, *The Rules are not sufficiently distinguish'd, which gives the Learner a Difficulty in chusing what to commit to his Memory, and what not. For these and many other Reasons, we could not think this Essay towards a Practical English Grammar sufficient to deter us from endeavouring to correct the Errors of our First Impression, and from giving the World an Edition more useful and more perfect.*

But if the first Essayist leave us so much room for Hopes of making a much farther Progress in this Work than the World has yet seen, the Essay on Grammar very much enlarges those Hopes, since in this we find not so much as any Aim at a Grammar peculiar to our own Language, the Author being content to repeat the self-same Things the self-same Way, as all these have done, who have endeavour'd to force our Tongue in every Thing to the Method and Form of the Latin and Greek. For his Execution is so contrary to the Design he seems in one Part of his Preface to propose, that by Writing in English, he only makes the Task the more difficult, since to understand his Terms, the Reader must understand Greek; whereas in the ordinary Way of learning that Language, the Student is suppos'd to have a competent Knowledge of the Latin before he approaches the Greek Grammar. To solve this, he tells us in the Preface, that every Man, Woman, and Child, ought to study the learned Languages, as incapable, without them, to understand the Terms made use of in several Professions: Not considering, that by this he requires an Impossibility, since much the greater Part of Mankind can by no means spare 10 or 11 Years of their Lives in learning those dead Languages, to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of their own.

But by this Gentleman's way of Arguing, we ought not only to be Masters of Latin and Greek, but of Spanish, Italian, High Dutch, Low-Dutch, French, the Old Saxon, Welsh, Runic, Gothic, and Islandic; since much the greater number of Words of common and general Use are derived from those Tongues. Nay, by the same way of Reasoning we may prove, that the Romans and Greeks did not understand their own Tongues, because they were not acquainted with the Welsh, or ancient Celtic, there being above 620 radical Greek Words deriv'd from the Celtic, and of the Latin a much greater Number.

With much better Reason the former Essayist seems to require some Skill in the Old Saxon, whence 'tis allow'd on all hands, the Body of our Tongue is really deriv'd. But we cannot agree with that Author, even so far as that, because the very Nature and Genius of our Language is almost entirely alter'd since that Speech was disus'd; and since the Meaning of Words is (except in some very few Cases) to be sought from the Usage of our own, and not that of former Times. The Saxons, for Example, (if we may credit Dr. Hickes) had various Terminations to their Words, at least Two in every Substantive Singular; whereas we have no Word now in Use, except the Personal Names, that has so. Thus Dr. Hickes has made Six several Declensions of the Saxon Names, but ours have not so much as one. He gives them three Numbers; a Singular, Dual and Plural: We have no Dual Number, except perhaps in Both. To make this plainer, we shall transcribe the Six Declensions from the Antiquary's Grammar.

The first Declension, which makes the Genitive Case in es, and the Dative in e, the Nominative in as, the Genitive Plural in a, and the Dative in um; as,

Singular.	{	Nom. Smith	{	Plural.	Nom. Smithas
		Gen. Smithes			Gen. Smitha
		Dat. Smithe			Dat. Smithum
		Accus. Smith.			Accus. Smithas
		Voc. Eala thu Smith			Voc. Eala ge Smithas
		Abl. Smith.			Abl. Smithum.

The Second Declension is of Names, whose Singular Number is a in the Nominative, their Genitive, Dative, Accusative, and Ablative in an, the Nominative Plural in an, Genitive in a, Dative in um; as Witega, a Prophet.

Singular.	{	Nom. Witega	{	Plural.	Witegan
		Gen. Witegan			Witegena
		Dat. Witegan.			Witegun
		Acc. Witegan.			Witegan
		Voc. Eala thu Witega			Eala ge Witegan
		Abl. Witegan.			Witegun.

The third Declension agrees with the first, only the Nominative Plural ends in u; as Andgit, the Sense.

Singular.	{	Nom. Andgit	{	Plural.	Andgitu
		Gen. Andgites			Andgita
		Dat. Andgite			Andgitum
		Acc. Andgit			Andgitu
		Voc. Eala thu Andgit			Eala ge Andgitu
		Abl. Andgite.			Andgitum.

The

The fourth Declension has the same Variations as the first, except that the Nominative Plural is the same as the Nominative Singular; as, Word.

Singular.	{	Nom. Word	}	Plural.	{	Word
		Gen. Wordes				Worda
		Dat. Worde				Wordum
		Acc. Word				Word
		Voc. Eala thu Word				Eala ge Word
		Abl. Worde.				Wordum.

The fifth Declension agrees with the first, except that the Genitive Singular ends in e, and the Nominative Plural in a; as in Wiln, a Maid.

Singular.	{	Nom. Wiln	}	Plural.	{	Wilna
		Gen. Wilne				Wilna
		Dat. Wilne				Wilnum
		Acc. Wiln				Wilna
		Voc. Eala thu Wiln				Eala ge Wilna
		Abl. Wilne.				Wilnum.

The sixth Declension has its Nominative Singular in u, its Genitive in a, Dative, Accusative, Vocative in u; and the Plural Cases all form'd like those of the fifth; as Sunu, a Son.

Singular.	{	Nom. Sunu	}	Plural.	{	Suna
		Gen. Suna				Suna
		Dat. Sunu				Sunum
		Acc. Sunu				Suna
		Voc. Eala thu Sunu				Eala ge Suna
		Abl. Sunu.				Sunum.

The Adjectives, or Qualities, differ as much from those in our present Language; for their Termination distinguish the Gender: that is, the same Termination is for the Masculine and Neuter, but a different for Feminine; as, God, Good.

Masculine Neuter.

The Feminine.

Singular.	{	Nom. God	}	}	{	Gode bona,
		Gen. Godes				Godre
		Dat. Godum				Godne
		Acc. Godne, God				Gode
		Voc. Goda				Gode
		Abl. Godum.				Godre.
Plural.	{	Nom. Gode	}	}	{	boni, bonæ, bona.
		Gen. Godra				
		Dat. Godum				
		Acc. Gode				
		Voc. Gode				
		Abl. Godum				

We might give you various Instances more of the essential Difference between the old Saxon and modern English Tongue, but these must satisfy any reasonable Man, that it is so great, that the Saxon can be no Rule to us; and that to understand ours, there is no need of knowing the Saxon. And tho' Dr. Hickes must be allow'd to have been a very curious Enquirer into those Obsolete Tongues, now out of Use, and containing nothing valuable, yet it does by no means follow (as is plain from what has been said) that we are oblig'd to derive the Sense, Construction, or Nature of our present Language from his Discoveries. But it is the present Tongue that is the only Object of our Consideration, as it matters not to the understanding of that, whether we know that Kine is deriv'd from Cowin, or Swine from Sowin. Time indeed has an entire Dominion over Words, as well as over all other Productions of Human Kind. Thus in our Language, as well as in all others, Words have extreamly vary'd from their Original Significations. Thus Knave signify'd originally no more than a Servant, Villain, a Country Steward, or Villager: Yet, I fear, if you should call a Man Kuave, or Villain, it would not much appease his Choler, to tell him, that these Words (some Hundreds of Years since) had a very harmless Signification.

Our proper Design, therefore, is to convey a Grammatical Knowledge of the Language we now speak, from whatever Springs and Sources descending down to us, in the most easy, familiar, and compendious Method that we could possibly find out. Nor could we by any means be diverted from this generous Aim, by any poor Ambition of seeming skill'd in the Foreign Terms of the old Grammarians; and tho' we have not reject'd them out of Contempt of Learning (as they call it) or of the Languages from which they are deriv'd, yet we could much less resolve to sacrifice the Ease of our Learner to a Custom so injurious to the general Progress of those, who are desirous to know the Grammar of their own Mother Tongue only.

To this End, we have been at some pains to put all the Rules into as smooth and sonorous Verse as the Nature of the Subject would bear; and we hope, that this has been far from giving any Obscurity to the Sense; but to give them the greater Light, under each we have add'd an Explanation in Prose, according to the Way taken by that learned Jesuit Alvarus, in his Grammar, which is not only used in almost all the Schools of Europe, except England, but commended by Schioppas, as the best practical Grammar of the Latin Tongue. It could not be avoided, but that some of them must run less harmoniously than the rest, but we believe the Number of them is not great. We have never met with any solid Objection against this Way (except some People's Inability to do the like) because, indeed, its Excellence is in the very Nature of the Thing. For Verse is far more
easily

easily learnt, and better retain'd, than Prose; and English Verse, by Reason of the Rhimes, yields a greater Assistance to the Learner than Latin Verse, one End of a Verse recalling the other. An Author of good Reputation confirms our Opinion in these Words: All Men paid great Respect to the Poets, who gave them so delightful an Entertainment. The Wiser Sort took this Opportunity of Civilizing the rest, by putting all their Theological, and Philosophical Instructions into Verse, which being learnt with pleasure, and retain'd with Ease, help'd to heighten and preserve the Veneration already, upon other Scores, paid to the Poets.

By this means the Child, or Learner will be oblig'd to burthen his Memory with no more than is absolutely necessary to the Knowledge of the Art he studies.

Nothing being more necessary to acquire a clear Knowledge of any Thing, than a clear Method, we have taken a peculiar Care in this Edition to observe all the Rules of Method. We begin with what is first to be learnt, that what follows may be understood; and proceed thus Step by Step, till we come to the last and most difficult, and which depends on all that goes before it. We have reduced the Terms, which are plain and obvious, into as small a Number as was consistent with Perspicuity and Distinction; for our End being the teaching only the present English Tongue, we had no Regard to any Term whatsoever, which had not an immediate Regard to that: By this means we believe we may say, That we have deliver'd the Learner from some Scores of hard Words, impos'd in other Grammars.

The Text is what is only meant to be taught in the Schools; and in that, we hope, no Teacher of any tolerable Capacity, will find any Difficulty, that may not be surmounted by a very little Application. The Notes have been pleasantly mistaken, by a Man that should have known better Things, for such Commentaries as the Dutch Authors have put to most of the Classics, i. e. an Explanation of obscure Places, difficult Expressions, hard Words or various Readings; whereas these Notes consist of more difficult Enquiries into Grammar in general; or sometimes contain a Defence of Particulars in the Text, and at other Times shew the Analogy between the Grammar of the English, and that of the Latin Tongue: All which must be of great Use to Men or Women of Judgment and Learning, but are not to be taught the young Beginner, whose Head cannot be suppos'd strong enough for Disquisitions of that kind.

Having taken these Precautions in the Grammar, we thought ourselves oblig'd to pursue them through the rest of the Arts contain'd in this Volume; in which we have had a peculiar Regard to the Truth of each, without any Respect to such Books as have been too long in the Possession of the Schools. Poetry, Rhetoric, and Logic have

have generally been taught in most of the Resorts of Learning in Europe, in the Latin Tongue: It was, therefore, necessary to our Design of accomplishing our English Scholar, that he should lose no Advantage which those enjoy, who make their first Court to the dead Languages. Nay, we may without Vanity say, that no Publick School in Europe has any Course of Poetry equal to what we give here. We have seen all that have been taught, and not one of them proceeds any farther, than the Art of Versifying, by teaching the several Quantities of Words, and what each sort of Verse requires. But this is the Art of making Poetasters, not Poets; of giving a Taste of Numbers, but not of the sublimer Beauties of the Authors they read, which are of the first Magnitude; by which means we often find, that those who have spent many Years in teaching Schools, are the worst Judges in the World of the very Authors they teach. If Poetry be at all to be studied (for which there are a thousand irrefragable Arguments) it ought to be truly taught, which yet it has never been in any Schools that we could ever hear of. In this Art of Poetry, therefore, we have fix'd the Rules of every Sort of Poetry, which will be a great Diminution in time of bad Poets; and we have farther, we hope, given a Standard of the Quantities of our Tongue, which if we have not perfectly obtained, we may venture to say, that we are not far from it.

The General Rhetorics of the Schools in England meddle only with the Tropes and Figures of Words and Sentences, but neglect the Cultivation of a young Invention. We know some ingenious Men have disallow'd of putting any People on the Exercise of that Faculty; but we presume, that we ought to do in this as the Youth of Antiquity did in their Gymnastic Exercises; they staid not till they were Men of confirm'd Strength and Robustness, but began in a more tender Age to make their Limbs pliant, and so to knit their Sinews and Nerves, that they should be without a Stiffness, which would not be removed by a late Application to that Art. Thus by using Youth early to a Methodical Invention, Exercise and Time will give a Readiness and Facility in seeing what all Subjects will afford of Use to Persuasion, which a Mind unused to that way of thinking, will not easily find out.

We may farther venture to say, that very few Schools in Europe can boast so just a Logic, clear'd of the old Fargon, and delivering the direct way to Truth, not to useless Wrangles. This was drawn up by a very eminent Hand from Mr. Locke, Father Malebranche, the Messieurs of Port Royal, and some others, tho' we have ventured to give it you something shorter than it is in the Original.



Upon this Noble Design of an ENGLISH EDUCATION, &c. By Mr. TATE, Poet-Laureat to Her Majesty.

AN *English Education!* Glorious Prize!
Fame claps her Wings, and sounds it to the Skies:
Tells 'em, the suff'ring *Muses* are referr'd
To be by *Theirs* and *Britain's* Guardians heard:
Whose Judgment Awes at once, and Charms Mankind,
Can silence *Slander*, and strike *Envy* blind.

To *Grecian* Hills our Youth no more shall roam,
Supply'd with these *Castalian* Springs at Home:
Our Ladies too, as in *ELIZA's* Days,
Be doubly Crown'd, with Beauty and with Bays.
MINERVA bids the Muse *This* Charter draw
To free Our injur'd Fair from Servile Awe,
And cancel cruel *PHOEBUS'* Salique Law. }

O wondrous Blessing! yet on Terms so cheap,
That *lowest* Stations shall th' Advantage reap;
The *meanest* Britons in this Prize may share,
Our *ALBION* be what *ROME* and *ATHENS* were.

Then say, what Thanks, what Praises must attend
The Gen'rous Wits, who thus could condescend!
Skill, that to *Art's* sublimest Orb can reach,
Employ'd its humble Elements to Teach!
Yet worthily Esteem'd, because we know
To raise *Their Country's* Fame they stoop'd so low.

Shall

On an English Education.

Shall private Zeal bestow such Cost and Toil,
To Cultivate that long-neglected Soil
Our *English* Language, (stor'd with all the Seeds
Of Eloquence, but choak'd with Foreign Weeds;)
And *Great BRITANNIA* not vouchsafe a Smile
To chear these springing Glories of our Isle?
If only Martial Conquests we advance,
And yield the Muse's Bow'rs to vanquish'd *France*;
If here we fix our Pillars of Renown,
Will not resenting *Britain's* Genius frown,
And, while our Troops politer Realms o'er-run,
Cry, *So the Vandals and the Goths have done?*
When Honour calls my Sons to new Alarms,
And grow in *Arts* victorious, as in *Arms*,
Our Language to advance, and prove our *Words*
No less design'd for Conquest than our *Swords*.

Till *Learning's* Banners thro' our Realms are spread,
And Captive *Sciences* from Bondage led;
Tho' *Gallic* Trophies shall our Island fill,
Our Conqu'ring Wings are clipt, and *LEWIS* triumphs still.




TO HIS HIGHNESS, *Prince GEORGE*, Eldest Son of His *ROYAL HIGHNESS Frederick, PRINCE* of *WALES*.

The following *ALPHABETS*, explain'd at one View, are humbly Dedicated.

(By) *His most Obedient, and most humble Servant, R. FORREST,*
Inventor of the *ROYAL ARRANGEMENT.*

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
Roman Print.	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Italick Print.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Round Hand.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Italian.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
German Text.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Old English FIRST.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Square Text.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Engrossing.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Running Secretary.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Court Hand.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Sett Chancery.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Common Chancery.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>
Church Text.	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Z</i>





A
GRAMMAR
OF THE
English Tongue.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

[1] **G**RAMMAR does all the Art and Knowledge teach,
According to the Use of every Speech,
How we our Thoughts most justly may express,
In Words together join'd in Sentences.

[2] *Intro*

NOTES.

[1] The modern, as well as old Grammarians, have given us various Definitions of this very useful Art. That of a certain Author seems defective, when he says, *Grammar* is the Art of *Speaking*; since 'tis plain a mastery of it, is of more Consequence in Writing; the Solecisms of Vulgar Discourse passing unheeded, tho' they would be monstrous in Writing. Of this Opinion we find the great Mr. *Locke*.

I cannot omit the learned and judicious Mr. *Johnson's* Definition, *Grammar* is the Art of expressing the Relations of Things in Construction, with due Accent in Speaking, and Orthography

The English Grammar, with Notes.

- [2] *Into Four Parts the Learn'd this Art divide :*
The First to Letters is precisely ty'd ;
The Second does to Syllables extend ;
The Third the various Rules of Words commend ;
The Fourth itself on Sentences does spend.

For in *English*, as well as other Languages, this Art consists of LETTERS, SYLLABLES, WORDS, and SENTENCES. The *Second* is produc'd by the various Conjunctions of the *First* ; the different Union of the *Second* begets the *Third* ; and the various Joinings of the *Third* compose the *Fourth*.

In

in Writing, according to the Custom of those, whose Language we learn. If he had said of Words, not Things, and Quantity for Accent, (which is a Thing or Art which no body alive understands, since it relates to the rising and falling of the Voice, not the Quantity) we think it the most extensive Definition we have met with ; but, indeed, every thing is extraordinary in this Author's Book. And we are pleas'd to find, that ours (which was made before we had the Happiness of seeing his Book) contains the Sense of it. But to speak, is to explain our Thoughts by those Signs, which Men have invented to that End. We find the most convenient Signs are Sounds, and the Voice ; but because these Sounds are transient, and pass away, Men have invented other Signs, to render them more durable and permanent ; as well as visible, or objects of the Eye, which are the Characters in Writing, called by the Greeks *γράμματα*, whence our Term of Grammar is deriv'd. Two things we may consider in these Signs : The *First* what they are by their Nature, that is, as Sounds and Characters. The *Second*, their Signification ; that is the Manner in which Men make use of them to express their Thoughts.

[2] Others divide Grammar in the following Manner ; as *Orthography*, or the Art of true Spelling ; *Orthoepy*, or exact Pronunciation, as to Quantity and Accent ; *Etymology*, or [the Derivation of Words, to discover the Nature and Propriety of single Words ; and *Syntax*, to join Words agreeably in Sentences. *Orthography*, or Spelling, has relation to Letters, both to the Knowledge of their Figures, and the Sounds expressed by them, and the putting them together to form Syllables, and Words. *Orthoepy* directs the Pronunciation of Syllables, as to their Length or Shortness : *Etymology*, or *Derivation*, regards Words ; and *Syntax*, Sentences.

Mr.

In the perfect Knowledge of these Four Heads consists the whole Art of GRAMMAR.

Letters being evidently the Foundation of the whole, ought, in the first place, to be thoroughly consider'd, and all those Rules which Industry and Observation have been able to furnish, laid down in such a Manner, that the Understanding of the Learner being in some measure inform'd of the Reasons of Things, may not pass through this Book to so little Purpose, as to learn only a few Words by Rote.

[3] A Letter, therefore, is a Character, or Mark, either in Print or Writing, which denotes the various Motions, or Positions

Mr. *Johnson*, in his Grammatical Commentaries, much better: "From hence there arise four Parts of Grammar. *Analogy*, which treats of the several Parts of Speech, their Definitions, Accidents and Formations. *Syntax*, which contains the Use of those Things in Construction, according to their Relations. *Orthography* of Spelling, and *Prosody* of Accenting in Pronunciation." Our Division is easily reduced to this, for *Orthography*, whose natural Place is first, as the Foundation of the whole, contains *Letters* and *Syllables*. *Analogy* Words, *Syntax* Sentences. As for *Prosody*, we presume it falls more justly (especially in *English*) under the Art of *Poetry*, as we have plac'd it; but as much as relates to the Pronunciation of Prose is taken in by *Letters*, where their true Sound is taught; and our Terms being more plain and easy, and needing no Explanation, we have chose to keep still to them.

[3] There are other Definitions of Letters, as the following: A Letter may be said to be, a simple uncompound Sound of, or in, the Voice, which cannot be subdivided into any more simple, and is generally mark'd with a particular Character. This Definition we take to err in two particulars; first, tho' every Sound ought to be mark'd with a proper and peculiar Character, yet by the Corruption, or Primitive Ignorance of the first Writers of our Modern Tongue, the same Sounds are often express'd by different Characters; and different Sounds are mark'd by one and the same Character: In the next Place, *Letters* are the Signs of Sounds, not the Sounds themselves: For the *Greeks* γράμμα is from Writing, and the *Latins* *litera*, from *lineando*, (as *linea* itself) or *linendo*, so that both Words signify that which is mark'd on the Paper. But if there be any Character, Sign and Mark, that does not express a

sitions of the [4] Instruments of Speech, either in producing, or ending of Sounds. Or you may term them Marks and Signs, expressing the several Sounds us'd in conveying our Thoughts to each other in Speech.

*A Letter is an uncompounded Sound,
Of which there no Division can be found:
These Sounds to certain Characters we fix,
Which, in the English Tongue, are Twenty-six.*

Of these Signs, Marks, or Characters, the *English* Language makes Use of Twenty-six, as will appear from the following Alphabet.

Of

Sound entirely simple, but a Sound compos'd and compounded of Two or more, and is resolvable into as many, it is not so properly a *Letter*, as an *Abbreviature* of several *Letters*, or a *Contraction* of them into one *Note* or *Mark*, containing in itself so many *Letters*, as its Power contains simple Sounds. This is plain in the *Latin* E , x , the *Greek* ξ , ψ , τ , and many others sufficiently known; for they are compos'd of (*et*), (*cs*), ($\kappa\varsigma$), ($\pi\varsigma$), ($\varsigma\tau$), &c. On the contrary, a simple Sound, tho' it be express'd perhaps by different Characters, yet it is to be esteem'd but one Letter: For (*th*), (*ph*), no less than ϕ , θ , and f , are but simple Letters.

[4] The chief Instruments of Speech, Discourse or Letters, are the Lungs, the Wind-pipe, Throat, Tongue, Nostrils, Lips and several Parts of the Mouth. The Breath, or that Air that is inspir'd or breath'd into us, is blown from the Lungs through the Wind-pipe, which furnishes the Matter of the Voice or Discourse. For from the various Collision of this Air or Breath, arises the Variety both of Tones and Articulation: And this Variety comes not from the Lungs, but from other Causes, as will anon be evident. For all the Variation which Sounds receive from the Lungs, is only from the different Force with which they send out the Breath, by which the Voice becomes more or less sonorous or loud; for the Lungs perform in Speech the Office of the Bellows in the Organ.

I know Anatomists have observ'd, that we cannot so much as talk without the Concurrence of twelve or thirteen several Parts, as the *Nose*, *Lips*, *Teeth*, *Palate*, *Jaw*, *Tongue*, *Weason*, *Lungs*, *Muscles* of the *Chest*, *Diaphragma*, and *Muscles* of the *Belly*; but I have nothing to do with any Part, but what is imme-

immediately concern'd in the Formation of Sounds, the Observation of the Manner of which, leads the Observer to certain useful Conclusions in the Subject we treat of. Farther Enquiries into other Parts concern'd more remotely in Speech, have little but Amusements here, tho' of Consequence in the Contemplation of the admirable Order of Nature.

The Variety of Tones (that is, as far as they relate to Gravity or Acuteness, flat or sharp) arises from the Wind pipe. For as a Flute, the longer and smaller it is, the more acute or sharp, or small the Tone; and the larger and shorter, the more grave and big the Tone is, that it gives: The same holds good in the Wind pipe, (whence, at least in some measure, arises the Variety of Tones in the Voices of several Men; or even of the same Men in the different Parts of their Ages) but chiefly from the *Larynx*, or Knot of the Throat: For the Tone of the Voice is more or less grave or acute, as the small Cleft of the Throat opens more or less; and this is the Seat of all Musical Modulations.

From the same Seat must we seek the Reason of the Difference betwixt a gentle Whisper, and loud Talk. For if, when we speak, we make a tremulous Concussion of the Throat and Wind-pipe, (that is by reason of their Extension) it produces loud speaking; but when the Throat and the Wind-pipe are less stretch'd, and more lax, it is Whispering. But all Letters are not capable of this Diversity or Variation; but only those, which we call Vowels, half Vowels, half Mutes (and such as derive themselves from half Mutes): For *b*, *t*, *c*, or *k*, are simply Mutes, and their Aspirates never admit of that Concussion; nor is their Sound in loud Speech different from what it is in a Whisper.

To this Head we may refer the Hoarseness, often the Companion of Catarrhs, which hinders that Concussion of the Throat and the Wind pipe.

The Articulation of Words, or the Formation of the several Letters, begins when the Breath has pass'd the Throat; and is almost wholly perform'd by the Nostrils, Mouth, Tongue and Lips. Tho' these Remarks seem out of the way to the common Reader, yet a judicious Master will find it worth his while to study this point thoroughly. For by knowing what Letters are formed by the Mouth, Tongue, Throat, Lips, &c. the Master may give a great Light to the Learner in the Art of Spelling, and perhaps the most certain Rule of doing it justly, because in these Notes we shall shew how every Vowel and Consonant is form'd.

Of the LETTERS. [5]

	Old English.	Roman.	Italian.	Sounded		
1	A	a	A	a	A	a
2	B	b	B	b	B	b
3	C	c	C	c	C	c
4	D	d	D	d	D	d
5	E	e	E	e	E	e
6	F	f	F	f	F	f
7	G	g	G	g	G	g
8	H	h	H	h	H	h
9	I	i	I	i	I	i
10		j	J	j	J	j
11	K	k	K	k	K	k
12	L	l	L	l	L	l
13	M	m	M	m	M	m
14	N	n	N	n	N	n
15	O	o	O	o	O	o
16	P	p	P	p	P	p
17	Q	q	Q	q	Q	q
18	R	r	R	r	R	r
19	S	s	S	s	S	s
20	T	t	T	t	T	t
21	U	u	U	u	U	u
22		v	V	v	V	v
23	W	w	W	w	W	w
24	X	x	X	x	X	x
25	Y	y	Y	y	Y	y
26	Z	z	Z	z	Z	z

[5] Tho' it would be too much from the present Design for me to enter into the Enquiry, who was the Inventor of Letters, and what Nation had the Honour of first enjoying this Benefit; yet that I may not wholly disappoint some who may expect this, I shall in a very few Words let him know, That the *Chinese* are allowed the Palm in this Particular; for their first King *Fohi*, who liv'd 1400 Years before *Moses*, 500 before *Menes* the first King of *Egypt*, and 2950 before *Christ*, was the Author of this Invention, and writ in their Language a Book called *Texim*, which is the oldest in the World.

But this was in Parts too remote, and which had so little Communication with the World, that is, all that World which was then known, that we may reasonably make another Enquiry after the Original of Letters in the hither Parts of *Asia*, *Egypt*, and *Europe*.

'Tis more probable from the *Mummies* and *Obelisks*, that *Hieroglyphics* where in these Parts the first Manner of Writing, and even prior to *Moses*; the *Pyramids* and *Obelisks* being made, at least in great measure, while yet the *Israelites* were in Slavery to the *Egyptians*, and by Consequence not very well qualified for Inventions so curious and judicious.

Whether *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians* learn'd LETTERS from the *Egyptians*, or their Neighbours of *Judah* and *Samaria*, may be a Question; since the Bible wrote in Letters is more likely to have inform'd them, than the *Hieroglyphics* of *Egypt*. But when or wheresoever the *Phœnicians* learnt this Art, I think it is generally agreed, that *Cadmus*, the Son of *Agenor*, first brought Letters into *Greece*, whence in subsequent Ages they spread over all *Europe*.

Thus much I have thought fit to say on this Head: What remains is, That as the Difference of the Articulate Sounds was to express the different Ideas and Thoughts of the Mind; so it is certain, that one Letter was intended to signify only one Sound; and not, as at present, now to express one Sound, and then another; which has brought in that Confusion, that has render'd the Learning of our Modern Tongues extremely difficult; whereas if the various Sounds were constantly express'd by the same Numerical Letter, more than half that Difficulty would be remov'd.

But since we are not here to reform, or indeed make a new Alphabet, as some have vainly, against the Stream, or full Tide of Custom, attempted; but to explain and deliver Rules about that which we have, and according to those Errors and Mistakes which Use, the inviolable Rule and Right of Speaking and Writing, has consecrated, such an Endeavour would be as useless as singular.

C H A P. II.

Of V O W E L S. [6]

*Under Two Heads these Letters still are plac'd,
The first holds Vowels, Consonants the last.*

THese Twenty-six Letters are naturally divided into Two Sorts, which are call'd *Vowels* and *Consonants*. *Vowels* or perfect Sounds, being by Nature of greater Excellence than *Consonants*, as founding by themselves, and giving the latter their Sounds, justly demand our first Consideration.

A *Vowel*, therefore, is a Letter denoting a full Sound made in the Throat, and can be pronounc'd without the help and joining of any other Letter to it.

*A Vowel by itself compleat is found,
Made in the Throat, one full and perfect Sound,
Five Letters we can only Vowels call,
For A, E, I, O, U, contain them all.*

[7] In *English* we have but these Five Marks or Characters of these perfect Sounds call'd *Vowels*, *a, e, i, o, u*, and *y* at the
End

[6] It is of Use to observe, that the several Sorts of Sounds us'd in Speaking, which we call *Letters*, are form'd in a very natural Manner. For first, the Mouth is the Organ that forms them, and we see, that some are so simple, and unmix'd, that there is nothing requir'd, but the opening of the Mouth to make them understood, and to form different Sounds; whence they have the Names of *Vowels*, or *Voices*, or *Vocal Sounds*. On the other Side we find, that there are others, whose Pronunciation depends on the particular Application, and use of every Part of the Mouth, as the Teeth, the Lips, the Tongue, the Palate: Which yet cannot make any one perfect Sound but by the same opening of the Mouth; that is to say, they can only found by their Union with those first and only perfect Sounds; and these are call'd *Consonants*, or Letters founding with other Letters.

[7] If we judge by the Characters or Marks, we find that there is not the same Number of *Vowels* in all Languages, and
yet

End of a Syllable for *i*, which is only a different Figure, but entirely of the same Sound. When these Vowels end a Syllable, they are usually long, but generally short in all other Positions.

*To each of these, two different Sounds belong ;
One that is short, another that is long ;
Five double Vowels add, to fill the Vocal Throng.* }

Each of these Five have two distinct Sounds, that is, a long and a short Sound ; the short Sound is always made long by adding (*e*) at the End, as *Lad, Lade ; Met, Mete ; Pip, Pipe ; Rob, Robe ; Tun, Tune* : To these we must add Five double Vowels, compounded each of Two of These. To attain to the perfect Knowledge of this, the Learner must first be taught the true Sounds of these Five Vowels, as they lie single, and each by itself ; for that is the Guide to arrive safely at all their Variations.

*Besides the long and short, to (A) does fall
A Sound that's broad, as in all, shall, and call ;
And in all Words, that end in double (L) ;
As Wall, and Stall ; in (ld), as bald will tell :
Betwixt a double (U) placed and (R),
As Warden, Ward, Warren, Warm, and Warmer.*

(*A*) in these Words seems to have gain'd this broad Sound from the ancient Spelling ; which even in the Days of *Queen Elizabeth*, added a (*u*) after it, as in *talk*, it being then written *taulk*, as in *Afcham* and several other Writers before 1560, &c.
(*A*) be-

yet all Nations almost agree, that there are more different Sounds of Vowels, than they have common Characters to express them.

For this Reason I am of Opinion, says our learned *Dr. Wallis*, that they ought to be distinguished into these Three Classes ; *Guttural*, or *Throat*, Sounds ; *Palatine*, or Sounds of the *Palate* ; and *Labial*, or Sounds of the *Lips*, as they are form'd either by the Throat, the Palate, or the Lips.

If therefore we make this Division of the Vowels, according to that Number of Vocal Sounds, as we find them in our Time, (as we ought) then will their Number be Nine, *viz.* Three in the *Throat*, three in the *Palate*, and three in the *Lips*, according to the three several Degrees or Manners of opening the Mouth : that is, by a *larger, middle, and less* Degree of opening it in those Three Places or Seats.

(A) besides its short and long Sound, has before (l) or rather double (l) generally a broad, open or full Sound, as it has in Words ending in (ld), &c. but when the double (l) is parted in the Middle of a Word it is pronounced short, as *Shallow*, *Tallow*; 'tis likewise broad when plac'd betwixt a (w) and (r), and likewise in *Wash*, *Watch*, *Water*, *Wrath*, &c.

(A) is short when single Consonants conclude,
Or Two of the same into the Middle intrude,
Or seem in Sound t'obtain the Middle Part;
But yet the final (e) do's Length to these impart.

[8] When a single Consonant ends a Syllable, *Bat*, *can*, *far*, (a) is short; and when two of the same Consonants meet in the Middle of a Word, as in *batter*, *cannot*, *Farrier*, &c. and when a single Consonant in the Middle sounds double, as in *banish*, *Dragon*, *Habit*, &c. and when it precedes Two Consonants that end a Word, as *blast*, *past*, &c. But silent (e) ever after these Two Consonants, lengthens the (a) as *paste*, &c.

(A) still we long most justly do suppose
In Words which but one Syllable compose,
Whenever silent (e) is in the close.
And when in th' End of Syllables, 'tis known
In Words that have more Syllables than one.

(A) sounds long, small, and slender, 1st, in Words of one Syllable with (e) at the End, as *make*, *fate*, *late*, &c. but this is the natural Effect of silent (e), which always gives length to the foregoing Vowel, and ought never to be written when that is short; 'tis likewise long in the Ends of Syllables in Words of many Syllables, as *Cradle*, *Ladle*, &c.

No common Word in (a) can e'er expire,
And yet its genuine Sound retain entire.

(A) is obscure, or not plainly pronounced, in the Word *Thousand*.

None

[8] We generally pronounce (a) with a more small and slender Sound, than most other Nations; as the *French* generally do their (e) when follow'd by (n) in the Word *Entendment*, tho' something sharper and clearer; or perhaps its most usual Sound in our Tongue comes nearest to the *French* Neuter, or open (e); as in the Words *Etre*, *Tete*, &c. or as the *Italians* do their (a). But yet not like the fat or gross (a) of the *Germans*, which if long, we express by (au) or (aw), or if short, by short (o).

[9] This

None but proper Names end in this Vowel, except these Seven in (*ea*), which yet found (*e*), as *Lea, Plea, Flea, Pea, Sea, Tea, yea*; the last Word is out of Use.

Of the Vowel (E.)

- [9] (*E*) is of a different Sound, and various Use;
Silent itself, all Vowels does produce;
But least itself, yet sometimes it is found
To lengthen ev'n its own preceding Sound,
As we in Scene and Glebe, and others find,
But (e) is mostly of the shorter kind.
But then its Sound is always clear express,
As in Whet, let, well, met, and rest.

The Sound of this *Vowel* is differently express'd, and of various and great Use in the Pronunciation of other *Vowels*; for, when silent itself it lengthens them all, but is seldom long itself, or lengthen'd by itself in Words of one, or more than one Syllable.

Its Sound is always short, howe'er express,
As fret, help, left, Beard, dreamt, and blest;
Unless made long by silent final (e),
Or double (e) in Form or Sound it be.

A single Consonant at the End after (*e*) makes it short, as in *Bed, fret, Den, &c.* Two or three Consonants at the End after it does the same; (*ft*) as *left* (*ld*) as *held*, (*lm*) as *Helm*, (*lp*) as *help*, (*lt*) as *melt*, (*mp*) as *Hemp*, (*nt*) as *dent, bent*, (*pt*) as *kept*, (*rb*) as *Herb*, (*rd*) as *Herd*, (*rk*) as *jerk*, (*rm*) as *Term* (*rn*) as *Hern*, (*rt*) as *pert*, (*sb*) as *Flesh*, (*sk*) as *Desk*, (*st*) as *Rest, best, blest*. The Sound of (*e*) express'd by (*ea*) in the Middle of several Words is short: as *already, Beard, Bearn* (a Child) *Weather, Treasure, cleanse, Dearth, dreamt, Earnest, Earth*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Father, Head*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Jealous, Leachery, Lead, Meadow, Measure, Pearl, Peasant, Pleasure, ready, Seamstress, spread*, and many more.

It

[9] This Vowel is pronounc'd with a clear and acute Sound, like the French (*e*) Masculine:—but it scarce ever has the obscure Sound of the French (*e*) Feminine; unless when short (*e*) goes before (*r*), as in *Vertue* and *Stranger*.

[10] The

It being thus naturally short, it lengthens itself in Words of one Syllable but in these sixteen Examples,

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Bede</i> , | } Proper Names. | 9. <i>Mede</i> , a Country. |
| 2. <i>Pede</i> , | | 10. <i>Mere</i> , a Lake or Fenn. |
| 3. <i>Vere</i> , | | 11. <i>Mete</i> , Measure; |
| 4. <i>Crete</i> , an Island. | | 12. <i>Rere</i> , hindermost. |
| 5. <i>Ere</i> , before that. | | 13. <i>Scene</i> , in a Play. |
| 6. <i>Glebe</i> , Land. | | 14. <i>Scheme</i> , a Draught. |
| 7. <i>Glede</i> , a Kite. | | 15. <i>Sphere</i> , a Globe. |
| 8. <i>Here</i> , in this Place. | | 16. <i>These</i> . |

To these, in my Opinion, we may add *there*, *were*, and *where*, tho' by a different, yet wrong, Pronunciation, some found the first (*e*) in these Words like (*a*) long.

In Words of more than one Syllable, the (*e*) at the End lengthens these Words, as,

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. <i>Adhere</i> . | 14. <i>Interfere</i> . |
| 2. <i>Apozeme</i> . | 15. <i>Intervene</i> . |
| 3. <i>Austere</i> . | 16. <i>Nicene</i> , Creed. |
| 4. <i>BlaspHEME</i> . | 17. <i>Obscene</i> . |
| 5. <i>Cohere</i> . | 18. <i>Portreve</i> . |
| 6. <i>Complete</i> . | 19. <i>Precede</i> . |
| 7. <i>Concede</i> . | 20. <i>Recede</i> . |
| 8. <i>Concrete</i> . | 21. <i>Replete</i> . |
| 9. <i>Convene</i> . | 22. <i>Revire</i> . |
| 10. <i>Extreme</i> . | 23. <i>Severe</i> . |
| 11. <i>Greve</i> , Lord. | 24. <i>Sincere</i> . |
| 12. <i>Impede</i> , to hinder. | 25. <i>Supersede</i> . |
| 13. <i>Intercede</i> , mediate. | 26. <i>Supreme</i> . |

NOTE, That *complete*, *replete*, *extreme*, *supreme*, are often spelt *compleat*, *repleat*, *extream*, *supream*; but since they are spelt both ways, I would not omit them, tho' they, when in *eam*, belong propely to the following Rule:

*When long, acute, and clear, (e), sounds we see,
As in ev'n, evil, be, me, we and he:
Ea, ie and double (e) are found,
Still to express of (e) the longer Sound.*

Custom lengthens the Sound of (*e*) by the improper *double Vowel*. (*ea*) in all Words where it does not found (*a*) short, or (*e*) short, as will be seen when we come to that improper *double Vowel*.

The Sound of (e) is lengthen'd by (ei) in these Words only,

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1. <i>Conceit.</i> | 5. <i>Either.</i> | 9. <i>Receive.</i> |
| 2. <i>Conceive.</i> | 6. <i>Neither.</i> | 10. <i>Seize.</i> |
| 3. <i>Deceit.</i> | 7. <i>Inveigle.</i> | 11. <i>Weild.</i> |
| 4. <i>Deceive.</i> | 8. <i>Receipt.</i> | |

(ie) lengthens the Sound of (e) or gives it that of double (e) in these:

- | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. <i>Atchievement.</i> | 14. <i>Grief.</i> | 27. <i>Reprieve.</i> |
| 2. <i>Believe.</i> | 15. <i>Grievance.</i> | 28. <i>Siege.</i> |
| 3. <i>Belief.</i> | 16. <i>Grieve.</i> | 29. <i>Shrieve.</i> |
| 4. <i>Besiege.</i> | 17. <i>Grievous.</i> | 30. <i>Shriek.</i> |
| 5. <i>Bier.</i> | 18. <i>Lief.</i> | 31. <i>Sieve.</i> |
| 6. <i>Brief.</i> | 19. <i>Liege.</i> | 32. <i>Shield.</i> |
| 7. <i>Cashier.</i> | 20. <i>Muletier.</i> | 33. <i>Thieves.</i> |
| 8. <i>Chief.</i> | 21. <i>Piece.</i> | 34. <i>Thief.</i> |
| 9. <i>Cieling.</i> | 22. <i>Piedmont.</i> | 35. <i>Thieve.</i> |
| 10. <i>Field.</i> | 23. <i>Pierce.</i> | 36. <i>Thievery.</i> |
| 11. <i>Fiend.</i> | 24. <i>Priest.</i> | 37. <i>Thievish.</i> |
| 12. <i>Friend.</i> | 25. <i>Relief.</i> | 38. <i>Yield.</i> |
| 13. <i>Frontier.</i> | 26. <i>Relieve.</i> | |

In all other Words the Sound of (e) long is express'd by the double Vowel (ee), as in *Bleed, Creed, &c.* [10] The Sound of (e) in *Stranger* is obscure.

When

[10] The Use of this (e) is the lengthning the Sound of the foregoing Consonant; and a very learned Man is of Opinion, that it had this Original. That it was pronounc'd but in obscure Manner, like the (e) *Feminine* of the *French*; so that the Words *take, one, Wine, &c.* which are now Words of one Syllable, were formerly Dis-syllables, or Words of Two Syllables, *ta-ke, o-ne, Wi-ne*; so that the first Vowel terminating the first Syllable, was therefore long; and that obscure Sound of the final (e) by little and little vanish'd so far, that in the End it was totally neglected, as the (e) *Feminine* of the *French* often is, the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel being preserv'd, and all the other Letters keeping their Sounds, as if the (e) were likewise to be pronounc'd. And a stronger Argument of this is, that we see this mute (e) in the old Orthography or Spelling perpetually annex'd to many Words, in which it is now constantly omitted, as *Darke, Marke, Selfe, Lease, Waite*, and innumerable more, to which Words there is no Reason to imagine, that it should have been join'd, if it had not been pronounc'd *Dar-ke, Mar-ke, Sel-fe, Lea-fe, Wai-te,*

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*When (e) ends Words, it has no Sound at all,
Except in Words which we do proper call;
Except it doubled be in Form or Sound,
The is to this the sole Exception found.*

(E) itself, at the End of a Word, has now no proper Sound of its own, as in *make, have, love, &c.* except in *the*, which is

Wai-te, &c. For, 'tis plain, it could not be join'd to those Words to make the foregoing Syllable long, which is now its principal Use; because the precedent Syllables are either not long, or made so by their *Diphthongs*, or *double Vowels*. Another Proof of this is, that we find in the old Poets this (e) makes either another Syllable or not, as the Occasion of the Verse requires; which happens to the *French (e) Feminine*, both in Verse and Prose.

But tho' this mute (e) is not founded in our Time, yet is it far from being of no use and superfluous; for besides its demonstrating, that these Words were formerly of more Syllables, than they are at present, it yet serves to these three Uses: *First*, To preserve the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel, which if long before, remains so, tho' that final or mute (e) be pronounc'd. *2dly*, To soften the Sound of (c), (g), and (th), as *huge, since, breathe, wreathe, seethe*, which that being away, would be pronounc'd *bug, sink, breath, wreath, seeth, &c.* *3dly*, To distinguish (v) Consonant from (u) Vowel, as in *have, crave, save, &c.* which would else be *hau, crau, sau, &c.* but (v) Consonant having now a peculiar and proper Character, it may perhaps hereafter happen that this mute (e) may be left out after it.

Whenever there is neither of these Considerations, it is redundant, except when it follows (l), preceded by some other Consonant, as in *Handle, Candle, &c.* here indeed the Use is not so apparent as in the following Instances, yet it has even here an obscure Sound, and the ending Consonants could not be pronounc'd without it; nay, in Verse they always make two Syllables: So that Dr. *Wallis*, who makes it here redundant, is certainly mistaken; tho' he is perfectly in the right in *Idle, Trifle, Title, Table, Noble, &c.* since, as he observes here, the mute, or rather the obscure (e) produces it.

This mute (e) in the Middle of Words is seldom us'd, unless it was in the primitive Words a final (e), as in *Advancement, Changeable, &c.* it was final in *Advance, Change, &c.* But this (e) which is mute in Words of the singular Number, is founded in the Plural, *House, Houses, &c.*

is writ with a single (*e*), to distinguish it from *thee*; and some proper Names, as *Phæbe*, *Penelope*, *Pasiphae*, *Gethsemane*, and in *Epitome*, &c. for (*e*) simple is seldom else pronounc'd at the End of a Word, for *be*, *me*, *she*, *we*, *be*, and *ye*, sound and wou'd better be written by (*ee*).

*Whene'er the Sound of (e) is in the End,
Some of these Letters well express't you'll find.
Y, or ie, happy; ey, as in Key,
Double (e) agree; ea, as in Tea.*

But the Sound of (*e*) is at the End of many Words, tho' differently express'd; *First*, and most commonly, by (*y*); as *happy*, *holy*, *Mercy*; these Words may be writ with (*ie*) or (*y*) as the Writer pleases.

2dly, By (*ey*) in *Anglesey*, *Balconey*, *Honey*, *Cockney*, *Humphrey*, *Key*, *Ramsay*, and many more; tho' Custom now begins to prevail in the Omission of the (*e*).

3dly, The Sound of (*e*) at the End is express'd by (*ee*), as in *Pharisee*, *Sadducee*, *agree*, *Chaldee*, *Bee*, *Knee*, and many more.

The Sound of (*e*) at the End is likewise express'd by (*ea*), as in *Sea*, *Flea*, *Pea*, *Tea*, *Yea*.

*Where e'er the silent (e) a Place obtains,
The Voice foregoing, Length and softness gains,
And after (c) and (g) this softning Power remains.*

The silent (*e*), which is put at the End of Words and Syllables, does not only produce, or lengthen the foregoing *Vowel*, but often renders its sound more soft; as in *Face* and *Lace*; so in *Rag*, *Rage*, *Stag*, *Stage*, *hug*, *huge*.

*In Compound Words its Silence (e) retains,
Which in the Simple in the End it gains.*

It does the same Office in the Middle Syllables, when it follows (*g*) or (*c*), as in *Advancement*, *Encouragement*; since (*c*) and (*g*) are always sounded hard, unless (*e*) or (*i*) soften them; as *sing*, *singe*, *swing*, *swinge*, &c.

*I, O, and U, at th' End of Words require,
The silent (e), the same do's (va) desire.*

The silent (*e*) is added to (*i*), (*o*) and (*u*), at the End of Words, because the Genius of the Language requires it; and likewise to (*v*) Consonant or (*va*), except when an (*i*) follows in the same Word; as in *living*, *thriving*, &c. to avoid the Concourse of too many Vowels; it's preserv'd in *blameable*, *changeable*, &c. to

mark the distinct Syllables. For (*ie*) we often now put (*y*), as *Mercy* for *Mercie*, and *dy* for *die*, &c.

*In Compound Words, tho' of obscurer Sound,
Or even silent, (e) must still be found.*

Tho' (*e*) be not founded, or at least very obscurely, yet must it not be left out in Writing in the Middle of Compound Words, as *namely, finely, closely, handsomely, whereof, wherein, whereon*, &c. nor after (*l*) at the End of a Word, another Consonant preceding it, tho' obscurely founded, as *Bridle, Rifle, Bugle*, &c. for its Virtue still reaches the foregoing Vowel as to its Length and Softness, unless where three Consonants intervene, as in *Fiddle, Ruffle*, &c. which are call'd a Syllable and half, tho' in Reality they are two distinct Syllables, as is plain from our Verses.

*When (n) concludes a Word, the (e)'s obscure,
Or does perhaps no Sound at all endure.*

The Sound of (*e*) before (*n*) at the End of a Word is very obscure, or rather silent, as *eleven, seven, even, Heaven, bounden, beaten*, &c. and this is so plain, that in Verse they are now always us'd for Words of but one Syllable. But proper Names of Persons and Places are an Exception to this Rule, as *Eden, Eben*, &c.

*When (re) concludes a Word the Sound removes
Before the (r) and (u) it mostly proves.*

The Sound of (*e*) after (*r*) is silent, or passes into a precedent (*u*) obscure; as *Fire*, sounds *Fi-ur*; *Desire*, *Desi-ur*; *more*, *mo-ur*; *Mare*, *Ma-ur*; *Rere*, *Re-ur*, &c. The same holds in *Acre, Massacre, Meagre, Maugre*, &c.

*When (s) at the End of Plural Words is found,
It is the silent (e) affords no Sound.*

(*E*) is silent when (*s*) is added to the Ends of Words in Names which signify more than one; as in *Blades, Trades, Glades, Babes*, &c. but the Reason of this is, because the Word had (*e*) silent to soften and lengthen the Sound before, and the (*s*) is only added to shew that it signifies more than one. Thus in *dotes, bites, takes, likes, strikes*, &c. which you will find anon to be call'd, by way of Excellence, Words that affirm something of some Name or Person. And tho' the Affirmation and Name are often written with the same Letters, as *Trades*, signifying many Trades, and *trades, he trades*; yet, besides the Sense, the Writing the Name with a Capital or great Letter, and the Word

of Affirmation with a small, (for so they ought to be written) may sufficiently distinguish them.

Nor must (e) final be omitted, tho' the Syllable that goes before consist of a *double Vowel*, as *House, cleanse, Disease, Increase, &c.* and in *Horse, Nurse, Purse.*

*But (e) between two (s's) at the End,
Does to the Ear a certain Sound commend;
Or else between c, g, ch, z, and s,
It still another Syllable must express.*

But here it is to be noted, that Words that have the Sound of (s), or (s) mingled in their Sound, (es) then makes another and a distinct Syllable; as after (e) in *Traces, Places, Slices, &c.* after (ch) in *Breaches, Reaches, Leeches, Riches, &c.* after (g) in *Stages, Sieges, obliges, &c.* after (s) in *Horses, Muscs, Closes, Noses, Roses, &c.* after (z) in *razes, amazes, surprises, &c.*

[11] Of the Vowel (I).

*When (I) precedes ght, and nd,
Gh, mb, gn, ld, still long will be;
Else it is always short, as you will see.*

}

As for its being long when (e) silent concludes the Syllable, as in *Tide, abide, &c.* that is according to the general Rule of (e) silent after any other Vowel; the same will hold of (e) after (r) in *Fire, Desire, &c.* Examples of the foregoing Rule are *Delight, Fight, Mind, Rind, kind, high, nigh, sigh; climb, design, mild, Child, except build, guild.* Short, as *bid, did, will, still, win, quilt, Mint, fit, &c.*

*(I) before (r) the Sound of (u) does sute,
Except in ir for in, as in irresolute.*

Irreverent, irrevocable, ir retrievable, irreligious, &c.

*(I) before (er) and (on) still sounds as (ye),
And after (ft) the Sound the same will be.*

Examples are, *Bullion, Onion, Communion, Hollier, Collier, Pannier, &c. Celestial, Christian, Combustion, Question, &c.* and so it sounds in *Poiniard.* 'Tis obscure in *Gossip.*

To

[11] When (i) is short, it sounds most commonly like that of the (i) of the *French*, and other Nations, with the small Sound; but when 'tis long, it is pronounc'd like the *Greek* (ι).

[12] Short

*To sound like double (e), (i) does incline,
As in Machine, and Shire, and Magazine;
Like (a) in Sirrah; but writ (oi) in join.*

And also in *appoint, boil, broil, Joints, &c.*

*No English Word can end in naked (i),
It must add (e), or in their room place (y).*

The (e) is added to (i) in the Conclusion of Words, and (y) often put in their Room; yet (ie) is better after (f) and (s), as in *crucifie, dignifie, crasie, busie, Gipsie, &c.* Tho' Incurioufness, often in these Words, puts (y).

[12] *Of the Vowel (O.)*

*(O) does express three several Sorts of Sound,
As (o) in go, the Mouth still opening round:
Of (au) in Folly, (u) in come and some,
And before (l) and single (m), except in Home.*

This Vowel expresses (o) round in *Rose*, (a) long in *Folly*, *fond*, (u) obscure in *come* and *some*, &c.

(O) in these Places sounds (u) because these Words were originally spelt with a (u) and not an (o).

*(O) still is short, unless when it is found
In one of all these Ways to lengthen Sound;
When (o) a Word or Syllable does close,
Unless when double Sounds of Consonants oppose.*

It closes in *go, ho, lo, fo, wo, no, who, do, undo, whose, &c.* or when it ends Syllables, as in *glo-rious, Sto-ry, &c.* Exceptions, as *Body, Codicile, notable, &c.* when the Sound of the following Syllable is doubled.

*When (o) before double (l) its Place does hold,
Or else before (ld) as Scold, bold, Gold,
Before (lt) as molten, Bolt; before
(Lft), as Bolster, and several more.*

Examples. When double (l) ends a Word, as *Toll, Poll, Roll, controll, &c.* but those were originally written with (ou), and yet retain the long Sound of the double Vowel. (ld) as *old, Scold,*

[12] Short (o) is pronounc'd like the German (a), or open or fat (o), only it is short; as in *fond, mollifie, &c.* long (o) is pronounc'd like the Greek (ω) and the French (au).

[13] The

Scold, hold, &c. before (lt) and (lst) as Bolt, Holt, Colt, Upholsterer, &c.

*Before (rd), (rge), as Cord and Forge,
Ford, Sword, and gord, and likewise George and gorge.*

*Before (rm), (rn), (rt), as Storm,
Forlorn, exhort, and others may inform.*

But softer and more obscure in *Fort, Comfort, Effort*, which has two Ways of Pronunciation, the last Syllable being long, and the first short some times, and at other times the contrary, tho' the first Way is the most just and true Quantity, *Purport, Transport, &c.*

*Before (st) and (ught); as Post,
(But with a sharper Tone in Frost, lost, Cost,)
Nought, bought, Thought, and after it when we view }
The Syllable close up with double (u),
As we do in blow, show, and know, find true.*

If it be long by the Syllables ending with (w), it will be no less by adding (e) silent, whose Quality is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel, and which ought to be added in *Bowe, blawe, Crowe, glowe, &c.* to distinguish them from Words which have the Sound of the proper double Vowel (ow); as *How, now, Cow, &c.*

*In Words of many Syllables (O) 'll be
Obscure in Sound, when plac'd before a (P).*

As for Example, in *Bishop, Bishoprick*; but in Words of one Syllable it sounds open, as in *stop, hop, slop, &c.* It is likewise very obscure before (n) at the End of a Word, as in *Hatton, Hutton, Button, Parson, Capon, Falcon, &c.* But these are rather silent (o)'s than obscure (u)'s, the second Syllable being so much suppress'd, that it seems no more than the second in *Heaven, even, &c.* which Use has now made but one.

*When single (l) or (m) or (r) pursue
(O), when it's plac'd 'twixt (r) and double (u),
When follow'd by (va) and silent (e) we prove,
(O) then sounds (u) except in rove, Grove, strove.*

This is plain from these Examples: *Colour, Columbine, Colony, &c. Comfort, come, Kingdom, Besom, Fathom, random, &c.* but commonly, &c. is excepted. *World, Work, Worship, &c.* before (th), as *Brother, Mother, smother, &c.* except *Broth, Cloth, Froth, Troth, Wroth*; but most of these have been, and are still frequently written with (oa). (O) after (r), in *Apron, Citron,*

Citron, environ, Iron, Saffron, is obscure like (u), and in *Rome* (the City) 'tis pronounc'd like (oo) in *Room*.

*The Sound of (o) in th' End you still must know
Is ne'er express'd thus nakedly by (o),
Except in do, unto, go, lo, so, and no.*

(O) never ends an *English Word*, except before excepted, and *undo, whofo*, (an antiquated Word) *to, too, two, who, wo, mo*, (for *more*) is a Word quite out of Use; the Sound of (o) being there express'd by (ow) except in *Foe, Toe, Doe, Roe*.

[13] *Of the Vowel (U).*

*Two Sounds in (u) we certainly shall find,
Rub's of the shorter, Muse the longer Kind.*

The long Sound is what it bears in the single *Vowel*, the short is more obscure and lingual. The short Sounds are *Dub, rub, rut, Gun, Drum, burst, must, Rust*.

*Long, when in Words of many Syllables
It ends a Syllable, as in Durables.*

This Vowel, when it ends a Syllable in Words of many Syllables, is long; as in *Curious, Union, Importunity, Furious, Purity, Security, &c.* But this long Quality of (u) in this Place seems to come from (e) final, understood, tho' left out to avoid the clashing of two Vowels, for it might be *Durable, Impunity, &c.* tho' a following Vowel of any kind will, after a single Consonant, naturally lengthen the foregoing; except when the Sound of the following Consonant is doubled, as in *Bury, buried, Study, &c.* where the (u) is shorten'd and falls into the Sound of (o) short or obscure.

*No English Word in (u) can fairly end,
Its Sound express'd by (ew) or (ue) we find.
Except you, thou and lieu, and this one Word adieu,
Few Words begin with, or i' th' Middle have (eu).*

Instead of (u) in the End, we put (ew), or (ue) as *Nepherew, New, Sinew, Yew, &c.* and *accrue, Ague, Avenue, &c.* Nor is the Sound of (u) in the Beginning and Middle of Words, in many Words, except such as are deriv'd from the *Greek*; as *Eucharist, Eunuch, Euphrates, Eulogy, Eutychus, Euphony, Deuce, Deutero-*

[13] The (u) long is pronounc'd like the *French (u)* small or slender.

[14] We

Deuteronomy, Europe, Euroclydon, Eusebius, Eustace, Euterpe, Eutyches, Feud, Grandeur, Pleurisy, Pleuritick, Rheumatick, Rheumatism, Rheum.

*Where-e'er the (u) is long besides, 'tis found
That its own Character denotes its Sound.*

Ar, ir, or, with ure and er,

*T' express the Sound of (u) we oft prefer,
When at the End of Words, that do consist
Of many Syllables, they are plac'd.*

The Sound of (u) in all other Places, but what are mention'd where it is long, is express'd by the Vowel itself; but when it is obscure and short in the End of Words of many Syllables (and some of one) it is sometimes express'd by (ar), by the Corruptness of our Pronunciation; as in *Altar, Angular, Calendar, Focular, Medlar, Pedlar, Pillar, Solar, &c.* or by (ir), as *Birch, Dirt, Shirt, Sir, Sirname, to spirt or squirt Water, stir, Third, Thirty*, the Words deriv'd from it, &c. or by (or), as in *Ancestors, Actors, Administrator, Ambassador, Anchor, Assessor, Corrector, Counsellor, Oppressor, &c.* or by (ure), as in *Adventure, Architecture, Conjecture, conjure, Creature, Feature, Figure, Fracture, Furniture, Gesture, Imposture, Inclosure, Indenture, injure, Jointure, Juncture, Lecture, Leisure, Manufacture, Mixture, Nature, Nurture, Overture, Pasture, peradventure, Picture, Pleasure, Posture, Pressure, Rapture, Rupture, Scripture, Sculpture, Stature, Structure, Superstructure, Tenure, Tincture, Torture, Treasure, venture, Vesture, Verdure.*

These we have insert'd because the (u) is short and obscure, tho' it have (e) final at the End, and serves therefore for an Exception to that Rule, as well as an Example of this.

Or by (er), as *Adder, Adulterer, Auger a Tool, Ballisters, Banner, Fodder, Crofter, Crupper, Daughter, Slaughter, &c.* [14]

CHAP. III.

[14] We shall here, at the End of the *Vowels*, say a few Words of their Formation, which, well study'd, will (as we have observ'd) be a great Help to the Art of Spelling. To proceed therefore according to the Division made in our Notes on Number [6]. The *Gutturals*, or *Throat-Letters*, or *Vowels*, are form'd in the top or upper Part of the Throat, or the lower Part of the *Palate* or *Tongue*, by a moderate Compression of the Breath. When the Breath goes out with a full Gust, or larger opening of the Mouth, the *German* (a) or the open (o) is form'd. But the *French*, and other Nations, as well as the *Germans*,

Germans most commonly pronounce their (a) in that manner : The *English* expresses that Sound, when it is short, by short (o) ; but when it is long, by (ou) or (aw) ; but seldom by (a). For in the Words *fall, Folly, Call, Collar, Laws, Loss, Cause, Cost,* and *odd, saw'd, sod,* and in many other Words like these, there is the same Sound of the *Vowels* in both Syllables, only in the first it is long, and in the last short. And this perhaps might bring our former Division of Sounds into doubt, since that supposes the Difference to arise from their Length or Brevity ; whereas here we make the Sounds the same. But this must be here understood of the Formation of the Sounds ; that is, the short and the long Sounds are produc'd in the same Seats or Places of Formation ; but in the former Rule, the Hearing only is the judge of the Sounds, as they are emitted, not as to the Place of their Formation.

In the same Place, but with a more moderate opening of the Mouth, is form'd the *French* (e) *Feminine*, with an obscure Sound : Nor is there any Difference in the Formation of this Letter, from the Formation of the foregoing open (a), but that the Mouth or Lips are more contracted in this, than in the former. This is a Sound, that the *English* scarce any where allow, or know, except when the short (e) immediately precedes the Letter (r), as *liberal, Vertue, Liberty, &c.*

The same Place is the Seat of the Formation of (o) and (u) obscure, but still with a less opening of the Mouth, and it differs from the *French* (e) *Feminine* only in this, that the Mouth being less open'd, the Lips come nearer together. This same Sound the *French* have in the last Syllables of the Words *serviteur, sacrificateur, &c.* The *English* expresses this Sound by short (u) as in *turn, burn, dull, cut, &c.* and sometimes by a Negligence of Pronunciation, they express the same Sound by (o) and (ou, as in *come, some, done, Company, Country, couple, covet, love, &c.* and some others, which they ought more justly to give another Sound to. The *Welsh* generally expresses this Sound by (y) only that Letter at the End of Words with them sounds (i).

The *Palatine Vowels* are form'd in the *Palate*, that is, by a moderate Compression of the Breath, betwixt the Middle of the *Palate* and the *Tongue* ; that is, when the Hollow of the *Palate* is made less by the raising of the Middle of the *Tongue*, than in the Pronunciation of the *Throat*, or *Guttural Sounds*. These Sounds are of three Sorts, according to the lessening or enlarging of the said Hollow ; which Difference may be produc'd two several Ways, either by contracting the Mouth or Lips,

the Tongue remaining in the same Position ; or by elevating the Middle of the Tongue higher to the Fore-parts of the Palate, the Lips or Mouth remaining in the same State. This is done either way, and it is the same Thing if it were done both ways.

The *English* slender (a) is form'd by a greater Opening of the Mouth ; as in *Bat, bate, Sam, same, dam, Dame, Bar, bare, ban, bane, &c.* This Sound differs from the fat or open (a) of the *Germans*, by raising the Middle of the Tongue, as the *English* do, and so compressing the Breath in the Palate ; but the *Germans* on the contrary, depress their Tongue, and so depress the Breath into the Throat. The *French* express this Sound when (e) goes before (m) or (n) in the same Syllable, as *Entendement, &c.* The *Welsh* and the *Italians* pronounce their (a) with this Sound.

In this same Seat the *French* form their (e) Masculine, by a less, or the middle Opening of the Mouth, with an acute Sound, as the *Italians, English, Spaniards*, and others, pronounce this Letter ; for it is a middle Sound betwixt the foregoing Vowel and that which follows : But the *English* express this Sound not only by (e), but when it is long, by (ea), and sometimes by (ei) ; as *the, these, sell, Seal, tell, Teal, steal, set, Seat, best, Beast, red, read, receive, deceive, &c.* But those Words which are written with (ea) would really be more rightly pronounc'd, if to the Sound of (e) long, the Sound of the *English* (a) justly pronounc'd, were added ; as in all Probability they were of old pronounc'd, and as they are still in the Northern Parts. And thus those written with (ei) would be more justly spoken, if the Sound of each Letter were mix'd in the Pronunciation.

In the same Place, but yet with a lesser opening of the Mouth, (i) slender is form'd, which is a Sound very familiar with the *French, Italian, Spaniards*, and most other Nations. This Sound when it is short, is express'd by the *English* by (i) short ; but when it is long, it is generally written with (ee) not seldom with (ie), and sometimes by (ea), as *fit, see't, fit, feet, fill, feel, field, still, steel, ill, eel, fin, seen, near, dear, bear, &c.* Some of those Words which with this Sound are written with (ea) are often and more justly express'd by (ee), and others spelt with (e) Masculine, adding to it the Sound of (a) slender, very swiftly pronounc'd. The *Welsh* express this Sound not only by (i), and in the last Syllable by (y), but also by (u), which Letter they always pronounce in that Manner, and sound the Diphthongs or double Vowels *au, eu*, like *ai* and *ei*.

The Labial, or Lip Vowels, are form'd in the Lips, being put into a round Form, the Breath being there moderately compress'd. There are three Sorts of Classes of these, as well as of the former.

The round (*o*) is form'd by the larger Aperture or Opening of the Lips, which Sound most People give the *Greek* *ω*; the *French* with the same pronounce their (*au*), and the *English* almost always pronounce their long (*o*) and also (*oo*), the (*a*) as it were quite vanishing in the Utterance; of which the same may be said as was before on (*ea*), as *one*, *none*, *whole*, *Hole*, *Coal*, *Boat*, *those*, *chose*, &c. The short (*o*) is express'd by the open one, as I have said before, but more rarely by the rough one.

The *German* fat (*a*) is form'd in the Lips, by a more moderate or middle Degree of opening 'em. The same Sound is used by the *Italians*, *Spaniards*, and not a few others. The *French* expresses this Sound by *ou*, the *Welsh* by *uw*; the *English* generally by (*oo*), more rarely by *u* or *ou*, as *Foot*, *shoot*, *full*, *Fool*, *Pool*, *good*, *stood*, *Wood*, *Mood*, *Source*, *could*, *would*, *should*, &c. But *do*, *move*, and the like, are better express'd by round (*o*) than fat (*u*).

Silent (*u*), so much in use with both *French* and *English*, is form'd in the same Place, but with a lesser opening of the Lips. This Sound is every where express'd by the *English* with their long (*u*), sometimes by (*e*) and (*ew*), which yet are better pronounc'd by retaining the Sound of the (*e*) Masculine, as *Muse*, *Tune*, *Lute*, *dure*, *mute*, *new*, *brew*, *knew*, &c. Foreigners would obtain the Pronunciation of this Letter, if they would endeavour to pronounce the Diphthong (*iu*) by putting the slender (*i*) before the Letter (*u*) or (*w*), as the *Spaniard* in *Ciudad*, a City; but this is not absolutely the same Sound, tho' it comes very near it; for (*iu*) is a compound Sound, but the *French* and *English* (*u*) is a simple. The *Welsh* generally expresses this Sound by *iw*, *yw*, *uw*, as in *lliu*, Colour; *llyw*, a Rudder; *Duw*, God.

We allow these Nine Sounds to be Vowels, that is, distinct, unmixt Sounds; nor do we know any more; for the *English* broad (*i*) does not seem to be a simple Sound, yet we do not deny, but that there may now be in some Part of the World, or Posterity may discover more Vocal Sounds in those Seats of Voice, than those Nine which we have mention'd, and so 'tis possible there may be some intermediate Sounds, such as perhaps is the *French* (*e*) Neuter, betwixt the Palatine Vowel (*a*) slender and (*e*) Masculine; for the Aperture or Opening of the

Mouth

Mouth is like the continu'd Quantity, divisible *in infinitum* : For as in the numbering the Winds, first there were four Names, then twelve, and at last thirty-two ; thus whereas the *Arabians*, and perhaps the ancient *Hebrews*, had only three Vowels, or one in each Seat, now in our Times we plainly discover at least three in every Seat ; perhaps our Posterity may interpose some betwixt each of these.

But all these Vowels are capable of being made long or short, whence arises the Difference of Quantity in long and short Syllables, tho' some of 'em are very rarely long, as obscure (*u*) and (*e*) Feminine : Others are more rarely short, as round (*o*) and slender (*u*), at least in our Tongue. But some of the Consonants are capable of Contraction and being lengthen'd, (especially such as make the nearest Approaches to the Nature of Vowels) except *p*, *t*, *k*, or hard *c*, which are absolute Mutes, nor have any manner of proper Sound, but only modify the Sound either of the preceding or succeeding Vowel.

Here we think it proper to bring all these Vowels into one View, rang'd in their proper Classes.

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> Guttural or Throat <hr/> Palatine or Palate <hr/> Labial or Lip </div>	}	Vowels.	Greater.	Middle.	Less.
			<i>a</i> <i>o</i> open	<i>e</i> Feminine	<i>o</i> obscure
			<i>a</i> slender	<i>e</i> Masculine	<i>ee</i> <i>i</i> slender
			<i>o</i> round	<i>oo</i> <i>u</i> fat	<i>u</i> slender

C H A P. III.

Of DOUBLE VOWELS, *proper and improper.* [15]

*When of two Vowels the compounded Sound
Fully in one Syllable is found
Of both partaking, yet distinct from all,
This we a Double Vowel still do call.*

WHAT we call *Double Vowels*, is, when the Sound of two *Vowels* is mix'd perfectly in one Syllable, and, indeed, makes a distinct Sound from either and all the other *Vowels*, and would merit peculiar Characters, if we were to form an Alphabet, and not follow that, which is already in Use; by which we express these distinct Sounds by the two *Vowels*, whose Sound composes them; (*ai*) in *fair*, (*au*) in *laud* or *applaud*, (*ee*) in *bleed*, *Seed*, &c. (*oi*) in *void*, (*oo*) in *Food*, and (*ou*) in *House*.

*But if the Sound of one is heard alone,
'Tis then improperly so call'd, we own,
Tho' of the Proper it before be one.*

When two Vowels come together in one Syllable, and produce no other Sound, but what one of the two gives alone, then is that not properly, but improperly call'd a *Double Vowel*; as (*ea*) is every where pronounc'd (*e*) long, the Sound of the (*a*) not mingling at all with it, is entirely suppress'd; as in *Meat*, *Pleasure*, *Treasure*, &c. (*ie*) is sounded like (*ee*) in *seen*, as in *fiend*: and (*ei*) sounds only (*e*) long, as in *receive*, and (*ey*) in *Key*, or like (*ai*), and so make no proper *Double Vowel*. (*Eau*), (*eu*), (*ew*, sound only (*u*) long, as in *Beauty*, *Eunuch*, *few*.

Hence it follows, that a true and proper *Double Vowel* must consist of two distinct Vowels in one Syllable, yet making but one Sound compounded of those two Letters, and different from the other single *Vowels*; they must be in one Syllable, because two *Vowels* often come together, but make two distinct Syllables, as in *aerial*, *annual*, *anguish*, *aloes*, &c.

Of

[15] These double Vowels are commonly call'd *Diphthongs*, or *compounded Sounds*, as sharing in (or blending) the Sound of Two Vowels in One.

[16] (*ee*)

Of the proper Double Vowel (ai) or (ay).

Six proper Double Vowels we allow,
Ai, au, and ee, and oi, and oo, and ou,
At th' end of Words write ay, oy, and ow.

The proper Double Vowels are therefore only these mention'd in the Rule. First (ai), or (ay); for (ai) ends no English Word, according to the former general Rule, that (i) ends no Word in our Tongue, and (ay) begins none, except a Word of one Syllable; as ay, in *Ay me!* an Exclamation. This Double Vowel is therefore written (ai) in the Beginning and Middle of Words, but (ay) at the End.

In the Beginning, as *Air, Aim, Ail, Aid*, but *Eight* in Number, and those Words that are derived from it, have the Sound of (ai), but are spelt (ei): In the Middle of Words, as *Brain, frail, Affair, repair*, but some few are spelt here likewise by (ei) for (ai), as *Concept, Receipt, Deceit, Heir, Reign, Vein, Weight*, &c. (ay) is put at the End, as *Drey, Clay, Fray, Play, Day*, and of all other Words that sound (ai), except *convey, Grey, (Colour and Badger) Greyhound; obey, prey, purvey, survey, they, trey, or treypoint, Whey*.

Tho' sometimes the Letters of this Double Vowel (ai) deviate from their proper Sound, into that of (i), or (e) short, yet is the Spelling preserv'd in (ai), as *again, Villain, Fountain, Waincot*, &c.

The finical Pronunciation in some Part of this Town of London has almost confounded the Sound of (ai) and (a); the Master and Scholar must therefore take a peculiar care to avoid this Error, by remembring that (a) ends no English Word, unless before excepted; and however you pronounce, write always *Day*, not *da*; and so of the rest.

When (a) and (i) come together in proper Names, especially those of Scripture, as *Ja-ir, Mo-sa-ic, Re-pha-im*, &c. they are parted, and make two Syllables.

Of the Double Vowel (au) or (aw).

The Double Vowel (au) is express'd at the Beginning and Middle of Words by (au), at the End by (aw), except in *aw, awful, awl, awkward* or *awkward*, &c. where (aw) begins the Words; and *Bawble, bawl, brawl, crawl, dawn, dawning, a Flawn*, a Sort of Custard; *Hawk*, and Words or Names deriv'd from it; *Hawser, Lawn, Prawn, Spawl, Spawn, sprawl, Straw*.

Strawberry, tawney, tho' in the Middle, are writ with (*aw*), all other Words are in the Middle as well as Beginning (*au*), except such as by the Apposition of (*ll*) to (*a*) sound (*au*); as *Ball, Call, Hall, &c.* Tho' the Sound of this *Double Vowel* be the same with (*a*) in *all, small, &c.* yet 'tis different from the common and more general Sound of that Letter.

Au begins a Word, as *Audience, Authority, austere, augment, &c.* *Au* is used in the Middle of Words, as *assault, because, Cauldron, Cause, Causy, daunt, debauch, fraud, gaudy, jaunt, vaunt, Jaundice, Laurel, Maud, Maudlin, pause, Sauce, Vault, &c.*

But *aw* must always conclude a Word, because our Language abhors a bare naked *u* at the End of a Word; as *Claw, Parw, raw, saw, Law, &c.*

These Two Letters are often parted in proper Names, and make two Syllables; as in *Archela-us, Hermola-us, &c.* yet in *Paul, Saul, &c.* it remains a *Double Vowel*.

Of the Double Vowel (*ee*). [16]

The (ee) that was excluded heretofore

From proper Double Vowels, we restore.

Tho' (*ee*) has been excluded by an ingenious Gentleman, from the Number of proper *Double Vowels*, because (*ee*) sounds like (*i*) in *Magazine, Shire, and Machine*; yet the same Reason holding against (*au*) much stronger, because it sounds the same as (*a*) in *all, call, fall, &c.* we have thought it but just to restore (*ee*) to its Right, since it is a very distinct Sound from both the long and short Sound of (*e*), which are native: That in *Shire, &c.* is borrow'd from this *Double Vowel*, as that of *all, call, shall, &c.* is from (*au*); these in (*a*) being much more numerous than those in (*i*),

The single (*e*) in Words of one Syllable mostly sounds (*ee*), as *me, he, she, we, ye, be, here, &c.*

Of the Double Vowel (*oi*) or (*oy*).

The proper *Double Vowel* (*oi*) at the beginning, is written by (*oi*), as *Oyster, Oil, &c.* It is in the same Manner express'd in the

[16] (*ee*) or *ie*, is founded like the *French* long *i*, that is, slender *i*) for the *French* give the same Sound to *fin, vin*, as we should do to *seen, veen*; or perhaps *fin, wien*, as we do in *Fiend*.

the Middle ; as *Poise, Noise, Voice, rejoice, &c.* This *Double Vowel* in many Words has the Sound of (*i*) long ; as in *Point, anoint, Joint, &c.* (*Oy*) is written at the End of all Words ; as *Boy, coy, Joy, destroy, employ, &c.*

Of the proper Double Vowel (oo).

Two Vowels of a sort no Word begin ;

So (oo) in th' Middle only is let in.

[17] As no *English Word* begins with two of the same Letters, except *Aaron, Aaronite*, so cannot (*oo*) be put at the Beginning of a Word, nor at the End, but of *too* in *too much*, and when it signifies *also* ; and in *Cuckoo*, as spelt by some. The Use therefore of (*oo*) is chiefly, if not only, in the Middle of Words ; as in *Loom, aloof, boon, Reproof, Broom, Room, Food, Fool, Tool, cool, Goose*, and where the true and proper Sound of this Vowel is express'd, as it is in many other Words. This *Double Vowel* sounds (*u*) in these Words ; they were anciently written with a (*u*) or (*ou*), in which the (*u*) only was founded.

But it sounds like short (*u*) in *Flood* and *Blood*, and like (*o*) long in *Door, Floor, Moor, &c.*

As other Letters the Office do of (oo),

So that of others by (oo's) performed too.

And as the Figures of this *Double Vowel* often express the Sounds of other Letters, so by the same original Error of Pronunciation other Letters express the Sound proper to this *Double Vowel* ; as (*ou*) in *could, should, would, &c.* and single (*o*) in *Wolf, Wolves, Rome, Tomb, Womb, approve, behave, move, reprove, &c.*

Of the proper Double Vowel (ou) or (ow.)

When (ou) retains its just compounded Sound,

A proper Double Vowel it is found ;

But when the Sound of either is suppress'd,

It sinks t' improper, as do all the rest.

This proper *Double Vowel (ou) or (ow)* has Two Sounds, one proper to it as a *Double Vowel*, or as compos'd of both (*o*) and (*u*) ; as in *House, Mouse, Louse, Owl, Fowl, Town* ; to
boar,

[17] *oo* is founded like the fat *u* of the *Germans*, and the *ou* of the *French* ; as in the Words *good, stood, Root, Foot, loose, &c.*

bow, *Fowl*, *Bough*, *our*, *out*, &c. and another, which is improper to its Nature, the Sound of the (*u*) being entirely sunk, as in *Soul*, *Snow*, *know*, &c. Thus in Words ending in (*ow*), obscure (*o*) only is founded; as in *shallow*, *Sorrow*, *Arrow*, *Billow*; where the (*u*) seems only put for Ornament-sake, merely to cover the Nakedness of single (*o*). This holds in most Words of more than one Syllable. (*Ou*) is also founded like (*u*) short in *couple*, *Trouble*, *scourge*, &c. in which the Sound of the (*o*) is entirely sunk, and leaves it no longer a proper *Double Vowel*. Thus in *you*, *your*, and *Youth* the (*u*) is founded long.

In *could*, *would*, *should*, and a few others, it sounds (*oo*). But in the modern Way of spelling and founding, the (*l*) is left out, and *cou'd*, *wou'd*, *shou'd*, sound *cood*, *wood*, *shood*, &c.

(*Ou*) the Beginning, and the Middle takes;
And still the End of Words for (*ow*) forsakes.

(*Ou*) begins a Word, as *Ounce*, *'our*, *out*, and its Compounds, *Ousel*, except *Owl*: And in the Middle of most Words; as *Hour*, *Flour*, *Mountain*, *Fountain*, *bounce*, *flounce*, &c. except, *Crown*, *Clown*, *Down*, *drown*, *frown*, *Gown*, *Town*, *Bower*, *Dowager*, *Dower*, *Dowry*, *bowse*, *dowse*, *sowse*, *Fowl*, *Howlet*, *Powel*, *Towel*, *Trovel*, *Vowel*, *blowse*, *drowsy*, *Carrowse*, *Cowardice*, *Endowment*, *lowre*, *Power*, *Tower*, *Howard*, *Allowance*, *Advowson*, *Bowl*, *Rowel*, *rowing*, *Shower*, &c.

This Sound is always at the End of a Word express'd by (*ow*, as *now*, *bow*, *enow*, &c. In short, this is a general Rule, That whenever a proper *Double Vowel* loses its native Sound, and varies to any other simple Sound, it ceases to be a proper, and becomes an improper *Double Vowel*, as having only the simple and uncompounded Sound of some one single Vowel. There is but one Exception to this Rule, and that is, when it wanders to the Sound of another *Double Vowel*, which is only done by (*ou*), when it sounds (*oo*) in *could*, *would*, *should*, &c. [18]

Of

[18] All other Sounds, besides those enumerated in the foregoing Discourse of simple Sounds, are plainly compounded, tho' some of them are commonly thought to be simple.

The Diphthongs, or *Double Vowels*, *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, *au*, *eu*, *ou*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, *aw*, *ew*, *ow*, when they are truly pronounc'd, are com-

compounded of the foregoing or prepositive Vowels, and the Consonants *y* and *w*, which yet are commonly taken for subsequent Vowels: For in *ai*, *au*, or *ay*, *aw*, the (*a*) slender is set first; in *ei*, or *ey*, the (*e*) Feminine; in *eu*, or *ew*, the (*e*) Masculine; in *oi*, *ou*, or *oy*, *ow*, the open (*o*) is sometimes set first, as in the *English* Words *Boy*, *Toy*, *Soul*, *Bowl*, a Cup; sometimes obscure (*o*), as in the *English* Words *boil*, *toil*, *Oil*, *Bowl*, *Fowl*, &c. We grant by the Pronunciation of some Men open (*o*) is us'd in these Words.

* But whereas some will needs have it, that the Consonants (*y*) and (*w*) do not at all differ from (*i*) and (*u*), or (as we write them) (*ee*) and (*oo*), very swiftly pronounc'd; it may easily be found to be a manifest Error, if we nicely attend the Formation of the Words *yee* and *woo*, especially if we often repeat them; for he will observe, that he cannot pass from the Sound of the Consonant, to the Sound of the following Vowel, without a manifest Motion of the Organs, and by that Means of new Position, which does not happen in the repeating of the Sounds (*ee*) and (*oo*).

We are sensible, that these which we call Diphthongs, or *Double Vowels*, in different Tongues, have different Sounds, of which we have no Business now to treat; yet these may all be found and discover'd among those Sounds, which we have discours'd of; and may be so referr'd to their proper Places. The long (*i*) of the *English* is plainly compounded of the Feminine, (*e*), and (*y*), or (*i*), and has the same Sound entirely with the *Greek* (*ει*).

The *Latin* *æ*, *œ*, the *English* *ea*, *oa*, *ee*, *oo*, and sometimes *ei*, *ie*, *ou*, *au*, (the like being to be found among other Nations) altho' they are written with Two Characters, are yet (at least as we pronounce them now) but simple Sounds.

* This is Dr. Wallis's Observation, which we do not think conclusive for what he brings it, because in the Instance he gives, the (*y*) and the (*w*) are plac'd before the Vowels, and then they are Consonants confess'd; but when they come after Vowels, they have the very same Effect on the Organs, as (*i*) and (*u*) have: For no body contends that they are never Consonants, or that when Consonants, they are form'd in the same Manner as when Vowels.

Of the improper Double Vowels. [19]

*Th' improper Double Vowels we declare
Nine, as (aa), (ea), (eo) and (eu) are
(ie), (oa), (oe) (ue), and (ui) :*

But all their several Sounds here let us try.

The Juncture of these several *Vowels* can never be properly called *Double Vowels*, since they every one produce but the Sound of one Letter ; (*tial*) is always sounded (*shal*), as in *impartial*, *credential*, &c. where the (*ti*) is turn'd into (*sh*), or the Two Vowels are divided after (*fl*) or any other Consonant but (*r*) and (*c*), and so make Two Syllables, as *bestial*. Thus (*io*) following (*t*) and before (*n*), sounds (*shan*), as *Constitution*, *Discretion*, &c. (*io*) retains the same Sound, when it follows single or double (*s*), as in *Allusion*, *Asperision*, *Compulsion*, *Suffusion*, *Version*, &c. *Admission*, *Compassion*, *Expression*, &c. But when (*io*) follows (*fl*), they are parted into Two Syllables, as in *Question*, *Combustion* ; and the same is to be observ'd after any other Consonant. (*Ua*) are always separated, except after (*g*) in *gua*, and (*q*) in *qua* ; as *Language*, *Lingual*, &c. *Qualify*, *Quality*, &c. except likewise when it follows (*j*), and then it sounds (*sua*), as in *persuade*, *dissuade*, and their Derivatives *persuasive*, *dissuasive*, &c. and *Suavity*, an obsolete Word.

Next (*uo*) must always be parted, except after (*q*), which can't be sounded without (*u*), as in *quick*, *Quality*, *Qualm*, *quote*, &c.

The improper *Double Vowels* are counted Nine in Number, as (*aa*), (*ea*), (*eo*), (*eu*), (*ie*), (*oa*), (*oe*), (*ue*), and (*ui*).

(*Aa*) sounds (*a*), but it is seldom found ;

(*Ea*) four several Ways declares its Sound ;

(*E*) long, (*a*) short, (*e*) short, and double (*ee*),

As in swear, Heart, Head, and in Fear you see.

(*Aa*)

[19] They are justly call'd improper, because they are most uncompounded in Sound, tho' written with Two Vowels. 'Tis probable when this Spelling prevail'd, each Letter had a Share in the Sound, but Negligence and Corruption of Pronunciation has wholly silenc'd one. This is remarkable, that in most of them the first Vowel prevails, and gives the Sound.

[20] As

(Aa) is seldom in a Word but proper Names, and there only sounds (a), and is generally divided.

(Ea) is sounded four several Ways, 1st, Like (a) long, as *bear, swear, tear, wear*; 2^{dly}, Like (a) short, as *hearken, Heart*, and Words derived from it, as *heartly, heartless*, &c. also its Compounds; as *Heart-burning, Heart-ease, faint-hearted*, &c. 3^{dly}, (e) short, as *already, ready, Bread, Breast, Head*, &c. 4^{thly}, It sometimes sounds (ee), or (e) long; as in *appear, Arrear, Fear, near*, &c. *Bead, conceal, Veal, glean, clean*, &c. And generally the long Sound of (e) is writ (ea), as *Feast, Beast*, &c. and the short Sound of (e) as *best, Guest*, &c.

(Eo) (e) short, and double (e), we find,
As well as (eu), to sound long (u)'s inclin'd.

(Eo) sounds (e) short in *Feoffee, Jeopardy, Leopard, Yeoman*, (e) long in *People, Feodary*, and (o) short in *George*.

(Eu), or (ew), sound (u) long; as *Duce, Deuteronomy, Pleurisie*, &c.

(Ie) sounds (y) in ending Words; and (e) short and long, or double (e) 'twill be.

(Ie) is sounded (e) long in *Cieling, Cashier, Field, Fiend, Frontier*, &c. but (e) short in *pierce, fierce*, &c. It is used likewise for (y) at the End of Words.

(Ei) sounds (ai) a long in feign and eight,
It sounds (e) long in perceive, Deceit.

(Ei) sounds like (ai), or (a) long, in *Reign, feign, Eight, weighty*, &c. It sounds (e) long in *deceive, perceive, Deceit*.

This Rule is general, That the Letter which gives or predominates in the Sound, is always plac'd first in these improper double Vowels.

The (a) to (o) in (oa) we apply,
To make (o) long, and silent. (e) supply.

In (oa) the (a) seems added only to make the (o) sound long, supplying the (e) silent, it giving the same Sound; as *Cloak and Cloke, approach, broach, Coast, diat, float, Goat, hoary, Load, Moat, Oak, poach, roam, Soal, a Fish, Toad, Woad*: (oa) has a peculiar broad Sound in *broad, abroad, Groat*; and that of (ai) in *Gaol*.

The (o) and (e) alternately prevails;
In (oe) when this sounds, then that still fails.

In (oe) sometimes the (e) prevails and the (o) is silent; as in *OEconomy, OE dipus, OEcumenical; OEconomical*; but in *Croe*

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(of Iron) *Doe, Foe, Sloe, Toe, Woe*, the (*e*) is silent, and the (*o*) produc'd; these latter being Words of *English* Origin, as well as *Use*, the former of the *Greek*. *Shoe*, and *Woe*, to make love, some write with (*oo*), leaving (*o*) bare, contrary to the Genius of the *English* Language; whereas the Distinction would be preserv'd, and the Sound justly express'd, by adding (*e*) to the (*oo*).

(Ue) *one Syllable we seldom sound;*

(U) *after (g) to harden (g) is bound.*

Few Words have (*ue*) founded as one Syllable, as *Guelderland*, *Guerkins*, *guest*; for *guests* is wrong spelt, tho' too much used of late by the Ignorance or Negligence of Authors, or Printers; for its true Spelling is *ghes*: In all which the (*u*) is only added to harden the Sound of the (*g*), the (*e*) only being founded; though (*gue*) in *Guerdon* sounds (*gue*), as do the Termination, or Endings of several Words, as *Apologue*, *Catalogue*, *colleague*, *collogue*, *Decalogue*, *Dialogue*, *Epilogue*, *Fatigue*, *Intrigue*, *League*, *Plague*, *Prologue*, *prorogue*, *Rogue*, *Synagogue*, *Theologue*, *Tongue*, *Vogue*. At the End of the following Words (*e*) is added to (*u*), not only to cover its Nakedness, according to the Genius of the Tongue, but sometimes to produce the (*u*); as in *accrue*, *Avenue*, *cue*, *due*, *ensue*, *Fescue*, *Glue*, *Hue*, *perdue*, *pursue*, *Residue*, *Retinue*, *Rue*, *spue*, or *spew*, *sue*. But (*ue*) in all other Words are parted, nor make any manner of double Vowel, as in *Affluence*, *Cruelty*, *Gruel*, &c.

(Ui) *three several Sorts of Sound express,*

As Guile, rebuild, Bruise and Recruit confests.

The improper double Vowel (*ui*) has Three several Sorts of Sound, 1. as (*i*) long, in *beguile*, *Guide*, *Disguise*, *quite*, &c. 2. (*i*) short, in *Guildford*, *build*, *rebuild*, &c. 3. (*u*) long, as in *Bruise*, *Recruit*, *Fruit*, &c.

C H A P. IV.

Of the CONSONANTS.

[20]

*A Consonant no proper Sound obtains,
But from its sounding with, its Name it gains;
And yet it varies every Vowel's Sound,
Whether before, or after it, 'tis found.*

TH O' a Consonant be a Letter that cannot be founded without adding some single or double Vowel before or after it, and therefore derives its Name from *confounding*, or *sounding with*, yet may justly be defined, A Letter shewing the several Motions and Configurations of the Parts of the Mouth, by which the Sound of the Vowels is variously determin'd, are first divided into *single* and *double*; the double are *x* and *z*,
the

[20] As the Vowels were divided into three Classes, so we divide the Consonants into the same Number; the *Labial*, or *Lip*; the *Palatine*, or *Palate*; the *Guttural*, or *Throat* Consonants, as they are form'd in the *Throat*, *Palate*, or *Lips*; that is, while the Breath sent from the Lungs into these Seats, is either *intercepted*, or at least more forcibly *compress'd*.

But it is besides to be remark'd, that we may observe a *triple Direction of the Breath*. For first, it is all directed wholly to the Mouth; that is, seeking its Way or Outlet thro' the Lips: or second, it is almost wholly directed to the Nostrils, there to find a Passage out; or third, it is as it were equally divided betwixt the *Nostrils* and the *Mouth*: But we believe this Diversity of the Direction of the Breath wholly proceeds from the various Position of the *Uvula*.

Since therefore the Breath sent out in this threefold Manner may be perfectly *intercepted* thrice in each of these Seats, there are Nine different Consonants which derive their Origin from them, and which, for that Reason, we call *primitive*, or *clos'd* Consonants: But if the Breath be not wholly intercepted in these Seats, but only more hardly compress'd, find, tho' with Difficulty, some way of exit; various other Consonants are form'd, according to the various manner of the Compression; which Consonants we shall call *deriv'd*, or *open* Consonants. As to the particular Formation of them, see the Notes, at the End of the Chapter.

[21] The

the rest are all single ; and these are again divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids* ; Eleven *Mutes*, and Four proper *Liquids*: *b*, *s*, and *w*, are *Neuters*, as not strictly adhering to either.

*The Consonants we justly may divide
Into Mutes, Liquids, Neuters ; and beside
We must for double Consonants provide.
Eleven Mutes GRAMMARIANS do declare,
And but four Liquids, l, m, n, and r.
Behind the Mutes the Liquids gently flow
Inverted, from the Tongue they will not go.*

Consonants are divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids* call'd also *Half-Vowels* ; the *Mutes* are *b*, *c*, *d*, *f*, *v*, *g*, *j*, *k*, *p*, *q*, *t*, and are so call'd, because a *Liquid* cannot be founded in the same Syllable when a *Vowel* follows it, as (*rpo*).

The *Liquids*, or *Half-Vowels*, as they have some Sort of obscure Sound of a *Vowel* attending their Pronunciation, which is likewise imitated in their Names, as *cl*, *em*, *en*, *ar*, so the Name of *Liquid* imports the easy Motion, by which they nimbly glide away after a *Mute* in the same Syllable, without any stand, and a *Mute* before it can be pronounc'd in the same Syllable, as *pro* in *probable*.

(C) the hard Sound of (k) will ever keep
Before, (a), (o), (u), (l), and (r), as *creep*,
Clear, Cup, Cost, Cat: Before (e), (i), and (y),
Or ev'n the Comma that do's (e) imply,
It mostly takes the softer Sound of (s) ;
As City, Cell, and Cypress must confess,
When final (c) without an (e) is found,
'Tis hard ; but silent (e) gives softer Sound.

[21] The genuine and natural Sound of (c) is hard, like (k), as when it precedes (a), (o), (u), (l), or (r) ; as in *Cat*, *Cost*, *Cup*, *clear*, *creep*. But before (e), (i), and (y), and where there is an Apostrophe or Comma above the Word, denoting the Absence of (e), it has generally the Sound of (s), as *Cell*, *City*,

[21] The *French* expresses the soft (c) by this figure (ç) for Distinction, which Character would be of use if it were introduced among us ; tho' it must be confess'd, that there is so much the less need of a new Character, as the Rule is so general as to admit of no Exception. Some affect to imitate the *French* Way of Spelling here, and write *Publique* for *Publick*, not considering that they use (*qu*) because they have no (k).

[22] The

City, Cypress. If in any Word the harder Sound precedes (*e*), (*i*), or (*y*), (*k*) is either added or put in its Place, as *Skill, Skin, Publick*: And tho' the additional (*k*) in the foregoing Word be an old Way of Spelling, yet it is now very justly left off, as being a superfluous Letter: for (*c*) at the End is always hard, without (*y*) or the silent (*e*) to soften it, as in *Chace, Clemency, &c.*

Most Words ending in the Sound of *ace, ece, ice, oice, uce*, must be written with (*ce*), not (*se*), except *abase, abstruse, base, case, cease, amuse, concise, debase, decrease, Geese, imbaze, encrase, mortise, Paradise, profuse, promise, recluse, Treatise, abuse, disuse, excuse, House, Louse, Mouse, refuse, use, close, loose.*

Most Words ending in *ance, ince, once, and unce*, must be written with (*c*) between the (*n*) and (*e*), except *dense, condense, dispense, immense, incense, tense, intense, propense, suspense, Sense.*

(*C*) before (*b*), has a peculiar Sound, as in *Chance, Cherry, Church, Chalk, Chip*; but in *Chart* 'tis like (*k*), and in *Chord* in Musick.

*The genuine Sound of (s) is still acute
And hissing; but the Close that does not sute,
There 'tis obscure, and soft pronounc'd like zed,
And sometimes 'twixt two Vowels when 'tis sped.*

(*S*) being so near akin to the soft Sound of (*c*), we thought is naturally follow'd that Letter in our Consideration, tho' not in the Alphabet. When (*s*) therefore keeps its genuine Sound, it is pronounc'd with an acute or hissing Sound, but when it closes a Word, it almost always has a most obscure and soft Sound like (*z*), and not seldom when it comes between Two Vowels, or double Vowels, when it has this soft Sound, Propriety and Distinction require, that it be writ with the shorter Character of that Letter, as *his, advise, &c.* and with the larger in all other Places, as *hiss, devise*, if written with an (*s*) and not with a (*c*), as it too often is. There are but Four Words of one Syllable, which end with hard (*s*), *Yes, this, thus, us.*

*That (s) with (c) you may not still confound,
To learn, and mind the following Rules you're bound.
By Vowels follow'd, (si), (ti), and (ci), alike,
With the same Sound do still the Hearing strike.
In Words deriv'd they keep a certain Law,
Impos'd by those from whence their Sound they draw.*

If

*If those in (de), (s), or (se) do end,
To their Derivatives they (si) commend;
If with (ck) or (ce) their close they make,
Then the deriv'd (ci) will surely take:
But if with (t) or (te) they do conclude,
Then with (ti) Derivative's endu'd.*

[22] *Si, ti, and ci*, sound alike, as in *Persuasion, Musician, Section, Imitation, &c.* These Words are all deriv'd from others, and therefore when the Original Words end in *(de)*, *(s)*, or *(se)*, then *(si)* is used; as *persuade, Persuasion, confess, Confession, confuse, Confusion, &c.* If with *(ce)*, or *(ck)*, or hard *(c)*, then *(ci)* is used; as *Grace, Gracious, Musick, Musician, &c.* But if with *(t)*, or *(te)*, then *(ti)* is used, as *Seet, Section, imitate, Imitation, &c.* except *submit, Submission, permit, Permission.*

Tho' this Letter seems very regular in its Sound of *(se)* in the Beginning, and *(es)*, at the End of Words, yet it is too apt to be mistaken for *(c)*, especially in the Beginning: Yet by the following Rules and Exceptions, the Mistake may be observ'd to be remov'd.

Most Words beginning with the Sound of *(s)* before *(e)* and *(i)* must be written with *(s)*, except these with *(c)* before *(i)*.

Cease, Cedar, Celandine, Celery, celebrate, Celebration, Celerity, Celestial, Celibacy, Celibate, Cell, Cellar, Cellarage, cement, Cense, Censor, censorious, Censure, cent, Centaurs, Center, Centinody, Knot-grass an Herb; Centory, or Centaury, an Herb; Centry, Centurion, Century, cephalick, Cere-cloth, ceremonial, ceremonious, Ceremony, certain, certainly, Certificate, certify, cerulean, Cerufs, Cess, Cessation, Cession, Cetrach, Finger-fern; and these proper Names, Cecrops, Celsus, Cenchrea, Cephas, Cerberus, Cerinthus, Ceres, Cæsar.

And

[22] The Reason to those who know *Latin*, is much easier; for if they are deriv'd from a *Latin* Supine ending in *(tum)* then *(ti)* is used, as *Natum, Nation*, but if the Supine end in *(sum)*, then *(si)* is used; as *Visum, Vision, Confessum, Confession*. If the Word be deriv'd from a *Latin* Substantive of the first Declension ending in *(ca)* or *(tia)*, or of the second Declension ending in *(tium)* or *(cium)*, then *(ci)* is used as *Logica Logician, Gratia Gracious, Vitium Vicious, Beneficium Beneficent, &c.*

[23] This

And these of (c) before (i).

Cicatrice, *Cicely*, sweet and wild Herbs; *Cicling*, *Cichory*, *Cileire*, Drapery of Foliage wrought on the Heads of Pillars; *Cinders*, *Cinnabar*, *Cinquefoil*, *Cinnamon*, *Cinque-ports*, *Cyperus* a sweet Root; *Cion*, or *Scion*, *Cipher*, *Circle*, *Circlet*, *circular*, *Circuit*, *circulate*, *Circulation*, *circumcise*, and all compounds of *circum* ———; *Cistern*, *Citarion*, *Citizen*, *citrine*, or *citrean*, *Citron*, *Citrus*, a sort of Cucumber; *Citadel*, *City*, *Cives*, a sort of small Leeks; *Ci-vit*, *Civilian*, *Civility*, *civilize*; and these proper Names, *Cicero*, *Cicilia*, *Cilicia*, *Cimbrians*, *Cimmerians*, *Circe*, *Cirencester*, *Cisbury*, *Cissa*, *Cistertian*, Monks; *Citherides*.

And these likewise are excepted of (c) before (y).

Cybele, *Cyclades*, *Cycle*, *Cyclometri*, *Cyclops*, *Cygnets*, *Cylindrical*, *Cymbal*, *cynical*, *Cynic*, *Cynthia*, *Cyprian*, *Cypress*, *Cyrene*, *Cyril*.

The Sound of (s) in the Middle of Words is usually written with (f), except *Acerbity*, *Acetosity*, *adjacent*, *Ancestors*, *antecedent*, *Artificer*, *cancel*, *Cancer*, *Beneficence*, *Chancel*, *Chancellor*, *Chancellorship*, *Chancery*, *conceal*, *concede*, *conceit*, *Conceitedness*, *conceive*, *concent*, *Agreement* or *Harmony* in *Musick*; *concenter*, *concentric*, *concern*, *Chalcedony*, *Concernment*, *concert*, *Concertation*, an affected Word; *Concession*; *Decease*, *decade*, an effected Word; *Deceit*, *deceive*, *December*, *Decency*, *decennial*, *decent*, *Deception*, *deceptive*, *Decertation*, an affected Word for striving; *Deceffion*, as bad a Word for departing; *exceed*, *excell*, *Excellency*, *except* *Exception*, *Excess*, *Grocer*, *Grocery*, *immarcessible*, a pedantique Word for incorruptible; *imperceptible*, *Incendiary*, *Incense*, *incarcerate*, *incentive*, *incessant*, *incessantly*, *incestuous*, *Innocence*, *innocent*, *intercede*, *Intercessor*, *intercession*, *intercept*, *mercenary*, *macerate*, *Mercer*, *Mercery*, *Magnificence*, *magnificent*, *Munificence*, *munificent*, *necessary*, *Necessaries*, *necessitate*, *Necessity*, *necessitous*, *Necromancer*, *Larceny*, *Ocean*, *Parcel*, *Parcels*, *precede*, *precedential*, *Precedence*, *Precedent*, *preceptive*, *Precepts*, *Preddecessors*, *sincere*, *Sincerity*, *Saucer*, *Sorcerer*, *Sorceress*, *Sorcery*, *Macedon*, *Macedonia*. Before (i) in the Middle, as *Acid*, *Acidity*, *Accident*, *ancient*, *Anglicism*, *Gallicism*, &c. in *cism*; *anticipate*, *artificial*, *associate*, *audacious*, *Audacity*, *beneficial*, *calcine*, *calcinate*, *Council*, *capacious*, *capacitate*, *Capacity*, *concise*, *cruciate*, *crucible*, *crucify*, *Crucifix*, *decide*, *decimal*, *decimate*, *Decimation*, *decipher*, *Decisison*, *decisive*, *Deficiency*, *delicious*, *docible*, *Docibility*, *efficacious*, *efficient*, *specially*, *Exception*, *Exercise*,
Ex-

Excise, Excise-man, Excision, excite, excruciate, explicate, fecible for feasible, gracious, implicitly, implicit, incapacitate, incapacity, inauspicious, incident incidentally, incircle, Incision, Incisure, incite, invincible, judicial, judicious, Loquacity, medicinal, Multiplicity, municipal, Nuncio, officiate, officious, pacify, pacific, Parsimony, Parricide, participate, Pencil, perspicacious, Perspicacity, perwacious, pertinacious, Precinct, precious, Precipice, precipitate, Precipitation, precise, precisely, prejudicial, proficient, Pronunciation, provincial, rapacious, Ratiocination, reciprocal, recital, recite, reconcile, reconcileable, Rouncivals, sagacious, Sagacity, Sicily, Simplicity, sociable, Sociableness, Society, Socinians, Solecism, solícite, Solicitation, Solicitor, solicitous, Solicitude, solsticial, spacious, specious, Speciality, specifical, Species, specific, Specimen, special, Sufficiency, sufficient, supercilious, superficial, Superficies, suspicious, tacit, Taciturnity, Turcism, Veracity, Vivacity.

Most Words ending with the Sound of (*fi*) or (*se*), must be written with (*cy*), except *Apostasy, busy, Controversy, Courtesy, Daisy, Ecstasy, easy, Epilepsy, Fantasy*, spelt likewise tho' wrong, *Fancy, Frensy, or Frenzy, Gipsy, greasy, Heresy, Hypocrisy, Jealousy, Leprosy, Palsy, Pansy*, a Flower, *Pleurisy, Posy, Nofegay*, and Motto of a Ring, *Possy Poetry, pursy queasy, Causy, to Prophecy, Causey, clumsy, Kersey, Linsey-wolsey, Malmsey, Tolsy, Whimsy.*

In most Words (*f*) between Two Vowels has the Sound of (*z*), except those enumerated, in the Rule about *ace, ece, &c.* under (*c*).

Most Words ending in the Sound of *arce, erce, orce, urce*, must be written with (*f*) between the (*r*) and (), except *amerce, Divorce, Farce, fierce, Force, pierce, scarce, Scarcity, Source.*

After (*ou*), (*f*), soft, and not (*c*), must be written; as *House, to House; Mouse, to Mouse; Rouse, to Rouse*; unless (*n*) interposes, and then it must be with (*c*), as *Bounce, Flounce, Ounce, &c.*

All Words of one Syllable, that end with, and bear hard upon the Sound of (*f*), must be written with (*fs*), except *this, thus, us*, and *Yes*; but if they are Words of many Syllables, or more than one, and end with the like Sound in (*us*), the (*s*) is not double, but (*o*) inserted before; as *ambiguous, barbarus, &c.*

(T) before (i), t'another Vowel join'd,
To sound like th' Acute, and hissing (s), we find:
But when an (x) or (s), do's (i) precede,
For its own Sound it strenuously do's plead.

(T); when (t) comes before (i), follow'd by another Vowel, it sounds like the Acute, or hissing (s), as in *Nation*, *Potion*, *expatiate*, &c. but when it follows (f) or (x), it keeps its own Sound, as *Bestial*, *Question*, *Fustian*, &c.

(T) with an (h) after it, has two Sounds, as in *thin*, the Tongue touching lightly the Extremes of the upper Teeth; and *then*, where the Tongue reaches the Palate, and the Root of the Teeth, making some Mixture of (d).

(H), tho' deny'd a Letter heretofore,
We justly to the Alphabet restore.

(H), tho' excluded the Number of Letters by *Priscian*, and some of our Moderns on his Authority, yet in the *Hebrew* Alphabet has three Characters: and besides some obscure Sound of its own, it mightily enforces that of the Vowels, and is manifestly a Consonant; after (w) it is pronounc'd before it, as *when*, *white*, sounds *hwen*, *hwite*; (k) before (n) borrows its Sound, as *Knave*, *Knight*, *hnaue*, *hnight*. 'Tis indeed sometimes near silent, as in *Honour*, *Hour*, &c. but so are many other Consonants in particular Positions.

(X), and (Z) are double Consonants;
The first the Pow'r of (c), or (ks), vaunts,
The second that of (ds) does boast,
The force of (d) is now entirely lost,
Or rather to a strenuous hissing lost.

}

(X) and (Z) are double Consonants, containing Two Powers under one Character; the former (cs), or (ks), the latter (ds) tho' the Sound of the (d) be not now heard, and only a strong Sibilation or Hissing be discover'd. The former expressing (ks) or (cs), cannot begin a Word except some proper Names, *Xanthe*, *Xanthus*, *Xantippe*, *Xantippus*, *Xenarchus*, *Xeneades*, *Xenius*, *Xenocrates*, *Xenophanes*, *Xenophilus*, *Xenophon*, *Xerolibia*, *Xerxenina*, *Xerxes*, *Xystus*, *Xiphiline*, and some few Terms not varied from the *Greek* (this Rule meaning only Words purely Native, and not relating to Art) and ends only some, not all of that Sound; which is express'd Six several Ways: (1st,) At the End of short Syllables by (cks), as *Backs*, *Necks*, *Sticks*, *Rocks*, *Ducks*, *Bricks*, *Mocks*, &c. (2dly,) At the

the End of Syllables made long by a *double Vowel*, it is express'd by (*ks*) as *Books, Looks, breaks, speaks, &c.* (3dly,) by double (*cc*) in the middle of Words where (*e*) or (*i*) follows; as *Accelerate, Accent, accept, Acceptation, Access, accessible, Accession, accessory, or accessory, Accedence, Accident, accidental, inaccessible, occident, occidental, succeed, Success, Succession, succedaneous, successful, succinct, Succinctness.* (4thly,) By (*æ*), in Words ending in *Ætion, Ecton, Icton, Oction, Ucton, and Uncton*; as *Extraction, Perfection, Prediction, Concoction, Destruction, Compunction, only except Complexion, Reflexion, a bending back, but more properly Reflection, when it relates to Thought; Connexion, Crucifixion, Defluxion.* (5thly,) By (*æ*s) at the End of some Words, as *Abstracts, Acts, Collects, Contracts, Defects, Effects, Insects, Objects, Projects, Subjects*; he *affects, corrects, instructs*; for *affecteth, &c.* the (*th*) being intirely chang'd into (*s*), (6thly,) Lastly, the Sound of (*k*) must be written with (*x*), in the Beginning, Middle, and End of all other Words, except *Ecstasy*. After (*ex*) never write (*s*) and seldom (*c*), but in *except, exceed, Excess, Excise, excite, &c.* and (*c*), after (*ex*) comes before (*co*), (*cu*), (*cl*) and (*ch*), having a full Sound, as *excommunicate, excuse, exclaim, exchange.*

(K) before (*i*), (*e*) when hard is seen;
And before (*n*), as *know, kill, keen.*

(K) begins all Words of a hard Sound before (*e*), (*i*) and (*n*), as *keep, kill, know, knack, &c.* nor is it ever put before any Consonant but (*n*), and then with so much Constraint, that it almost loses its Sound for that of (*b*).

Before all other Consonants (*c*'s) plac't,
Altho' the harder Sound is there express't.

And if the Sound of (*k*) comes before any other Consonant, it is express'd by (*c*), as in *Character, clear, cringe.*

The Sound of (*k*) at the beginning of any Word or Syllable before (*a*), (*o*), or (*u*), is always express'd by (*c*), as *Cat, con, Cup*; or when a silent (*e*) follows (*k*), as *spake, spoke*; or (*ea*) in the middle, as *speak, bleak, &c.* and then (*k*) is written singly without (*e*) final.

To (*y*) a double Nature does belong,
As Consonant and Vowel in our Tongue;
The first begins all Words, yet none can end,
The last, it for the Close does still contend.

[23] (*Y*) is both a Vowel and Consonant; as a Vowel, it has appear'd to an ingenious Author to be superfluous; yet it is of great Use in our Language, which abhors the ending of Words in (*i*); and when the Sound of (*i*) comes double, tho' in two distinct Syllables, as in *dying, frying, &c.* When it follows a Consonant it is a Vowel, and when it precedes a Vowel it is a Consonant, and ought to be call'd (*ye*), and not (*wy*); and tho' it ends so many Words as a Vowel, it can end none as a Consonant.

At the End of all Words of one Syllable (*y*) has a sharp and clear Sound, as *by, dy, dry, fly, why, jny, thy, &c.* But at the End of Words of more Syllables it generally Sounds obscure, like (*e*), as *eternally, gloriously, godly*, except at the End of Words of Affirmation, as *apply, deny, edify, &c.* (*y*) only precedes Vowels, and chiefly (*a*), (*i*), (*o*); and these it also follows and incorporates with them into double Vowels, for (*ay*), (*ey*), (*oy*), have the same Sound with (*ai*), (*ei*), (*oi*); but the former are more us'd at the End of Words. In the Middle of Words it is not so frequently us'd for a Vowel, except in Words of the Greek Origin.

*And the same Right the double (u) demands;
Begins as Consonant, as Vowel ends.*

[24] (*W*). This Letter in its most general Use is a Consonant, going before all the Vowels, except (*u*); it likewise precedes (*r*), and follows (*s*) and (*th*), as *Want, went, Winter, Wrath, write, thwart.* It follows as a Vowel (*a*), (*e*), (*o*), and unites with them into the double Vowels, (*aw*), (*ew*), (*ow*), as well as (*u*); as *sow, sorwe, saw, few*: But in (*oo*) it generally is obscure, especially in Words of many Syllables, as in *Shadow, Widow, &c.*

It likewise, as has been observ'd under (*b*), goes before (*b*), tho' it be founded after it, as in *when, what, &c.*

*(Va) to the (f) in Nature is ally'd,
And to its final, has (e) always ty'd.*

[25] (*Va*)

[23] This Consonant is founded like the German (*j*) Consonant, that is, with a Sound most nearly approaching an extream rapid Pronunciation of the Vowel (*i*). The Arabians express (*y*) by their *ye*, or our (*w*) by their *warw*.

[24] The (*w*) is founded in English as (*u*) in the Latin Words *quando, -lingua, suadeo*, and others after *q, g, f.* We generally make this Letter a Consonant, yet its Sound is not very different (tho' it does something differ) from the German Vowel, the *fat*, or *grofs* (*u*) very rapidly pronounc'd.

[25] The

[25] (*Va*), or (*V*) Consonant, as 'tis call'd, is near akin to (*f*): It never ends a Word without silent (*e*) after it, nor is it ever doubled, however strong the Accent may be upon it; in *English* it only goes before *Vowels*; it likewise follows (*I*) and (*r*), as *Calves*, *Carve*, &c.

(*G*) *varies with the Vowel still its Sound,*
Soft before (i), (e); before the rest hard's found.
By (h) and (u) 'tis harden'd, as in Ghets
And Guilt, and as some other Words express.

(*G*) changes its Sound according to the Vowel it precedes, for before (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), it has a hard Guttural Sound, as *Game*, *Gold*, *Gum*: But this hard Sound is melted into a softer, by (*e*), (*i*), or (*y*), as *Gentle*, *Danger*, *Ginger*, but it is harden'd here by the Addition of (*h*), or (*u*), as *Ghets*, *Guilt*, &c. It retains its native Guttural Sound before (*e*) in these: *Altogether*, *Anger*, *Auger*, *beget*, *Conger-eel*, *exegetical*, *Finger*, *forget*, *gear*, or *geer*, *Geese*, *geld*, *Gelderland*, *Gelder Rose*, *Gelding*, *get*, *gewgaws*, *heterogeneous*, *homogeneous*, *heterogeneous*, *homogeneous*, *Hunger*, *Hanger*, *Hungerford*, *linger*, *longer*, *Monger*, *springeth*; obsolete, *stringed*, *Vinegar*, *winged*, *wringeth*, *wrongeth*, now written, *wrings*, *wrongs*, *younger*; but a *Singer* with a Voice, and a *Singer* by Fire; a *Swinger* on a Rope, and a *Swinger*, a great Lye, must be distinguish'd by the Sense, or the old Way of Spelling the soft Sounds, by adding a (*d*) after the (*n*), as indeed they Sound, (*D*) before (*g*) always softens the Sound of (*g*), as *Hog*, *hodge*, *Log*, *lodge*, *Dog*, *dodge*, &c. (*G*) is hard before (*i*) in the following Words; as *Argyle*, *begin*, *Gibberish*, *Gibble-gabble*: *Gibbons*, *Giddens*, Surnames; *giddy*, *Gift*, *gig*, *giggle*, *giglet*, *Gilbert*, *gild*, *Gilder*, *Gildon*, a Surname; *Gillet*, a Surname; *Gills*, *guilt-head*, *Gimlet*, *gimp*; *gird*, *girder*, *Girdle*, or *Girdler*; *Girl*, *girt*, *Girth* of a Horse; *Gith*, *gittern*, *give*, *Gizzard*; with all the Compounds and Words derived from any of these.

Two (gg)'s together make both hard remain,
Tho' (i), or (e) or (y) be in their Train.

When-

[25] The (*V*) Consonant we pronounce as the *French*, *Italians*, *Spaniards*, and other Nations do, that is, with a Sound very near approaching the Letter (*f*); yet (*f*) and (*v*) have the same Difference which (*p*) and (*b*) have.

[26] If

Whenever two (*gg*)'s comes together, they are both hard, tho' (*e*) (*i*) or (*y*) follow.

If the Primitive or Original Word end in hard (*g*), all Words derived from them do the same; as *Dog*, *dogged*, &c. but most of these latter are under the former Rule, because most of them double the (*g*). (*N*) between the Consonant and (*g*) hardens it; as *stronger*, *longer*, *finger*, &c.

(*Je*)'s always soft, a Vowel still precedes,
And in a Syllable the foremost leads.

All Words where-e'er this softer Sound we see
Before (*a*), (*o*), and (*u*), are writ with (*Je*).

(*J*) (*j*) Consonant always begins a Syllable, is ever plac'd before, never after a Vowel, and has an unvary'd Sound, as being pronounc'd every where as soft (*g*) in *Ginger*; but when the Sound of soft (*g*) is at the End of a Word, it is express'd by (*g*), with silent (*e*) after it, *Rage*, *Sage*, *Wage*, &c. or with (*dg*), as *Knowledge*, &c.

All Words beginning with this soft Sound before (*a*), (*o*) and (*u*), must be written with (*je*), as well as all proper Names deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*.

Many Words which now begin with a (*g*) before (*e*), were originally spelt with (*J*), as *Jentleman*, not *Gentleman*; and ought indeed to be thus written always, which wou'd avoid Confusion in the Spelling.

(*Q*) in its Sound is always sounded *kue*,
And ne'er is writ without a following (*u*).

(*Q*) sounds (*kue*), or (*que*), and has always (*u*) after it, and begins all Words with that Sound. It ends no Word without (*e*) after it, and that in but a few Words of *French* Termination, as *Antique*, *oblique*, *pique*, *barque*, *cinque*. [26]

To

[26] If the Breath directed thro' the Mouth to the Lips, be intercepted by the closing of the Lips, the (*P*) is form'd; the *Greek* (π); the *Hebrew* (*Pe*). The *Arabians* have not this Letter, but substitute in its Place (*Be*) or (*Phe*); the *Persians* besides this (*Phe*) of the *Arabians*, have their (*H*), which they distinguish from (*Be*), by putting Three Points under it.

If the Breath reaches not the Lips, but be wholly intercepted, in the Palate, by moving the Tip of the Tongue to the Fore-part of the Palate, or, which is all one, to the Roots of the upper Teeth, the Consonant (*T*) is form'd; the *Greek* (τ), the *Arabian* (*Te*) or (*Ta*), &c.

But

To these we shall add some Rules relating to Consonants, join'd together.

(Gh) *in the Beginning does express*
 (G) *hard, as in Ghost we find, and in Ghess.*
Elsewhere this (h) we mostly now omit,
Yet by it the Syllable a Length does get.
In Northern Parts this very (h) is found
With a much softer Aspiration to Sound.

In the Beginning of Words (gh) is pronounc'd like hard (g). Elsewhere 'tis now almost wholly left out, but yet it implies, that the Syllable is to be lengthened. But some (especially the Northern People) sound the (h) with a softer Aspiration; as in *Might, Light, Night, Right, Sight, Sigh, weigh, Weight, though*; (but the Three last Letters in this Word are now by the Politer thrown away as useless) *Thought, wrought, taught, &c.*

(Gh) *sometimes will sound like double (f)*
As Cough, tough, rough, enough, trough, and laugh.

When *enough* signifies Number, 'tis spelt *enow*.

(Ch)

But if the Breath do not even reach so far, but be intercepted at the top of the Throat, by moving the hinder Part of the Tongue to the hinder Part of the Palate, (k) or hard (c) is form'd, and the *Greek* (κ), &c. The *Welsh* always give their (c) this hard Sound. These three Consonants we call absolute Mutes; for they give no manner of Sound in themselves, nor indeed can give any, because the Breath no way gets into the free Air, for it neither gets out by the Nostrils, nor by the Mouth.

If the Breath, *equally divided between the Nostrils and the Mouth*, be intercepted by the closing of the Lips, the Consonant (B) is form'd, the *Greek* (β), the *Arabian Dal*, &c. But if the Breath be intercepted in the Throat by the hinder Parts of the Palate and Tongue (G) is form'd, the *Greek* (γ), &c. The *Welsh* always give this hard Sound to their (G) And these we call *Half-Mutes*, for they make a little Sort of Sound in the Nose, which can be heard by itself without the Assistance of the Sound of any other Letter.

If the whole, or, if you please, the greater Part of the Breath be divided to the Nostrils, only in its Passage striking the Air that remains in the Concave or Hollow of the Mouth, the Lips being just clos'd, (M) is form'd, the *Greek* (μ), the *Arabian Mim*, &c. But if the Closure or Interception be made in the

Fore-

(Ch) produces a compounded Sound,
Which from (ty) most surely may rebound,
Or from (tsh), as in Church 'tis found.

}

We must except Words that are deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*, especially proper Names, and where a Consonant follows; for there they sound harder, like (c) or (k).

(Sh) like (sy), (ph), like (f) we find,
And the (th) is of a double Kind;
Sometimes a softer Sound, akin to (d),
Sometimes a stronger, that's akin to (t).

(Th) Sounds (dh) sometimes, where it has a softer Sound, as it has in the following Words: As *thou, thee, thy, thine, the, this, that, those, these, they, them, their, there, thence, thither, whither, either, whether, neither, though, although*; but in these Two last it is generally left out. And in some Words ending in (*ther*), as *Father, Mother, Brother, Leather, Feather*; and in *smoothe, Breathe, Wreathe, see the, bequeathe, Clothe*.

Elsewhere it generally has a stronger Sound; as in *with, without, within, through, think, thrive, throw, thrust, Thought, Thigh, Thing, Throng, Death, Breath, Cloth, Wrath, Length, Strength, thin, &c.*

P A R T

Fore-part of the Palate (N) is form'd, the *Greek* (ν), and the *Hebrew* and *Arabian* Nun. But if in the Throat, that is, in the Back-part of the Palate, that Sound is form'd which the *Greeks* express by (γ) before (κ), (γ), (χ), (ξ): And the *Latins* of Old by (g), as *Agchises, ageps, aggulus, &c.* for *Anchises, anceps, angulus*, as *Priscian* and *Varro* assure us. Which all now write with (n) before the same Consonants, especially in the same Syllable; suppose (k), (q), (x), and (c), (g), (ch), pronounc'd with a hard, that is, their genuine Sound. For the Sound of (n) is different in the Words *thin, sin, in*, from that in *sing, single, sink, ink, lynx, &c.* so in *hand, band, ran*; from what it is in *hang, bank, rank, &c.* Nay, the Sound of this Letter is varied in the very same Words: For (n) sounds otherwise in *lon-ger, stron-ger, an-ger, drin-ker*; *in-gruo, con-gruo*; but otherwise in *long-er, strong-er, ang-er, drink-er*; *ing-ruo, cong-ruo*. So we hear some saying, *in-quàm, tan-quàm, nun-quàm, &c.* while others pronounce them as if they were written *inq-wam, tanq-wam, nung-wam*; or *ink-wam, tank-wam, nunk-wam*. When (n) is pronounc'd in the former, the

Extremity

Extremity of the Tongue always strikes the Fore-part of the Palate near the Roots of the upper Teeth; but in the latter the same Extremity of the Tongue rather depends to the Roots of the lower Teeth: but the Hinder-part of the Tongue is rais'd to the Hinder-part of the Palate, and there intercepts the Sound; to wit, it is form'd in the Mouth in the same manner as (g); but it has the same Direction of the Breath with (n) And this, if we are not deceiv'd, is that very Sound which many would give to the *Hebrew* *y* when they teach us to pronounce it by *ng, ngh, gn, nghn, &c.* for they insinuate some Sound, which does not perfectly agree with either (n) or (g), but has something common to both, And we know not but the *Spaniards* mean the same Sound by their (\bar{n}) mark'd thus over-head.

We call these Three Consonants *Half-Vowels*; for they have a greater proper Sound than those which we lately call'd *Half-Mutes*.

These nine Consonants, which we have discours'd of, are form'd by a total Interception of the Breath, so that it has no manner of Passage through the Mouth, which therefore we nam'd *clos'd*: But the same Formation remaining, *if the Breath hardly press'd, yet (tho' with Difficulty) find an Outlet*; those Consonants are form'd, which we call *open'd*, which are the *Aspirates* of all those (except the *Half-Vowels*) from whence they are derived: More *subtle* and *thin*, if the Breath goes out by an oblong Chink, Slit or Crevice; or more *gross*, if it go out by a round Hole. They are referr'd to the same Classes their *Primitives* were, as being near akin to them. We subjoin no *Aspirates* to the *Half-Vowels*; not that there is no Sound when the Breath breaks from him that is about to pronounce them, but because that Sound has not yet, as far as we can discover, obtain'd any Place in the List, or Catalogue of Letters; for it expresses the Lowing of an Ox, or the Human Sigh; that is, if that be made in the Lips, this chiefly is in the Palate or Throat.

If the Breath escape the Mouth, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (p), its Aspirate (f), or (ph), that is, the Greek (φ), the *Arabian* (Phe), the *Welsh* (ff), is form'd and pronounc'd; nor is it of Consequence, whether the Breath gets out by a longish Chink, or by a round Hole; for tho' that Way the Sound is more *subtle* and *fine*, and this more *gross* yet the Distinction of both is so very nice and small, that we doubt whether they in any language are express'd by different Letters.

If the Breath break out by a Chink, when we are a going to pronounce (*b*), it forms the *English* (*v*) Consonant, &c. The *Spaniard* not seldom gives the same Sound to (*b*), using the Letters (*b*) and (*v*) promiscuously. The *Welsh* express this Sound by (*f*), and the foregoing Sound by (*ff*). The *English Saxons* either had not this Sound, or express'd it by (*f*) in Writing, for they knew nothing of the (*v*) Consonant; and they wrote many Words with (*f*) (as the *English* did after them for some Ages) which are now written with (*v*) as much as those which still are spelt with (*f*); as *gif*, *Heofen*, &c. which now are writ *give*, *Heaven*, &c. The *Arabians* and *Persians* have not this Sound: And the *Turks* pronounce their *Vau* in this manner, and as a great many, the *Vau* of the *Hebrews* (which some think more properly pronounced as the *Arabic Warw* or (*w*). And we doubt not but the *Æolic* (*f*) had this Sound; for since the *Greeks* had before the Character (*φ*), there was no manner of need to invent a new one to express the same Sound. Besides *Priscian* owns, that the *Latin* (*f*) had formerly the same Pronunciation, that is, the same Sound, that was afterwards given to the (*v*) Consonant, and so the Letter (*f*) pass'd to the Sound of (*φ*) or (*ph*).

But if the Breath make its Way out thro' a round Hole, the *English* (*w*) is form'd, and the *Arabian* (*waw*), which Sound many give to the *Hebrew* (*vau*). But the *German* (*w*) if we mistake not, has a Sound compounded of this and the former Letter; that is, by placing that before this; so that the *English* would spell that with *wwa*, which the *Germans* express by *wa*. This Sound is not very different from the *English* (*oo*), the *French* (*ou*), and *German* *groß* or *fat* [*u*] most rapidly pronounced. For this Reason some have thought it a Vowel, tho' it be in Reality a Consonant; yet it must be own'd very near akin to a Vowel. The *Welsh* make that a Vowel as well as this a Consonant, expressing them by the same Character (*w*), but when 'tis a Vowel, it is accented over-head and sounds long; in other Places 'tis a Consonant, its Sound being short; as, *Gw'jdd*, (which is two Syllables) a Goose; *gw'yr*, crooked; *gw'yr*, Men. Whenever this Sound in *Latin* follows, *f*, *q*, *g*, as in *suadeo*, *quando*, *lingua*, &c. most take it for a Vowel; and perhaps some, who would have it a Consonant in the *English* Words *wade*, *perswade*, *sway*, &c. and yet the Sound is the very same in both Places. But the subjoin'd Vowel in the Diphthongs or double Vowels (*au*), (*eu*), (*ou*), truly pronounced, is no other than this very Consonant; as any Man may see by

D

consulting

consulting the discerning *Gataker*, in his Treatise of *double Vowels*.

If the Breath more grossly goes out by the *Hole*, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (*T*), the *Greek* (*θ*) is form'd the *Arabic* (*Ṭhe*), &c. and the *English* (*Th*), in *Thigh*, *thin*, *thing*, *thought*, *throng*: The *Anglo-Saxons* formerly express'd this Sound by this Note (*þ*), which they call'd *Spina*, or the *Thorn*: The *Welsh* write it with (*th*).

But if the Breath on this Occasion go more *subtily* out of the Mouth by a *Chink*, that Part of the Tongue which is next to the Extremity, being lifted up, that the Breath may, as it were, be flatted or thinn'd, and press'd with a wider, but gross Form, the *Greek* (*σ*) is form'd, the *Hebrew* *Samech* and *Shin*, the *Arabic* *Sin* and *Sad*; the *Latin* and *English* (*s*) pronounced with its right Sound, that is, a *sharp*, *acute*, or *stridulous*, or *hissing* Sound; as in the Words, *Yes*, *this*, *us*, *thus*, *his*, *less*, *send*, *strong*, &c. With this Sound we also pronounce soft (*c*) before (*e*), (*i*) and (*y*); as in *Grace*, *Mercy*, *Peace*, *since*, *Principal*, &c. The *French* sometimes give the (*c*) the same Sound when it has a Tail, as in *Garçon*.

If the Breath get out of the Mouth by a Hole in a grosser Manner, when you are about to pronounce (*D*), it forms the *Arabic* *Dahl*, the *Hebrew* *Daleth*, the softer (*D*) of the *Spaniards*; that is, as that Letter is pronounc'd in the Middle and End of Words, as *Majestad*, *Trinidad*, &c. The *English* write this Sound in the same Manner as they do another, which we have lately named; that is, with (*th*) in *thy*, *thine*, *this*, *though*, &c. The *Anglo-Saxons* write that Sound with (*þ*), but this with (*Ð*), (*ፅ*), as is plain from their Writings, (tho' they sometimes confounded these Characters) but in following Ages the *English* express'd both Sounds by (*þ*), which by Degrees, degenerated into the Character (*ȝ*), which in very many Manuscripts perpetually begins those Words which now are written with (*th*). And hence sprung the Abbreviations of *the*, *that*, *thou*, by *ᵊ*, *ᵋ*, *ᵌ*. The *Welsh* express the former Sound by (*th*), the latter by (*dd*), only some pretend that it is better written by (*db*), who have not been able to alter the old *Orthography*. But we (as we have observed) express both Sounds by (*th*), but erroneously, since neither of them is a compounded Sound, but evidently simple, varying or descending almost in the same manner from the Sounds of (*d*) and (*t*); as (*f*) and (*v*) do from the Sounds of (*p*) and (*b*). We grant, that by the same Reason, that (*ph*) is written for (*f*), (*bb*), (*th*), and (*db*),

(*dh*) might be also written ; that is, in some measure, to shew the Affinity and Derivation of the Aspirate Letters, to those from whence they draw their Original. But it is evident from the following Words, that the genuine Sound compos'd of the Letters, is plainly different from that of the Aspirate Letter ; as *Cob-ham*, *Chat-ham*, *Wit-ham*, *Mait-ham*, *Wad-ham*, *Wood-house*, *Skep-herd*, *Clap-ham*, *Mess-ham*, &c. And thus we find entirely other Sounds in *Oc-ham*, *Block-head*, *Hog-herd*, *Cog-bill*, *House-hold*, *Dis-honour*, *Mis-bap*, *dis-honest*, *dis-hearten*, *Mas-ham*, *Caus-ham*, *Wis-heart*, &c. than those which we commonly write with (*ch*), (*gh*), (*sh*) : But the *French*, the *Flemings*, and many others, do not at all, or extremely little, pronounce either of those Sounds which we express by (*th*) ; and while the *French* endeavour to pronounce it, they utter (*t*), the *Flemings* (*d*), and some others (*f*). Yet it is not hard to pronounce these genuine Sounds, if we would but take a more peculiar Care of, and have a nearer Regard to their Formation ; that is, all the Parts of the Formation remain the same as if we were going to pronounce (*t*) and (*d*), only we suffer the Breath to go out of our Mouths here, and not there. We must also take heed, that for want of Attention, the Parts of the Tongue next to the Extremity rise a little, and so form the Letters (*f*) and (*z*) ; for as (*f*) is to (*t*), so is (*z*) to (*d*), as we shall now explain.

If when you are about to pronounce (*d*), you extrude the Breath in a most *subtle* manner, as it were thin'd by a Chink or Crevice, (the Part next to the Extremity of the Tongue being to that End lifted up) the *Latin* (*z*) is form'd the *Greek* (*ζ*), the *Hebrew* *zain*, and the *Arabian* (*ze*), which Sound the *English* express by their (*z*) ; but they, as well as the *French*, do sometimes express this Sound by (*f*), especially when it is placed between two *Vowels*, and in the End of a Word, as in *Pleasure*, *Ease*, *Laws*, &c. And when a *Name*, or *Noun*, with hard (*s*) in the last Syllable is made a *Verb* or *Word*, then this *Verb* or *Word* is pronounc'd with soft (*f*), (that is *z*) ; so a *House*, a *Louse*, a *Mouse*, a *Price*, *Advice*, (or *advise*, according to some) (tho' in our Opinion, the (*c*) ought to be kept in the Name, as a farther Distinction of the Name from the *Word* or *Verb*) *close*, *Brass*, *Glass*, *Grass*, *Grease*, and with hard (*s*) ; but to *house*, to *louse*, to *mouse*, to *prise*, or *prize*, (tho' *Prize* with a (*z*) signifies a Purchase, a Caption of some Ship, &c. or the Reward of some Action, or to be obtain'd by some Action, &c.) to *advise*, to *close*, to *bræze*, &c. are pronounced with soft (*f*) or (*z*). But other Letters in the like manner

have an analogous Alteration. For from the Names *Wife*, *Life*, *Strife*, *Half*, *Calf*, *safe*, *Breath*, *Cloth*, are pronounced with the harder Sounds; they are thus made *Verbs* or *Words*, to *avive*, to *live*, to *strive*, to *halve*, to *calve*, to *save*, to *breathe*, to *clothe*. The *Italians* (especially when it is doubled) express (*z*) stronger, as the *Hebrew* (צ), (*tz*): Thus not a few pronounce in *Latin* Words, when (*t*) goes before (*i*) and another Vowel follows; as *Piazza*, *Venetia*, they pronounce *Piatza*, *Venetzia*, &c.

We may add to (*d*) or, if you please, to (*n*), two other Letters form'd in the same Seat, that is, in the Palate, *viz.* (*l*) and (*r*). We chuse rather to join these Letters to (*d*) and (*n*), than to the Letter (*t*), by reason of the Concussion of the *Larynx*, or Wind pipe, and the Emotion of the Breath to the Nostrils in their Pronunciation, of which the Letter (*t*), and all that are derived from it, are utterly incapable.

The Letter (*l*) is form'd if when you are about to pronounce the (*d*) or (*n*), you gently send out the Breath from one or both Sides into the Mouth, and by the Turnings of the Mouth to the open Lips, with a trembling of the Tongue. And the Sound of this Letter, if we are not deceived, is the same in all Languages, as the *Hebrew* ל, and the *Greek* λ.

But the *Welsh* have another and stronger, tho' a kindred Sound to this, which they write with a (*ll*) to distinguish it from that of the single (*l*), by the Breath's being much more forcibly press'd into the Mouth, whence proceeds a more frothy Sound, as it were, compounded of (θλ.) But this Sound we think, no other Nation knows, unless perhaps the *Spaniards*.

The Letter (*r*), which is generally called the Dog Letter, is likewise form'd in the Palate: that is, if when you are about to pronounce (*d*) or (*n*), the Extremity of the Tongue being turned inward by a strong and frequent Concussion, beats the Breath that is going out; from which Conflict that horrid or rough Sound of the (*r*) proceeds. And the Sound of this Letter is the same in all Nations, as the *Hebrew* רשׁ, and the *Greek* ρ. The *Welsh* frequently subjoin (*h*) to this Letter; and their (*rh*) answers the *Greek* aspirated (ρ̇). They tell us, that the *Americans* bordering on *New-England*, or at least a great Part of them, cannot pronounce either an (*l*) or (*r*), but substitute (*n*) in their Place; thus, for *Lobster*, they say *Nobstan*.

If the Breath, being more strictly compress'd, breaks out more subtilly, when you are about to pronounce (*k*) or hard (*c*), it forms the *Greek* (χ), the *Arabian* (cha), truly pronounc'd, &c. that is by a middle Sound betwixt (*c*) and (*h*); and this
Sound

Sound is very familiar to the *Germans* and *Welsh*, and they both express it by (*cb*). But it is quite laid aside in *English*; for our (*cb*) is a quite different Sound, as we shall shew hereafter.

But if the Breath go out in a grosser manner, and less impress'd, (by reason of the more lax Position of the Tongue, and larger Exit for the Breath) the *Latin* (*b*) is form'd, and the *Hebrew* and *Arabian* (*He*), and the *Greek* *aspirate Spirit*. And this Sound is common to most Nations. But the *French*, tho' they write (*b*) seldom pronounce it. The Difference between the Sound of this and that of the foregoing Letter is only this, that the Breath in the former is expell'd with a greater Force, and by a narrower Passage, as it were through a Chink, and is therefore nam'd the double *Aspirate*; this more freely, and as it were through a Hole or large Passage.

The *Greeks*, as if it were no Letter, because its Sound is but small) call it an *Aspiration*, and (at least now-adays) set it not down in the direct Line of the Letters, but put it over the Head of a Letter: Tho' formerly they did set 'em before the Vowels in the direct Line, but they set the (*ε*) after them, if we are not mistaken; and this makes them use (*b*) for a Note of an Hundred; for what is now written *ἑκατον*, was formerly written *Hexaτον*. But we can see no manner of Reason why (*b*) should not be a Consonant in all other Languages; for it is by no means to be rejected from the Number of Letters, because the Sound of it is sometimes not pronounc'd by the *French*, and some others; for that is no more than is common to many other Letters, especially of the *Hebrew*, and other Oriental Tongues, which are quiescent or silent: Nor because it does not hinder the Elision of the foregoing Vowel, when another Vowel follows in the subsequent Word; for (*m*) wou'd then lie under the same Fate, and (*f*) anciently did not hinder this Contraction. But we must confess, that there is some Doubt whether the *Latins*, who were such mighty Emulators of the *Greek*, allow'd (*b*) to be a Letter or not, especially when we find the *Grammarians* so earnestly denying it, with *Priscian* at the Head of them.

If when you are about to pronounce (*γ*), or the hard (*g*), the Breath being more hardly compress'd, goes out by a more subtle Chink, as I may say, or Slit, that Sound is form'd which is express'd by (*gb*). The *English* seem formerly to have had this Sound in the Words *Light*, *Right*, *Night*, *Daughter*, &c. but now they only retain the Spelling, entirely omitting the Sound; but the *North-Country* People, especially the

Scots, almost retain it still, or rather substitute the Sound of (*b*) in its room. The *Irish* in their (*gb*) have exactly this Sound, as in *Logh*, a Lake, &c. It differs from the *German* (*ch*) as (*g*) does from (*c*), that is, by the Direction of the Breath to the Nostrils, which neither (*c*) nor (*ch*) can do. But the *Germans* generally write by (*ch*) those very Words which the *English* write with (*gb*), for their *Nacht*, *recht*, *liecht*, *sochen*, *tochter*, answer our *Night*, *right*, *light*, *fight*, *Daughter*; and there are many more Words of the same kind. The *Latins*, *Greeks*, *Hebrews* and *Arabians*, knew nothing of this Sound. The *Persians* pronounce their *Ghaf* with this Sound, which is distinguished from the *Arabic Kef* by Three Points over it.

But if the Breath go out more freely, and as it were through a more large Hole, the *English* (*y*) Consonant is form'd; the *German* (*j*) Consonant, the *Arabian* (*ye*), which Sound many contend belongs to the *Hebrew* (*jod*). For this Sound is very near akin to that of the Vowel (*i*) slender, most rapidly pronounc'd. The Diphthongs, as they are call'd, *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, are promiscuously written by (*i*), or (*y*), especially by the *English* and the *French*. (*Y*) is not only put for (*i*) at the End of Words, but in the Middle, when (*i*) follows the Sound of (*i*); as *dying*, *lying*, &c. The *Anglo-Saxons*, and after them the *English*, for many Ages, always put a Point over (*y*), when it was us'd for the Vowel (*i*), thus (*ÿ*).

But it is manifest, that there is a great Affinity between this Letter and (*g*) and (*gb*), from those Words which are now written by (*gb*), as *light*, *might*, *thought*, &c. being in the old Manuscripts written with (*y*), in the same Character, as *yet*, *yonder*, &c. For they had a Threefold Figure, one (*Ƴ*), which we now express by (*th*), as we have already observed; another which was us'd for (*i*) Vowel, and differing from the former only by the Point over it; and a Third (*3*) which was always put for (*y*) Consonant, and which was found in those Words which we now spell with (*gb*): But the Library-keepers, of latter Times, ignorant of the Matter, have by a very gross Error substituted in the Room of it the Character of the Letter (*x*), when they made those monstrous Words *thouxt*, *souxt*, &c. for *thought*, *sought*, &c. or rather for *thouyt*, *souyt*, &c. as they were then used to be written by (*y*) Consonant, as we may find them in the Impression of *Chaucer*, and others of the old Poets. We must also add, that not a few Words, which we now spell with (*y*), the old *Saxons*, and now most commonly the *Germans*, wrote with (*g*); for our Words *Slay*, *sayl*,
say,

say, pay, day, rain, and many more, are partly by the *Anglo-Saxons*, and partly by the *Germans* written *Schlagen*, *segel*, *seger*, *sag*, *tag*, *tegem*. And on the contrary, many Words which are now written with (g), were formerly written with (y); as *again*, *against*, *given*, &c. were anciently written *ayen*, *ayenst*, *yeoven*, &c.

Thus we have run through all the simple Sounds that we know, and have given Rules for their several Formations, and distributed them into their several Families and Classes; and as we have of the Vowels, so shall we here of the Consonants, give you a Plan, which your Eye may view all at once.

Consonants.	Labial or Lip	{	Mute —————	P	F	F	L. R.
			Half Mute ———	B	V	W	
			Half-Vowels ———	M	a	Low ing	
	Palatine or Palate	{	Mute —————	T	S	TH	
			Half-Mute ———	D	Z	DH	
			Half-Vowel ———	N	a	Sigh	
	Guttural or Throat	{	Mute —————	C	CH	H	
			Half-Mute ———	G	GH	Y	
			Half-Vowel ———	n	a	Sigh	
				<div> <div>more subtil,</div> <div>more gros</div> </div>			
							Aspirates,

As we have said something of the Compound Sound of the Vowels, we shall add a Word or Two here of the Compound Consonants. The *English* (j) Consonant or soft (g), or (dg) is compounded of (d) and (y), as is plain from *Jar*, *joy*, *gentle*, *lodging*, which sound *Dyar*, *Dyoy*, *dyentle*, *lodying*, &c. the *Arabian Gjien*, (which Letter, tho' it descend from the *Hebrew Gimel*, retains not its Sound) and the *Italian Gi*.

The *French* (j) Consonant and soft (g) is compounded of the Consonants (zy); for their *Je*, *J*; *age*, *aye*, &c. are *Zye*; *azy*, &c. The *Persians* express this Sound by their *Zye*, which is distinguish'd from the *Arabian Ze*, by having Three Points over it.

The *German* (j) Consonant is plainly a simple Sound, that is, as we have said, the same with the *English* (y).

The *English* (sh), the *French* (ch), the *German* (sch), the *Hebrew* and *Arabic* (shin) sound (sy), for the *French* *Chambre*, the *English* *shame*, and the *German* *schem*, sound *Syambre*, *syame*, *syam*. The *Welsh* express the Sound by (st), wherefore with them (with a Note of Production over the following Vowel *Sion*, (*John*) is a *Monosyllable*, but *Sion* (*Mount Sion*) a Word of two Syllables.

The *English* (ch) or (tch), sounds (ty), for *Orchard*, *Riches*, &c. sound *Ort-yard*, *Rit-yes*, &c. The *Italians* pronounce their (c) thus before (e) and (i). The *Persians* to express this Sound, besides the *Arabic* Alphabet, make use of their (che), which by having Three Points beneath it, is distinguish'd from the *Arabic* *Gjim*. If before the *English* Word *yeaw*, you severally put *d*, *t*, *s*, *z*, it will be made *dyeaw*, *tyeaw*, *lyeaw*, *zyeaw*, which is the *English* *Jew*, *cheaw*, *sheaw*, and the *French*, *Jeu*, *Play*.

The (X) of the *Latins*, and almost all other Languages, and the *Greek* (ξ), is compos'd of (cs), (xσ).

This Letter is not known to the *Hebrews*, nor the *Oriental* Tongues, but in the room of it they write those simple Letters, of which it is compos'd, which the *Germans* likewise often do, for their *Ochs*, *wachs*, *sechs*, *sechst*, &c. are the *English* *Ox*, *wax*, *fix*, *fixt*; the *Welsh* always write this with (cs).

The *Latin* (k) was anciently put (ca), and they promiscuously wrote *Calendæ* and *Kalendæ*; but it now generally has the same simple Sound with the *Greek* (κ), whence it is deriv'd, or the *Latin* (c), and it would be plainly a superfluous Letter, if (c) always retain'd its genuine Sound; and therefore the *Welsh*, whose (c) has always one constant Sound, have no such Letter, as well as some other Nations.

The *Latin* (q) of old, put for (cu) or rather (cw), which has always (u) after it, has the very same Sound with (c) or (k), and is a superfluous Letter. The *Welsh* have it not, but always put for (q), (cw), or (chaw): And the *Anglo-Saxons* wrote (cpen,) that is, *Cwen* for *Queen*.

The *English* (wb) is pronounc'd perfectly (bw), and the *Anglo-Saxons* used to place them so; and we cannot tell, how the succeeding *English* came to invert the Position, and set the (w) before the (b).

But this is worthy our Observation, That the Consonants (y) and (w), tho' it be not minded, most commonly are subjoin'd to kindred Consonants before kindred Vowels; that is,

(y)

(y) is often subjoin'd to the Guttural Consonants (c), (g), when a Palatine Vowel follows; for *can*, *get*, *begin*, &c. sound as if they were written *cyen*, *gyet*, *begyin*, &c. for the Tongue can scarce pass from these Guttural Consonants, to form the Palatine Vowels, but it must pronounce (y). But it is not so before the other Vowels, as in *call*, *gall*, *go*, *Gun*, *Goose*, *come*, &c. (W) is sometimes subjoin'd to the Labial or Lip Consonants (p) and (b), especially before open (e), as *Pot*, *Boy*, *boil*, &c. which are sounded as if spelt thus, *Pwot*, *Bwoy*, *bwoil*, &c. But this is not always done, nor by all Men.

We have (page 2) consider'd Letters as the Signs of Sounds, but have not yet examin'd the *Analogy* they bear to the Sounds they represent. We have already said, that *Sounds* are taken for the Signs of our Thoughts, and that Men invented certain Figures to be the Signs of those *Sounds*. But whereas these Figures or Characters, in their first Institution, signify immediately only the *Sounds*, yet Men often carry'd their Thoughts of the Characters to the very *Things* which the *Sounds* signified; whence it comes to pass, that the Characters may be consider'd two Ways, *viz.* either as they simply signify the *Sound*, or as they assist us in conceiving that which is signify'd by the *Sound*.

Four Things are necessary to give them their Perfection in the first State.

(1.) That every Figure or Character mark or denote some *Sound*; that is to say, That no Character be set down in any Word, but what is pronounc'd.

(2.) That every *Sound*, which is express'd in the Pronunciation, be mark'd with some Figure: That is to say, that we pronounce nothing but what is written.

(3.) That every Figure mark only one simple or compounded *Sound*.

(4.) That one and the same *Sound* be not mark'd by more Figures than one.

But considering the Characters in the second Manner, that is to say, as they help us in the Conception of those Things which the *Sounds* signify, we find sometimes that it is for the better, that the foregoing Rules are not always observed, especially the first and the last.

Because first, it often happens in those Languages, which are derived from Others, that there are certain Letters which are not pronounced, and which, for that reason, are of no manner of Use to the Sound, but are yet useful in helping us

to understand that which the Words signify. As for Example, in the *French* Words, *Champs*, *Temps*, and *Chants*, the (p) and (t) are not pronounced, which are of Use to the Signification, because by them we find that the first comes from *campus*, and *tempus*, the latter from *cantus*.

In *Hebrew* itself there are Words which differ only by one ending in *Alph*, and the other in *Hamech*, that are not pronounc'd; as אָרַח, which signifies *to fear* or *dread*, and אָרַח, *to throw*, *sling*, *cast*, &c.

Hence 'tis plain, that this Abuse of Words (as 'tis call'd) is not without its Benefit to the Language.

The Difference between the Capitals and small Letters may seem to some a Contradiction to the fourth Rule, That *one and the same Sound be not mark'd with more than one Figure*: And for this Reason they urge that the ancient, as well as the present *Hebrew*, had none of this Difference; and that the *Greeks* and *Romans*, for a long Time, made use of only Capital Letters in their Writing. But this Distinction is of great Advantage and Beauty, in mingling with a pleasing Variety the Capitals and small Letters in the Beginning of Periods, proper Names, &c. and to distinguish Names from Words of Affirmation, and all other Parts of Speech.

Besides, this Objection will hold against the Difference of Hands, or Figures of Writing or Pointing, as the *Roman*, *Italic*, *German*, &c. in the Impression of this very Book, or any other Language, ancient or modern, which is very usefully employed in the Distinction, either of certain Words, or certain Discourses and Sentences, which conveys the Force and Energy intended by the Author to the Reader, and does not at all change the Pronunciation.

Tho' what we have said be sufficient to shew, that the Use of Letters which are not pronounc'd, is not so great an Imperfection as is generally imagin'd, at least in those Instances and Particulars of Words deduc'd from other Languages; yet it must be allow'd, that there are too many crept in by a Corruption which has spread itself through several Languages. Thus it must be confess'd, that it is a certain Abuse to give the Sound of (s) to (c), before an (e) and (i), and of pronouncing (g) before the same Vowels otherwise than before the others; of having softned the (s) between Two Vowels and of giving (t) the Sound of (s) before (i), follow'd by another Vowel, as *Gratia*, *Action*, *Distion*, &c.

Some People have imagin'd, that they could correct this Fault in the *Vulgar Tongues*, by inventing new Characters, as Mr.

Lodwick

Lodwick has done in his *Universal Alphabet*, and *Ramus* in his *Grammar* of the *French Tongue*, by retrenching every Letter that was not pronounc'd, and writing every Sound by that Letter, to which the Sound to be express'd was proper; as by placing an (*s*) before (*i*) and (*e*), and not a (*c*) and the like: But he, and all other of his Mind, ought to consider, that besides the Disadvantage this would be to the Vulgar Tongues for the Reasons urg'd before, they would attempt an Impossibility; and they little think how difficult a thing it is, to change and bring the People of a whole Nation to the Change of a Character they have been us'd to, Time out of Mind; and the Emperor *Claudius* found himself disappointed in an Attempt of this Nature, and was fain to lay aside his Design of introducing a Character he had prepared.

All that can be done in this Particular, is to retrench by degrees all those Letters which are of no Use, either to the Pronunciation, or the Sense, or Analogy of Languages, as the *French* and we have begun to do; and to preserve those that are useful, and to set some certain small Marks to distinguish them from those which are not pronounc'd, or which may intimate to us the several Pronunciations of the same Letter. But even this labours under a Difficulty not to be remov'd but by degrees, and in many Years; for the altering any of the present, or adding any New Characters at once, wou'd be of no manner of Use, while all the chief Books of the Language are without these Marks or Alterations, and so many People must be oblig'd to learn their *Alphabet* over again, or be puzzled to read what would then be written or printed. And indeed, the Rules we have given in these Cases, will (we persuade ourselves) be of more Use than all these Projects for directing the Learner. Yet, to omit nothing that has been offer'd with any Probability, we shall add the Method of a *French* Author, to this End; a Point above or below will serve for the first Case, and when (*c*) is pronounc'd like (*s*), it may have a Tail added; and when the (*g*) is pronounc'd like (*j*) Consonant, its Tail need not be quite clos'd.

The End of the First Part.



P A R T II.

C H A P. V.

Of SYLLABLES.

*A Syllable's a compleat and perfect Sound,
In which the single, or one double Vowel's found;
Or either join'd with Consonants, and spoke
In one Sole Breathing, as in Cloke.*

[1] **A** SYLLABLE is a compleat Sound utter'd in one Breath, which sometimes consists of one *Vowel*, or double *Vowel*; sometimes of one *Vowel*, or double *Vowel* join'd to one or more *Consonants*, not exceeding Seven in Number.

By

[1] The Word SYLLABLE is deriv'd from the *Latin Syllaba*, and that from the *Greek Word συλλαβή* from συλλαμ-βάνω, which is to comprehend; so that *Syllaba*, in the Latitude of the Term, may be taken for any Comprehension or Connexion in general, but in a *Grammatical* Sense only for a Connexion of Letters in one Sound. *Scaliger* has defined a *Syllable* to be an Element under one Accent, that is, what can be pronounc'd at once: *Priscian* more plainly has it, *Comprehensio Litterarum*, &c. *a Comprehension of Letters falling under one Accent, and produc'd by one Motion of Breathing*. Yet this has been rejected by some *GRAMMARIANS* as imperfect, and excluding all Syllables of one Letter: Another has defin'd it thus, *A SYLLABLE is a Literal or Articulate Voice of an individual Sound*; for every Syllable must fall under the same Accent, for as many Vowels, as may occur, in a Word, to be produc'd under divers Accents, or with several Motions of the Breathing, so many Syllables; and on the contrary, tho' there be several Vowels, if they are pronounc'd under one Accent, and with one Breathing, they make but one Syllable.

In

By this Definition it is plain, that one single Vowel may compose a Syllable; as the first Syllables in the following Words, *A-bram, E-ternal, I-very, O-rient, U-nity*. But no Number of Consonants can be sounded without a Vowel; for tho' after the *Mutes* and *Liquids*, (*bl*), (*cr*), in *Table* and *Acre*, the (*e*) be quiescent, or at least obscure; yet that Sound, which is express'd by those Consonants, is deriv'd from that (*e*), by which, making a Sort of Sound, we think (*bl*) and (*cr*) are not just Exceptions made to this Rule; for from Versification it is plain, that *Table* is compos'd of a long and a short Syllable.

*As many Vowels as emit a Sound,
So many Syllables in Words are found.*

As many Vowels or double Vowels, as are found in any Word, of so many Syllables is that Word compos'd, except any of the Vowels be silent or quiescent, as the final (*e*) and some Vowels, which make the improper double Vowel; the Rules of which have been already given in the *First Part*, treating of LETTERS, and the (*e*) which is added to some Syllables in the Middle of Words; as the (*e*) in *Advancement* and *Rudeſty*, which serve only to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. Except likewise Words ending in (*es*), and no (*s*) coming before (*e*); as *Names, Trades, &c.* But if (*s*) or the Sound of (*s*) comes before (*es*), it is another Syllable; as *Horses, Affes, &c. Faces, Races, Pages, Prizes*: And when (*u*) follows (*g*) or (*q*); as in *Quart, Guide, Guilt, &c.* and when (*e*) is follow'd by (*n*); as in *even, Heaven, &c.* But when this (*e*) is generally left out, they become one Syllable every where.

*Eight Letters in some Syllables we find.
And no more Syllables in Words are join'd.*

[2] As there are but Eight Letters in any Syllable, so has no Word above Seven or Eight Syllables, (and few in *English* so many) as *Re-con-ci-li-a-ti-on, In-com-pre-hen-si-bi-li-ty*.

To

In every Word, therefore, there are as many Syllables as there are Vowels simple or compound, and each of these in its Formation requires a distinct Motion of the Pectoral Muscles. Thus *a, a, a*, make Three Syllables, form'd by so many Motions, distinguish'd by small Stops betwixt each Expiration or Breathing, whereas one (*a*) of the same Length is form'd but by one.

[2] In *Hebrew* all the Syllables begin with a Consonant, allowing *Aleph* to be one; and a Syllable has never more than one Vowel.

[3] At

To divide Syllables justly in Writing, especially when Part of a Word is written in one Line, and Part in another, this is a general Rule.

*When any single Consonant is seen,
Single or double Vowels plac'd between,
The Consonant divides still with the last,
But to the first the (P) and (X) join fast.*

When a single Consonant comes between Two Vowels, or between a single and double Vowel, it must in the dividing Syllables be join'd to the latter.

Except when (*x*) or (*p*) comes between Two Vowels; for they are join'd to the first, as in *Ex-ample*, *Ox-en*, *up-on*; except *Su-pine*.

*In compound Words its own will each retain,
The same additional Endings must obtain.*

Except Compounds, where each Word compounding retains its proper Letters; as *un-arm'd*, *un-usual*, *in-ure*, *ad-orn*, *with-out*, *with-in*, *Safe-ty*, *Love-ly*, *name less*, &c.

When a Word receives an additional Termination, or Ending; as (*ed*) *Wing-ed*; (*edst*) *Deliver-edst*; (*eth*) *Deliver-eth*; (for which *Delivers* is now written, and the former ending entirely rejected (*est*) *Deliver-est*; (*ing*) *Deliver-ing*; (*er*) *Deliver-er*; (*ance*) *Deliverance*.

*The Consonants preceding (l) and (r),
Follow'd by (e) never divided are.*

As *in-se-pa-ra-ble*, *Tri-ple*, *Mi-tre*, &c. But this Rule seems included in that of initial Consonants.

*Two Consonants betwixt Two Vowels, plac'd,
If they begin a Word, pursue the last:
But those that can no Word at all begin,
Can ne'er a Syllable, without a Sin.*

When Two Consonants come between two Vowels, if they be such as can begin a Word, they both go to the latter Vowel; but if they cannot begin a Word, they must be parted; one joining the first Vowel, and the other the latter.

To make this the plainer, we shall here enumerate the double Consonants that can begin Words, which you may easily know by putting (*e*), or any other Vowel, after them; and if they naturally and easily fall into one articulate Sound, they

they can begin a Word ; if not, they must be parted into distinct Syllables.

These Consonants that begin Words, are Thirty in Number.

{ *Bl. Bleed*
Cl. Clear
Fl. Fleet

{ *Gl. Glory*
Pl. Plane
Sl. Slight

{ *Br. Brace*
Cr. Croud.
Dr. Dry.
Fr. Frost.

{ *Gr. Grove*
Pr. Prince
Tr. Treat
Wr. Wrath

{ *Ch. Change*
Dw. Dwarf
gn. gnaw

{ *Sn. Snare*
Sp. Spill
Sq. Squib

{ *Kn. Knave*
Qu. Queen
sc. scant
sh. show
sm. smart

{ *st. still*
sw. swear
th. this
tw. two
Wb. Wheel

Nine Ways Words begin with Three Consonants, as

{ *Sch. Scheme*
Scr. Screen
Shr. Shrine
Skr. Skrew
Spr. Spread

{ *Spl. Spleen*
str. strain
Thr. Three
Thw. Thwart.

In short, all this Rule is comprized in this, that a *Mute* and a *Liquid* following one another, go together with the last *Vowel*, but all *double Consonants* in the Middle besides, are divided.

To this, as well as the former Rules, this Exception holds, That Compounds keep each its Part, as has been observed ; and additional Endings are distinct Syllables.

But such Consonants as cannot begin a Word, can never begin a Syllable, and must therefore be parted in the Division of Syllables ; as in *sel-dom*, for (*ld*) can't begin a Word ; (*lt*) in *Mul-ti-ple*, *Trum-pet*, *ar-dent*, *can-did*, *ac-cord*, *swagger*, &c.

When Three or more Consonants meet in the Middle of a Word, that Word is generally a Compound, and therefore each keeping its own, generally the first Consonant goes to
the

the first Vowel, and the other to the latter; as in *Con-tract*, *In-struc-tion*, &c.

*Two Vowels meeting, each with its full Sound,
Always to make Two Syllables are bound.*

If Two Vowels come together, and both fully sounded, they must be divided, and make Two Syllables, as *Re-enter*, *Mutual*, &c.

The following Observations relating to Syllables, or to the Pronunciation of Letters, as they are placed in Syllables, and not singly by themselves, we thought more proper for this place, than where they have been placed by others; for to talk of the Pronunciation of Syllables, before the Learner knows what a Syllable is, seems something preposterous.

The Sound of (*shull*) in Words of more Syllables than one is written in some by (*ti*) before (*al*), as *Credential*, *Equinoctial*, *Essential*, *Nuptial*, *Impartial*, &c. Some others write (*ci*) before (*al*), as *Artificial*, *Beneficial*, *Judicial*, *Prejudicial*, &c. and the Reason is, that the primitive Words, from whence these are deriv'd, end in (*ce*) *Artifice*, *Benefice*, *Prejudice*, &c. or from the *Latin* Words, in which as (*t*) or (*c*) is us'd, it continues in *English*, as *Judicial* from *Judicialis*, &c.

The Sound of (*shan*), must be written (*cian*) as *Arithmetician*, *Grecian*, *Logician*, *Magician*, &c. from *Arithmetic*, *Greeks*, *Logic*, and *Magic*, and so all others from the (*c*) in *Latin*, except *Ocean*, *Precision*, *Tertian*, *Egyptian*, *Asian*, &c.

The Sound of (*shate*) is express'd by (*ti*) before (*ate*), in *Gratiate*, *expatiate*, *negotiate*, *vitiate*, &c. except *emaciate*, *associate*, *nauseate*.

The Sound of (*shent*), is written by (*cient*), in *Ancient*, *Proficient*, &c. (*tient*), in *Patient*, *Impatient*, &c. and (*scient*) in *Omniscient*, &c.

The Sound of *zhun*, or *shun* in the End of Words must be written (*tion*), with (*t*), except *Allusion*, *Animadversion*, *Ascension*, *Asperision*, *Aversion*, *Circumcision*, *Collision*, *Collusion*, *Comprehension*, *Compulsion*, *Conclusion*, *Condescension*, *Confusion*, *Concussion*, *Convulsion*; *Decision*, *Decursion*, *Delusion*, *Division*, *Diffusion*, *Dimension*, *Discursion*, *Dispansion*, *Dispersion*, *Dissension*, *Distension*, *Dissuasion*, *Diversification*, *Divulsion*; *Effusion*, *Emulsion*, *Ereosion*, *Evasion*, *Eversion*, *Excision*, *Exclusion*, *Excursion*, *Expansion*, *Explosion*, *Expulsion*, *Extension*, *Extrusion*; *Illusion*, *Immersion*, *Incision*, *Inclusion*, *Incurision*, *Inbesion*, *Inspersion*, *Intervention*, *Intrusion*, *Invasion*, *Irrision*, *Mansion*; *Occasion*, *Occision*, *Occlusion*; *Pension*, *Perswasion*, *Provision*; *Reprehen-*
sion

tion, Reversion, Revulsion; Sponſion, Suffuſion; Verſion: To theſe add the following Words in [ſſion], as Admiſſion, Commiſſion, Compaſſion, Compreſſion, Conceſſion, Concuſſion, Confeſſion, Deceſſion, Depreſſion, Diſmiſſion; Expreſſion, Impreſſion, Interceſſion; Miſſion; Omiſſion, Oppreſſion; Paſſion, Percuſſion, Permiſſion, Proceſſion, Profeſſion, Progreſſion; Seceſſion, Seſſion, Succeſſion.

The following Words written (*ſition*), tho' moſt of the like Sound are ſpelt (*tition*), as *Petiſition; Acquiſition, Compoſition, Depoſition, Diſpoſition, Diſquiſition; Expoſition; Inquiſition, Interpoſition; Poſition; Tranſition, Tranſpoſition.* [3]

PART

[3] At the End of this ſhort *Part* of our *Division*, we ſhall lay down a new Method of learning to read in all Languages, as we find it in a *French* Author, and which perhaps an ingenious School maſter, may improve to the Advantage of his Scholars: To which we ſhall add, what Mr. *Lodwick*, our own Countryman, has advanc'd on the ſame Head.

This Method (ſays our Author) regards chiefly thoſe who cannot read: It is certain, that the Learners find no great Difficulty in learning the Letters themſelves, but the hardeſt Labour and Pains they go through, is in joining the Letters together in Syllables. For every Letter has its peculiar Name, which is pronounc'd differently by itſelf, from what it is in Conjunction with other Letters; for Example, if you teach a child to pronounce *Fry* in a Syllable you firſt make him pronounce *ef, er, y*; which muſt perfectly confound him, when he comes to join theſe Three Sounds together, out of them to form the Sound of the Syllable *Fry*.

The ſame Obſervation is made by Mr. *Lodwick*: As the preſent *Alphabets*, ſays he, are imperfect, ſo are alſo the *Primmers*, or firſt *Books*, wherein Children are taught to Spell and Read: Firſt, In not having a perfect *Alphabet*. And Secondly, In not being digeſted in ſuch a Method, as is fit and proper to teach them as they ought to be taught. For the uſual Way of teaching to ſpell, is to diſmember every Syllable (of more than one Letter) into many Syllables, by expreſſing every Letter apart, and *Syllabically*; and the Conſonants with ſuch a Vowel, as they are ordinarily named with, and then requiring them to join all theſe Syllables into one Word.

But how prepoſterous this Method is, one Inſtance for all will manifeſt. Suppoſe the Monosyllable *Brand*, to be ſpell'd, they

they will teach them thus to dismember it; *Bee, er, a, en, dee*, and then require them to join these into one Syllable, which 'tis impossible for them to do, and they must express this one Syllable by Five Syllables, which was not design'd; whereas they should teach them to express every Syllable intire at first Sight, without dismembring it; and to do this, they must proceed gradually: First beginning with the most *simple Syllables*, and so by degrees proceeding to the more difficult and *compound-ed*, till they can readily pronounce a whole Syllable at first Sight; even the most difficult that are. To that End let all the *Primmers* be thus contriv'd; at the Top of the Leaf let all the Vowels be plac'd singly in Order, as they follow in one Rank; and in the same place Syllables, 1st, Of *one Vowel*, and *one Consonant* following it, throughout all the Variations; then of *one Consonant* and *one Vowel* following that. 2^{dly}, Of *two Consonants* before, and *one Vowel* following throughout the Variations; 3^{dly}, Of *one Vowel*, and *three or four Consonants* following; and of *three Consonants* going before, and *one Vowel* following. 4^{thly}, Of *One, Two, and Three, Consonants* going before a *Vowel*; and *One, Two, Three, or Four Consonants* following. 5^{thly}, Of some Syllables with Diphthongs and Triptongs. For Example:

<i>a.</i>	<i>e.</i>	<i>i.</i>	<i>o.</i>	<i>u.</i> &c.
<i>ab.</i>	<i>eb.</i>	<i>ib.</i>	<i>ob.</i>	<i>ub,</i> &c.
<i>ad.</i>	<i>ed.</i>	<i>id.</i>	<i>od.</i>	<i>ud,</i> &c.
<i>ba.</i>	<i>be.</i>	<i>bi.</i>	<i>bo.</i>	<i>bu,</i> &c.
<i>ald.</i>	<i>eld.</i>	<i>ild.</i>	<i>old.</i>	<i>uld,</i> &c.
<i>dra.</i>	<i>dre.</i>	<i>dri.</i>	<i>dro.</i>	<i>drue,</i> &c.
<i>balm.</i>	<i>belm.</i>	<i>bilm.</i>	<i>bolm.</i>	<i>bulm,</i> &c.

After this, place a Number of Words of *Two, Three, or Four Syllables*, from the more easy, to the more difficult Expressions without heed to their Significations; tho' in our Opinions, if there could be some Order and Connexion in their Signification, it would help the Memory: Further, let there follow some Words of several Syllables, with the Accent variously plac'd, as on the *first, second, and third, &c.*

Thus far Mr. *Lodwick*, who proceeds farther, but that relating too much to his *Universal Alphabet*, cannot have a Place here.

To this we shall add some Rules of Spelling, which though we did not think full enough of Demonstration to be inserted in the Body of the Rules, yet since they really afford Matter of Speculation

culation sufficient to employ the curious Teacher or Learner of his *Mother Tongue*, and may perhaps be rendered capable of Improvement, we shall here add. They were given to us by one Dr. Jones who (as we guess by his Name) being a *Welshman*, may, in some Particulars of his Book, be misled by the Pronunciation of his own Tongue; yet is his Book worth our Consideration. But this will be plainer from his Observations. His Maxims are, first, *That all Words were Originally Written as Spelt*. Though this may be disputed, yet the Consequence is not so great, as to make us enter into the Controversy.

His next is, *That all Terms which have since alter'd their Sound*, (the Origin of the Difficulty of Spelling,) *did it for Ease and Pleasure*.

From the *harder, harsher, longer*, to the *easier, pleasanter, and shorter* Sounds, which, for that Reason became the more usual. From hence it follows, *That all Words that can be sounded several Ways, must be written according to the hardest, sharpest, longest and most unusual Sound*. And this Rule he assures us, is without Exception in our Tongue.

The longest Sound is that, which expresses most simple Sounds, or sounds the same Number after the longest manner; thus, if you say *agen* and *again*, it must be written *again*; because it sounds more Letters. The same may be said of *Favor* and *Favour*.

The more unusual Sound is known to all by common Practice.

Thus none can fail to know which is the *longest* and most *unusual Sound*, and that is sufficient almost in all Cases, because the Length and Unusualness of the Sound causes it to be the harder Sound; which is the third Thing to be observed in this Universal Rule.

But to make the Use of this Rule compleat, because it may happen that some Words (tho' not many) may sound divers Ways, and yet express the same Number of Letters, and that in the same Manner, either long or short, and both Sounds like usual, as in *Anger*, and *Angur*; *Finger*, and *Fingur*, &c. it will be useful to know which in such Case is the easier and pleasanter simple Sound, and to which harder and harsher Sounds they are so like, as that they are apt to exchange Sounds with them.

A is much easier than *E* or *O*; *B*, than *P*; *D*, than *T*, or *b* in *tho'*; *E* than *I*, *O*, *U*; *E E*, than *E*, *I*, *O*; *G*, than *C* for *K*, or hard *C*, or *ch*. in *cheer*; *M*, *ng*, than *N*; *Ou*, than *O*. or *U*;

U; *Sb*, than *Cb* or *S*; *T* in *The*, than *To*; short *U*, than *A*, *E*, *I*, *O*; *V*, than *F* or *Pb*; *Z*, than *S* in *so*.

Simple Sounds are easier than Compounds, Compounds of Two Sounds than Compounds of Three, and so on; and Compounds of easy Sounds, than Compounds of hard Sounds.

Double Characters are to be reckon'd as single, if they have but one Sound.

We have omitted the particular Proofs of these Rules, which the Reader may consult his Book for, if his Curiosity prompt him; this being sufficient to give Ground to his Enquiry: And we believe in trying, he will find 'em sometimes pretty true, if not always.

The End of the Second Part.





P A R T III.

Of WORDS. [1]

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

WE come now from mere Sounds to [2] *Words*, which convey something to the Understanding: For by these we are able to express our Thoughts, or Sentiments of all that we see, feel, hear, taste, touch, or understand. All *Knowledge* indeed draws its Original from the Senses; and our *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reasoning*, under which the several Classes or Orders of Words are rang'd proceed

[1] It may here be proper to explain what we mean by a *Word*, which we think may be thus defin'd: *A distinct articulate Sound, which Men have made the audible Sign of some one of their Thoughts.* Or if we rather take it from Words, as Written and Spoken, we may define it thus; *Words are distinct articulate Sounds, implying by common Consent some Thoughts or Operations of the Mind express'd by some certain Marks, Figures, or Characters agreed on by Men, as the visible Signs of those Sounds and Thoughts.*

This last Definition includes Words in both Senses, that is, both as Spoken and Written.

[2] Man being a Conversible Animal, and form'd for Society, there was a Necessity of some Ways or Means of conveying the Mind or Thoughts of one Man to another; which, tho' it might be in some measure done by the Eyes, Hands, Fingers, Motions and Gesticulations of the Body, &c. as in the Pantomimes of the Antients, and Mutes of the Seraglio, &c. yet those being more imperfect, as well as more troublesome and tedious, Nature (which always chooses the easiest and
most

ceed from these Notices of Things and Beings, and their Relations to each other, and have no other Source: By these we know, that there are Things; that these Things have certain Qualities, Beings, Actions, or Passions, &c. whence it seems pretty plain, that the *Words*, which are to express our Sentiments of these Things, must bear some Proportion and Likeness to the Things they are to express. Being therefore in *Conversation*, or *Writing*, to express or signify all the Objects of our Senses, and the mental or intellectual Deductions from them; *Words* are naturally, to that End, to be divided into Four original Classes or Orders, *i. e.* *Things*, or rather the *Names* of *Things*; the *Qualities* of those *Things*, the *Circumstances*, *Actions*, *Passions*, and *Beings* of *Things*, with their *Relations*, *Regards*, and *Connexions* to, and with each other in Sentences.

According to this, there are Four Parts of Speech, or Four Heads, to which every Word in all Languages may be reduc'd.

The Four Parts of Speech.

[3] NAMES. } AFFIRMATIONS.
 QUALITIES. } PARTICLES, or the *Manner of Words*.

C H A P. VI.

most efficacious Way) directs Mankind to impart the Sentiments of the Mind, rather by the Voice, and the Motions of the Tongue, which are more easy in the several Variations of Sounds than any other Way. For this Reason, Men have distinguish'd every Modification of the Voice by a particular Letter, (of which we have already discours'd at large, both in the Text and the Notes); and tho' these Letters are not many in Number, yet are they, by their various Conjunctions, sufficient for all the Languages that ever were, or ever can be in the Universe. They are indeed but Twenty-six in our Tongue, and yet they may be so variously dispos'd, as to make more than five hundred and seventy-six several Words of two Letters, and Twenty-six times as many Words may be form'd of three Letters; that is to say, Fifteen thousand and six; and Twenty-six times as many more may be made of four several Letters, that is, Nine hundred thousand thirty six; and so on in Proportion. From this manifold Generation of Words, from the various Combinations of Letters, we may judge of their vast Variety, as being indeed not much less than infinite.

[3] In all Languages there are *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*: *Names* signify *Things*; *Qualities* signify the *Manner* or

or Qualities of those Things; *Affirmations* affirm something of them. And there are other Words, which signify neither of these, but the Relation of one to the other, and those are the *Manner of Words*: But these Relations of Words to Words are of several Kinds, which are express'd by some of these Particles, or short Words, *of, to, for, O, by, with, through, in, &c.* of which in *Construction*.

It is true, that some have endeavour'd to reduce all Words to three Classes, which we shall consider in our Notes; but others vainly boast, or pretend to contract 'em yet closer into Two, either ignorant of the Operations of the Mind, which they were invented to express, and which can never be brought into that Compass, as will be plain from what follows; or for want of considering what they say, or to be thought Men of wonderful Penetration by ignorant Hearers. Those Gentlemen, who have with great Clearness of Reason propos'd them under Three Heads, have however told us, that some Philosophers have thought themselves oblig'd to add a Fourth, distinct from the other Three, as will appear from the Sequel.

Words having something corporeal and something spiritual in 'em, we may say, they consist of Soul and Body. The Ideas of the Mind, when they command the Organs of the Voice, to form such Sounds which are the audible Signs of those Ideas, are the Soul of Words; but Sounds form'd by the Organs of the Voice, are the material Part, and may be call'd the *Body of Words*.

We shall therefore here consider them, as they are abstracted from Sound, in their Relation to the Mind of Man, and in which we have the Advantage of all other Creatures, and a very strong Proof of our Reason superior to them; that is, by the Use we make of Words to convey our Thoughts to each other, and that surprizing Invention of combining Six and Twenty Sounds in so multiplicitous a Manner, as we have said; by which we discover the Variety of our Thoughts, and all our Sentiments on all manner of Subjects, tho' there be no real or natural Likeness betwixt the Words and Operations of the Soul of Man; but only Signs by Compact and Agreement, to signify our Thoughts.

Words therefore being (as is said) invented to express our Thoughts, it follows, that we cannot perfectly discover the different Sorts and Significations of Words, without first considering what passes in our Minds.

It is agreed by all Philosophers, That there are Three Operations of the Mind, *viz. Perception, Judgment, and Reasoning.*
P E R-

PERCEPTION is the simple Apprehension of any Thing, or Quality of a Thing whether purely *Intellectual*, as when we simply think of the *Being*, *Eternity* and *Decree of God*; or *Corporeal*, and *Material*, as a *Square*, a *Circle*, a *Horse*, a *Dog*.

JUDGMENT affirms, that the Thing we *perceive*, is so, or not so: as having the Ideas of the *Earth* and *Roundness*, we affirm, *that the Earth is round*.

By REASONING, we draw Consequences to evince the Truth, or Fallacy of a contested Proposition, by comparing it with one or more incontestable Propositions; or in short, from Two Judgments, to infer a Third, as when we have judg'd that Virtue is Praise worthy, and that *Patience* is a Virtue, we infer and conclude that *Patience* is Praise-worthy.

Hence we may easily observe, that this *third* Operation of the Mind, is but an Extension of the *second*. It will therefore be sufficient for our present Subject, to consider the first Two, or what of the first is contain'd in the second; for if we seriously attend what passes in our Mind, we shall find, that we very rarely consider the simple Perception of Things, without affirming something or other of it, which is the Judgment.

This Judgment we make of Things, as when we say *the Earth is round*, is call'd a *Proposition*; and therefore every Proposition naturally includes Two *Terms*, one call'd the *Subject*, which is the Thing, of which the *Affirmation* is, as *the Earth*; and the other is call'd the *Attribute*, which is the Thing that is affirmed of the *Subject*, as *round*; and then, *is*, which is the Connexion betwixt these Two Terms.

But it is easy to perceive, that these two Terms do properly belong to the first Operation of the Mind, because that is what we *conceive*, and is the Object of our Thoughts; and that the Connexion belongs to the *second*, which may be properly call'd the Action of the *Mind*, and the Manner in which we think.

And thus the greatest Distinction of that which passes in our Mind, is to signify, that we may consider the Objects of our Thoughts, and the Form and Manner of them, of which the chief is the *Judgment*. But we must besides refer thither the *Conjunctions*, *Disjunctions*, and other the like Operations of the Mind, as well as all the other Motions of the Soul, as *Desires*, *Commands*, *Interrogations*, &c.

From hence it follows, that Men wanting signs to express what passes in the Mind, the most general Distinction of Words must be of those which signify the Objects, and Manner of our Thoughts; though it frequently happens, that they do not signify the Manner alone, but in Conjunction with the Objects, as

we shall soon demonstrate, having already shewn, that the Knowledge of what passes in the Mind is necessary for the understanding the Principles of GRAMMAR.

The Words of the first Class, are those which we call *Names*, *Personal Names*; QUALITIES deriv'd from *Words of Affirmation*, or *Verbs* (call'd in the *Latin* Participles), *Fore-plac'd Words*, (or *Prepositions*), and *added Words*, (or *Adverbs*). Those of the second, are *Words of Affirmation*, (or *Verbs*) *joining Words*, (or *Conjunctions*) and *Interjections*, as the old GRAMMARIANS call'd them absurdly, distinguishing them into a peculiar Part of Speech, which are plainly only *added Words* of *Passion*, which all derive themselves, by a necessary Consequence, from the natural Manner of expressing our Thoughts.

CHAP. VI.

Of NAMES. [I]

*Whate'er we see, feel, hear, or touch, or taste,
Or in our Understanding's Eye is plac'd,
NAMES properly we call; for always they
Some certain Image to the Mind convey;
As Man, Horse, House, Virtue, and Happiness,
And all such Words, as Things themselves express.*

[2] **N**AMES express the *Things themselves*, that is, every Thing that is the Object of our several Senses, Reflection, and Understanding; which conveying some certain *Idea* or *Image* to the Mind, they want not the Help of any other Word to make us understand 'em. Thus when we hear any one say, *A Man, a House, a Horse, Virtue, Vice, Happiness, &c.* we perfectly understand what he means.

*Before the NAMES, (a), (an), or (the), may be,
But Thing you never after them can see.*

Since

[1] The Words that signify the simple Objects of our Thoughts, are in all Languages, but *English*, call'd NAMES; but our first Formers of *Grammar*, either out of Affectation or Folly, corrupted the *Latin* Word *Nomen* into the barbarous Sound *Noun*, as it is call'd in the *Vulgar Grammars*. And thus the *Grammarians* have made a Division of NAMES, calling the

Since *Names* express the *Things themselves*, you cannot put the Word *Thing* after 'em, without Nonsense. Thus you cannot say *Man Thing*, *Virtue Thing*, and the like.

They also admit of *a* or *the* before 'em, or *an*, if they begin with a Vowel.

*Of Names three several Sorts there are,
As Common, Proper, Personal, declare.*

There

Name of a Thing or Substance a *Noun Substantive*, and that, which signifies the *Manner* or *Quality*, a *Noun Adjective*. But these additional Terms of *Substantive* and *Adjective* seem to us superfluous and burthensome to the Minds of the young Learners, without any manner of Benefit to the Understanding; for the different Nature of the Two Words is fully express'd by the Terms NAMES and QUALITIES, and it is vain to do that by many, which may be done by few. Nature is simple in all her Operations, and he is the best Engineer, who produces the Effect, with the fewest Wheels, Screws, &c.

Those, who use these Terms, give this Reason for them, that they are call'd *Adjectives*, or (as some) *Adnouns*, because having no natural Substance of their own, they subsist by nothing but the *Noun Substantive*, to which they are join'd, as in these Two Words, *round Earth*; the last is the *Substantive*, and the first only signifies the *Manner* or *Quality* of its Being: That is, the *Adjective*, *Adname*, or *Quality*, cannot be put by itself in any Sentence; it would not make Sense, it wou'd convey no Idea to the Mind; for to say a *Round*, a *White*, a *Black*, a *Crooked*, &c. is to say nothing: It requires therefore some *Name*, or *Noun Substantive*, as they call it, to be join'd to it, to make Sense, or form any Idea; as a *round Ball*, a *white Horse*, a *black Hat*, a *crooked Stick*, are true Objects of the Thoughts, and every Body understands them: But if you say, a *Man*, a *Horse*, a *House*, &c. we perfectly know what you mean; and therefore subsisting by itself, in good Sense it is call'd a *Substantive Name*, or in the vulgar Phrase a *Name Substantive*.

[2] The Objects of our Thoughts are either *Things*, as the *Sun*, the *Earth*, *Water*, *Fire*, *Air*, *Wood*, &c. which we generally call SUBSTANCE; or the *Manner* of Things, as to be *round*, *red*, *hard*, *knowing*, &c. which are called ACCIDENTS. And there is this Difference betwixt the *Things*, or *Substances*, and the *Manner of Things*, or *Accidents*, that the *Substances* subsist by themselves; but the *Accidents* subsist only by and in the *Substances*.

This

There are Three Sorts of NAMES; *Common Names* are such as agree to, or express a whole Kind; as the Name *Horse* signifies *my Horse*, *your Horse*, and all the *Horses* that are.

Proper Names distinguish *Particulars* of the Kind from each other; as *Cæsar*, *Pompey*, *Cicero*, distinguish those from all the rest of Mankind. The same holds of the proper Names of *Cities*, *Towns*, *Mountains*, *Rivers*, *Countries*, &c.

Personal

This is what makes the principal Difference betwixt Words, that signify the simple Objects of our Thoughts; the Words which signify *Substances*, or the Things themselves, are call'd *Names* or *Substantive Names*; and those which signify *Accidents*, by expressing the *Subjects* with which these Accidents agree, are call'd *Qualities*, or (according to the common Way) *Adjective Names* or *Adnames*.

This is the first Original of *Names*, both *Substantive* and *Adjective*, or *Names* and *Qualities*. But we have not stop't here; for less Regard has been had to the Signification, than to the Manner of signifying. For because the Substance is that which subsists by itself, the Appellation of *Substantive Names* has been given to all those Words which subsist by themselves, in Discourse, without wanting another *Name* to be join'd to them, tho' they did only signify Accidents. Thus on the contrary, even those Words, which signify Substances, are call'd *Adjectives*, when by their Manner of signifying they may be join'd to other *Names* in Discourse: As the *Warriour God*, the *Bowyer King*, and the like, which tho' they are call'd *Names*, put together by Apposition, degenerate here plainly into the Signification of Qualities belonging to the *Names*, and are therefore *Names* degenerated into *Qualities*, or *Substantives* into *Adjectives*.

But the Reason that renders a Name incapable of subsisting by itself, is when, besides its distinct Signification, it has another more confus'd, which we call the CONNOTATION of a Thing, to which that agrees which is meant by the distinct Signification.

Thus the distinct Signification of *Red*, is *Redness*; but it signifies the Subject of that Redness confusedly; which makes it not capable of subsisting by itself in Discourse, because we must express or understand the Word which signifies the Subject. As, therefore, that *Connotation* makes the *Adjective*, or *Quality*; so when that is taken away from Words which signify Accidents, they become *Substantives* or *Names*: As from *Colour'd*,

Personal Names are us'd, when we speak of *Persons* or *Things*, to avoid the Repetition of the same Word, and supply the Place of Names of Men, Women, and Things.

*Two different Endings different Numbers show,
And which no other Parts of Speech does know.*

[3] *Names,*

lour'd, Colour; from *Red, Redness*; from *Hard, Hardness*; from *Prudent, Prudence*, &c. On the contrary, when you add to Words signifying *Substances*, that *Connotation*, or confus'd Signification of a Thing, to which the *Substances* have Relation, it makes them *Adjectives*, or *Qualities*, as *Man, Manly, Man-kind*.

The *Greeks* and the *Latins* have an infinite Number of these Words; as *ferreus, aureus, bovinus, vitulinus*, &c. but they are not so frequent in the *Hebrew*, nor in *French*, and many of the vulgar Tongues; but in the *English*, we think, they are not more rare than in the dead Languages.

Again, if we take these *Connotations* from these *Adjectives* or *Qualities* form'd of *Names*, or of *Substantives*, we make them new *Substantives*, which we may properly call *Derivatives*; and so *Humanity* comes from *Humane*, and *Humanus* from *Homo*.

But there is another Sort of *Names*, which pass for *Substantives*, tho' in reality they are *Adjectives*, since they signify an *accidental* Form; and besides, denote a Subject to which the Form agrees: Such are the Names of the several Offices and Professions of Men; as *King, Philosopher, Painter, Soldier*, &c. but the Reason why these pass for *Substantives*, is, that they can have nothing but Man for their Subject, at least according to the ordinary way of Speaking, and the first Imposition of Names; so not necessary to join their *Substantives* with them, since they may be understood without any Confusion, and they can have no Relation to any other Subject. By this Means these Words have obtain'd what is peculiar to *Substantives*, viz. to subsist by themselves in Discourse.

'Tis for this very same Reason that certain *Names*, and *Personal Names*, or *Pronouns*, are taken *Substantively*, because they relate to a Substance so general, that it is easily understood, as our *Country, Earth* is understood; *Judaea, Province* is understood.

And we have observ'd, that *Adjectives* or *Qualities* have Two Significations; one distinct of the *Form*, and one confus'd of the *Subject*: But we infer not from thence, that they signifying

[3] *Names* in general signifying either one or more of the same kind, must have Two different Numbers to express this Difference; as, the *Singular*, which signifies but *One*; and the *Plural*, which signifies *more than one*; and all *Names* discover this Distinction of Number, by the changing their Endings; as *Man*, One Man; *Men*, more than one.

This likewise gives another Mark to distinguish *Names* from the other Parts of Speech: For tho' the *Affirmations* have Two Numbers,

ying the most distinct Signification, are also the most direct; for they signify the Subject directly, tho' more confusedly, but the Form only indirectly, tho' more distinctly. Thus *White* signifies directly something *that has Whiteness*, but in a very confus'd Manner, without denoting in particular any one Thing that may have *Whiteness*; and it signifies *Whiteness* only indirectly, but in as distinct a Manner as the Word *Whiteness* itself.

There are Two Sorts of *Ideas*, one represents to us a single Thing, as the *Idea* of one's *Father*, *Mother*, a *Friend*, his own *Horse*, his own *Dog*, &c. The other *Idea* presents to us several Things together, but of the same Kind, as the *Idea* of *Man* in general, *Horses* in general, &c. But not having different *Names* for these different *Ideas*, we call the *Names* of single *Ideas*, *proper Names*; as the Name of *Plato*, which agrees to one particular Philosopher, so *London* to one City; and those *Names* which signify common *Ideas*, general or appellative *Names*, as the Word *Man*, which agrees with all Mankind; of the same Kind are the Words *Lyon*, *Dog*, *Horse*, &c. yet the proper Name often belongs to several at the same Time, as *Peter*, *John*, *Robert*, &c. but this is only by Accident, by reason that many have taken the same Name; but then other *Names* are added, which determine and restore the Quality of a *proper Name*. Thus the Name of *Charles* is common to many, yet if you add the (*2d*), it becomes proper to the King of that Country where 'tis spoken. Nor is it necessary sometimes to make any Addition, because the Circumstances of the Discourse sufficiently denote the Person that is spoken of.

[3] The *common Names*, which agree to several, may be consider'd several Ways: For *First*, They may either be apply'd to one of the Things, to which they agree, or may all be consider'd in a certain Unity, which the Philosophers call UNIVERSAL UNITY. *2dly*, They may be apply'd to several together, considering them as several.

Numbers, yet they are not thus distinguish'd; as we shall see, when we come to 'em. There are Two more Distinctions of *Names*, which come properly after all the Parts of Speech, because they depend on the Knowledge of 'em.

*To Singular Names we always add an (s)
When we the Plural Number would express;
Or (es), for more delightful easy Sound,
When'er the Singular to end is found
In (ex), or (ze), (ch), (sh), or (s),
(Ce), (ge), when they their softer Sound confess.*

The Singular Number is made *Plural* by adding (s) to the Singular; as *Tree, Trees; Hand, Hands; Mile, Miles*: But when the Necessity of Pronunciation requires it, in the Place of (s) we must add (es); that is, when the singular ends in (s) or (se), (ze), (x), (ß), (ce), (ch), or (ge) pronounced soft, as *Horse, Horses; Fox, Foxes; Fish, Fishes*, and *Fish: Maze, Mazes; Prince, Princes; Tench, Tenches; Page, Pages*; by which means the *Plural Number* consists of Two Syllables, tho' the Singular is but one; as all the foregoing Examples shew.

<i>The following Examples are yet seen,</i>	}
<i>When for the (s) the Plural ends in (en),</i>	
<i>As Oxen, Women, Chicken, Brethren, Men.</i>	
<i>Cow has the Plural Cows, or Keen, or Kine;</i>	
<i>And so has Sow, the Plural Sows, or Swine.</i>	Ox,

To distinguish these two Sorts of Ways of *Signifying*, two Numbers have been invented, the *Singular*, as a *Man*; the *Plural*, as *Men*. Nay, the *Greeks* have yet another Number, call'd the *Dual Number*, or signifying Two; the *Hebrews* have the same, but that is only when the Words signify a Thing double either by Nature, as the *Eyes*, the *Hands*, the *Feet*; or by Art, as *Scissors, Tongs, &c.*

As for *Common* and *Appellative Names*, they seem all naturally to require a Plural Number, yet are there several which have none, whether by the Influence of Custom only, or some Reason; so the *Names of Gold, Silver, Iron*, or other Metals, have scarce any Plural in any Language. The Reason of which we fancy to be this, That because of the great Resemblance there is between the Parts of Metals, every Species thereof is not considered, as having several Individuals under it. This is very palpable in the *French*, where to denote a singular Metal, we add the Particle of Partition, *de L'Or, de L'Argent, du Fer*, Gold, Silver, Iron, as we say *Irons*, but then it signifies not the Metal

Ox, Chick, Man, and all deriv'd from it, as *Herfeman, Footman, &c. Womàn, Child, Brother*, have the Plural in (*en*); tho' *Brethren* fignifying both Brothers, and Sisters, has likewise *Brothers*; and *Swine* fignifies both Male and Female, and with (*a*) before it, is us'd for *one Hog, or Sow*. *Chicken* is fometimes likewise used for *one Chick*: *Deer, Sheep, Fern*, are the fame in both Numbers; of the Singular with (*a*) before them.

To thefe Irregulars fome more add yet;

As Loufe, Lice; Moufe, Mice; Goose, Geefe; and Foot,
Feet,

And Tooth, Teeth; Die, Dice; and alfo Penny, Pence,
Deriv'd from Penny's Criticks fay, long fince.

The Names, whose Sing'lars end in (f) or (fe),

Their Plurals have in (ves), we always fee;

As Calf, Calves; Sheaf, Sheaves; half, halves; and
Wife, Wives;

Leaf, Leaves; Loaf, Loaves; Shelf, Shelves; Self,
Selves; Knife, Knives;

Add unto thefe Wolf, Wolves; Thief, Thieves; Life,
Lives.

Staff

Metal itself, but Instruments made of Iron; the Latin *Æra* fignifies Money, or a certain founding Instrument, like the Cymbal, &c.

But this Difference of Number in Names, is exprefs'd by a Difference of Termination or Ending, as is exprefs'd in the Text. But tho' *Qualities* fhould have a Plural, becaufe they naturally imply an uncertain Signification of a Subject, which renders them capable of agreeing with feveral Subjects, at leaft as to the Manner of fignifying, tho' in effect they did only agree to one, yet in *English* there is no Difference of the Termination or Ending, to diftinguifh this Agreement.

There are Three Things more, which are *Cafe, Declenfion, and Gender*, which the *English Names* have not. But the Cafes of the *Latin and Greek* expreffing the Relations of Word to Word, and their Dependance on each other, we fupply that with greater Eafe by Prepositions, as by *of, to, for, from, &c.* But thefe having a peculiar regard to the Conftitution of Words join'd in Sentences, we fhall refer our Learner to that Place.

Tho' we have (in our Language) no Note of Difference of Gender, either by the Ending or Termination of the Words, or any Article proper to them; yet we thought it proper in this general View of GRAMMAR, which we give you in

Staff has *Staves* ; tho' the double (*ff*) Singular generally makes double (*ff*) with (*s*) in the Plural ; as *Cliff*, *Skiff*, *Muff*, &c. *Mischief* is us'd both *Mischieues* and *Mischiefs* in the Plural ; (*f*) and (*ve*) are so nearly related, that they easily pass from one into the other, in all Languages.

Except Hoof, Roof, and Wharf, and Proof, Relief, Ruff, Cuff, Skiff, Muff, Dwarf, Handkerchief, and Grief.

There may be some others of the same Kind, these are enough to make good the Exception in the Sound of those Singulars that end in (*s*) and (*tb*) : There is a like Softning or Alleviation, without changing the Letters, as *House*, *Houses* ; as it were *Houzes* ; *Path*, *Paths* ; *Cloth*, *Cloths*, or *Cloaths*. *Earth* keeps its harder Sound when 'tis us'd in the Plural, which is but seldom.

*Custom, to which all Languages must bow,
Does to some Names no Singular allow.*

Use

these Notes, to add something on this Head in relation to other Tongues.

The *Adnames*, or *Adjective Names*, or, as we call them, *Qualities*, naturally agree to several ; and therefore it has been thought fit, both for the avoiding of Confusion and the Ornament of Discourse, with Variety of Terminations to invent a Diversity in the *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, or *Qualities*, suitable to the *Names* or *Substantives*, with which they agree.

Now Men having consider'd themselves, and observ'd the considerable Difference of the two Sexes, thought fit to vary the same Adjective Names, by giving them different Terminations, as they are differently apply'd to Men or Women ; as when we say in Latin, *bonus Vir*, a good Man, in the Masculine ; speaking of a Woman, they change the Ending of the *Adjective* or *Quality*, and say *bona Mulier*.

But in *English* we are more strict in this ; for we express the Difference of Sex by different Words, and not by the Variation of *Epithets* or *Substantives* ; as *Boar*, *Sow* ; *Boy*, *Girl* ; *Brother*, *Sister* ; *Buck*, *Doe* ; *Bull*, *Cow* ; *Bullock*, *Heifer* ; *Cock*, *Hen* ; *Dog*, *Bitch* ; *Duck*, *Drake* ; *Father*, *Mother* ; *Goose*, *Gander* ; *Horse*, *Mare* ; *Husband*, *Wife* ; *Lad*, *Lass* ; *King*, *Queen*, *Man*, *Woman* ; *Master*, *Dame* ; *Nephew*, *Niece* ; *Peacock*, *Peahen* ; *Ram*, *Ewe* ; *Son*, *Daughter* ; *Uncle*, *Aunt* ; *Widower*, *Widow* ; *Wizard*, *Witch* ; *Batchelor*, *Maid*, *Virgin* ; *Knight* or *Lord*, *Lady*. But the following Twenty-four Fe-

minines

Use has in *English*, as well as other Languages, deny'd the Singular Number to some Words; as *Annals*, *Alps*, *Ashes*, *Bowels*, *Bellows*, *Breeches*, *Calends*, *Cresses*, *Goods*, (meaning Things possess'd by any one, as the Goods of Fortune) *Entrails*, *Ides*, *Smallows* of every Kind, *Nones*, *Scissors*, *Snuffers*, *Sheers*, *Tongs*, *Lungs*, &c.

*To others she, with arbitrary Will,
Denies the Claim of Plural Number still;
All Proper Names we in this Rule contain,
The Names of Liquids, Herbs, most Sorts of Grain,
Fat unctuous Matter, Wax, Pitch, and Glue,
The Names of Virtues, Vice, and Metals too.*

As we have some Words, which have no Singular Number, so on the other hand we have many more without a Plural; some by the Nature of the Things signified, others by meer Use. Thus all proper Names of Men, Women, Mountains, Rivers, or any other Creature, to whom, for Distinction, a proper Name is given; as *Bucephalus* to the Horse of *Alexander the Great*; These have no Plural Number, because they naturally agree but to one: For when we say the *Cæsars*, the *Alexanders*, the *Mordaunts*, and the like, it is figuratively, including under those

minines or Females, are distinguished from the Males, by the Variation of the Termination of the Male into (*ess*;)

<i>Abbot</i>	<i>Abess</i>	<i>Lion</i>	<i>Lioness</i>
<i>Actor</i>	<i>Actress</i>	<i>Marquis</i>	<i>Marques, or</i> <i>Marchioness</i>
<i>Adulterer</i>	<i>Adulteress</i>		
<i>Ambassador</i>	<i>Ambadress</i>	<i>Master</i>	<i>Mistress</i>
<i>Count</i>	<i>Countess</i>	<i>Prince</i>	<i>Princess</i>
<i>Deacon</i>	<i>Deaconess</i>	<i>Prior</i>	<i>Prioress</i>
<i>Duke</i>	<i>Duchess</i>	<i>Patron</i>	<i>Patroness</i>
<i>Electer</i>	<i>Electress</i>	<i>Poet</i>	<i>Poetess</i>
<i>Emperor</i>	<i>Empress</i>	<i>Prophet</i>	<i>Prophetess</i>
<i>Governor</i>	<i>Governess</i>	<i>Shepherd</i>	<i>Shepherdess</i>
<i>Heir</i>	<i>Heiress</i>	<i>Tutor</i>	<i>Tutress</i>
<i>Jew</i>	<i>Jewess</i>	<i>Viscount</i>	<i>Viscountess.</i>

And two in (*ix*), as *Administratrix*, *Executrix*.

This is all that our Language knows, of any Thing like the Genders, which is only a different Way of expressing the Male and the Female, but the old Languages have gone farther: For as some *Adjectives* or *Qualities* might have Relation to other Things besides Men and Women, it was thought necessary to

those proper Names all those who resemble them in their Valour, Conduct, Virtue, &c. except *Alps*, and perhaps *Appennines*.

To these we may add the Names of *Virtues, Vices, Habits*, abstract Qualities; of *Metals, Herbs, Spices, Liquids, unctuous Matter, Fat, Wax, Pitch, Glue*; most Sorts of Grain, as *Wheat, Rye, Barley, Darnel*, except *Oats* and *Tares*, (*Peas, Beans*, and *Fetches* are Pulse, not Grain, tho' set down by some for 'em) likewise *Chaff, Bran, Meal*. The Names of Spices, as *Pepper, Ginger, Mace, Cinnamon*, except *Cloves* and *Nutmegs*; Of Herbs and Drugs, *Cochineal, Sotherwood, Grass, Maddier, Rue, Moss, Fennel, Rosemary, Wolfswort, Cliver, Endiff, Sage, Parsley, Spikenard, Spinach, Savory, Hellebore, Hemlock, &c.* except *Colworts, Letks, Artichoaks, Cabbages, Nettles*, and those whose Names are compounded with *Foot*, or *Tongue*, as *Crowfoot, Adders-tongue*: Of Liquids, as *Air, Choler, Blood, Must, or new Wine, Beer, Ale, Spittle, Snet, Sweat, Urine, Vinegar, Milk*: Of unctuous Matter, as *Honey, Butter, Fat, Grease, Amber, Wax, Marrow, Pitch, Rosin, Tar, Glue, Lard, Dirt, Sulphur, Bitumen, Brimstone*: Of Metals, as *Lead, Brass, Pewter, Tin, Copper,*

appropriate to them, one or other of the Terminations invented for *Men* and *Women*: Hence all other Names, or Substantives, have been rang'd under the Heads of Masculine or Feminine, and sometimes indeed not without a plausible Reason, as in the Names of Offices properly belonging to Men, as *Rex, Judex, &c.* (which, as we have before hinted, are but improperly *Substantives*) which are of the *Masculine Gender*, because *Homo* is understood. In the same Manner, all the Female Offices are of the *Feminine Gender*, as *Mater, Uxor, Regina*, because *Mulier* is understood.

But this happens in other Cases meerly by Fancy, without any other Reason, than the Tyranny of Custom, and therefore it varies according to the Languages, or even according to the Words introduc'd from one Language into another. Thus *Arbor*, a Tree, is *Feminine* in *Latin*, but *Arbre* is *Masculine* in *French*, and *Dens* (a Tooth) is *Masculine* in *Latin*, and *Feminine* in *French* (*Dent*). Nay, that has sometimes chang'd in one and the same Language according to the Times and Occasions. And thus according to *Priscian*, *Alvus* in *Latin*, was anciently *Masculine*, and afterwards became *Feminine*; *Navire* (a Ship) was anciently *Feminine* in *French*, but is now *Masculine*.

Copper, Silver, Gold; add Ivory, Jet : Of Virtues, Prudence, Justice, Chastity; and of Vices, Pride, Sloth, Envy : Of abstract Qualities, Wisdom, Probity, Modesty, Bashfulness, Swiftness, Boldness, Constancy, Courage, Ardour, Candour, Contempt, Paleness, Fame; add to these Hunger, People, Vulgar, Offspring, Rust, Dust, Soot, Wool, &c.

The best Rule for this is, That Things that are small and undistinguishable, want the Plural Number; but those which are larger, and more distinguish'd, have it.

Thus

The same Variation of Custom or Use has made some Words, which were formerly certain, of a doubtful Gender, being used as Masculine by some, as Feminine by others, as *hic*, or *hæc* *Finis* in Latin, or *le* or *la* *Comte* in French.

But the Gender, which is called doubtful, is however not so common as some *Grammarians* imagine: for it properly belongs only to the Names of some Animals, which in Greek and Latin are promiscuously join'd both to Masculine and Feminine *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, to express either the Male or Female, as *Bos*, *Canis*, *Sus*, &c.

There are still other Words, which they place under the Neuter Gender, but they are properly only *Adjectives* or *Qualities* taken *Substantively*, because they commonly subsist in Discourse by themselves, and have no different Terminations accommodated to the different Genders, as *Victor*, *Victrix*, *Rex*, *Regina*, *Pistor*, *Pistrix*, and the like.

We ought also here to observe from hence, that what the *Grammarians* call *Epicene*, is not a different Gender; for *Vulpes* (a Fox), tho' it indifferently signifies either the Male or Female, is really of the Feminine Gender in the Latin; and thus in French the Word *Aigle* (an Eagle) is truly Feminine, because the Masculine or Feminine Gender in a Word, does not so properly regard its Signification, as that it should be of such a Nature as to join with *Adjective* or *Quality*, in the Masculine or Feminine Termination, as either does occur: And so in the Latin, *Custodiæ*, *Vigiliæ*, *Prisoner*, or *Watchman* or *Centinel*, are really Feminine, tho' they signify Men. This is what is common in the Genders to all Languages that have them.

The Latin and Greek in the Neuter Gender do not regard them, having no Relation to the Male or Female Sex, but what Fancy gives them, and the Termination of certain Words.

[4] Tho'

Thus much for *Names Common and Proper*: We shall conclude this Head with a thorough Examination of the *third Sort*, call'd *Personal Names*. [4]

*Three Persons only every Language claims,
Which we express still by the following Names;
I, Thou, and He, She, It, We, Ye, and They,
If you to these will add Who, What, you may.*

[5] Since in Discourse whatever is said, is spoke either of ourselves, to another, or of a third, it is necessary that there be

[4] Tho' we think it pretty obvious, that *Personal Names* are not a different Part of Speech from *Nomes*, notwithstanding some, who are wedded to the old Way, only because it is old; yet we shall here add the learned Mr. *Johnson's* Proof of this Truth. *Pronoun* (says he, in his fifth Animadversion, p. 10.) *quasi pro Nomine*: It is put for a Noun then it seems by the Name, and our Author (*LILLY*) it is much like a Noun in his Definition of it, so like indeed, that it is the same: The only Difference betwixt it and other Nouns, is, that it signifies a Person Primarily, and Secundarily a Thing, which is *Vossius's* Definition of it. *Primario Nomen respicit, I suppose, Nomen Personæ, secundario rem, Analog. lib. 1. cap. 3. and if it signify a Person, it must come under the Notion of a Noun, for a Person is a Thing, such a Thing as may be considered alone by the Understanding, and be the Subject of a Predicate, I mean the Substantive Pronoun, for there are also Pronouns Adjective. Indeed, this Part of Speech is in order of Nature the first Noun, for when Adam and Eve were only in the World, they needed no other Name but I and Thou to speak to one another, and whose Names were not given them out of any Necessity. The Pronoun therefore is a Noun, only a Personal one, to be used when we speak of Things personally, to which (upon the Multiplication of Mankind) was added the proper Name to distinguish Persons by, and also particular Things, which are as it were spoken of Personally, when they are spoken of particularly. And thus we find Nouns used in the first Person, as Romulus Rex Regia Arma afferō. Liv. l. 1. also Anobal peto pacem. Id. l. 30. and Callapius recensui, at the End of Terence's Plays. And thus far Mr. *Johnson*; which is sufficient to shew that we have justly plac'd them here under the Head of Names.*

[5] The frequent Repetition of the same Words, being as disagreeable, as it is necessary for us to speak often of the same Thing,

be Three Persons; *I*, the first, *thou*, the second, and *he*, *she*, or *it*, the third; of which all other Words but *I* or *thou*, with the Plurals, are. If we speak of a Male, we say, *he*; if of a Female, *she*; if of Things that have no Sex, we use *it*. The Plural Number of *I* is *we*; of *thou*, *you* and *ye*; tho' by Custom we say *you*, when we speak but of one Person, *thou* being seldom us'd but to GOD, as *Wilt thou, O Lord!* and on solemn Occasions to Princes, *Remember, O Prince! that thou art born a Man*: otherwise *thou* is never us'd but in Contempt, Anger, Disdain,

Thing, to avoid this, there are, in all known Languages, certain Words establish'd to supply this Defect, and remove this Indecorum, which are call'd *Pronames*, for *Names, Personal Names*, or as vulgarly in *English*, *Pronouns*.

In the first Place it has been observ'd, that it would be tedious, as well as indecent, to be often naming ourselves by our *Proper Names*; and for that Reason the *Proname* of the *first Person* was introduc'd to stand in the Place of his Name who speaks, as *I, we*.

And on the other hand, to avoid the too frequent Repetition of the Name of the Person to whom you speak, *thou* or *you* (*Pronames* of the *second Person*) were invented.

And lastly, to avoid the too often repeating the Names of other *Persons* or *Things* of which we discourse, the *Personal Names* of the *Third Person* were invented, as *He, she, it, who, what*.

These *Personal Names* performing the Office, and supplying the Place of other *Names*, they have like them two *Numbers*, that which signifies *one*, and that which signifies more than *one*, (*i. e.* the *Singular*) as *I, thou, you, he*; and the *Plural*, as *we, ye, or you, and they*. *You* (as has been said) is used in the *Singular* for *thou* and *thee*, as well as in the *Plural* for *ye*. Thus in *French*, *vous* for *tu* and *thy*.

In other Languages, which have *Genders*, the *Pronouns* have the same; the *first* and *second* are common, except in the *Hebrew*, and those Languages which imitate that, in which the *Masculine* is distinguish'd from the *Feminine*; but in the *English* we have no *Genders*, as has been seen in the foregoing Notes. The same may be said of Cases. There is this to be observ'd in these *Personal Names*, That the Termination changes in both *Numbers*, when it comes after a *Verb* or *Word of Affirmation*, as *I, me; we, us; thou, thee; you, or ye, you; he, him; she, her; they, them*; except *it*, which does not vary.

Disdain, or Familiarity. *He, she, and it,* have (in the Plural Number) only *they*.

These Names in both the Numbers we allow

A leading and a following State to know :

The leading State is I, the following ME,

The following State is US, the leading WE ;

Thus THOU and THEE, YE, YOU, HE, HIM

and SHE,

HER, THEY and THEM ; WHO and WHOM ;

but WHAT and IT,

To vary like the rest do not think fit.

Those *Personal Names* have in both Numbers a double *Form* or *State* ; the first is what we may call the *leading State*, as *I*, the second the *following State*, as *ME*. In the Plural Number the *leading State* is *WE*, the *following US*. The Second is in the *leading State THOU*, in the *following THEE*, in the Plural *YE* and *YOU*. The Third is in the *leading State HE*, if we speak of a Male, in the *following, HIM* ; or *SHE, HER*, and in the Plural *THEY, THEM*, which is the Plural of *HE, SHE*, and *IT*, which never varies its Ending, and is in both States *IT*, when we speak of Things of neither Sex. *WHO* in the *leading State* of both Numbers, has *WHOM* in the *following State* in both. It is called the *Interrogative*, because it asks Questions of *Persons* or *Individuals* (as, *Who is there, Peter ?*) as *What* does of the *Kind* or *Quality* ; and also in the Order of a Thing ; as, *What is that ? it is a Book : What art thou ?* in the Order of Number, the first, second, third, fourth, &c. (which is the same in both the *leading* and *following State*, or, indeed, like *It*) *It* has no State.

But to make this the plainer, we shall lay down a View of all these *Personal Names* together, in both their States.

Perf. 1.	{	Sing.	{	<i>I</i>	<i>Me</i>
		Plur.	{	<i>We</i>	<i>Us</i>
Perf. 2.	{	Sing.	{	<i>Thou</i>	<i>Thee</i>
		Plur.	{	<i>Ye</i>	<i>You</i>
Perf. 3.	{	Sing.	{	<i>He</i>	<i>Him</i>
			{	<i>She</i>	<i>Her</i>
		Plur.	{	<i>They</i>	<i>Them</i>
Interrog.	{	Persons	{	<i>who</i>	<i>whom</i>
		Things	{	<i>what</i>	

C H A P. VII.

Of Q U A L I T I E S.

*We've seen, that Names the Things themselves express,
Qualities the Manners of those Things confis ;
And on the Names intirely do depend,
For without them they can no Sense pretend :
As round, black, white, swift, crooked, square,
Must (to be understood) to Names adhere.*

[1] **N**AMES, as we have seen, express the *Things* themselves ; *Qualities* are the Manners of those Things, as *good, bad, round, square, &c.* For Example : The Being of *Wax*, is the Substance of *Wax*, or *Wax* itself, without regard to any Form or Colour, and is what we properly call the Name ; the Roundness, Squareness of the Figure, (which may be absent without any Detriment to the Being of the *Wax*) are the Manners of the *Being* ; as to be ignorant or knowing, are the Manners or Qualities of our *Being* : Thus we say a *round, black, white, &c. Table* ; *Table* is the Name, and *round, black, white, &c.* are the Qualities of that Name.

And since these Words are added to Names, to explain their Manner of Being, in respect of some Quality, Number, Figure, Motion, Relation, Posture, Habit, &c. as a *cunning Fox*, the *third Heaven*, a *crooked Crab-tree*, a *swift Horse*, a *Golden Candlestick*, &c. they are properly call'd Qualities, and are incapable, preserving their Nature, of being added to any other Part of Speech.

*Thing, that to follow Names did still deny,
Does after Qualities good Sense supply :
As black Thing, white Thing, good Thing may convince ;
This makes that understood, and be good Sense.*

You

[1] In our *Notes* on NAMES, we have likewise deliver'd such Sentiments of *Qualities*, under the Title of *Adjectives, Adnames, &c.* as are sufficient to be said on this Head, at least as far as relates to the General GRAMMAR. But we cannot omit Mr. *Johnson's* Proof, *That the Adjective or Quality is a different Part of Speech from the Name or Substantive.* Grammatical Commentaries, p. 8. The Adjective (no doubt of it) requires

You may know this Part of Speech, by putting *Thing* after it, which it will bear with good Sense, as a *good Thing*, a *black Thing*, a *white Thing*, &c. nor has it any different Endings to express *one* and *many*. And as it cannot be understood, or convey any Idea or Notion by itself, (as we cannot in Sense say, a *black*, a *white*, &c.) without being joined to some *Name*, (as a *black Horse*, a *good Man*, a *white House*, &c. so it bears all *Particles* expressing different *Relations of Names* with the Name to which it belongs; for it can do nothing nor signify any thing, without a Name express'd or understood, as to *hit the white*, (Mark) is understood; to *bowl on a Green*, (Turf) is understood; refuse the evil (*Thing*), and choose the good (*Thing*), is in both Places suppos'd.

In

quires a *Substantive* to be joined with it in Speech, to which it may adhere. *But the Question is, whether it be a Noun or Name of a Thing; that is, whether it be equally so with the Substantive; for if it be not, there is not an equal Participation of the Genus between these Two, and so the Division is imperfect and Equivocal: That is, these Two have not the same Genus, and therefore cannot be the same Part of Speech.* Now, I suppose, that no body will say the *Adjective* is equally, or as much the Name of a Thing as a *Substantive*. The *Substantive* represents all that is essential to the Nature of the Thing, as *Homo*, a Man, represents Animal rationale, or a rational living Creature; but *Bonus*, Good, represents only an accidental Quality, which tho' morally necessary, is not naturally so, but merely accidental. So that tho' a Man may be called Good, and therefore Good, in some Sense, may be said to be his Name; yet it is not equally as much his Name as Man, this last representing all that is essential to his Nature, the other only what is accidental. For *Adjectivum* comes from *adjicio*, and there can be no need of adding any thing to the *Substantive*, but what is accidental; for what is necessary and essential, is in the *Substantive* already. 'Tis therefore a sufficient Definition of a *Substantive*, That it is the Name of a Thing; but that it may be known what is meant by Thing, I have added, which may so subsist in the Imagination, as to be the Subject of Predication: And the true Definition of an *Adjective*, is, that it is a Word added to the *Substantive*, to declare some additional Accident of the *Substantive* consider'd by itself; as of Quality, Property, Relation, Action, Passion, or Manner of Being. I have added, consider'd by itself; because

*In Qualities no different Numbers are,
As their unvary'd Endings may declare.*

This is spoke as to their Forms in our Language; for in other Languages, where they have various Terminations, they have Numbers.

*Three kinds of Qualities there are we know,
Which from their Names immediately do flow:
First from Possession, we possessive call,
And from all Names by adding (s) do fall.*

These

because the Relation of Substantives, as consider'd in Sentences, is declar'd by Prepositions, and not by Adjectives. Here is then a very different End and Intention in the Use of these Words, and that is one good Ground of constituting different Parts of Speech. But then, not only the End in Signification, but the End also in Construction, is very different; and that is the other Ground of making different Parts of Speech. For I know no reason, why any body should be troubled with the Distinction of the several Parts of Speech, but to know their different Significations and Constructions in general, or how generally to make use of them in Speech.

Tho' this be a Demonstration of the Difference between the Name and Quality, or Substantive and Adjective, and that they are two different Parts of Speech; yet since what follows proves the Participle and Adjective to be one Part of Speech, we shall pursue our learned Author's Discourse; only adding, that Scioppius long since contended for the same thing in his *Institutiones Grammaticæ Latinæ*, in the beginning of his *Auctuarium*, p. 162. of the Book.

Now the Construction of a Substantive is its Government, by which it is govern'd in such Case as its Dependence requires, in its several Relations that it may have in a Sentence: Whereas the only Construction of the Adjective is its Agreement with its Substantive, or being govern'd by it, so as to agree with it in Case, Gender and Number, whatever Relation it be in, or whatever Case it be in by that Relation. And tho' Substantives be put in Apposition with other Substantives, and agree with them, yet this is no real Objection, such Substantives becoming Adjectives by that very Use, as an Adjective or any other Part of Speech becomes a Substantive, when it is used like a Substantive; that is, consider'd as a Thing. NOW in this the Participle and the Adjective

These *Possessive Qualities*, or *Qualities of Possession*, are made by any *Name*, whether *Singular* or *Plural*, by adding (*s*) or (*es*), if the Necessity of Pronunciation require it; as *Man's Nature*, for the Nature of *Man*; *Mens Nature*, for the Nature of *Men*. *Waller's Poems*.

*But if the plural Name (s) does end,
The (s) possessive and that (s) is join'd.*

If the *Plural Name* (as it generally does) end in (*s*), the two (*ss*), (that is, that which forms the *Number*, and that which forms the *Possession*) join in one, or rather one is left out for the Easiness of Sound; as the *Lords House*, for the *House of Lords*; the *Commons House*, for the *House of Commons*, instead of the *Commons's House*, the *Lords's House*.

*The same in Proper Names is often found,
For the more easy Flowing of the Sound.*

The

Adjective both agree as well in Signification as Construction. The Adjective declares an accidental Difference of the Substantive, so does the Participle. The Adjective denominates the Substantive by that accidental Difference, so in some Sense becomes its Name; so does the Participle: unless any one will say that a trotting Horse does not as much denominate the Substantive as a white Horse, The Adjective agrees with its Substantive in Construction, and so does the Participle. The only Difference between them is, that the Participle is said to signify some distinct Time. I shall consider that hereafter; but if that Difference be sufficient to make them Two Parts of Speech, the Ajective and Substantive must be two different Parts, because of a greater Difference. But that that Difference is not sufficient to make them different Parts of Speech, I shall shew in my Animadversion upon the Infinitive Mood; which, notwithstanding its Consignification of Time, I shall prove to be a Substantive. And therefore, if Consignification of Time will not unsubstative that, as agreeing in the general Signification and Use of a Substantive; so neither will the like Consignification of Time unadjective the Participle, which agrees in general Signification and Construction with the Adjective.

Thus far Mr. Johnson; and he makes his Word good in Animadversion, from p. 341 to 350; which he may consult that is not satisfy'd with what we have produc'd from him on this Head.

[2] Those

The same is often done in the Singular Number, when a Proper Name ends in (*s*), as *Priamus's Daughter*, *Venus's Temple*; for *Priamus's Daughter*, or *Venus's Temple*. Tho' the full Writing is sometimes preserv'd, as *King Charles's Court*, and *St. James's Park*, and the like. [2]

*Whene'er Two Names compounded we do see,
The first is always deem'd a Quality.*

This is the other Sort of *Qualities*, that derive themselves immediately from NAMES; as *Sea-fish*, *Self-Love*, *River-fish*, *Turkey-Voyage*, *Sea-voyage*, *Home-made*, *Self-Murder*, *Man-slaughter*, *Gold-Ring*; and this sort of *Qualities* Dr. Wallis calls *respective*: in which almost all other Respects (but those of *possessive Qualities*) are imply'd; which are yet more distinct, when they are requir'd to be express'd by *Particles*. This is nothing else but the Name put after the manner of a *Quality*, and join'd to the following Word, by this Line or Mark call'd *Hyphen*, to incorporate it, as it were, into one Word, and which is sometimes done without that short Line.

*As Qualities from Names, we see, do flow,
Thus some to Pers'nal Names we likewise owe;
As our, ours; their, theirs; her, hers; my and mine;
His, your, yours, and its, and whose, thy, and thine.*

These are Personal Possessives, and *my*, *thy*, *her*, *our*, *your*, *their*, are us'd, when they are join'd to Names, as *This is my Horse*, *This is my Hat*. But *mine*, *thine*, *hers*, *yours*, *theirs* are us'd, when the Name is understood; as *This Horse is mine*,
This

[2] Those who have imagin'd that this (*s*) was put in the Place of *his*, (the first Part being cut off by *Aphæresis*) and that therefore the Note of *Apostrophe* ought always to be express'd or understood, are extreamly out of the way in their Judgment, For tho' we do not deny but the Note of the *Apostrophe* may justly (sometimes) be plac'd there, to give a more distinct Perception of the Use of the (*s*) where there is occasion, yet we must deny that therefore it ought always to be done, and to signify the Absence of *his*; for it is join'd often to the Names of Women, and to *Plural Names*, where *his* cannot be suppos'd, to be, without a palpable *Solecism*; and in the Words *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, *hers*, where sure no body cou'd ever dream that *his* shou'd be.

[3] The

This Hat is thine ; that is, *This Horse is my Horse* ; *This Hat is thy Hat*, &c. Thus *own* cannot follow the latter, but the former, as we say, not *yours own*, or *ours own*, but *your own*, and *our own*. But *mine* and *thine* are most commonly us'd, when a Name follows, that begins with a Vowel ; as *my Arm*, or *mine Arm* ; *thy Aunt*, or *thine Aunt*. We shall put them all in one View, as we have done the Personal Names.

				with the Name.	without the Name.
Perf. 1.	{	Sing.	{	<i>My</i>	<i>Mine</i>
		Plur.		<i>Our</i>	<i>Ours</i>
Perf. 2.	{	Sing.	{	<i>Thy</i>	<i>Thine</i>
		Plur.		<i>Your</i>	<i>Yours</i>
<i>His</i>					
Perf. 3.	{	Sing.	{	<i>Her</i>	<i>Hers</i>
		Plur.		<i>Their</i>	<i>Theirs</i>

These by no means subsisting by themselves, nor signifying any thing without Reference to some other Name or Names, are properly Qualities. [3]

Another

[3] The Demonstratives *this* and *that*, and their Plurals *these* and *those*, *the same*, and the Relative or Interrogative *which*, are by no means Pronames, but Adjectives. For they are not put for a Name or Substantive ; that is, they do not supply the Place of a Name (as is essential to a Proname, and which the very Denomination of the Word demonstrates to be necessary to it) but they are added to Names or Substantives, as the Qualities or Adjectives are : as *this Man*, *that Man*, *the same Man*. If they ever occur without their Names or Substantives, which they often do, the Substantives are always understood ; thus we say, *one*, *all*, *many*, *others*, *the Learned*, *the Unlearned*, omitting or leaving out the Substantives or Names, and yet these Adjectives are not put into the Number of Pronames.

Which is the same in both Numbers, and is us'd when we speak of Things, as *who* and *whom*, are when we talk of Persons.

We

*Another Sort of Qualities there are,
Which being, doing, suffering, declare,
And Time imply, as present, past, to come,
In some more plainly, more obscure in some.
In (ing) it ends, when doing is express'd,
In d, t, n, when suffering's confess'd.*

These Qualities are, what the old GRAMMARIANS call'd *Participles*, and a modern Author has continued under that Name, notwithstanding what Mr. Johnson, Scioppius, and others have urg'd; but without any Reason produc'd for so doing. But we being convinc'd, that those Reasons are not to be answer'd, besides several more, which might be produc'd; as Words which signify *Time*, *Action*, &c. and yet are allow'd, on all Hands, not to be either *Participles*, or of *Affirmation*, venture to call them *Qualities*.

We have not in the Verse said any thing of the Ending when it betokens *Being*, because that is confin'd to that one Word, and therefore needs no Rule; and is only *being* and *been*. *I being sick, sent for a Doctor. I have been a Soldier.* It signifies *doing*; as, *I am hearing a Song; I was tuning my Harpsichord.* It signifies *suffering*; as, *I was beaten, I was abus'd*; and the like. [4]
(A)

We must observe, that *what* is us'd Adjectively, when it signifies *Qualis*, and is in a Question, as in *what Man?* that is what kind of Man, or in Number the first, second, and that is often us'd for *which*, and so is an *Adjective*.

The Word *own* very often emphatically subjoin'd to *Names* and *Pronames*, is likewise an *Adjective*; as *your own Horse, my own Goods, Alexander's own Sword.*

The Word *self*, tho' plac'd by some among the *Pronames* (because 'tis generally render'd into *Latin* by the Word *ipse*) is yet plainly a *Substantive* or *Name*, to which there is scarce any Word directly answers in the *Latin*; that which comes nearest to it is *Persona*, or *Propria Persona*; as *thyself, myself, ourselves, yourselves, himself, itself, themselves*, are we confess us'd for *hisself, itself, theirselves*; but interposing *own*, we say *his ownself, its ownself, their ownselfes*. In the same Sense we meet in the *Greek Poets*, *ὁ βῆν* as *βῆν κρᾶτος* or *βῆν Ἡρακλῆην* or *Ἡρακλῆος*, *Hercules ipse, Hercules himself, Hercules his ownself*.

[4] The time, that is imply'd by this sort of *Quality* or *Adjective*, is generally obscure in *English*, and rather plac'd in the *Word of Affirmation*, which is generally plac'd with it; but
in

(A), (an), and (the) we Qualities may name,
Because their Use and Nature are the same.

These Signs of Names (*a*) and (*the*), have the Nature of Qualities, for they are added to Names, nor subsist or convey any Idea without them, and pay the same Attendance on the Names

The Use of these Signs are worthy Remark; for (*a*) before a Consonant, and (*an*) before a Vowel, extend the Signification of a Name to any one, and so to all, one by one, of its Kind; but (*the*) restrains it to some Particular, and by that means makes a Common Equivalent to a Proper Name.

*But since these Signs don't Individuals shew,
They ne'er before a Proper Name can go;
Nor before Pers'nal Names and Qualities,
Nor when the Thing in general we express,
Nor before Names of Virtues, Herbs and Vice.*

But these Signs not denoting Individuation, are not set before *Proper Names*, as *Peter, John, William, &c.* Nor before *Personal Names* or *Qualities*. Nor are they us'd, when the Name expresses the Thing in general; as we say, *Man being mortal, soon fades away and dies*; not *the*, or *a Man*; and we say, *Virtue consists in the Mean*, not *a*, or *the Virtue*, &c. These Signs signifying *Particularity*, we say, *the Justice of God*, since that is particular. Nor are they set before the particular Names of *Virtues* or *Vices*, or *Herbs*, *Metals*, &c. as we say, not *a Temperance*, *a Sloth*, *a Hyssop*, *a Thyme*.

(*A*) and (*an*) sometimes signify *one*, as *all to a Man*. [5].

The

in the *Latin* we agree with Mr. *Johnson* against *Sanctius*, That the *Time* is signified pretty plainly by the *Participle*.

[5] Names generally signify Things in a general and unlimited Sense, but *Signs* or *Articles*, (as some call them) restrain and determine the Signification of Names, and apply them to a particular Thing. If we say, *'tis a Happiness to be King*, 'tis an uncertain, wandring and undetermin'd Word; but if you add (*the*) to it, and say, *'tis a Happiness to be the King*, it determines it to be the King of the People mention'd before. So that these little Signs contribute much to the Clearness or Discourse.

The *Latins* have none of these *Signs* or *Articles*, whence *Scaliger* fallily concluded, that they were useless; but he is indeed a Critic that very often is in the wrong: And here 'tis plain from

The is a Demonstrative, and signifies the same as *that*, but less emphatically. It denotes the Determination of one or more, to which the general Word is actually apply'd. Thus we use the Word *Earth*, when we design the Species or Element; but the *Earth*, when we mean the Globe of the Earth, (which is a certain determin'd Individual) is plac'd with both in the Singular or plural Number, because we may speak determinately of one, as well as more Individuals.

As neither of these are fix'd to a Word of a *general Signification*, or *proper Name*, so they are not us'd when any other Quality is present, that virtually contains 'em; as, *a Man, one Man, some Man, any Man; the World, this Word*; for here *one, some, any, this*, certainly imply *a* and *the*.

There are, besides, some particular Phrases, as *many a Man, never a Man*, which differ from *many Men, no Men*, as *every Man* from *all Men*; the former signify *many Men, all Men, no Men*, separately, or taken distinctly; the latter conjunctly, or collectively. Nor are the following absolutely unlike these, when (after *such*, and the Particles of Comparison, *as, so, too*, and scarce any others) the Quality (*a*) is interpos'd between the Name and its Quality, (which is usually put after it) as, *Such a Gift is too small a Reward for so great a Labour, and as great a Benefit*.

*When QUALITIES for NAMES we e'er find set,
They then the Properties of NAMES will get.*

from the Instances given, that they are necessary to the avoiding Ambiguities. The *Greeks* have one $\delta\eta\tau\omicron$. Tho' these Signs should not be put before proper Names for the Reason given, yet the *Greeks* do sometimes put the Article to the *Proper Names* of Men, as $\delta\Phi\iota\lambda\iota\pi\pi\omicron\varsigma$, and the *Italians* do it customarily, as *l'Aristo, Il Tasso, l'Aristotle*, which the *French*, imitate in those Words or Names, which are purely of *Italian* Original, but in none else; and we put them to the Names of *Rivers*, as the *Thames, the Ouze, the Rhine, &c.*

In fine, the *Articles* or *Signs* are not put to the *Qualities* or *Adjectives*, because they must receive their Determination from other Names or *Substantives*. Or when we find them set before *Qualities, or Adjectives*; as the *Black, the White, &c.* then are they set for Names, or *Substantively*: The *White* means as much as *Whiteness*, or else the *Substantive* is understood; as the *Black* is the *black Mark* or *Spot*.

Qualities

Qualities are sometimes put for *Names*, and then they assume their Rights and Properties; tho' some contend, that the *Names* are always understood, tho' not express'd to make 'em subsist in good Sense.

*Most Qualities by Two Degrees do rise,
Or fall as much in Number, Bulk, or Price;
By adding to its End or, er, or est,
Which by some little Words is else express'd;
As wise, wiser, wisest, and most wise;
But (very) of the Place of (most) supplies.*

Qualities have yet another Difference from *Names*, for they admit by the Variation of their Endings, or by the Addition of some little Words, Degrees of Comparison. For signifying *Manners*, or *Qualities*, they naturally must be of several Degrees, which increase twice, by adding (*er*) to the QUALITY it self, and (*est*). *Fair* is the *Quality* it self; for Example its first Rising or Degree is *Fairer*; and the next, beyond which there's none, is *fairest*. These again are form'd by little Words, without altering the Ending or Termination of the *Quality*, as, *fair*, *more fair*, *most*, or *very fair*.

All Words therefore, whose Signification will admit *Increase*, and consequently in good Sense will suffer these Words (*more*, *most*, or *very*) before 'em, are *Qualities*, that have their Degrees of Comparison, or of Increase and Decrease.

*These Three alone irregular are found,
Good, bad, and little, alter Name and Sound.*

These Three have an irregular Manner of being compar'd, as, *good*, *better*, *best*; *bad*, or *ill*; *worse* (and *worser*) *worst*; *little*, *less*, (or *lesser*) *least*: To which add *much*, (or *many*) *more*, *most*.

But there are some *Qualities*, before which you cannot in good Sense put *more*, or *most*, as *all*, *some*, *any*, &c. for we cannot say, *more all*, *most all*, &c. *Much*, *more*, and *most* when they are join'd to Names of the Singular Number, signify Quantity; as *much*, *more*, *most* *Wine*: But when the Name join'd to them is of the Plural Number, they signify Number, as *much*, *more*, and *most* *Company*; but *much* is chang'd into *many*, when Numbers are signified. Thus the *Quality* ALL, join'd with a Name of the Singular Number, relates to *Quantity*, as *all the Wine*: but with a Name of the Plural Number, it signifies *Number*, as *all the Children*. *Every* is never put with a Name of the Plural Number, as *every Man*,

not every Men. Thus *enough* signifies *Quantity*, whose Plural is *enow*, which signifies *Number*; *I have Wine enough, I have Books enow.*

When the *Quality* NO has no Name after it, we say *none*; as, *Is there no Wine? There's none.*

C H A P. VIII.

Of AFFIRMATIONS.

[1] **W**E come now to that Part of Speech, which is the Soul of a Sentence, for without this a Sentence cannot subsist; since nothing can be spoken, that is affirm'd or deny'd, without it. The *Latins* call this Part of Speech *Verbum*, from whence our *English* Grammarians very awkwardly have borrow'd *Verb*, which all other Nations, that borrow from the *Latin*, call in their own Tongue *Word*, for that is the plain *English* of *Verbum*: The *Word* was us'd by way of Eminence; but if our Grammarians had us'd *Word* instead of *Verb*, though it would have been more easy and obvious to the Learner's Memory and Understanding, yet it would require a long Explanation of its Nature, as a *Part of Speech*, nothing of that being contain'd in its Name; but the very Essence of it is express'd in the Term *Affirmation*, since all Words of this kind do affirm Something of Something; as will be plain from the Notes on this Head.

[2] *An*

[1] We have thus far explain'd those Words, which signify the Objects of our Thoughts, to which indeed the Prepositions and Adverbs belong, tho' the Order of the Text has postpon'd 'em: We now come to consider those Words, which signify the Manner, as *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, *Conjunctions*, or joining Words and *Interjections*.

The Knowledge of the Nature of the *Verb*, or *Affirmation*, depends on what has been said at the beginning of these Notes on Words, and that is, that the Judgment we make of Things (as when I say, *the Earth is round*) necessarily implies two Terms, one call'd the SUBJECT, which is the Thing of which the Affirmation is made, as the *Earth*; and the other the ATTRIBUTE, which is, what is affirm'd of the Subject, as *round*. And besides these two Terms, there is in that Pro-

E

position

position another Word, which is the Connexion of those two Terms, and which is properly the Action of the Mind, which affirms the Attribute of the Subject. Men are therefore under an equal Necessity of inventing Words, that mark and denote the Affirmation, which is the principal Manner of our Thoughts, as to invent those, which mark the Objects of 'em. And this third Connective Term is what is generally call'd a *Verb*, but more intelligibly an AFFIRMATION, since its chief Use is to signify the Affirmation; that is, to shew, that the Discourse in which this Word is us'd, is the Discourse of a Man, who not only conceives Things, but judges, and affirms something of 'em; in which the Verb, or Affirmation is distinguish'd from some Names and Qualities, which signify Affirmation likewise; as *Affirmans*, *Affirmatio*, because they do not signify, that the Thing is become the Object of our Thoughts, by the Reflection of the Mind, and therefore do not mark, that he who uses those Words affirms, but only, that he barely conceives an Affirmation.

We have said, that the chief Use of the *Verb*, is to signify the *Affirmation*, because we shall see, that the Verb is likewise made use of, to signify other Motions of the Soul, as *to desire, to pray, to command, &c.* but is only by changing the Inflection, and the Mode. We shall at present only consider the Verb in its chief Use and signification, which is that which it has to the *Indicative*, or first *State, Mode* or *Manner*.

According to this Sense, it may be said, that the *Verb* or *Affirmation* ought to have no other Use, but the marking the Connexion we make in our Minds, between the Terms of a Proposition. Thus there is only the Verb *esse, to be*, (which is call'd a Verb Substantive) that remains in this Simplicity: And further, we may say, that even this Verb is properly thus simple, only in the third Person of the Present Tense or Time, *est, is*, and on certain Occasions: For as Men naturally incline to shorten their Expressions, they have always join'd to the Affirmation other Significations in the same Word. 1st, They have join'd that of some Attribute, by which means too Words then make a Proposition; as when I say, *Petrus vivit*, Peter *lives*, because the Word *vivit* (or *lives*) includes both the Affirmation, and Attribute of being alive, since it is the same thing to say, *Peter lives*, and *Peter is living*; thence arises the great Diversity of Verbs, in every Language; whereas if the general Signification of the Affirmation were only given to the Verb, without joining any particular Attribute, there would be

no need of more than one Verb in each Language, which is that we call Substantive.

2dly, They have join'd the Subject of the Proposition on certain Occasions, so that two Words (nay, even one) may make an intire Proposition; two Words, as *sum Homo*, because *sum* not only signifies the Affirmation, but includes the Signification of the Pronoun, or Personal Name, *Ego, I*; which is the Subject of the Proposition. And in our own Tongue we always express it, *I am a Man*. One Word may likewise express an intire Proposition; as *vivo, sedeo, &c.* For these Verbs include both the Affirmation and the Attribute, as we have already said; and being in the first Person, they include the Subject likewise, as, *I am living; I am sitting*: And hence comes the Difference of Persons, which is generally in Verbs.

3dly, They have also join'd a Relation to the Time with respect to the Thing affirm'd; so that one Word (as *cœnasti*) signifies that I affirm to him, to whom I speak, the Action of *supping*, not for the present Time, but the past, *Thou hast supp'd*. And from hence the Verbs derive their Diversity of Times, (or as the Vulgar has it, Tenses) which is also generally common to all Verbs, or Words of Affirmation.

The Diversity of these Significations, join'd in the same Word, is what has hinder'd a great many, otherwise of very good Capacities, from rightly understanding the Nature of the Verb; because they have not consider'd it according to what is essential to it, which is the Affirmation, but according to the various Relations accidental to it, as a Verb, or Word of Affirmation.

Thus *Aristotle*, confining himself to the third Signification, added to that which is essential to it, defines a Verb, *Vox significans cum Tempore, a Word that signifies with Time*. Others, as *Buxtorfius*, adding to it the second, defines it, *Vox flexilis cum Tempore, & Persona; a Word that has divers Inflexions with Time and Person*.

Others have confined themselves to the first Signification, added to the Essential, which is that of the Attribute; and considering, that the Attributes Men have join'd to the Affirmation in the same Word, are commonly Actives and Passives, have thought the Essence of a Verb consists in *signifying the Actions and Passions*. And in fine, *Julius Scaliger* thought, that he had discover'd a great Mystery in his Book of the Principles of the Latin Tongue, by saying, that the Distinction of Things into *permanentes & fluentes, Things permanent or lasting, or fixt, and passing, or that pass away*, was the true Original

of the Distinction of *Names*, or *Nouns* and *Verbs* or *Affirmations*; since *Names* are to signify the former, and *Verbs* the latter. But we may easily perceive that these Definitions are false, and do by no means explain the true Nature of the *Verb*.

The manner of the Connexion of the two first shew it sufficiently, because 'tis not there express'd what the *Verb* signifies, but only that with which it signifies, viz. *cum Tempore*, *cum Persona*; the two latter are still worse, having the two great Vices of Definitions, which is to agree *neque omni*, *neque soli*. For there are *Verbs* which signify neither *Actions* nor *Passions*, nor what passes away, as *existit*, *quiescit*, *friget*, *alget*, *tepet*, *calet*, *albet*, *viret*, *claret*, &c. of which we may have occasion to speak elsewhere.

There are Words, which are not *Verbs*, that signify *Actions* and *Passions*, and even Things transient, according to *Scaliger's* Definition. For 'tis certain, that *Participles* (or Qualities deriv'd from *Verbs*) are true *Nouns*, and yet those of *Verbs active*, signify *Actions*, and those of *Verbs passive* *Passions*, as much as the *Verbs* themselves from which they are form'd; and there is no Reason to pretend, that *fluens* does not signify a Thing that passes, as well as *fluit*. To which may be added against the two first Definitions of the *Verb*, that the *Participles* signify also with Time, there being a present, a past, and a future, especially in the *Latin* and *Greek*, &c. And those who (not without Reason) believe, that a *Vocative Case* is truly the second Person, especially when it has a different Termination from the *Nominative*, will find, that on that Side there would be but a Difference of the more, or the less, between the *Participle* and the *Verb*. And thus the essential Reason, why a *Participle* is not a *Verb*, is, that it does not signify the *Affirmation*; whence it comes that to make a *Proposition*, which is the Property of the *Verb*, the *Participle* must add a *Verb*, that is, restore that which was taken away by turning the *Verb* into the *Participle*. For how comes it that *Petrus vivit*, *Peter lives*, is a *Proposition*; and *Petrus vivens*, *Peter living*, is not so, unless *est*, *is*, be added, as *Petrus est vivens*, *Peter is living*, but because that *Affirmation* (which is in *vivit*) was taken away by making the *Participle vivens*? Whence it appears, that the *Affirmation*, that is, or is not found in a Word, makes it to be, or not to be, a *Verb*.

Upon which we may observe *en passant*, that the *Infinitive Mode* or *Form*, or *Mood*, which is very often a *Noun* or *Name*, (as when we say in *French*, *le Boire*, *le Manger*) is different from *Participles*, the *Participles* being *Noun Adjectives*, or what

we call *Qualities*: But the *Infinitive Moods* are *Noun Substantives*, or *Names* made by Abstraction of those *Adjectives*; in the same manner as of *Candidus*, *Candor* is made, and of *White*, *Whiteness*. Thus *rubet*, a *Verb*, signifies *is red*, including the Affirmation and the Attribute; *rubens*, the Participle signifies only *Red*, without Affirmation, and *Rubere* taken for a *Noun*, signifies *Redness*.

It should, therefore, be allowed a constant Rule, that considering simply what is essential to a *Verb*, the only true Definition is *vox significans Affirmationem*, a Word that signifies an Affirmation, since we can find no Word that marks an Affirmation, but what is a *Verb*; nor any *Verb* but what marks it (at least) in the *Indicative*, or *first Mood*: And there can no manner of doubt be made, that if a Word were invented, as *est* would be, which should always mark the Affirmation, without having any Difference of Time or Person; so that the Diversity of Person should be mark'd only by *Nouns* or *Names*, and *Pronames* or *Personal Names*, and the Diversity of Times by *Adverbs* or added Words, (as in *English*) it would however be a true *Verb*. As in the Propositions, which the Philosophers call eternally true, as *God is infinite*, *Body is divisible*, *the Whole is greater than its Parts*; the Word (*is*) implies only the simple Signification, without any Relation to Time, because it is true to all Times, and without our Minds stopping at any Diversity of Persons.

Thus the *Verb* (according to what is essential to it) is a Word that signifies Affirmation. But if we would join its principal Accidents, it may be thus defin'd, *Vox significans Affirmationem, cum Designatione Personæ, Numeri & Temporis*, a Word which signifies Affirmation with the Designation of the Person, Number and Time, which agrees properly with the *Verb Substantive*. But for the others, in as much as they differ by that Union Men have made of the Affirmation with certain Attributes, they may be thus defin'd, *Vox significans Affirmationem alicujus Attribute, cum Designatione Personæ, &c.* a Word signifying the Affirmation of some Attribute, with the Designation of Person, Number, and Time. We may likewise transiently observe, that the Affirmation, (as 'tis conceived) may be the Attribute of the *Verb* also, as in the *Verb Affirmo*, which Verb signifies Two Affirmations, one regards the Person speaking, and the other the Person spoken of, whether it be of himself, or of another. For when we say *Petrus affirmat*, it is the same as to say, *Petrus est affirmans*, and then *est* marks our Affirmation, and the Judgment we make concern-

[2] *An Affirmation (As the Word does show)*
Something affirms, and does Number know,

[3] *And*

ing *Peter*, and *affirms*, that we conceive and attribute to *Peter*.

The *Verb* *NEGO* (on the contrary) contains by the same Reason an Affirmation and Negation. For it must be farther observ'd, that tho' all Judgments are not *affirmative*, and that there are some Negatives, nevertheless *Verbs* never signify any thing of themselves, but Affirmations; Negations are only mark'd by Particles, or little Words, as *non*, *ne*, *haud*, &c. or by Nouns that imply it, as *Nullus*, *nemo*, &c. which being join'd to *Verbs* change the Affirmation into a Negation, as, *no Man is immortal*, *Nullum corpus est indivisibile*. Tho' much of these Notes, which relate to the Knowledge of the true Nature of a *Verb*, may seem to (and indeed in many Things do) relate more to the dead Languages than the Living, yet there is nothing advanced which will not be useful to the Student of GRAMMAR, since by these Observations he will enter into the very Essence of the Art, and see in what it is founded on the Nature of Things; and we are very certain, that great Part of these *Notes* are equally advantageous to our understanding the Nature of our own Words, and in what they are founded on the general Reason of all Languages.

[2] We have in the foregoing Notes observ'd, that the Diversity of *Persons* and *Numbers* in *Affirmations* or *Verbs*, proceeds from the joining in the said Words the Subject of the Proposition, at least on certain Occasions, to the *Affirmation* proper to the *Verb*, to shorten the Expression, (tho' this will not hold in most modern Tongues, at least in none which want Variety of Terminations,) to distinguish the *Persons*, (which we do by Personal Names) for when a Man speaks of himself, the Subject of the Proposition is the *Pronoun* or *Personal Name*, of the first Person *Ego*, *I*; and when he speaks of him to whom he addresses himself, the Subject of the Proposition is the *Pronoun* of the second Person, *Tu*, *thou*, *you*.

Now that he may not always be oblig'd to use these *Pronouns*, it has been thought sufficient to give to the Word which signifies the Affirmation, a certain Termination, which shews that it is of himself a Man speaks, and that is what is call'd the first Person of the Verb, as *Video*, *I see*.

The same is done with respect to him, to whom a Man addresses himself; and this is call'd the second Person, *vidēs*, *thou*

thou seeſt, or *you ſee*. And as theſe Pronouns have their *Plurals*, that ſignify more than one, as when a Man talking of himſelf joins others, as *us*, *we*; or of him to whom he ſpeaks, by joining others, as *you*, to two different Terminations in the *Latin*, are join'd to the Plural, as *videmus*, *we ſee*, *videtis*, *you ſee*.

But becauſe often the Subject of the Propoſition is neither a Man's ſelf, nor the Perſon to whom he ſpeaks, 'tis neceſſary not only to reſerve theſe two Terminations to thoſe two Perſons, but that a third be made to be join'd to all other Subjects of a Propoſition. And this is what is call'd the third Perſon, as well in the Singular Number, as Plural; tho' the Word *Perſon* properly agrees only to rational and intellectual Beings, and ſo is proper but to the Two former, ſince the third is for all other Sorts of Things, and not for Perſons only. But that we ſee, that naturally what we call the third Perſon ought to be the *Theme* of the *Verb*, as it is alſo in all the Oriental Tongues; for it is more natural, that the Verb ſhould ſignify properly the Affirmation, without making any Subject in particular, and that afterwards it be determin'd by a new Inflexion, to include the firſt or ſecond Perſon for a Subject.

This Diversity of Terminations for the firſt Perſon ſhews, that the Ancient Languages had a great deal of Reaſon not to join the *Pronouns* of the firſt and ſecond Perſon to the Verb, but very rarely (and on particular Conſiderations) contenting themſelves to ſay, *video*, *vides*, *videmus*, *videtis*, becauſe theſe Terminations were originally invented for this very Reaſon, *viz.* to avoid joining the Pronouns to the Verbs; yet all the vulgar or living Languages, and ours eſpecially, always join them to their Verbs; for we ſay, *I ſee*, *thou ſeeſt*, or *you ſee*, *we ſee*, &c. the Reaſon of which may be, or rather plainly is, that our Verbs have no diſtinct Terminations to expreſs the Perſons without them.

But beſides theſe two Numbers, *Singular* and *Plural*, which are in Verbs as well as Nouns, the *Greeks* have a *Dual Number*, which is proper only to two; but this is not ſo commonly made uſe of, as the other two.

The Oriental Languages thought it proper to diſtinguiſh, when the Affirmation related to the one, or the other, and to the Maſculine, or Feminine; for this Reaſon they gave the ſame Perſon of the Verb two Terminations to expreſs the two Genders, which indeed is a great help in avoiding *Equivocals*.

- [3] *And Time, and Person; whether it express Action, Being, Passion; or their want confess.*

An *Affirmation* is a Part of Speech (as the Word imports) which affirms some Attribute, with the Designation of Time, Number, and Person, expressing *being, doing, or suffering, or the Want of them, or the like.*

*Two Times the English Language only knows,
The first, the present, next the passing shows:
And they by different Endings are made known,
By adding (d), or (ed), are mostly shown;
The present Love, the passing lov'd does make,
Or else some other Affirmations take
Before it, which its different Times declare,
And in the Rules of Affirmation share.*

ALL

[3] The Signification of the *Time*, is another Thing, which we have said to be join'd to the Affirmation of the Verb; for the Affirmation is made according to the different Times, since we may affirm a Thing *is, was, or will be*: whence other Inflections are given to *Verbs*, signifying these several Times, which our *English* Grammarians have by a barbarous Word call'd *Tenses*. But there are but three *simple Tenses, or Times*, the *present*, as *amo, I love*; the *Past*, as *amavi, I have loved*; and the *Future*, as *amabo, I will (or shall) love*.

But because in the past one may mark, that the Thing is but just past or done, or indefinitely, that it was done; it from this proceeds that in the greatest Part of the *Vulgar Languages* there are two Sorts of *Preterits or Past Times*, one that marks the Thing to be precisely done, and is therefore call'd *Definite*; as, *I have written, I have said*; and the other that marks or denotes it done indeterminately, and therefore call'd *Indefinite, or Aoristus*, as, *I wrote, I went, I din'd*; which is properly only spoke of a Time, at least of a Day's Distance from that, in which we speak. But this holds truer in the *French* Language, than in any other; for in that they say, *J'écris hier, I wrote Yesterday*, but not *J'écris ce Matin*, nor *J'écris cette Nuit*, but *J'ay écrit ce Matin, J'ay écrit cette Nuit, &c.*

The *Future* will also admit of the same Differences; for we may have a Mind to denote or mark a Thing that is suddenly to be. Thus the *Greeks* have their *Paulopost* future, *ὀλίγον μέλλων*, which marks the Thing about to be done, as *ποιήσομαι, I am*

All *Affirmations* affirming in Time, this Time is express'd either by different Endings, as *Love*, *lov'd*, or *loved*; *burn*, *burn'd*, or *burned*; or by putting other Affirmations before them, which also express the Manner of the Affirmation, as *have*, *shall*, *will*, *might*, *wou'd*, *shou'd*, &c. as will be seen in the Sequel.

In *English* we have but two Times distinguish'd by the different Endings; the *present* is the Affirmation itself, as *I love*; the second is the *passing*, as *I lov'd*: All other Times are express'd by the 'foresaid Words.

*The Personal Names the Persons do express,
As I, thou, he, we, ye, and they confess.
With these their various Endings too agree,
As we by love, lovest, and loves may see.*

The

I am about to do it: And we may also mark a Thing, that is simply to happen, as *πορεύσω*, *I will do it*; *amabo*, *I will love*.

This is what we may say of the Times, or Tenses of Verbs, considering 'em simply in their Nature, as Present, Past, and Future. But because it has been thought fit to mark these Tenses, with a Relation to another by one Word, other Inflections have been invented in the Verbs or Affirmations, which may be call'd the *Compound Tenses*, or *Times*.

The first is that which marks the Past, in relation to the Present, and 'tis call'd the *Preterimperfect Tense*, or *Time*, because it marks not the Thing simply and properly as done, but as imperfect, and present, with respect to a Thing which is already nevertheless past: Thus when I say, *Cum intravit cœnabam*, *I was at supper when he entered*, the Action of Supping is past in respect of the Time, of which I speak, but I mark it as present in respect of the Thing, of which I speak, which is the *Entrance of such a-one*.

The second Compound Time, or Tense, is, that which doubly marks the past, and on that Account is call'd the *Preterpluperfect Tense*, or the *Time more than perfectly past*; *Cœnaveram*, *I had supp'd*: by which I denote my Action of supping, not only as past in it self, but also as past in respect to another Thing which is also past; as, *I had supp'd when he enter'd*; which shews my Supping was before his Entrance; which is also past.

The Third Compound Time is that which denotes the Future with respect to the Past, viz. the *Future Perfect*, as *Cœnavero*, *I shall have supp'd*; by which I mark my Action of

The Persons of the Affirmation are always express'd by the Personal Names *I, thou, he*, in the *Singular*, and *We, ye, or you*, and *they*, in the *Plural* Number; the two first reaching only themselves, the third all other Names, because all other NAMES are of the third Person. They also vary their Endings in the second and third Person Singular; as *I love, thou lovest, he loves*; *we, ye, and they love*, in the present Time; and *I loved, thou lovedst, he loved* in the passing Time; the *Soldier fights, God prevails. I love*, besides the first Person, denotes the Time when *I love*, that is, the present Time when I am speaking; but by adding (*d*), it signifies the Time passing, as *I loved, lov'd, or did love*.

[4] *The following Nine are of most general Use,
And various Meanings in the rest produce;*

Do

Supping as Future it self, and Pass'd in regard to another Thing to come, that is to follow, as *when I shall have supp'd, he will enter*; which is to say, That my Supper (which is not yet come) will be past when his Entrance (which is also not yet come) will be present.

Thus a fourth Compound Time may be added, that is, that which marks the Future with Relation to the Present, to make as many Compound Futures as Compound Preterits, or Past Times, or Tenses; and perhaps the second Future of the *Greeks* marks this in its Origin, whence it comes, that it almost always preserves the Figurative of the Present; nevertheless in the Use of it, it has been confounded with the former; and even the *Latin* makes use of the simple Future for that; as, *Cum coenavero intrabis, You will enter when I have supp'd*; by which I mark my Supper, as future in it self, but as present when you enter.

This is what has given Rise to the several Inflections of *Verbs* or *Affirmations*, that they may distinguish the several *Times* or *Tenses*; upon which we must observe, that the Oriental Tongues have only the *Past* and the *Future*, without any of the other Differences of *imperfect, preterpluperfect, &c.* which renders those Languages subject to great and many Ambiguities, not to be met with in others. But these Differences of the Times (in our Tongue especially) are clearly denoted by the *Auxiliary Verbs*, and very few Alterations of the Terminations, as in *Latin*; as is shewn in the *Text*.

[4] In this Place we shall also add what we have to say of the *Moods* or *Forms* of *Verbs*, as *Affirmations*. We have there-
fore

Do, will, and shall, must, ought, and may,
Have, am, or be, *this Doctrine will display.*
For these Necessity, or Pow'r, or Wil',
And Time, or Duty are expressing still.

Of Affirmations, the following Nine are most generally us'd, being placed before all other Affirmations, to signify their Time, Power, Will, Liberty, Necessity, Duty, &c. Of these therefore, it is necessary we first treat.

Do does the Present Time with Force express,
And did the Passing shews us with no less.

Do

fore already said, that Verbs are of that kind of Words that signify the Manner and Form of our Thoughts, the chief of which is *Affirmation*: And we have also observ'd, that they receive different Inflections, according as the *Affirmation* relates to different *Persons* and *Times*; but Men have found, that it was proper to invent other Inflections also, more distinctly to explain what pass'd in their Minds. For first they observ'd, that besides simple Affirmations, as *he loves, he lov'd, &c.* there were others conditional and modify'd, as, *Tho' he might have lov'd, tho' he would have lov'd, &c.* And the better to distinguish these *Affirmations* from the others, they doubled the Inflections of the same *Tenses* or *Times*, making some serve for simple *Affirmations*, as *loves, lov'd*; and others for those *Affirmations* which were modify'd; as, *might have lov'd, would have lov'd*; tho' not constantly observing the Rules, they made use of simple Inflections to express *modify'd Affirmations*, as *et si vereor*, for *et si verear*; and 'tis of these latter Sort of Inflections, that the GRAMMARIANS make their Mood call'd the *Subjunctive*: Moreover (besides the *Affirmation*) the Action of our Will may be taken for a Manner of our Thought, and Men had Occasion to mark what they would have understood, as well as what they thought. Now we may will a Thing several Ways, of which three may be consider'd as chief:

1. We *would* have Things that do not depend on ourselves, and then we *will* it only by a simple Wish which is explain'd in *Latin* by the Particle *Utinam*, and in our Tongue by *would to God*. Some Languages (as the *Greek*) have invented particular Inflections for that; which has given occasion to the GRAMMARIANS to call them the *Optative* Mood: And there's in *French*, and in the *Spanish*, and *Italian*, something like

Do is, and denotes the present Time, which in the passing Time changes its Ending into *did*: Both these are us'd to express their several Times with the greater Force, Distinction, and Fulness; as *I do love, I do not love*. Thus *did* expresses the passing Time emphatically, except when *whilst* goes before it, for then 'tis but imperfectly past, or passing. The Personal Endings of this Affirmation, are, *I do, thou dost, he does*, singular; *we, ye, and they do*, plural.

When *do* signifies Action, as, *I do such a Thing*, it admits these other Affirmations before, to denote its Time and Manner of *doing*. *Will* does the same, when it signifies *willing*, as, *I will this to be done*; tho' this is seldom done in our present way of Writing.

*Will is the present Time, and wou'd the past,
But before other Affirmations cast
The Time to come by both is still express'd.*

}
Will

like it, since there are triple Tenses; but in others, the same Inflections serve for the *Subjunctive* and *Optative*; and for this Reason one may very well retrench this Mood in the *Latin* Conjugations; for 'tis not only the different way of signifying, which may be very much multiply'd, but the different Inflections that ought to make Moods.

2. We *will* sometimes after another manner, when we content ourselves with *granting* a Thing, tho' *absolutely* we would not do it; as, when *Terence* says, *Profundat, perdeat, pereat, Let him lawish, let him sink, let him perish, &c.* Men might have invented an Inflection to mark this Movement, as well as they have invented one in *Greek*, to mark a *simple Desire*, but they have not done it, and make use of the *Subjunctive* for it; and in *French* and *English* we add *qu'e, let*. Some GRAMMARIANS have call'd this the *Potential Mood, Modus Potentialis, or Modus Concessionis*.

3. The third sort of *willing* is, when what we *will* depends on a Person, of whom we may obtain it, signifying to him the *Desire* we have that he *will* do it. This is the *Motion* we have when we *command* or *pray*. 'Tis to mark this *Motion*, that the Mood call'd *Imperative* was invented: It has no first Person, especially in the *Singular*, because one cannot properly *command* one's self; nor the third in several Languages, because we don't properly *command* any but those to whom we address and speak. And because the *Command* or *Desire* in this

Mood

Will is the present Time, and *wou'd* the past, of this Affirmation; but they signify the Time to come, when they are plac'd before other Affirmations, as, *I will love, I wou'd love.* Its Persons are, *I will, thou wilt, he will, sing. we, ye, they will,* plur. *Will* implies the Inclination of the Agent.

*The same Rule holds of shall, and shou'd, we find;
Since all the Time to come alone intend.*

Shall is the present Time, and *shou'd* the past; but it signifies the Time to come, when added to other Affirmations; as *I shall love, I shou'd love.* *Shall* is sometimes left out, as, *If he write, for, If he shall write; if he have written, for if he shall have written.*

In the first Person simply shall foretells:

In will a Threat, or else a Promise dwells.

Shall in the Second and the Third does threat;

Will simply then foretells the future Feat.

We

Mood has always regard to the *Future*, it thence happens, that the *Imperative* and *Future* are often taken one for another, especially in the *Hebrew*, as *non occides, you shall not kill, for kill not:* Whence it comes to pass, that some GRAMMARIANS have placed the *Imperative* among the *Futures*.

Of all the Moods we have been speaking of, the Oriental Tongues have only this latter, which is the *Imperative*: And on the contrary, the Vulgar Tongues have no particular Inflection for the *Imperative*, but our way of marking it in the *French*, is to take the second Person plural, and even the first, without the Pronouns that go before 'em: Thus *Vous aimez, You love*, is a simple Affirmation; *aimez* an *Imperative*. *Nous aimons, We love*; *aimone* an *Imperative*: But when we command by the Singular, which is very rare, we do not take the second Person, *Tu aimes*, but the first, *aime*.

There's another Inflection of a Verb, that admits of neither Number nor Person, which is what we call *Infinitive*; as *esse, estre, to be*; *amare, aimer, to love*. But it must be observed, that sometimes the *Infinitive* retains the Affirmation, as when I say, *Scio malum esse fugiendum*, I know the Evil is to be avoided; then often it loses it, and becomes a Noun, especially in *Greek* and the vulgar Tongues; as when we say, *Le boire, le manger*, and also *je vieux boire, volo libere*: for 'tis as much as to say, *volo potum, or potionem*.

This

We use not *shall* and *will* promiscuously for one another, for *shall* in the first Person simply foretells; *will* implies a Promise, or a Threat. In the second and third Person, *shall* promises, or threatens, and *will* only simply foretells; thus, *I shall burn, you will, or, thou wilt burn, he will burn, we shall, ye will, they will burn*; that is, I foretell this *will* be. *I will, you shall, or thou shalt; he shall, we will, ye shall, they shall burn*; that is, I promise, or engage, that such a Thing *shall* be done.

Wou'd and *shou'd* foretels what was to come, but with this Difference, *wou'd* implies the Will and Propension of the Agent; *shou'd*, only the simple Futurity; as, *I wou'd burn, I shou'd burn; rather than turn, I wou'd burn; if the Fire were about me, I shou'd burn.*

Shou'd seems likewise, in many Places, to be the same as *ought*; as, *I have been oblig'd to Roger, and shou'd now return the Obligation.* The Persons of these are, *I shou'd, thou shou'dst, he shou'd; I wou'd, thou wou'dst, he wou'd.*

We,

This being suppos'd, 'tis demanded what the Infinitive is properly, when 'tis not a Noun, but retains its Affirmation; as in this Example, *Scio malum esse fugiendum.* I know of no body that has taken Notice of what I am about to observe, which is, that we think the Infinitives among the other Moods of Verbs, what the Relative is among the Pronouns; for as the Relative has more in it than the other Pronouns, that it joins the Proposition in which it is to another Proposition, so I believe the Infinitive, besides the Affirmation of the Verb, may join the Proposition, in which it is, to another; for *Scio* is as good as a Proposition of itself; and if you add *malum est fugiendum*, 'twou'd be two several Propositions; but putting *esse* instead of *est*, you make the last Proposition but a Part of the first. And thence it is that in *French* they almost always render the Infinitive by the Indicative of the Verb, *Je scay, que le mal est fuir*, and then this *que* signifies only this Union of one Proposition to another; which Union is in *Latin* contain'd in the Infinitive, and in *French* also, tho' rarely, as when we say, *Il croit savoir toutes choses.*

This way of joining Propositions by an Infinitive, or by *quod* and *que*, is chiefly in use, when we make one Part of a Discourse have a Relation to another; as if I would report, that the King said to me, *Je vous donnera une charge*, I shall not generally do it in these Terms, The King said to me, *I*
will

We, ye, and they, { wou'd,
shou'd.

The Time to come most absolutely note

Both shall and will; but wou'd and shou'd do not,

But with Condition Time to come express;

Which Difference they every-where confess.

Shall and will denote absolutely the Time to come; shou'd and wou'd do it conditionally.

May does the Right, or Possibility;

And can the Agent's Pow'r to do imply.

May and can, with their past or passing Times might and cou'd, imply a Power; but with this Distinction, may and might are said of the Right, Possibility, and Liberty of doing a Thing; can and cou'd of the Power of the Agent; I can burn, I cou'd burn, I may burn, I might burn; that is, it is possible or lawful for me to burn. The Persons are, I may, thou may'st, he may; we, ye, and they may. I might, thou might'st or you might, he might; we, ye, and they might. I can, thou can'st, he can; we, ye, and they can. I cou'd, thou cou'dst, he cou'd; we, ye, and they cou'd. May and can are used with relation both to the Time present, and to come; cou'd from can, and might from may, have relation to the Time past and to come.

Must

will give thee a Post, le Roy m'a dit, Je vous donnera une charge, by leaving the two Propositions separate, one for me, the other for the King, but shall join 'em together by a Que le Roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge; and then it being only a Proposition, which is of myself, I change the first, je donneray into the third, il donnera, and the Pronoun vous (signifying the King speaking) to the Pronoun me, (signifying my self) who speak.

This Union of the Proposition is also made by si in French, and by an in Latin, in relating an Interrogative; as any one may demand of me, Pouvez vous faire cela, Can you do that? I should in relating it say, On m'a demande si je pouvoir faire cela, I was ask'd, If I could do that: And sometimes without any Particle, by changing only the Person; as, He ask'd me, Who are you? He ask'd me who I was.

But we must observe, that the Hebrews, tho' they spoke in another Language (as the Evangelists) make very little Use of this Union of Propositions, but always relate Discourses directly as they were made, so that the *ὅτι* (*quod*) which they fre-

Must the Necessity does still denote,
And still the Duty we express by ought.

Must implies Necessity, *I must burn*; *ought* implies Duty, as, *I ought to burn*. But these two Affirmations have only the present Time, and their Persons are only express'd by the Personal Names, for it is now quite obsolete to say, *thou oughtest*; for it now changes its Ending no more than *must*.

Have (when with Qualities of Suffering plac'd)
 Denotes the Time that perfectly is past;
 And thus by *had* is most directly shown
 The Time, that more than perfectly is gone.
Shall, and *will* have, do still the Time declare,
 That will be past before some others are.

Have (join'd to a Quality that signifies suffering) denotes the Time perfectly past, that is, that which is now past. *Had* marks the Time that is more than perfectly past, or some time past, that is, at the Time when it was spoken of; as, *I have burn'd*,

frequently used, did often serve for nothing, and did not join Propositions: An Example of which is in St. John, ch. 1. *Miserunt Judæi ab Hierosolymis sacerdotes & scribas ad Joannem ut interrogarent eum, Tu quis es? Et confessus est & non negavit; & confessus est quia (ὅτι) Non sum ego Christus. Et interrogaverunt eum, Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit, Non sum; Propheta es tu? Et respondit, Non.* According to the common Use of our Tongue, these Questions and Answers would have been related indirectly thus: *They sent to ask John who he was? and he confess'd he was not Christ. And they demanded, who he was then, if he was Elias? and he said, No. If he was a Prophet? and he reply'd, No.* This Custom is even met with in prophane Authors, who seem to have borrow'd it also from the Hebrews: And thence it is that the *ὅτι* had often among them only the Strength of a Pronoun, depriv'd of its common Use of Connexion, even when Discourse is reported not directly.

We have already said, that Men have, on an infinite Number of Occasions, join'd some particular Attribute with the Affirmation, made so many Verbs different from *Substantives*, which are to be found in all Tongues, and that they may be called *Adjective*; to shew, that the Signification, which is proper to each, is added to the Signification common to all Verbs, which is that of *Affirmation*. But 'tis a vulgar Error to believe,

that

burn'd, I had burn'd. Thus *shall have*, and *will have burn'd*, denote the Time, which will be past before another Thing, which is to come, *happens*, or *is*. As *when I shall have read a Page, I will shut the Book*. The Persons of these Affirmations are, *I have, thou hast, he has; we, ye, and they have.* *I had, thou hadst, he had; we, ye, or you, and they had.*

*Whenever have, Possession does denote,
These Affirmations it admits, else not.*

When *have* signifies *Possession*, as *I have a Horse, I have a Commission*, and the like, it admits some of the Nine Affirmations we have been treating of before it, to express its Times, Manner, &c. else not.

*Am, or be, still in their native Sense
Being import; but then they still disperse
The Affirmation to the Quality
(Without it lost) that suffer'ing does imply.*

Am, or be (for they are the same) naturally, or in themselves signify *being*; but join'd to, or set before a *Quality*, signifying *suffering*, restore the Affirmation of *suffering*, which as a *Quality* it lost; as *I am burn'd, he must be burn'd*. It has therefore a double Formation.

Singular,

that all these Verbs signify *Action* or *Passion*; for there's nothing a Verb cannot have for its Attribute, if the Affirmation be join'd to the Attribute. Nay, we see that the Verb Substantive *Sum, I am*, is frequently Adjective, because instead of taking it to signify the Affirmation simply, the most general of all Attributes is join'd to it, which is *Being*; as when I say, *I think, therefore I am; I am* signifies *sum ens, I am a Being, a Thing; Existo*, signifies also *sum existens, I am, I exist*.

However that does not hinder, but that the common Division of these Verbs into *Active, Passive, and Neuter*, may be retain'd. Those Verbs are properly call'd *Active*, which signify *Action*, to which is oppos'd *Passion*; as, *To beat, to be beaten; to love, to be beloved*: Whether those *Actions* be determined to a *Subject*, which is call'd real *Action*, as, *To beat, To break, to kill, &c.* or only to an *Object*, which is called intentional *Action*, as, *To love, to know, to see*.

Whence it is, that in several Languages, Men make use of the same Word, by giving it several Inflections, to signify both the one and the other, calling that a *Verb Active*, which has an Inflection, by which the *Action* is mark'd, and a *Verb Passive*,
that

	Singular,	Plur.
In the present Time	{ <i>Am, art, is,</i> <i>be, beest, be,</i>	{ <i>are.</i> <i>be.</i>
In the passing, or past Time	{ <i>was, wast, was,</i> <i>were, wert, were,</i>	{ <i>were.</i>

I am burn'd, thou art burn'd, he is burn'd, if I were burn'd, I was burn'd, I have been burn'd, I had been burn'd, I shou'd be burn'd, I shou'd have been burn'd.

All other *English Affirmations*, having no other differing Endings to signify all the other different Times, which are in Nature, must of Necessity supply that Defect, by making use of one or more of these Nine foregoing Words; for besides the *present* and the *passing* Times, which the *English* distinguishes by varying the Ending of the *Affirmation*, there is the *future*, or Time to come, the Time perfectly *past*, and the Time more than perfectly *past*; all which these little Affirmations easily supply.

*Where'er those Affirmations do precede,
The Endings of the following have no need
To change at all, but those must vary still,
The Use of Pers'nal Endings to fulfill.*

Whenever

that which has an Inflection, by which the *Passion* is mark'd; *Amo, Amor; verbero, verberor*. This was the Custom in all the ancient Languages, *Latin, Greek, and Oriental*; and moreover, these latter gave Three Actives to the same Verb, with each their Passive, and a Reciprocal between both the one and the other; as, *s'aimer* would be, which signifies the Action of the Verb, on the Subject of that Verb. But the vulgar Tongues of *Europe* have no *Passive*, and instead of that they make use of a Participle made of the *Verb Active*, which is taken in a Passive Sense, with the Verb Substantive; *Je suis, I am*; as *I am beloved, Je suis aime*; *Je suis battu, I am beaten, &c.* Thus much for Verbs, *Active* and *Passive*.

Neuters, call'd by some GRAMMARIANS *Verba intransitiva*, are two Sorts; the one does not signify the *Action*, but a *Quality*; as, *Albet, it is white; viret, it is green; friget, it is cold, &c.* Or some Situation; as, *Sedet, he sits; stat, he stands; jacet he lies.* Or has some relation to Place; *Adest, he is present; abest, he is absent.* Or some other State or Attribute; as, *Quiescit, he is quiet; excellit, he excels; præest, he is superior; regnat, he is King.*

The

Whenever these foregoing *Affirmatives* are plac'd before any others, they not only change their own *Personal Endings*, but hinder the following *Affirmations* from changing theirs, as *I do love, thou dost love, he does love, we, ye, and they do love*; not *I do love, thou dost lovest, he does loves, &c.* But the *Personal Name* is often left out, when the *Affirmation* implies Exhortation or Command, as *burn for burn thou, or ye.*

We have shewn, that *Affirmations* form their *passing Time* by adding (*d*) to the *present*, or by changing (*e*) into (*d*) or (*ed*); as, *I love, I lov'd or loved; I burn, I burn'd or burned*; but the (*ed*) is now almost wholly left out, except in *winged*, and a very few more, and therefore it is only on account of some old Books, that we mention it here.

These *Personal Endings* are not only omitted after the Nine *Affirmations*, but after *if, that, tho', altho', whether, &c.*

*But when the present ends in (d) or (t),
The passing Time the same we always see.*

When the *present Time* ends in (*d*), or (*t*), the *passing* has the same ending; as *read, spread, cast, bit, knit*, and some others,

The other Verbs *Neuter* signify *Actions*, but such as do not pass in a Subject different from him who acts, or which do not relate to another Object; as, *To dine, to sup, to march, to speak.*

Nevertheless, these latter Sorts of Verbs *Neuter*, sometimes become *Transitive*, when a Subject is given them; as *Ambulare viam*, where the Way is taken for the Subject of the *Action*; often also in *Greek*, and sometimes in *Latin*, a Subject is given it, being a Noun form'd of the same Verb; as *Pugnare pugnam, servire servitutum, vivere vitam.*

But we believe these later Ways of Speaking were occasion'd only to mark something particular, that was not intirely contain'd in the Verb, as when one would say, *Man leads a shameful Life*, which is not imply'd in the Word *vivere*; it has been said, *vivere vitam beatam*; as also *Servire duram Servitutum*. Thus when we say, *vivere vitam*, 'tis without doubt a *Pleonasm*, come from those other Ways of Speaking: For this Reason (in all the new Languages) we avoid joining the Noun to the Verb, as *a fault*, and don't say, for Example, *To fight a great Fight.*

By this that Question may be resolv'd, whether every Verb not *Passive* governs always an *Accusative*, at least understood: 'Tis the Opinion of some very able GRAMMARIANS, but
for

others, which are distinguish'd only by the Pronunciation, tho' they were doubtless of old, *readed, spreaded, casted, bitten, knitted, &c.* And if they were still spelt with a double Consonant, it would be much better for the Distinction, tho' this Defect is fully supply'd by the former Nine little *Affirmations* of Time, &c.

*Other Exceptions to this Rule we find,
Which to the following List are most confign'd.*

There are some *Affirmations*, which are irregular in this Matter, or are Exceptions to this Rule; but this Irregularity reaches only those, which are Native, and originally *English* Words, and of one Syllable, or deriv'd from Words of one Syllable.

The first Irregularity, and that which is the most general, arose from our Quickness of Pronunciation, by changing the Consonant (*d*) into (*t*) as often as by that means the Pronunciation is made the more expeditious; and indeed seems rather a Contraction, than an Irregularity; particularly after *c, ch, sh, f, k, p, x*; and after *s*, and *th*, when pronounc'd hard; and

for our Parts we don't think it. For first, the Verbs that signify no Action, but some Condition; as *quiescit, existit*; or some Quality, as *albet, calet*, have no Accusative they can govern; and for the rest it must be regarded, whether the Action they signify has a Subject or an Object, that may be different from that which acts. For then the Verb governs the Subject, where this Object has the Accusative. But when the Action signified by the Verb has neither Subject nor Object different from that which acts, as, *to dine, to sup*; *prandere, canare, &c.* then there is not sufficient Reason to say they govern the Accusative: Tho' those GRAMMARIANS thought the Infinitive of the Verb to be understood as a Noun form'd by the Verb, and by this Example, *Curro*, they will have it *Curro cursum* or *curro currere*: However, this does not appear to be solid enough, for the Verb signifies every Thing the Infinitive signifies taken as a Noun; and further, the Affirmation and Designation of the Person and Tense. As the Adjective *candidus, white*, signifies the Substantive drawn from the Adjective (to wit) *candor, whiteness*, and also the Connotation of a Subject, in which is that abstract: wherefore, there's as much Reason to pretend, that when we say, *Homo candidus, candere* is to be understood

and sometimes after *l, m, n, r*, when a short Vowel goes before: for these Letters more easily admit a (*t*) than a (*d*) after 'em; as, *plac't, snatch'd, fish't, wak't, dwelt, smelt*, instead of *plac'd, snatch'd, fish'd, wak'd, dwell'd, smell'd*.

But (*d*) remains after the Consonants *b, g, v, w, z, s, th*, when they have a softer Sound, and when a longer Vowel precedes *l, m, n, r*, for they more easily unite and incorporate with (*d*) than (*t*), because of the like Direction of the Breath to the Nostrils; as you may find in the Notes to this Grammar on the Formation of those Letters; thus, *liv'd, smil'd, raz'd, believ'd, &c.* from *live, smile, raze, believe*.

Except when the long Vowel is shortned before *l, m, n, r*; or when (*b*) and (*u*) are chang'd into (*p*) or (*f*), and the softer Sound of (*s*) passes into their harder, as *felt, delt, dremt, ment, left, bereft, &c.* from to *feel, deal, dream, mean, leave, bereave, &c.*

But when (*d*) or (*t*) go before, and are join'd by (*d*) or (*t*), (in this contracted Form), they incorporate with the radical (*d*) or (*t*), into one Letter;—that is, if (*t*) be the radical Letter, they unite into (*t*), but if (*d*) be the radical Letter,

understood, as to imagine that when we say *curris, currere* is to be understood.

The *Infinitive* (which we have been explaining) is what properly should be called a Verb Impersonal, since it marks the Affirmation, which is the Property of the Verb, and marks it indefinitely, without Number and Person, which is properly to be Impersonal.

Nevertheless the GRAMMARIANS generally give the Name of *Impersonal* to certain defective Verbs, that have hardly any thing but the third Person.

There are two Sorts of these Verbs, the one have the Form of *Verbs Neuter*, as *pœnitēt, pudet, piget, licet, lubet, &c.* the other are made of *Verbs passive*, and retain the Form, as *Statur, curritur, amatur, vivitur, &c.* Now these Verbs have sometimes more Persons than the GRAMMARIANS think of, as may be seen in the *Method. Latin Remarks on Verbs*, Chap. 5. But what we may consider here, and which few Persons have taken Notice of, is, that it seems they are call'd *Impersonal*, only because implying in their Signification a Subject, which agrees only to the third Person. 'Twas not necessary to express the Fact, because 'tis remark'd enough by the Verb itself; and thus the Affirmation and Attribute have been compriz'd

ter, then they incorporate into (*d*) or (*t*), according as this or that Letter is the easier to be pronounc'd, as *read*, *led*, *spread*, *dread*, *shred*, *tread*, *bid*, *hid*, *chid*, *fed*, *bled*, *bred*, *sped*, *strid*, *slid*, *rid*, &c. (which doubtless, were originally, *readed*, *bided*, &c. as it were, *read'd*, *bid'd*, &c.) from to *read*, *lead*, *spread*, *shed*, *dread*, *shread*, *bid*, *hide*, *chide*, *feed*, *bleed*, *breed*, *speed*, *stride*, *slide*, *ride*, &c. thus, *cast*, *hurt*, *cost*, *burst*, *eat*, *beat*, *sweat*, *fit*, *quit*, *smit*, *writ*, *hit*, *bit*, *met*, *shot*, &c. (tho' perhaps these Words wou'd for the Distinction of the *passing* Time from the *present*, be better spelt, *eatt*, *beatt*, *bitt*, *hitt*, &c. as it were, *eat't*, *bit't* *hit't*, &c. from these WORDS, to *cast*, *hurt*, *cost*, *burst*, *eat*, *beat*, *sweat*, *fit*, *quit*, *smite*, *write*, *bite*, *hit*, *meet*, *shoot*, &c. thus, *lent*, *sent*, *rent*, *girt*, &c. for *lend'd*, *send'd*, &c. from to *lend*, *send*, *rend*, *gird*, &c.

Tho' this Irregularity be sometimes lost, and the regular Spelling observ'd, as *plac'd*, *fish'd*, &c. yet 'tis but seldom, and in few Words.

There

priz'd by the Subject in one Word, as *Pudet me*, that is *pudor tenet*, or *est tenens me*; *pœnitent me*, *pœna habet me*; *Libet mihi*, *libido est mihi*: Where it must be observ'd that the Verb *est* is not only simply the Substantive, but signifies also *Existence*. For 'tis, as if 'twas said, *Libido existit mihi*, or *est existens mihi*. And thus in other Impersonals resolv'd by *est*; as *licet mihi*, for *licitum est mihi*, *oportet orare*, for *opus est orare*, &c. As to Passive impersonals, *Statur*, *curritur*, *vivitur*, &c. they may also be resolv'd by the Verb *est*, or *fit*, or *existit*, and the Nouns Verbal taken of themselves, as *Statur*, that is, *Statio fit*, or *est facta*, or *Existit*; *Curritur*, *cursus fit*; *Concurritur*, *concurfus fit*; *vivitur*, *vita est*, or rather *vita agitur*. *Si sic vivitur*, *si vita est talis*, *If Life is such*. *Misere vivitur*, *cum medice vivitur*; *Life is miserable when 'tis too much subjected to the Rules of Physick*, and then *est* becomes a Substantive, because of the Addition of *misere*, which makes the Attribute of the Proposition.

Dum servitur libidini, that is, *dum servitus exhibetur libidini*, when a Man makes himself Slave to his Passions. By this methinks may be concluded, the Vulgar Languages have not properly Impersonals; as when we say in *French*, *il faut*, *it must*, *il est permis*, *il me plaist*; for *il* is there properly a Relative, which always serves instead of the Nominative of the Verb, which generally comes after in the Construction, as if we say, *il me plaist de faire cela*; that is to say, *il de faire*, for the *Action* or

the

There are not a few other irregular WORDS in the *passing* Time, but those, which are more particular and special, may be reduc'd to their Classes; as,

1. *Won, spun, begun, swam, struck, sung, stung, flung, rung, wrung, sprung, swung, drunk, sunk, shrunk, stunk, hung, come, run, found, bound, ground wound*; many of them are likewise spelt with (a), as *began, sang, rang, sprang, drank, came, ran*, and some others, tho' not so often; from to *win, spin, begin, swim, strike, stick, sing, sting, sling, ring, wring, spring, swing, drink, sink, shrink, stink, hang, come, run, find, bind, grind, wind, &c.*

2. *Faught, taught, raught, sought, besought, caught, bought, draught, thought, wrought*; from to *fight, teach, reach, seek, beseech, catch, buy, bring, think, work*; yet some of these sometimes keep their Regularity; as, *reach'd, beseech'd, catch'd, work'd, &c.*

3. *Took, shook, forsook, awoke, arose, stood, broke, spoke, bore, shore, swore, tore, wore, clove, strove, throve, drove, shone, rose, arose, smote, wrote, bode, abode, chose, trod, got, begot, forgot, rod*; some likewise write *thrive, rise, smit, writ, abid, rid, &c.* others form them by (a) as, *brake, spake, bare, share, sware, tare, ware, clawe, gat, begat, forgot*, and perhaps some others; but this Way is seldom, and very unpollite;

the Motion to do that pleases me, or est mon plaisir, 'tis my Pleasure. However, this *il* (which few People in our Opinion have rightly understood) is only a Sort of Pronoun, for *id* that, which serves instead of the Nominative understood or imply'd in the Sense, and represents *il*, so that 'tis properly taken from the Article *il*, of the *Italians*; instead of which we say *le*; or from the Pronoun *ille*, from whence we also take our Pronoun of the third Person *il*; *il aime, il parle, il court, &c.*

For the Passive Impersonals, *amatur, curritur*, express'd in *French* by *on aime, on court*; 'tis certain these Ways of speaking in our Modern Languages, are still less Impersonal, tho' Indefinite; this *on* is there for *Man, Homme*, and consequently serves instead of the Nominative to the Verb: All this relates particularly to the *French*, and we have less of the Impersonal than they, but the same Reasons will remove ours justly apply'd. And one may also observe, that the Verbs of the Effects of Nature, as, *Pluit, ningit, grandinat*, may be explain'd by these same, in both Tongues.

e; the present Times of these Words are, *take, shake, forsake, wake, awake, stand, break, speak, hear, shear, swear, tear, wear, weave, cleave, (to cling to), cleave, (to split), strive, drive, shine, rise, arise, smite, write, bide, abide, ride, chuse, (or choose) tread, beget, forget.*

4. Give, bid, sit, having their passing Times, gave, bad, sate.

5. Draw, know, snow, grow, throw, blow, crow, fly, slay see, ly, make their passing Times, drew, knew, snow, (or rather snow'd,) grew, threw, blew, (or rather blow'd,) crew, (or rather crow'd; flew, flew, saw, lay, flee (or flye), fled; from go, went. These are all, or the most Part at least, of the most Consequence of all the Irregular WORDS in the *English Tongue.*

*When Affirmations are together join'd,
To still between them does its Station find.*

When Two Words of Affirmation come together, before the latter the Sign (*to*) is always express'd or understood; as *I love to read, I dare fight*; in the latter (*to*) is understood; for it means, *I dare to fight*, as, *do, will, may, can*; with their passing Times, *did, wou'd, shou'd, might, cou'd, and must, bid dare, let, help, and make.* C H A P.

As *Pluit* is properly a Word, in which for Brevity sake the Subject, the Affirmation, and Attributes are included, instead of *Pluvia fit, or cadit*; and when we say *it Rains, it Snows, it Hails, &c.* it is therefore the Nominative, that is to say, *Rains, Snows, Hails, &c.* included with their Verb Substantive *est* or *fuit*; as if we should say, *il plute est, le Neige se fait*, for *id quod dicitur pluvia est, id quod vocatur nix fit.*

This is better seen in the Way of Speaking, where the French join a Verb with their *il*, as *il fait chaud, il est tard, il est six heures, il est jour, &c.* For 'tis the same as may be said in Italian, *il caldo fa*, tho' in use we say simply, *fa caldo: Æstus, or Calor est, or fit, or existit.* And *il fait chaud*, that is to say, *il chaud (il caldo) or le chaud se fait, to say existit, est.* Thus we also say, *il se fait tard*, for *il tarde*, that is to say, *il tarde (le tard, or the Evening) se fait.* Or, as is said in some Provinces, *il s'en va tard* for *il tarde*, *le tard s'en va venir*, that is, the Night approaches. As also *il est jour*, that is, *il jour (or the Day) est, is.* *Il est six heures*, that is, *il temps six heures est*; The Time or part of the Day call'd Six a Clock, is. And thus in other the like Terms.

Tho' we have no *Participles* in *English*, but what by the best Judges are reduc'd to *Qualities*, yet to carry on this general *Grammar*, we here add something on them: Participles are true Noun Adjectives, and 'twould not be proper to discourse of 'em here, if they had not such a near Relation to Verbs. This Relation consists (as we have said) in that they signify the same Thing as the Verb, except the Affirmation, which is taken away, and the Designation of the three different Persons, which follows the Affirmation. For which Reason (when 'tis restor'd to it) we do the same thing by the Participle, as by the Verb; as *amatus sum*, is the same thing as *amor*; and *sum amans*, as *amo*. And this Way of speaking by Participle, is more usual in *Greek* and *Hebrew* than in *Latin*, tho' *Cicero* makes use of it sometimes.

Thus the Participle retains the Attribute of the Verb, and also the Designation of the Time or Tense, there being Participles of the Present, the Preterit, and the Future, especially in *Greek*. But this is not always observ'd, tho' some Participles join often all Sorts of Tenses; as for Example, the Passive Participle *Amatus*, which in most GRAMMARIANS passes for the Preterit, is often of the Present and Future; as *amatus sum*, *amatus ero*. And on the contrary, that of the Present, as *amans* is often of the Preterit, *Apri super se dimicant, indurantes attritu arborum rostra*, *Plin.* That is to say, *postquam induravere*, and the like. *New. Lat. Remarq. on Participles.*

There are Active and Passive Participles, the Active in *Latin* end in *ans*-or *ens*, *curans*, *docens*; the Passive in *us*, *amatus*, *doctus*; tho' there are some of these that are Active, to wit, those of Verbs Deponent, as *Locutus*. But there are some also, that add this Passive Signification, *que cela doit estre, qu'il faut que cela soit*, that must or ought to be, as are the Participles in *dus*, *amandus*, that *that ought to be* below'd; tho' sometimes that latter Signification is almost quite lost.

The Property of Participles of Verbs Active, is to signify the Action of the Verb, as 'tis in the Verb, that is to say, in the Course of the Action it self; whereas Verbal Nouns, that signify Actions also, signify them rather in the Habit, than in the Act. Thence it is, that Participles have the same Regimen as the *amans Deum*. Whereas Verbal Nouns have the same Regimen as Nouns, *amator Dei*. And the Participle it self has the same Regimen as Nouns when it signifies rather the Habit than the Act of the Verb, because it then has the Nature of a simple Noun Verbal, as *amans virtutis*.

We have seen, that by taking away the Affirmation from Verbs Active and Passive Participles are made, which are Noun Adjectives, retaining the Regimen of the Verb, at least in the Active.

But there are in *Latin* two Noun Substantives form'd, one in *dum*, called a *Gerund*, which has divers Cases, *dum*, *di*, *do*; *amandum*, *amandi*, *amando*; but it has but one Gender, and one Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *dus*, *amandus*, *amanda*, *amandum*.

Another in *um*, called *Supine*, which has also two Cases, *tum*, *tu*, *amatum*, *amatu*; but it has no more Diversity either of Gender or Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *tus*, *amatus*, *amata*, *amatum*.

We know very well the GRAMMARIANS are puzzled a little to explain the Nature of the *Gerund*; and that some very able ones have thought 'twas an Adjective Passive, whose Substantive was the Infinitive of the Verb; so that they pretend for Example, that *tempus est legendi Libros*, or *Librorum* (for both the one and the other is us'd) is as if it were *tempus est legendi* τῷ *legere libros vel librorum*. There are two Speeches, to wit, *tempus legendi* τῷ *legere*, which is the Adjective and Substantive, as if it was *legendæ lectionis*, & *legere Libros*, which is the Noun Verbal, that then governs the Case of the Verb, as well as a Substantive governs the Genitive, when we say *librorum* for *Libros*. But considering every thing, we don't see, that the Term is necessary.

For 1. As they say of *legere*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, which as such may govern either the Genitive, or even the Accusative, as the Ancients said, *curatio hanc rem*; *Quid tibi hanc tacitio est*? Plaut. We say the same Thing of *legendum*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, as well as *legere*, and that consequently it may do all that's attributed to *legere*.

2. There is no Ground to say, that a Word is understood when 'tis never express'd, and cannot be express'd without appearing absurd. Now never was an *Infinitive* join'd to its *Gerund*; and if one should say *legendum est legere*, it would appear altogether absurd, therefore, &c.

3. If the *Gerund* *legendum* were an Adjective Passive, it would not be different from the Participle *legendus*; for what Reason therefore did the Ancients, who understood their Tongue, distinguish *Gerunds* from *Participles*? We believe therefore the *Gerund* is a Noun Substantive, which is always Active, and which differs from the Infinitive only consider'd as a Noun; be-

cause

cause it adds to the Signification of the Action of the Verb, another of the Necessity or Duty; as if one would say the Action that is to be done, which seems to be mark'd by the Word Gerund, which is taken from *gerere*, to do; whence it comes that *pugnandum est*, is the same Thing as *pugnare oportet*; and the *English* and *French*, which have not this, render it by the *Infinitive*, and a Word which signifies *ought to be*. *Il faut combattre*; and in *English*, *we ought to fight*.

But as Words do not always preserve the Force for which they were invented, this Gerund in *dum* often loses that *Oportet*, and preserves only the Action of the Verb; *Quis talia fando Temperet a Lacrymis*; That is to say, *in fando*, or *in fori talia*.

As for the *Supine*, we agree with those GRAMMARIANS, that it is a Noun Substantive, which is passive; whereas the Gerund in our Opinion is always active.

C H A P. IX.

Of PARTICLES, or Manners of WORDS.

By PARTICLES these several Things are done;
Circumstance and Manner of Words are shown,
And then to every Part of Speech are shewn;
Or else they do denote of Words the State,
And how each Word to other does relate:
Or Sentence else to Sentence they unite,
And their Dependance on each other cite.

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[1] PARTICLES (that is, little WORDS) or Manners of WORDS, have these several Offices: 1st, They express or signify the Circumstance or Manner of Words; as *I love you dearly*; explaining (when join'd to an Affirmation) *how*, *when*, *where*, or *whether*, or *no* one is, does, or suffers; as *he reads well*; *he dances scurvily*; *he sings now*; *the Play is acted here*; *it is a Doubt whether he sings or not*. It is join'd

[1] We have already observed, that Cases and Prepositions, or *Foreplaced Words*, were invented for the same Use; that is, to shew the Relations, that Things have to one another. In all Languages these Relations are shewn by Prepositions.

to a QUALITY; as, *he is very happy; he is always fortunate; a Woman truly loving is ever disappointed; a Wife seldom scolding is very rare, &c.* 'Tis sometimes join'd to itself; as *I live very comfortably.* They farther denote, or shew the State of Words, and their Reference or Relation to each other; as *Stephen goes over Highgate-Hill; James went under Temple-bar; Mary went through the Hall; Susan went to Westminster, from St. James's Park; the King dwells at St. James's; Henry lives in the Town, but Matthew without, or out of it, &c.* It connects Sentences; as *Roger went to his Country-house, and study'd there the whole Season; Peter also accompany'd him; nor was there any thing wanting; neither did Ralph stay long behind.*

[2] They are therefore divided into three Sorts, or rather rang'd under these three Heads; the first shewing the *Manners* or *Qualities* of Words, by being added to them; the second denotes some Circumstances of *Actions*, and joins Words to Words, and little Members of a Sentence to each other; the third joins Sentence to Sentence, as greater Members of a Period.

These

[2] The Desire Men have to shorten Discourse, gave Rise to *Adverbs*; for the greatest Part of these *Particles*, are only to signify in one Word, what could not else be done without a *Preposition* and a *Noun*; as *Sapienter*, for *cum sapientia*, with *Wisdom*; *hodie*, for *in hoc die*, in this Day.

And this is the Reason, that in the vulgar Languages the greatest Part of the *Adverbs* are generally more elegantly explain'd by the *Noun* and the *Preposition*; thus we rather say (we speak generally, for it holds not always) *with Wisdom, with Prudence, with Pride, with Moderation*, than *wisely, prudently, proudly, moderately*; tho' in *Latin*, it is generally more elegant to use the *Adverbs*.

Thence it is, that a *Noun* or *Name*, is often taken for an *Adverb*; as *Instar* in *Latin*, *primum*, or *primo*, *partim*, &c. Thus in *French* *Dessus, dessous, dedans*, which are indeed *Nouns*. These two Sorts of *Particles*, which we have just remark'd on, are concern'd in the Objects of the Mind, not in the Actions or Judgment.

The second Sort of Words which signify the Form of our Thoughts, and not properly their Objects, are the *Conjunctions* or *Joining-Words*, as *et, non, vel, si, ergo, &c.* and, not, or, if, therefore, because if we consider well, and reflect justly, we shall find, that these *Particles* signify nothing but the very Operation of the Mind, which joins or disjoins Things, which we deny, or

which

*These from the other Parts of Speech are known,
Because before them they do still disown,
By, with, for, through, from, of; and all
Those Names, which we the Personal do call.*

This Part of Speech is easily distinguish'd from the rest; because in good Sense they cannot admit these Words, *of, to, for, O, with, by, from, through*; nor the *Personal Names, I, thou, he, we, ye, they*; for we cannot say, *of foolishly, to foolishly, from foolishly, &c.* nor *I foolishly, thou foolishly, he foolishly.*

*This first, with Affirmation and its Name,
Makes perfect Sense, as Peter slowly came;
And by its answering to the Question How,
And in what manner, do they steer the Plough?*

You may know the first, by its making complete Sense with one *Affirmation* and its *Name*; as, *A Philosopher speaks wisely; A wise Man lives happily.* And by answering the Question *How?* or *after what Manner?* This Part of Speech is sometimes join'd to a *Name* or *Quality* to express their Manner, as, *too much a Philosopher; egregiously impudent.* But here indeed, and in most Cases, a *Word* is express'd or understood, to which this also relates.

*This Sort the Manner, Time, and Place imply,
As by the following Scale you will descry.*

This Sort relates either to the *Manner, Place, or Time*: The first expresses the Manner of *being, doing, or suffering* Absolutely or Comparatively.

which we consider absolutely or conditionally: for Example, There is no Object in the World lies out of our Mind; which answers the Particle *Non*; but it is plain that it denotes nothing but the Judgment which we make, to shew that one Thing is not another.

Thus *Ne*, which in *Latin* is a Particle of Interrogation, As *Aisne, do you say it?* is not the Object of our Mind, but only marks the Motion of our Soul, by which we desire to know something. And the same may be said of all Words of Interrogation, as *quis, quæ, quod.*

Interjections are Words, that signify nothing without us, but they are Words, or rather Sounds, which are more Natural than artificial, which express the Emotions of our Souls; as *alas! woe's me! oh! &c.*

I. *Absolutely.*

- By {
1. Certainty ; as, *Verily, truly, undoubtedly.*
 2. { Contingence ; as, *Happily, perhaps, by chance, per-
chance.*
 3. Negation ; as, *Not, in no wise.*
 4. { Natural Powers, or Habits ; as *Wisely, liberally,
justly.*
 5. { Sensible Impressions ; as *Brightly, nastily, bitterly,
ludly, smoothly.*
 6. { Passions of the Soul ; as, *Merrily, joyfully ; as Ha!
ba ! he !* Wandringly, as *Lo ! O ! ho !* Scorn-
fully, as, *Tush ;* Lovingly, as, *Ab !* Hatefully, as,
Fob ! Sorrowingly, as, *Alas, ah ! woe's me !*

II. *Comparatively.*

- By {
1. { Excess ; as, *very, exceedingly, too much, more, most ;
as more hardly, most softly.*
 2. Defect ; as, *almost, well nigh, little less, least of all.*
 3. Likeness, or Equality ; as *so, alike, as it were, as.*
 4. { Unlikeness, or Inequality ; as *other-wise, differently,
far otherwise.*

III. *Of Place.*

- Denote {
1. { Prefence in a Place, answering to the Question *where ?*
as *here, there, elsewhere, every where, no where,
somewhere else, above, below, within, without ;*
or to the Question *with whom ?* as, *together,
at once, apart, severally.*
 2. Motion from a Place ; as *whence, hence, thence.*
 3. { Motion towards a Place ; as *Whitherwards, hither-
wards, thitherwards, otherward, toward, up-
ward, backward.*
 4. { The Way to a Place ; as, *Whither away, this, that,
or another Way.* Tho' these are scarce to be
allow'd Particles, or Manners of Words.
 5. { The Term or End of Motion ; as *whither, hither,
thither, witherto, hitherto.*

IV. *Of*

IV. Of Time.

Denote	{	1.	{	Being in Time ; as, <i>when</i> ! either the Present, as, <i>now, to day</i> ; the Past, as <i>already, yesterday, before, long since, heretofore</i> ; the Future, as <i>to-morrow, not yet, after, hereafter, henceforward</i> .
		2.	{	Duration and Continuance ; <i>how long</i> ! a long <i>while, slowly, quickly, shortly, hitherto</i> .
		3.	{	Vicissitude or Repetition, <i>how often</i> ! <i>often, sometimes, seldom, daily ; yearly ; by turns, alternately ; once, twice, thrice, ten times, &c.</i>

Those that are deriv'd from *Qualities*, which admit Degrees of Comparison, do the same ; as, *hardly, more hardly, most, or very hardly*.

*The Second Sort, that shew of Words the State,
And how each Word to Others does relate,
You in the following Catalogue will find,
And how its Use and Meaning is to each assign'd.*

OF] denotes Relations betwixt the Word that goes before, and the Word that follows it, whether that Word be *Name, Quality, or Affirmation* ; as, *the Son of Adam* : but this properly belongs to *Construction*, to which we refer you.

It signifies *concerning*, or the *Object*, or *Matter* about which you speak or write ; as, *a Treatise of Virtue, or on or concerning Virtue*.

The *Matter* ; as, *a Cup of Gold*.

The *Means*, (or *WITH*) to *die of Hunger*.

It signifies *AMONG* ; as, *of Five Horses Four were blind*.

THROUGH ; 'tis of *God's great Mercy* : But this is a *Vulgarism* ; and scarce worth Notice.

FROM, *South of Windsor*.

OFF] signifies *Separation and Distance*, and has its Opposite in *ON*, which implies *Continuation* ; as, *to put off, to put on ; He put off his Hat, he stood off-to Sea*. It signifies *Delay* ; *He put me off from Day to Day, he is off and on with me*.

FROM] implies the *Term from which*, or *Motion*, and is oppos'd to *TO* ; as, *He went from Hackney to London ; From Head to Foot, from first to last, from hence to thence, &c.*

It signifies OFF; as, *He took me from the Ground, or from off the Ground. Out of Sincerity, I speak it from my Heart.*

TO] (*unto*, not much us'd) signifies Motion *to*; *I go to Wind-for; faithful to his Sovereign.*

IN] *to Day, i. e. in this Day, To-morrow.*

FOR] *she had a thousand Pounds to her Fortune.*

BEFORE] *you promise me to my Face.*

ABOUT, or concerning] *Speak to the Head we agreed on.*

TOWARDS] *I thank you for your Kindness to me.*

TILL, or until] *The Meeting is put off to November.*

In Comparison OF] *He is nothing to Hercules, or in Comparison of Hercules.*

MAY, can or will] *I have nothing to comfort me; i. e. that may, can, or will comfort me.*

TILL, or Until] is only spoken of Time; *He play'd till Eight o'Clock.*

Before] *He would not remove his Quarters till (or until) his Contributions were paid.*

FOR] denotes the Purpose, End, or Use, Benefit or Damage for, &c. *George got a Horse for Stephen; the Advocate pleads for his Client.*

Oppos'd to against] *William is for me, John is against me.*

Fitness, Inconvenience] as, *This Hat is too little for me.*

Exchange, or trucking] as, *He had Barley for his Hops.*

In place, or instead of] *Harry did Duty for John.*

Distribution] *I appointed one Room for every Company.*

In regard or consideration of] as, *He liv'd high enough for his Estate.*

In consideration of] *James was rewarded for his Valour.*

During] *He was Captain of the Fort for Life.*

Notwithstanding] *For all his conceited Wisdom, he was a Fool.*

BY] The several Meanings of this Word are seen in this Sentence; *He was slain by his Enemy, by (near, or beside) a Spring of Water, but wounded first by his own Fear, and then by his Enemy's Sword.*

IN] *By Day, by Night.*

WITH]

WITH] Shews the Instrument, or Means, and Concomitance; *He was slain with a Sword; he abides with me; he purg'd with Jalap.*

THROUGH] implies the Cause, Means, or Medium, but chiefly the local Medium, tho' it signifies the Moral and Natural likewise; as, *The Beams of the Sun with incredible Speed pass from Heaven, through the Air to the Earth, endu'd with Light and Heat, by (with, through) which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants, which God has prepar'd for us, and given to us for our Use, and his Glory.*

AFTER] opposes *before*, relates to Time and Place, the Posteriority of the former, and Inferiority of the latter: *After Christmas, comes Hillary Term; the Sheriff is after the Mayor.*

For] *She pines after Melons.*

IN, INTO] denotes Time, Place, the Manner of being, thinking, doing; with the Motive, Cause, or Means of doing; *John lives in the Castle; William goes into the Country; in Winter; in the City.*

Posture, Disposition] *To stand in a decent Posture; he is in his Cloak.*

The Motive] *He did it in Revenge.*

Among] *Harry has not Sobriety in all his Meditations.*

Manner of Change] *He changes Water into Wine.*

AT] implies Nearness to a Place, Time, Price; the Instrument, Cause, Manner, &c. *At School, at Westminster, at the beginning, at the bottom.*

Near, close by] *He watches at the End of the Street.*

For] *He dispos'd of his Tickets at a good Rate: What do you sell this at?*

WITH] *He plays at Bowls, at Cards, at Dice.*

According to] *At my Pleasure.*

On, or Upon] *Banister is good at the Flute; Peter is a Marksman at Shooting.*

Employment] *To be at Study, at Supper, at Prayers.*

WARD] is always put after a Word; as *toward, homeward, Heav'n-ward*, and implies *to*.

After these former Particles still set

The Personal Names, all in the following State.

The Personal Names coming after any of these Particles, are to be put in their following State; as, *before me, not I, against Him, not He; after Whom, not Who.*

There are many more of this sort, but we shall be content with these, as well as Dr. *Wallis*, since abundantly sufficient for our End: For the rest, we shall refer you to a Treatise of our *English Particles*, which we shall publish as a Supplement to the Study of the *English Tongue*; as *Turselinus*, and others, have done to that of the *Latin*.

*By the third Sort of Particles is shewn
How Sentences Dependence may be known,
And to each other Sentences we join.*

}

The third Sort of these *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, join *Sentences* together, and let us see by that the Relation of one Notion to another, and the Dependence of one Sentence on another; as, *and, also, so as; nor, neither, but, unless, nevertheless, however, otherwise; if, save, except, tho', altho', whereas, since, likewise, thereupon, &c.*

What else is necessary to be known in *Grammar*, concerning these *Particles*, will be shewn in the following Part of our Division of *Grammar*, under the Title of *Sentences*.

The End of the Third Part.



PART



PART IV.

CHAP. X.

Of SENTENCES.

*At least, Three Words a Sentence must contain,
Which must some Sentiment or Thought explain.*

A SENTENCE comprehends at least *Three Words*, by which some Sentiment or Thought of the Mind is express'd: Nor can it be without one *Affirmation*, and a *Name* signifying the Subject of that *Affirmation*, i. e. a *Name* of which something is affirm'd; as, a *Lye is abominable*.

[1] The Construction of the Sentence, is the regular Connexion of the Words in the Form of Nature, which is generally more regarded by the *English*, and other Modern Languages, than by those of the Antients.

A

[1] As we have done in our Notes on the Parts of Speech, or Words, so we shall here add the general Notion of *Grammar* in the Syntax, or Construction of Words together in a Sentence, according to those Principles of the Art which we have drawn from Reason established.

The Construction of Words is generally distinguish'd into *Concord* and *Government*; the first, by which the Words ought to agree among themselves; and the second, when one causes any Alteration in the other.

The first, generally speaking, is the same in all Languages, because it is the natural Order, which is in the general Usage, the better to distinguish our Discourse.

Thus the Distinction of the Two Numbers, Singular and Plural, is the Reason why the Adjective is to agree with the Substantive in Number; that is, that one be put either in the Singular or Plural, as the other is. Because the *Substantive* is the Subject that is confusedly, tho' directly, mark'd by the *Adjective*.

jective. If the *Substantive* marks *many*, there are *many* Subjects of the Form, mark'd by the *Adjective*, and by Consequence it ought to be in the Plural Number, as *Homines docti*, *learned Men*. But there being no Termination in the *Quality* in *English*, to distinguish the Number, it is only imply'd in Reason, the same Word signifying the Singular, as well as Plural Number.

The Distinction of the Masculine and Feminine Gender, obliges the Languages which have distinct Terminations, to have a Concordance or Agreement between the *Name* and *Quality*, or *Substantive* and *Adjective* in Gender, as well at Number.

The *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, for the same Reason, are to agree with the *Nouns* and *Pronouns*, or *Names*, and *Personal Names*, in Number and Person.

But if at any Time, in Reading, you meet with any Thing that may appear contrary to these Rules, it is by a Figure of Discourse; that is, by having some Word understood, or by considering the Thoughts more than the Words themselves; as we shall see anon.

The Construction of Government, on the contrary, is entirely arbitrary; and, for that very Reason is different in all Languages. For one Language forms their Government or Regimen by *Cases*; others make use of little Signs or Particles in their place, which yet do not mark all the Cases; as in *French* and *Spanish*, they have only *de* and *a*, which mark the *Genitive* and *Dative Cases*; the *Italians* add *da*, for the *Abblative*, the *English* have *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *by*, &c. yet none for the *Accusative*, and the same sometimes for Two Cases. Here you may look back to what has been said on the Cases, and forward to what may be added in the *Appendix of Prepositions*, to the short Remark on them in their Places.

Yet it will not be amiss to observe some general Maxims, which are of great use in all Languages.

The *First*, That there is no *Nominative Case*, or *first State of the Name* in any Sentence, which has not a Reference to some *Verb* or *Affirmation*, either express'd or understood; because we never talk merely to mark the bare Objects of our Conception, but to express our Sentiments of what we conceive, which is the Office of the *Verb* or *Affirmation* to mark.

The *Second*, That there is no *Verb* or *Affirmation*, which has not its *Name* or *Nominative Case* either express'd or understood, because it is the proper Office of the Verb to affirm; and therefore it must have something to affirm of, which is the *Subject* or the *Nominative* of the *Verb*: tho' before an Infinitive there is an *Accusative*, (not a *Nominative Case*) as, *Scio Petrum esse doctum*.

doctum, I know Peter to be learned. But this of the Accusative relates only to those Languages which have that Case.

The *Third*, That there can be no *Adjective* or *Quality*, which has not a Reference to some *Substantive* or *Name*, because the *Adjective* marks confusedly the *Substantive* or *Name*, which is the Subject of the Form that is distinctly mark'd by the *Adjective* or *Quality*; as *Doctus*, learn'd, must have regard to some Man who is *learned*.

The *Fourth*, That there never is a *Genitive Case*, which is not governed by some other *Name* or *Noun*, because that Case continually marks that which is as the Possessor; so that it must be govern'd by the Thing possess'd. For this Reason, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, this Case is never govern'd properly by a *Verb*. This Rule is with more Difficulty apply'd in the vulgar Tongues, because the Particle or Sign *of*, which is properly the Sign of the *Genitive Case*, is sometimes put for the Proposition *of*, and *de French*, for *ex* and *de*.

The *Fifth*, That the Government of Verbs is oftentimes taken from divers Sorts of References, included in the Case, according to the Capriciousness of Custom or Usage, which yet does not change the specifick Reference of each Case, but only shews, that Custom has made choice of *this* or *that*, according to Fancy.

Thus in *Latin* we say, *Juvare aliquem*, and *Opitulari alicui*; for these are Two Verbs of *Aid*, because it pleas'd the *Latins* to regard the Government of the first Verb, as the Form, to which the Action passes; and that of the second, as a Case of Attribution, to which the Action of the Verb has a Reference.

Thus in *French* they say, *Servir quelqu'un*, and *Servir a quelque Chose*, to serve one, to serve for, or to a Use.

Thus in *Spanish* the greatest Part of the Verbs *Active* govern indifferently a *Dative*, and an *Accusative Case*.

Thus the same Verb may receive several Governments; as, *Præstare alicui*, or *aliquem*; and thus they, for Example, say, *Eripere morti aliquem*, or *aliquem a morte*, and the like.

Sometimes these different Regimens of the Verbs cause an Alteration in the Sense, in which the Use of a Language must be consider'd; as, for Example, in *Latin*, *Cavere alicui*, to watch, or be careful of the Preservation of one; but *cavere aliquem*, is to be aware of him. But in this we must always have a particular Regard to the Usage of all Languages.

We have in the Text said what is necessary for the Knowledge of the Figures of Speech, to which we refer you.

*A Sentence is, or simple, or compound,
Still in the first, One AFFIRMATION's found,
And of the Subject too, One NAME express'd,
Or understood, as is by all confess'd.*

Sentences are twofold, *simple and compound*; a *simple Sentence* is, where there is but one AFFIRMATION and one NAME of the Subject of that Affirmation, either express'd or understood.

*A compound Sentence is of Two compos'd,
Or more, by Particles together-clos'd;
Or by conjunctive Qualities combin'd,
As in th' Examples you may quickly find.*

A compound Sentence is made up of *Two or more simple Sentences* join'd to each other by some *Particles or conjunctive QUALITY*; as, *Pride, and thou walkest. This is the Man who did the Savage kill.*

Of the Construction of NAMES.

*The NAME, the Subject of the AFFIRMATION,
Before it generally assumes its Station.*

The *Name or Personal Name*, of which the Affirmation affirms something, is generally plac'd in *Construction* before the Affirmation; as, *I am happy. Susan loves Roger. The Parson preaches. The Book is read.*

*Except Command, or Question be imply'd,
Then to the Name Precedence is deny'd.
But if may, can, shall, will, ought, wou'd and do,
Before the principal Affirmation go,
Then does the Name between them take its Place,
Else will the Style want all its proper Grace.*

Except when a *Question, Command, Permission, or Concession*, be implied; for then the *Name* is put after the Affirmation, or betwixt one of the *Nine Affirmations*; *Do, may, can, will, shall, ought, &c.* as, *Does Stephen write? Will ye depart? Burn I? Earnest thou, or, Dost thou burn? &c.*

*If of the Nine, Two do at once precede
The principal Affirmation, then take heed
The Name between those Two obtain its Lot,
Cou'd I have gone? cou'd Cælia have forgot?*

But if the *principal Affirmation* have two of the Nine before it, then the Name is set between them ; as,

*Cou'd Cælia have forgotten me, soon
Might Roger have gone out of Town ?
When the Command the second Person takes,
The Pers'nal Name then no Appearance makes.*

When the *Command, Permission, Concession, &c.* is in the *second Person*, the *Personal Name*, which usually goes before the *Affirmation*, is often omitted or understood ; as *burn*, for *burn thou* ; or *you*, or *ye*.

In other Persons there is frequently a *Circumlocution* by the *Affirmation* *let* ; as, *let me burn* ; *let him burn* ; *let them burn*. *Let him ask as often as he will, he never shall obtain. Let me do what I will, it is to no purpose.* As for *ask I*, or *ask he*, &c. *never so often*, &c. it is a *Barbarism*, and never us'd by any good Author.

*When did, might, shou'd, wou'd, cou'd, and had and were,
If do imply ; and also after there
The Affirmation goes before the Name ;
By way of Emphasis 'twill do the same.*

When the *passing, or past Times* of *do, may, can, will, shall, have, am*, supplies the Place of, or implies *if*, the *Name* is set after the *Affirmation*, and also *there* is us'd ; as, *Had he* (for *if he had*) *ask'd, he had obtain'd.* *Had I* (for *if I had*) *heard this, I wou'd not have been so complaisant.* *Were I a Prince, I wou'd govern better.* *There fell a thousand Men on the Spot.* *There is Cold in the Ice,* (or *Cold is in the Ice.*) The same is likewise done by way of *Emphasis* ; as, *It was Mordaunt, who conquer'd.* *It was the Church that fell.*

This happens sometimes, when there are none of these *Con- siderations* ; as *said I, said he, then follow'd Belvidera.*

*To, and an Affirmation oft we know
Will for the Name to th' Affirmation go :
And to a Sentence we the same allow.*

}

Instead of the *Name* that goes before the *Affirmation*, and of which the latter affirms something, sometimes another *Affirma- tion*, with *to* before it, supplies its Place, as having something affirm'd of it ; as, *to dance* is *wholesome* ; *to play* is *delightful* ; *to consider* is *useful*.

A whole *Sentence* is the same ; as, *That the Day is broke, is evident, since the Sun shines.* In short, whatever will answer

to the Question *who?* or *what?* will supply the Office of the Name to the Affirmation.

*The Pers'nal Name, or follows, or precedes,
Ev'n as the Name itself pursues or leads.*

The *leading State* of the Personal Name is set before, or after the Affirmation, according to the foregoing Rules of Names; as, *I read, hearest thou?* &c.

*That Affirmation, which its Act extends
To something else, still after it commands
A Name, to which that Action does relate;
As, Roger spurns me with his usual Hate.*

As the Name, when it signifies the Subject of which something is affirm'd by the *Affirmation*, goes before the Affirmation, (except before excepted) so a Name is always plac'd after the Affirmation, which signifies the Thing to which the Action of the Affirmation immediately relates; as, *I read a Book; the Fire Burns Robert.*

Thus the following State of the Personal Names generally are set after the Affirmation, and the Particles *to, for, of, &c.* tho' *whom* generally goes before the Affirmation; as, *Martin is the Man whom I saw last.*

*These Names distinguish'd are by what and who?
And whom and what? as the Examples shew.*

These Two Names are easily known, or distinguish'd by asking the Question *who?* or *what?* and *whom?* and *what?* The first Name answers to the Question *who?* or *what?* as, *who reads?* Answ. *I;* *what burns?* *the Fire;* on the contrary, *what do I read?* Answ. *the Book;* *whom does the Fire burn?* Answ. *Robert.*

*But when the Action don't at all relate,
T'another, but in the Subject terminate,
No Name the Affirmation then requir's,
To follow it, but in itself expires.*

All the Bustle some GRAMMARIANS have made about *Verbs Neuter*, is dispatch'd in these four Lines, that is in this one Rule; that when the Action of the Affirmation does not extend or relate to any other Person or Thing, but terminates in the Subject, there is no Name requir'd after it; as, *I grieve, I rejoice, I sit, I run, I stand, &c.*

Of the Construction of AFFIRMATIONS.

. This very nearly relating to the former, seems to demand our next Consideration, both indeed being interwoven with each other.

*The Affirmation always must agree
In Number and Person with the Name you'll see.*

The Affirmation must agree with the Name of which it affirms something in *Number* and *Person*: That is, if that be of the Singular or Plural, this must be so too; if that be of the first, second, or third Person, this must be of the same, whether the Number or Person be express'd by the Ending or Termination, or by the nine Affirmations discours'd of under the Head of Affirmations; as, *I write or do write, thou writest or dost write, he writes or does write; we, ye, and they write or do write*: Not *I writest, he write, &c.*

*When of two Names (tho' each be Singular)
We ought affirm, the Affirmations are
Most justly in the Plural seen t'appear.*

}

But when the Affirmation relates to, or affirms of two foregoing Names, tho' they are both of the Singular Number, must be of the Plural; as, *the King and Queen are happy*, not *is happy*.

It is a lame Allowance of a late Author of *Grammar*, that it may be also of the Singular in *English*, since he is forc'd to salve the Solecism, by understanding other Words to make up the Defect; as in this, *His Justice and Goodness was great*; that is, says he, *His Justice was great, and his Goodness was great*.

*An Affirmation may be (at our Ease)
Or Singular, or Plural, as you please,
When to a NAME of Number it is join'd,
Tho' still the Name you Singular do find.*

A Name of Number, or whose Meaning implies more than one or many, tho' it be itself of the Singular Number, the Affirmation may yet be in the Plural; as, *the MOB is unruly*, or, *the MOB are unruly; the Convocation are debating, or is debating*. The Affirmation agreeing sometimes with the Number of the Name, and sometimes with the Signification.

*When two Affirmations are together seen,
Then must the Particle (to) be set between,
Except, let, bid, dare, help, and all the Nine.*

}

When

When two Affirmations follow one another, the Particle *to* ought to be set between 'em, except *do*, *will*, *shall*, *may*, *can*, with their passing or past Times, *did*, *shou'd*, *wou'd*, *cou'd* *might* and *must*. Add to these, *let*, *bid*, *dare*, and *help*, and perhaps some few others.

Have, am, or be, with *passive Quality* join'd,
Or with a *Quality* that *Being* does intend,
All *Suffering* and *Being* do express
That the *Britannick Language* will confess.

Have, *am*, or *be*, join'd to a *Quality*, expresses all manner of *Being*, or *Suffering* in our *Tongue*, which has no other way of doing it. They are set before *Qualities* of all sorts, and even *Names*.

There is no Change of the *Personal* or *Numeral Terminations*, when the *Affirmation* signifies *Command*, or is preceded by *if*, *that*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *whether*, and sometimes by other *Particles*.

Of the Construction of QUALITIES.

*The Qualities in English mostly claim
The Place immediately before their Name.*

Tho' in *Nature* we think of the *Name* before the *Quality* yet in *English*, *Qualities* are generally plac'd before the *Names* to which they belong, or of which they expresses the *Manner* :

*Except an Affirmation comes between ;
As in the following Example's seen.*

Unless when an *Affirmation* comes between the *Quality* and the *Name* ; as, *Just art Thou, O God ! and righteous are thy Judgments* ; or, *GOD is just, and his Judgments are righteous*. Otherwise when it comes alone, without its *Attendants*, which it governs, it always goes immediately before its *Name* ; as, *A good Man is rarely to be found, a good Woman much more rarely. Good Men are valuable Jewels in a Commonwealth ; good Women make good Wives. Good Things are only so in Opinion.*

*Poetic Diction with peculiar Grace
Allows the Name (not Prose) the foremost Place.*

The *Quality* rarely in *Prose* is set after the *Name*, but in *Verse* 'tis beautiful and harmonious ; as, *Hail, Bard divine !*

*But when there are more Qualities than one
That come together, or together join ;
Or else one Quality with its govern'd Train ;
Then do they follow the preceding Name.*

But

But when there are more Qualities than one come together tho' collaterally join'd, or one Quality with its depending Words, it generally comes after the Name; as, *A Man both wise and valiant*, a Man *exceeding wise and valiant*; a Man *skilful in many Things*. But then we likewise say, *a wise and valiant Man*, an *exceeding wise Man*, a *skilful Man in many Things*.

*A Name and all its Qualities unite,
And form one Word, as all the Learned write;
But when these several Words in one conspire,
They then some other Quality require.*

A Name with its Qualities (or any governing Word, with its Attendants) is as one compounded Word; on which these join'd Names and Qualities assume another Quality, as if they were one Word, (and these being join'd, another; and so, onward) as, *a Man*, an *old Man*; a *wise old Man*, a *very wise old Man*, *three wise old Men*. Here to the NAME *Man* is prefix'd *a*, which is of the Quality-kind; and then to the Quality, *old* is added; and to that *an*; then *wise*, *very wise*; and to all these aggregated or incorporated Words the Quality *a*, or *three*, is prefixed.

*Two Sorts of Qualities from Names do flow,
And both before their Names directly go.*

There are two Sorts of Qualities (as we have observ'd under that Head) which are deriv'd immediately from Names, and go immediately before them, supplying the Place of almost all the Manners of Words or Particles; the first we call *Possessives*: And this is form'd from almost all Names, Singular or Plural. By adding (*s*), or (if the Pronunciation requires it) (*'s*), it implies the same as the Particle *of*; as, *Man's Nature*, *the Nature of Man*; *Mens Nature*, or *the Nature of Men*; *Vergil's Poems*, &c.

The same is done when an aggregated Name occurs, (that is, a primary Name with its Attendants; for a formative (*s*) of the *Possessive* is put after the whole aggregate; as, *the King's Court*, or *the Court of the King*; *the King of Spain's Court*, or, *the Court of the King of Spain*: For the (*s*) is put after the whole Aggregate, (*the King of Spain*) as after one single Name.

*A, or an, immediately we place
Before the NAME, a Man, an Hour, a Face,
But if another QUALITY come in,
'Tis mostly plac'd the a and Name between.*

The Quality *a*, or *an*, is generally plac'd immediately before the Name; as, *a Man*, *an arm*, *a Mountain*: But if any other Quality comes with it, it must be plac'd generally between the (*a*) and the Name; as, *a good Man*, *a black Horse*. But (*a*) is sometimes set between the other Quality and the Name, as *many a Man*, *never a Man*. (*A*) is always before the Singular Number, but (*the*) before both Singular and Plural.

The Construction of PARTICLES; or, the Manners of WORDS.

We have shewn under the Head of *Particles* or *Manners of Words*, that besides *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*, there is another Part of Speech, which denotes the Reference and Relation of *Names* to *Names*, *Names* to *Affirmations*, and the Connexions of *Sentence* or *Sentence*: For this Reason we have divided them into three Sorts; the First shews the Circumstances or Manners of Words, which are join'd to every Part of Speech.

*These after Affirmations we admit,
But before Qualities we mostly set.*

This first Sort are generally put after the Affirmation whose Manner it does express; as, *Cynthia danced admirably*; *Peter spoke learnedly*; *Dorothy acted finely*; *Harry fought lately*. But it is set before Qualities; as, *Robert was very lucky*; *John is extremely rich*, very rich.

[2] Secondly, All *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*, have various States, Relations and References to each other, which are mostly express'd by these Particles, *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *O!* *by*, *with*, *through*, &c. These are at least of the most frequent Use; the rest we shall treat of in a Discourse by itself, as we have before observ'd under *Particles*: An Example will render the

[2] These several States or Relation of *Name* to *Name*, are express'd in *Latin*, by varying the Terminations or Ending of the *Name*, five several Ways, which were call'd *Cases*, *a cadendo*. So that there were threescore various Endings in the *Latin*, and double the Number in *Greek*, all express'd by these few *English Particles*; the first State *of*, or the *Name* itself, is call'd the *Nominative Case*. If Things were always consider'd separately from one another, *Names* would have only the two Changes of *Number* and *Gender* to the QUALITIES.

But

the Use more plain; as, *O! God! the Memorial of thy Love to Sons of Men, from the Beginning of the World, to this Day, is recorded with Thankfulness in the Hearts of the Religious.* All these Particles in this Sentence shew the Relation or Reference of *Name to Name*, and their Connexion, in that Manner, with each other.

*Between the Words whose Reference they express,
These Particles demand the certain Place.*

These *Particles*, which denote the Dependence of one thing on another, or the Reference or Relation of one Word to another, must naturally be plac'd betwixt them whose Relation and Dependence it is to express; as we may observe in the following List.

OF

But since they are often consider'd with Regard to the Relation they have to one another, the giving of divers Terminations or Endings to *Names*, which are call'd *Cases*, are made use of in some Languages to express these Relations.

It must be confess'd, that the *Greek* and the *Latin* are (we think) almost the only Languages in which the Names have what are properly call'd *Cases*, that is, in which these Relations are express'd by the different Endings of the same Words; but as there are some sort of Virtual *Cases*, or States in all Languages, (especially in the Pronouns or Personal Names, as we have observ'd) and because without that the Connexion of Discourse, which is call'd Construction, would not be well understood; 'tis in a great measure necessary, for the right understanding of any Language whatsoever, to know what is meant by the *Cases*, or States of the *Names*; which we shall here endeavour to explain with all the Perspicuity we are able, keeping to the old *Names* of them, and applying them to the new.

Of the first State, or Nominative Case.

The simple Position of the *Name* is call'd the *Nominative*, which indeed is not properly a *Case*, (tho' it be a *State*) but the matter from which the *Cases* are form'd, by the various Changes of the first Termination, or Ending of the *Name*. Its chief Use is to be set before the *Verb* or *Affirmation*, to be the Subject of the Proposition in Discourse; *Dominus regit me*, the Lord governs me; *Deus exaudit me*, God hears me, or my Prayer.

Of

Of the Vocative.

When we name the Person to whom we speak, or any other Thing to which we apply ourselves, as if it were a Person, the Name does by that acquire a new Relation, which is sometimes mark'd by a Termination different from that of the *Nominative*, and which is called *Vocative*, from *vocare*, to call; and thus from *Dominus* in the *Nominative*, they make *Domine* in the *Vocative*; of *Antonius Antoni*. But as that was not very necessary, since the *Nominative* might be us'd in the place of the *Vocative*, it has happen'd, 1st, That this different Termination of the *Nominative* is not us'd in the Plural Number. 2^{dly}, That even in the Singular Number, it is only us'd in the second Declension of the *Latin Tongue*. 3^{dly}, That in the *Greek* (where it is more common) the *Nominative* is often us'd for the *Vocative*, as may be seen in the *Greek Version* of the *Psalms*: From whence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the *Hebrews*, cites these Words, to prove the Divinity of CHRIST, θεός es, ὁ θεός; where 'tis plain, that ὁ θεός is a *Nominative* for a *Vocative*; since the Sense is not, *God is thy Throne*, but, *Thy Throne, O God*, &c. 4^{thly}, In fine, *Nominatives* are sometimes join'd to *Vocatives*, as *Domine, Deus meus! Nate mee vires, mea magna Potentia solus!*

All these Difficulties, in this and other Cases, in the *Latin* and *Greek* are avoided by the Signs express'd with Ease, without studying the various Terminations of so many Thousands of Names; which are insist'd upon, only for the Information of the Student in the general Notion of the *Grammar* of the Ancient Tongues, and the Analogy of Ours to them.

Of the Genitive Case.

The Case is so call'd from *Genus*, Kindred or Family, because 'tis us'd to express Alliances of Blood between Persons; besides, it imports great Variety of other Relations between Things, as well as Persons. For the Relation of one Thing to another, in any manner whatever, has occasion'd, in the Languages that have Cases, a new Termination in the Names or Nouns, which is call'd the *Genitive* (as we have said) to express that general Relation which is after diversify'd into several Species, such as the Relations are of the *Whole* to its *Parts*, as *Caput Hominis*; of *Parts* to the *Whole*, as *Homo crassi capitis*; of the *Subject* to the *Accident* or *Attribute*, as *Color Rosæ, Misericordia*

sericordia Dei; of the *Accident* to the *Subject*, as *Puer optimæ Indolis*; of the *Efficient Cause* to the *Effect*, as *Opus Dei*, *Oratio Ciceronis*; of the *Effect* to the *Cause*, as *Creator Mundi*; of the *final Cause* to the *Effect*, as *Potio Soporis*; of the *Matter* to the *Compound*, as *Vas auri*; of the *Object* to the *Acts* of the *Soul*, as *Cogitatio Belli*, *Contemptus Mortis*; of the *Possessor* to the *Things* possessed, as *Pecus Melibæi*, *Divitiæ Crassi*; of the *Proper Name* to the *Common*, or the *Individual* to the *Species* as *Oppidum Londini*.

And as amongst all these Relations there is some opposite, which sometimes occasions Equivocal Terms, (for in these Words, *Vulnus Achillis*, the *Genitive Achillis* may signify either the Relation of the *Subject*, and then 'tis taken passively for the Wound which *Achilles* has received; or the Relation of the *Cause*, and then 'tis taken actively for the Wound which *Achilles* gave;) so in that Passage of *St. Paul*, *Certus sum quia neque Mors, neque Vita, &c. poterit nos separare a Charitate Dei in Christo Jesu, Domino Nostro, &c.* The *Genitive Dei*, has been understood two different Ways by Interpreters; those who have ascrib'd to it the Relation of the *Object*, believing, that in this Passage was meant the Love which the *Elect* bear to God, in *Jesus Christ*; whilst Others (who have ascrib'd to it the Relation of the *Subject*) do understand by the Passage aforesaid, the Love of God to the *Elect* in *Jesus Christ*.

Tho' the *Hebrew Names* are not declin'd by *Cases*, the Relation express'd by the *Genitive*, does notwithstanding cause a Change in the *Names*, tho' quite different from that of the *Greek* and *Latin*; for, in these Languages, the Change is in the Word govern'd, but in the *Hebrew*, in the Word governing.

In the *Vulgar Tongues* they make use of a Sign to express the Relations of this Case, as *of* in *English*, *de* in *French*, &c. as *Deus, God, of God; Dieu, de Dieu*.

What we have said (that the *Genitive* made use of) to denote the Relation between the *Proper Name* and the *Common*, or, which is the same Thing, between the *Individual* and the *Species*, is much more common in the vulgar Tongues. For in *Latin* the *Common* and the *Proper Name*, are frequently put in the same Case, by Apposition, as 'tis call'd, às *Urbs Roma, Fluvius Thamesis, Mons Parnassus*; but we ordinarily say, The City of *Rome*, the Hill of *Parnassus*; but we say the River *Thames*, as well as of *Thames*.

Of the Dative Case.

There is yet another Relation, which is that of the Thing to the Benefit or Damage of which other Things have a Relation.

tion. This in the Languages which have Cases is call'd the *Dative Case*, which is also used so many other Ways, that 'tis hardly possible to mention the Particulars; *Commodare Socrati*, to lend to Socrates; *Utilis Reipublicæ*, useful to the Commonwealth; *Perniciosus Ecclesiæ*, pernicious to the Church; *Promittere Amico*, to promise a Friend, or to a Friend; *Visum est Platoni*, it seemed good to Plato; *Affinis Regi*, related to the King, &c.

In *English* we express this Case, or that which is equivalent to it, by the Sign *to*, or *for*, which usually do or may come before it, tho' the same Signs are likewise us'd to what is the Accusative and the Ablative in the *Latin*.

Of the Accusative.

The Verbs or Affirmations that express Action, which pass from the Agent, as *to beat*, *to break*, *to beat*, *to love*, *to hate*, have Subjects that receive these Things or Objects which they regard: For if I beat, I must beat something; and so of the rest. So that it is plain, that these Verbs or Affirmations require after 'em a Name, to be the Subject or Object of the Action they express. And hence it is, that in the Languages which have the Cases, the Names have a Termination they call *Accusative* as *amo Deum*, I love God; *Cæsar vicit Pompeium*, Cæsar vanquished Pompey:

There is nothing in *English* to distinguish this Case from the Nominative, or rather to distinguish this State of the Name from the first; but as we almost ever place the Words in their natural Order, they are easily discover'd, because the Nominative (or first State) is generally before, and the Accusative after the Verb or Affirmation; as *The King loves the Queen*, and *The Queen loves the King*. The King is the Nominative in the first Place, and the Accusative in the second; and the Queen the Accusative in the first, and the Nominative in the second.

Of the Ablative Case.

Besides the Five Cases already mentioned, the *Latins* have a Sixth, which was not invented to express alone any particular Relation, but to be join'd with some of the Particles, called *Prepositions*: For the first Five Cases, not being sufficient to express all the Relations that Things have to one another, they have in all Languages had recourse to another Invention, which is that of contriving *little Words* to be put before *Names*, which for that Reason are called *Prepositions*. And so as the Relation of a Thing, in which another is contain'd, is express'd in *Latin* and *English* by (*in*), it is in *French* by (*dans*), as *Vinum in Dolio*,

OF *has* this peculiar Eminence,

Always to bound of Words the general Sense.

As *of* signifies the Relation between the Name that follows it, and that which goes before it, and joins the following Name to the foregoing; as, *the Sons of Adam*: So in all the following Instances, and all others that may be thought of, it is observable, that *of* has the Property of limiting and determining the general Signification of the Word on which it depends.

1. Of *The Part to the Whole.*

The Tail of the Lion.

2. Of *the Subject to the Accident.*

The Splendor of the Sun.

3. Of *the Efficient to the Effect.*

The Temple of Solomon.

4. Of *the End to the Means.*

The Preparations of the Feast.

5. Of *Materials to Materiate.*

A Cup of Silver.

The Whole to the Part.

A Man of a thick Skull.

The Accident to the Subject.

A Boy of a good Understanding.

The Effect to the Efficient.

The Creator of the World.

The Means to the End.

The Death of the Cross.

Materiate to Material.

The Stones of the Temple.

Dolio, le Vin dans le Muid, the Wine in the Vessel. But in the Languages which have Cases, these Prepositions are not join'd with the first Form of the Name, which is the *Nominative*, but with some of the other Cases: And tho' in *Latin* there are some join'd with the *Accusative*, as *Amor erga Deum*, Love towards God; yet they have invented another Case, called the *Ablative*, to be join'd with several other Prepositions, from which it is inseparable in Sense; whereas an *Accusative* is often separated from its Prepositions, as when it is after a *Verb Active*, or an *Infinitive*.

That Case in Propriety of Speech is wanting in the Plural Number, since it never has there a different Termination from that of the *Dative*: But because it would too much confound the Analogy, to say that the Preposition govern'd an *Ablative* in the *Singular*, and a *Dative* in the *Plural*, it has been judg'd fitter to suppose an *Ablative* in the Plural Number, tho' always the same with the *Dative*.

And for the same Reason it is, that they have given an *Ablative* to the *Greek Names*, which are always like the *Dative*; for preserving the great Analogy between these Two Languages, which are commonly learned by one another.

6. *Of the Object to the Act.*
The Love of God.
7. *Offices Political.*
The King of England.
8. *Of the Possessor to Possession.*
The Flock of Mælibæus.
9. *Of Time to the Event.*
The Time of War, the
Hour of Supper.
10. *Of the Contents to the*
Continent.
The Fish of the Sea.

The Act to the Object.
The Delight of the Eye.

Relations Oeconomical.
The Master of the House,
Possession to the Possessor.
The Shepherd of the
Flock.

Event to Time.
The Luxury of the Age.
The Silence of the Night.

Continent to the Contents.
A Handful of Flowers.

*Two Names without a Word between,
Of betwixt both most frequently is seen.*

When Two Names come together, *of* generally goes before the latter; as may be seen in all the foregoing Examples: But when this *of* signifies Possession, then it may be left out, and *s*, or *es*, put at the End of the first Name, by which it becomes a Quality; as we have sufficiently prov'd already, *The House of Roger*, or *Roger's House*.

*Except they to the same Thing do relate,
For then the middle of is out of Date.*

For Names that relate to the same Things have no Particle between them; as, the *River Thames*, *Christopher Columbus*, *London City*; tho' we likewise say, the *River of Thames*, the *City of London*, &c.

*Between Superlatives and following Names,
OF, by Grammatick Right, a Station claims.*

All Superlatives may have the Particle *of* before the following Name; as *the greatest of Villains*, *the most wise of Philosophers*, *the best of Princes*.

*Qualities that do Partition signify,
Affection, Vice, or Virtue do imply;
Any Desire or Passion of the Mind,
Follow'd by of we generally find.
Such as want Knowledge, Ignorance declare,
Forgetfulness, or Mem'ry in this Rule are.*

Qualities that signify Partition, generally have *of* after them; as, *One of the French Prisoners*, *none of these*, *the third of Family*, &c. and those which signify Affection, Passion, or Desire of the Mind; any Knowledge, Ignorance, Memory,

mory, Forgetfulness, Vice, Virtue, or any such Disposition of the Soul, have of between them and the Word to which they relate, *Covetous of Gold, fearful of Thunder, anxious of Glory, void of Grace, empty of Sense, conscious of Guilt, ignorant of all Things, forgetful of his Friends, mindful of his Children, guilty of Bribes, weary of his Journey, free of the Corporation, needy of Money, &c.* We say also, *forsaken of all Men, worthy of Happiness, born of Royal Race, naked of Friends, depriv'd of Estate, robb'd of Money.* Thus after some AFFIRMATIONS; as, to repent of Sin, to treat, talk, write, of Happiness, &c.

Where Benefit or Hurt comes from the Name,
TO, to direct you whither 'tis aim'd, does claim.

TO or FOR import the Thing or Person to or for whom any Convenience or Inconvenience is meant by the NAME, QUALITY, or AFFIRMATION; as, *a Friend to the Muses, good for his Stomach, yielding to his Betters.* Hence all Words that signify the Use, Relation, Likeness, doing, or giving, of one Thing to another, must have to or for after it. Tho' to is sometimes left out, as *give me, like me, tell me, near me;* where to is understood much better than express'd.

In Invocation we prefix an O!

O! God, our Frailty thou do'st surely know.

When we call on God, the King, or any one else, in a solemn Manner, we put O! before the Name of him we address to; as, *O! King, remember that thou art a Man.*

When you the Instrument or Manner how,

By which, wherewith express, allow

These Particles to be always seen

By, with, and through, and from, and also in.

When we express the Instrument, the Medium by which, wherewith, or the Manner how a Thing is done, you make use of by, with, from, through, in, and the like; as, *The Beams of the Sun, with incredible Speed, pass from Heaven, through the Air to the Earth, endu'd with Light and Heat by (with, through) which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants which God has provided for us, and given to us for our Use, and his Glory. He was slain with his Sword. He abides with me.*

By is us'd for the efficient Cause, (as well Principal as Instrumental and Moral) and also signifies near to, &c. as, *he was slain by his Enemy, by (beside or near) a Spring of Water, but wounded first by his own Fear, then by his Enemy's Sword.*

In signifies, as it were, Presence in a Place, and is us'd when we would either express *Rest*; as, *Mary lives in the Cellar, in the City, in the Winter, in a strange Posture, in an ill State of Health, in Battle Array; in act to strike, in his Cloak, in Favour, in War, rich in Land or Money, in Fear, in Doubt, in good Part; he is in Esteem, he did it in Revenge, in Hope, in my Thought.*

These are the several Senses in which the Particle *IN* is us'd.

On the third Sort of Particles which connect Sentence to Sentence, we have only this to remark:

*That they between those Sentences take Site,
Which by their joining Vertue they unite.*

They are plac'd between the Two Propositions, or Sentences which they unite; as for their Names, see *Particles* the third Sort. 'Tis true, we might here give, or might there have given you several Denominations of them, as *Copulative, Disjunctive, Comparative*, and the like, as some others have done, and so given a several Head or Term to every other Particle of this Kind; but we seeing no Advantage accrue from such a multiplying of Terms, but the Burthen very much increased to the Learner, have thought fit to leave out all that unnecessary Jargon.

What more may be said of Particles, and their various Meanings and Use, shall be found in our forecited Treatise of Particles.

We shall not conclude this short Discourse of *Construction*, without adding a few Words of a *Period*, and of *Figurative Construction*; tho' we are of Opinion, that the first is more proper to fall under the Consideration of *Rhetorick*, and that the Use of the latter is in *English* the Effect of Custom, not Art: Yet since we find others have thought fit to deliver Rules relating to both, we shall not omit them entirely.

To compose therefore a Period, or to express a Sentence, that is compos'd of Two or more Sentences, with Art, we must first take care that the Expressions be not too long, and that the whole Period be proportion'd to the Breath of the Speaker. The Expressions of particular Sentences, that are Members of the Body of a Sentence, ought to be equal, that the Voice may repose at the End of these Members by equal Intervals. The more exact this Equality is, the more Pleasure it will produce, and the more excellent the Period.

.A Period

A Period ought to consist at least of Two Members, and at most but of Four. A Period is at least to have Two Members, because its Beauty proceeds from the Equality of the Members, and Equality supposes at least Two Terms. To have a Period perfect, there should not be Four Members crowded into one Period, because being too long, the Pronunciation must be forc'd, which must by consequence be displeasing to the Ear; because a Discourse that is incommodious to the Speaker, can never be agreeable to the Hearer.

The Members of a Period ought to be join'd close, that the Ear may perceive the Equality of the Intervals of Respiration: For this Cause the Members of a Period ought to be united by the Union of a single Sentence, of that Body of which they are Members. This Union is very discernable, for the Voice repotes at the End of every Member; only the better to continue its Course, it stops not fully, but at the End of the whole Sentence.

Variety may be two Ways in a Period, *i. e.* in the Sense, and in the Words. The Sense of each Member of the Period ought to differ with each other. We cannot express the different Thoughts of our Minds, but by different Words of different Signification: Equal Periods are not to follow one another too near.

An Example of a Period of Two Members; As, (1.) *Before I shall say those Things, (O conscript Fathers) about the Publick Affairs, which are to be spoken at this Time;* (2.) *I shall lay before you, in few Words, the Motives of the Journey, and the Return.* The next consists of Three Members; as, (1.) *Since by reason of my Age I durst not pretend to assume the Authority of this Post;* (2.) *And had fix'd it as a Maxim, that nothing ought here to be produc'd but what was perfect'd by Industry, and labour'd by the Understanding;* (3.) *I thought that my whole Time and Pains should be transferr'd to those of my Friends.* The last consists of Four Members, of which this is an Example: (1.) *If Impudence should have as great Prevalence in the Court,* (2.) *as Insolence has found in the Country and Desert Places,* (3.) *Aulus Cæcinna wou'd not less in this Trial give way to the Impudence of Æbutius,* (4.) *than he has already in Violence given place to his Insolence.*

This is sufficient to give a full Idea of the Nature and Beauties of a Period, which we have inserted merely in compliance with Custora, being sensible that the Learner will be so far from being able to make his Advantage from it, till he has arrived much beyond the Province of Grammar, that there will

be few *Masters* found, who have the Education of Children, that know any thing of this Matter.

Custom, produced by the general Inclination of Men to short Speaking, has introduced several Figures or Forms of Construction, by which Words are transpos'd, left out, one put for another, and the like. The Figures therefore of Construction are these:

I. *Transposition*, which is the placing of Words in a Sentence out of their Natural Order of Construction, to please the Ear in rendring the Contexture more agreeable, elegant, and harmonious: For when the Concurrence of rough Consonants, and gaping Vowels, renders the Sound and Pronunciation inelegant, this Figure may be us'd, but never but upon such an Occasion, except in Verse, where *Transposition* is generally more elegant and harmonious than in Prose.

II. *Suppression*, which is an Omission of Words in a Sentence, which yet are necessary to a full and perfect Construction; as, *I come from my Father's*; that is, *from my Father's House*; but *House* is omitted. Words are suppress'd for Brevity or Elegance, but their Number in *English* is too great to be enumerated; but for our Direction, we may mind these Rules: 1st, That whatever Word comes to be repeated in a Sentence oftner than once, to avoid the inelegant Repetition of the same Word, it must be left out; as, *This is my Master's Horse*; or, *This Horse is my Master's*; for, *This Horse is my Master's Horse*. 2^{dly}, Words that are necessarily imply'd need not be express'd; as, *I live at York*: *Life* is necessarily imply'd, and therefore need not be express'd. 3^{dly}, All Words that Use and Custom suppress in any Language, are not to be express'd, without some particular Reason; as, *A good Man leads a good Life*; where the *Quality Good* is necessary to the *Same Life*.

III. *Substitution* is the using one Word for another, or the Mode, State, Manner, Person, or Number of a Word for another: And the Construction indeed often lies in the Sense, and not in the Words; as, *The whole Nation were in an Up-roar*; where *the whole Nation* is put for all *the People* of the Nation, *Part of the Men are kill'd*; *Part* and *Nation* signifying Number, (tho' the Name be of the Number signifying one) it puts the Affirmation in the Plural, or the Number signifying many, but it may be in either.

C H A P. XI.

Of Stops or Pauses in Sentences; the Use of Marks in Writing, and Abbreviations of Words.

FROM what has been said of Sentences, 'tis plain, that in a full Sentence there may be Four Members, *viz.* Comma (,) Semicolon (;) Colon (:) and Period, or Full-stop (.) and these bear a kind of musical Proportion of Time one to another: For a *Comma* stops the Reader's Voice, while he may privately tell one; the *Semicolon*, two; the *Colon*, three; and the *Period*, four.

The Use of these Points, Pauses, or Stops, is not only to give a proper Time for Breathing, but to avoid Obscurity and Confusion of the Sense in the joining Words together in a Sentence. After a *Comma* always follows something else which depends upon that which is separated from it by a *Comma*; as,

*If Pulse of Verse a Nation's Temper shows,
In keen Iambics English Metre flows.*

Where the Sense is not compleat in the first Verse, and the second has a plain Dependance on the first.

A *Semi*, or *Half Colon*, is made use of when half the Sentence remains yet behind; as,

*Tho' God bids Peace with Promises of Life,
Men only Reason arm for deadly Strife;
By bloody Wars Earth making desolate,
And sacrificing Thousands to their Hate, &c.*

A *Colon*, or two Points, is made when the Sense is perfect, but the Sentence not ended; as,

*O Lord! in thee do I put my Trust: Save me from all
those that persecute me, and deliver me, &c.*

The *Full-Point* is when the Sentence is compleat and ended; as,

*O Shame! O Curse! O more than hellish Sight!
Damn'd Devils with each other never fight.*

Besides these Points, there is a Mark that signifies a Question is asked, and is put when the Sense of that Question is compleat; this is the Figure of it (?) as,

*Why so frolick? why so merry?
Is your Noddle full of Sherry?*

When we express our Wonder, or Admiration of any thing, after the Sentence, we put this Point (!) which is called a Point of Admiration; as, *O Times! O Manners!*

In Sentences there is sometimes occasion to interpose another distinct Sentence, which being left out, the Sense of the Sentence is entire, and it is thus mark'd (), and is call'd a *Parenthesis*; as, *For to their power (I bear Record) they were willing.*


When Words cannot be writ entirely in the Line, the Syllables are parted, one ending the Line, and another of the same Word beginning the next; and this is mark'd at the End of the first Line thus (-).

The (e) is often left out, as well as other Vowels, for the sake of the Sound, and that is call'd an *Apostrophe*, and is thus express'd ('); as, *I am amaz'd, for amazed; Henry lov'd me, for Henry loved me, &c.*

Accent (`) being placed over any Vowel in a Word, notes that the Tone, or Strefs of the Vowel in pronouncing is upon that Syllable.

Breve (˘) is a *Curve*, or crooked Mark over a Vowel, and denotes that the Syllable is founded quick or short.

Dialysis (·) being two Points placed over two Vowels of a Word, that wou'd otherwise make a Diphthong, parts 'em into two several Syllables.

Index () the Forefinger pointing, signifies that Passage to be very remarkable against which it is placed.

Asterism (*) guides to some Remark in the Margin, or at the Foot of the Page. Several of them set together signify that there is something wanting, defective, or immodest in that Passage of the Author, thus, ***

Obelisk (†) a Dagger is us'd as well as the *Asterism*, to refer the Reader to the Margin.

Section (§) or *Division* is us'd in subdividing of a Chapter into lesser Parts.

Caret (^) when any Letter, Syllable, or Word happens, by Inadvertence, to be left out in Writing or Printing, this Mark, (^) is put under the Interlineation, in the exact Place where it

Alice
is to come; as, *when [^]was gone, &c.*

Circumflex (^) is the same in Shape as the *Caret*, but is always plac'd over some Vowel of a Word, to denote a long Syllable; as, *Eu-phrâ-tes.*

Hyphen (-) *Connexion*, is us'd to join or compound two Words into one, as *Male-contents*, *Male-administration*; or when Names or Words are purposely left out, a Stroke or small Line is thus put ——— to signify the Name or Word understood, with the *initial* and *final* Letters at the beginning or end, or both. Being plac'd over a Vowel, it is not then called *Hyphen*, but a *Dash* for *M* or *N*.

Crotchets [] or *Brackets*, include Words or Sentences of the same Value and Signification with those they are join'd to, and may be us'd instead of *Parentheses*.

Quotation (") or a double *Comma* turn'd, is put at the beginning of such Lines as are recited out of other Authors; as the Motto upon the Sun-Dial, " LOOK UPON ME, THAT I MAY BE SEEN.

It is grown customary in Printing, to begin every Substantive with a Capital, but 'tis unnecessary, and hinders that expressive Beauty and remarkable Distinction intended by the Capitals.

Let all proper Names of Men and Women, Christian or Sur-name begin with a Capital or Great Letter; and indeed all Names ought to be written with the initial Letter, a Capital. The same must be done by any other Part of Speech, when there's a Force or Emphasis laid on it; otherwise Qualities, Affirmations, Particles, are always written with small Letters. The first Word of every Epistle, Book, Chapter, Verse, &c. begins with a Capital; as also the proper Names of Countries, Cities, Towns, and all manner of Places, Arts, Sciences, Dignities, Titles of Honour, Offices, Bills, Notes, Days, Months, Winds, Rivers, &c. In Writing, you are to begin every Sentence after a full Stop, or Period, with a great Letter, and every Verse or Line in Poetry. If any notable Saying or Passage of an Author be quoted in his own Words, it begins with a Capital, tho' it be not immediately after a full Stop. Where Capitals are us'd in whole Words and Sentences, something is express'd extraordinary great.

Let not a Capital be written in the Middle of a Word, amongst small Letters, except in Anagrams.

IHS. Jesus, *The Three first Letters of his Name in Greek.*

V. D. M. Verbi Dei Minister, *Minister of the Word of God.*

Philom. Philomathes, *a Lover of Learning.*

P. S. Postscript, *after written.*

N. B. Nota Bene, *mark well.*

&, et, *and.*

Vid. Vide, *see.*

Viz. Videlicet, or Videre licet, *you may see.*

i. d. idem, *the same.*

i. e. id est, *that is.*

q. d. quasi dicat, *as if he should say.*

Sc. Scilicet, or Scire licet, *you may know.*

etc. et cætera, *the rest.*

&c. et cætera, *and so forth, or so on.*

N. L. Non Liqueat, *it appears not.*

Dit. Ditto, *the same.*

Cent. Centum, *an Hundred.*

Per Cent. *by the Hundred.*

e. g. Exempli Gratia, *for Example.*

v. g. Verbi gratia, *upon my Word.*

Pag. Pagina, *Side or Page.*

L. Linea, *Line.*

lib. Liber, *Book.*

Fol. Folio, *a Book of the largest Size, or a whole Sheet.*

4to. Quarto, *a Quarter of a Sheet.*

8vo. Octavo, *having Eight Leaves to a Sheet.*

12mo. Duodecimo, *Twelves, or a Sheet divided into 12 Parts, as this Grammar.*

A Column is half a Side of a Leaf, *as in this Page.*

a. Aulus, *Afternoon.*

M. Mensis, *a Month.*

Dies Dominicus, vel Solis, vel Sabbati, *Sunday.*

Dies Lunæ, *Monday.*

Dies Martis, *Tuesday.*

Dies Mercurii, *Wednesday.*

Dies Jovis, *Thursday.*

Dies Veneris, *Friday.*

Dies Saturni, *Saturday.*

A. D. Annoq; Domini, *in the Year of our Lord.*

G. R. { Georgius Rex, *King*
George.
Anno Regni, *in the*
Year of the Reign.

N. S. New Stile.

Fra. Francis, *Frances.*

Cl. Clericus, *a Clergyman, or Clerk.*

Pr. Priest.

Deac. Deacon.

Bp. Bishop.

A. Bp. Arch-Bishop.

S. S. T. D. { Sacro - Sanctæ
Theologiæ Do-
ctoris, *Doctor of*
Divinity.

L. L. D. { Legum { Doctor,
J. D. } Jurum { a Doctor
of Laws.

M. D. Medicinæ Doctor, *Doc-
tor of Physick.*

A. B. Artium Baccalaureus,
Batchelor of Arts.

A. M. Artium Magister, *Ma-
ster of Arts.*

F. R. S. Fellow of the Royal
Society.

Ast. P. G. Astronomy Professor
at Gresham-College.

P. M. G. Professor of Musick
at Gresham-College.

C. C. C. Corpus Christi Col-
lege at Oxford.

C. S. Custos Sigilli, *the Keeper
of the Seal.*

C. P. S. Custos Privati Sigilli,
Keeper of the Privy Seal.

R. Recipe, *take thou.*

ana. *of each alike.*

P. a pugil, *or half a Handful.*

M. Manipulus, *a Handful.*

S. S. Semissis, *half a Pound.*

q. s. quantum sufficit, *a suffi-
cient Quantity.*

q. l. quantum libet, *as much as you please.*

lb. s. d. ob. q. libra, solidi, denarii, oboli, quadrantes, *Pounds, Shillings, Pence, Half-pence and Farthings.*

I. One Thousand.

V. Five Thousand.

X. Ten Thousand.

L. Fifty Thousand.

C. One hundred Thousand.

D. Five hundred Thousand.

CC. Two Hundred.

D. or IO. Five Hundred.

DC. Six Hundred.

M. or clō. A Thousand.

IOO. Five Thousand.

CCIOO. Ten Thousand.

IOOO. Fifty Thousand.

MDCCXXXVI. One Thousand, seven Hundred and thirty-six.

S. V. Siste Viator, *stand still Traveller.*

The Roman Account.

The First Day of the Month they Kalends call.

May, March, October, July, *six Nones fall;*

In the other Eight Months, four; eight Ides in all.

}

The End of the Grammar.



The



The Art of POETRY.

CHAP. I.

Of ACCENTS and QUANTITIES.

THE Art of Pronunciation is reckon'd a Part of *Grammar*, and is the true Utterance of Words, according to their *Quantity* and *Accent*. *Quantity* is the Length or Shortness of Syllables; and the Proportion, generally speaking, betwixt a long and a short Syllable, is two to one; as in *Music*, two *Quavers* to one *Crotchct*.

In *English*, as well as in *Latin* and *Greek*, there are not only these long and short Syllables, but those which are either long or short, as the Measure requires; as *Rēcōrds* and *Rēcōrds*.

[1] *Accent* is the rising and falling of the Voice, above or under its usual Tone, but an Art of which we have little Use, and know less, in the *English* Tongue; nor are we like to improve our Knowledge in this Particular, unless the Art of *Delivery* or *Utterance* were a little more study'd.

Of

[1] There are three Sorts of Accents, an *Acute*, a *Grave*, and an *Inflex*, which is also call'd a *Circumflex*. The *Acute*, or *Sharp*, naturally raises the Voice; and the *Grave*, or *Base*, as naturally falls it. The *Circumflex* is a kind of Undulation, or Waving of the Voice; as in pronouncing *amare*, to love, you should pronounce it as if spelt *aamare*, rising at the first *a*, and falling at the second. But tho' the *Latins* (in Imitation of the *Greeks*) have some Signs to express these Marks, yet the Use of them is not known, except in the Distinction of Adverbs: Nay, should some old *Roman* arise from the Dead, if we believe *Quintilian*, the Rules of them could not be deliver'd in Writing. Some of our Moderns (especially Mr. *Bisbe*, in his *Art of Poetry*) and lately Mr. *Mattaire*, in what he calls, *The English Grammar*, erroneously use *Accent* for *Quantity*, one signifying the Length or Shortness of a Syllable, the other the raising or falling of the Voice in *Discourse*; which indeed most People

Of this long and short Syllable are all *Poetic Feet* in *English* (as well as all other Languages) form'd; and tho' *Horace* himself makes use of no less than twenty-eight several Sorts of Feet, yet do they all, and many more, arise from the various Compositions of long and short Syllables.

Before we come to the different Feet that are in Use in our Mother Tongue, it will be proper to lay down some Rules of Quantity, by which we may in some measure arrive at some Certainty in this Particular.

*In Words whose Letters still appear the same,
By diff'ring Sense yet gaining diff'rent Name,
The Sense 'tis, still distinguishes the Sound;
In Names That's short, which long in Words is found.*

In Words that differ in the *Sense*, but not in the *Spelling*, the first Syllable of the *Name* is long, but the last Syllable of the *Affirmation* is long; as the following Examples will shew;

People have naturally, except such who have the Misfortune of a Monotony, or of Speaking always in the same Tone of Voice; which is a great Vice in Utterance, and what few are guilty of, but such as have a small and acute Voice; for those of a grosser Constitution seldom are fixt to one Tone.

A very learned and ingenious Author gives us this familiar and easy Distinction betwixt *Quantity* and *Accent*: 'It may be observ'd, that the Variations of the Voice, by *high* and *low*, *long* and *short*, *loud* or *soft*, (however they happen to be founded by some) are all of as different Nature and Effects, as the Beats of a Drum are from the Sounds of a Trumpet, or the Reading in one unvaried Tone is from Singing. All the possible Diversities of Poetic Feet, together with the Changes of *loud* and *soft*, the Drum expresses to a Wonder: But while yet there is *μονωτονία* in the Sound, there can be no place for Accents: This plain Instrument does indeed in one single Tone shew what a Power there is in Musical Numbers, and of the various Movement of *Poetic Feet*, and how the Ear is affected with the sudden Intermixture of *loud* and *soft* Notes; but let the Trumpet tell how far short all these are of well-turn'd, and rightly-plac'd Accents: In these consists the Life of Language, these being the Enchantments, which being justly apply'd to well-chosen Words, lead all the Passions captive, and surprize the Soul itself in its inmost Recesses.'

for no Words of different Sense are exactly spelt alike, unless the *Name*, and the *Affirmation*.

	Names.		Words of Affirmation.
The first Syllable is pronounc'd long.	<i>Absent</i>	The last Syllable is pronounc'd long.	<i>Absent</i>
	<i>Accent</i>		<i>Accent</i>
	<i>Cement</i>		<i>Cement</i>
	<i>Collect</i>		<i>Collect</i>
	<i>Conduct</i>		<i>Conduct</i>
	<i>Consort</i>		<i>Consort</i>
	<i>Convert</i>		<i>Convert</i>
	<i>Contest</i>		<i>Contest</i>
	<i>Ferment</i>		<i>Ferment</i>
	<i>Frequent</i>		<i>Frequent</i>
	<i>Incense</i>		<i>Incense</i>
	<i>Object</i>		<i>Object</i>
	<i>Present</i>		<i>Present</i>
	<i>Project</i>		<i>Project</i>
	<i>Record</i>		<i>Record</i>
	<i>Subject</i>		<i>Subject</i>
	<i>Torment</i>		<i>Torment</i>
	<i>Unite</i>		<i>Unite</i>

And some others. But the following Rules of Quantity will be of some Use ; as,

*When Endings to One-Syllab'-Words are join'd,
Long the first Syllable you always find.*

(1.) When an Ending is join'd to a Word of one Syllable, the first Syllable is long ; as, *Peace-able, sin-ful, self-ish, goodness, toil-some, faith-less, hear-ty, god-ly, &c.*

*When (er), (or), (ure), two Syllab'-Words do end,
Of the first Syllab' they the Sound extend.*

(2.) In Words of two Syllables which end in *er, or, or rather in our and ure*, the first is long, as *enter, Honor or Honour, venture, &c.* but we must except *defer, refer, prefer*, which indeed belong to the Rule of *Particles*.

*When (le) or (en) obscure do end a Word,
To the first Syllable they Length afford.*

As for Example, *Trouble, double, Fiddle, Garden, &c.*

*When Particles with other Words compound,
The last still lengthen their own proper Sound.*

(3.) When

(3.) When *Particles* are compounded with Words of one Syllable, the *Word* itself is long ; as *allure*, *colleague*, *pollute*, except *object*, *adjunct*, *Advent*, *Aspect*, *Compass*, *Concourse*, *Conduit*, *perfect*, *Perfume*, *Prelate*, *Profit*, *Progress*, *Prologue*, *Reliques*, *Respite*, *Succour*, *Substance*, *Suburbs*, *Surplice*. Note, that *perfect* and *perfume*, when they are Affirmations, relate to the foregoing Rule, not the Exception.

*If to two Syllab'-Words an Ending's bound,
That which before was long maintains its Sound.*

If an Ending be added to a Word of two Syllables, that Syllable which was originally long continues so ; as *Profit*, *profitable*, except *protest*, *Protestant*.

*When many Syllables compose a Word,
That Vowel's long, that from the last is third ;
Except Position gives the last but one
(By crowding Consonants) a longer Tone.*

(4.) In Words of many Syllables (as we call all that consist of more than two) the third Vowel from the last is long, as *Salvation*, *Damnation*, &c. except when the last Syllable but one is long by *Position*, that is, by the coming together of many Consonants, and bearing the Vowel hard upon 'em, as *Abundance*, *accomplish*, *illustrate* ; to which we may add, *Affiance*, *Affidavit*, *antecedent*, *Armado*, *Balconey*, *Bravado*, *Carbonado*, *Cathedral*, *Dandalion*, *Horizon*, *obdurate*, *Opponent*, *pellucid*, *Precedent*, (tho' erroneously too often spelt *President*) *Recusant*, *Vagary*. In these that follow the last Syllable is long ; as, *atquiesce*, *comprehend*, *condescend*.

*Some Words of many Syllables are found
E-v'n of two Vowels to extend the Sound ;
The fourth, or fifth, and of the last but one ;
But still the last is of a weaker Tone.*

(5.) Some Words of many Syllables have two long Syllables, the fourth or fifth Vowel from the last, and the last but one ; tho' the Quantity of the last be not so loudly sounded in the Delivery ; as *Academy*, which yet is often pronounc'd *Acá-demy*, *accessary*, *Acrimony*, *admirable*. Tho' it may be doubted whether *admirable*, as usually pronounc'd, be not more properly one long and three short. *Adversary*, *Antimony*, *Alimony*, *ambulatory*, *amicable*, *anniversary*, *antiquated*, *Apoplexy*, *arbitrary*, *Auditory*, *habitable*, *Hierarchy*, *Ignominy*, *necessary*, *Necromancy*, *refractory*, *sedentary*.

*Four or more Syllables, that end in nefs,
The first and last long Syllables confess.*

But *Temperament*, and all Words of four or more Syllables ending in *ness*, have the first and last Syllables long; as *Righteousness*, *Tediousness*, &c. except *Forgetfulness*, *Despightfulness*.

*Some are of doubtful Quantity by Use,
And shorten now, and now the same produce.*

Some are of a doubtful Quantity, according to the Will or Occasion of the Writer or Speaker; as, *acceptable*, *contribute*, *corruptible*, *Confessor*, *Successor*, &c. and indeed some of the former.

*Back to the Vowels now convey your Eye,
And there the Rules of Quantity you'll spy;
In Words that many Syllables deny.
For Common most they short, and long are found,
But those that to such Consonants are bound
As close the Lips, can ne'er extend their Sound.
Emphatic Words we justly still produce;
But every Sign is short by sacred Use.*

The Rules of the Vowels will be found at the beginning of the *Grammar*; and we here may add to these Observations, that most Words of one Syllable are common, except they end with silent (*e*), whose Nature it is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. All the Signs are short, without an Emphasis, which they seldom have; as, *a*, *the*, *an*, *for*, *by*, *with*, *to*, *from*, &c. but whatever Word of one Syllable ends with a Letter that closes the Mouth, can never be long; as all such as end in (*m*), or the Sound of (*m*), and in most Mutes.

*Two Syllables our English Feet compose,
But Quantities distinguish them from Prose.
By long and short in various Stations plac'd,
Our English Verse harmoniously is grac'd.
With short and long Heroic Feet we raise,
But these to vary is the Poet's Praise.
For the same Sounds perpetually disgust:
DRYDEN to this Variety was just.*

Having given these Rules for *Quantities* in the *English* Tongue, we must observe, that two Syllables make a Poetic Foot, which hitherto will not admit a greater Number, tho' in the *Latin* and *Greek* a Foot might contain six, and those might be resolv'd into the simple Feet of two or three Syllables. *Heroick Verses* consist of five *short*, and five *long* Syllables intermixt, but not

so very strictly as never to alter that Order. Mr. *Dryden* has vary'd them with admirable Beauty, beginning his Heroick Verse sometimes with a *long* Syllable, follow'd by two *Shorts*, and other Changes, which a Master only must venture on.

From hence 'tis plain, that the Learner can never imagine that any Number of Syllables is sufficient to make any kind of Verse, for by that means there could be no Prose: So that to constitute a Verse, Variety of Numbers is necessary.

In *English*, the Metre or Sorts of Verse are extremely various and arbitrary, every Poet being at liberty to introduce any new Form he pleases. The most us'd are, first the *Heroic*, consisting of five long and five short Syllables, generally speaking; Verses of four Feet, and of three Feet, and three Feet and a Cefure, or one Syllable. *Stanza's* have been endeavour'd to be introduc'd, but never yet have been able to establish themselves.

[2] To help the Learner to some Means or Examples of forming new Feet in the *English Tongue*, we shall here set down

[2] But as many Ways as Quantities may be varied by Composition and Transposition, so many different Feet have the *Greek* Poets contriv'd, and that under distinct Names, from two to six Syllables, to the Number of 124. But it is the Opinion of some Learned Men in this Way, that Poetic Numbers may be sufficiently explain'd by those of two or three Syllables, into which the rest are to be resolv'd.

Of those eight here set down, the *Spondée* and the *Dactyl* are the most considerable, as being the Measures us'd in the Heroic Verse, *Homer*, *Virgil*, &c. These two Feet are of equal Time but of different Motion: The *Spondée* has an even, strong, and steddly Pace, like a Trot, as I may say; but the *Dactyl* resembles the nimbler Strokes of a Gallop. An inverted *Dactyl* is an *Anapest*, a very sprightly Trot, and a Motion proper to excite and enrage. The *Iambic* is also of a light and sprightly Nature, and reigns most in our *English* Verse. The *Trochée* is quite contrary to the *Iambic*, fit to express weak and languid Motions; as all those Measures are which move from long to short Syllables, The *Pyrrhic* and *Tribrach* are very rapid, as the *Molefs* is slow and heavy.

Tho' Rhyme has been (by the Ignorance of our Fore-fathers) thought the only Essential of *English Verse*, yet it is in Reality the most inconsiderable Part of it, and may be left out without any Detriment; as is plain from the Great *Milton*. But if you resolve

down the Variations made by the Ancients, of a long and a short Syllable.

A *Spondée*, Two long Syllables.

Pyrrhic, Two short Syllables.

Trochée, A long and short Syllable.

Iambic, a short and a long Syllable.

These are of two Syllables.

- A *Moloss*, Three long Syllables.

Tribrach, Three short Syllables.

Dactyl, One long and two short Syllables.

Anapest, Two short and one long Syllable.

CH A P. II.

The Art of POETRY in General; and first, of Epigram, Pastoral, Elegy, and Lyric.

HAVING in the foregoing Chapter laid down the Rules of the Mechanic Part of *Poetry*, which is as far as the *Grammar* generally goes, tho' with great Absurdity, we shall now proceed to the Art itself, which (by we know not what Infatuation) has never been yet taught in our Schools. For if *Poetry* is to be banish'd our Studies intirely, to what purpose does every petty School teach the Rules of *Quantity*? But if we are allow'd to read the Poets; nay, if we are so fond of them, as to teach them to Children before they are Masters of the Tongue they study, why must not the beauty and Excellence of their Works be shown? By the first we teach Boys to be mere *Versifiers*, *Poetasters*; by the second we form their Judgment, and let them see the Difficulty of being a good *Poet*; which would deter them attempting an Act for which they find no true Genius, and at the same time give them a just Value for the Books they read. The common *Profodia's* make Scriblers, which is a Scandal; the present Rules institute a Poet, which is an Honour.

resolve to write in Rhyme, you must take a peculiar Care of observing them exactly, for a Botch in this is unpardonable. My Lord *Roscommon*, tho' he was an Enemy to Rhyme, yet was most exact in it, when he vouchsafed to make use of it. This Niceness must be observ'd in double or treble Rhymes, which yet are never properly us'd, but in *Burlesque*.

For

For the Learner must not fancy, that to write a Verse, or conclude a Rhyme, gives the Title of Poet; no, he must understand the Nature of the Subject thoroughly; and let his Copy of Verses or Poem be never so short, he must form a Design, or Plan, by which every Verse shall be directed to a certain End, and each have a just Dependence on the other; for only this can produce the Beauty of Order and Harmony, and satisfy a rational Mind. For to jumble a Company of Verses together without any Design, let them be never so smooth and flowing, is an Undertaking of no Value, and incapable of any thing *Great and Noble*. A *Blockhead* with a good Ear, and a tolerable Knowledge of the Language, may do these; but nothing but a *Poet* the other.

But if a Design be necessary in the shortest and least of our Poems, it is vastly more necessary in those of greater Length; which without this will infallibly prove intolerably tedious, and a rude indigested Heap. Fix this, therefore, in the *Learner's* Mind, that a VERSIFYER and POET are two different Things; the first is contemptible, and has been so these 2000 Years; but the latter honourable, in the Opinion of the Men of Sense and Learning, in all Ages and Nations, since the Birth of this Heavenly Art.

Before we come to the Rules of the several Parts of *Poetry*, we must premise a Word or two to the Teachers. The *Master*, or *Mistress*, who instructs the Young in this Art, shou'd thoroughly know its Nature and Parts, not only in this, which is but an Abridgment of a larger Discourse, that will be publish'd soon after it, but the full Display of this Art in a much greater Volume.

They shou'd likewise read themselves with Application all the best Translations of the old *Latin* and *Greek* Poets, and direct their Scholars to read and study the same. For tho' these Translations are far short of the Originals, yet are they capable, as they are, of fixing a just and true Taste and Relish of the Nature of *Poetry* in the *English* Student; which has not been kept so much in View in most of our Modern Compositions, but as they depart from Nature, want her Regularity of Order and Beauty. *Ovid's Metamorphosis* shou'd be first read thoroughly, because it furnishes all the Histories of the *Heathen Gods*, and their Notions about them. To these you may add my Lord *Bacon*, *Danet*, and other Books on that Subject. *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Horace*, *Homer*, we have in part in pretty good Versions: And in some of these the Scholar shou'd every Day take a Lesson, besides that which he takes in the Rules of the Art; by which he

he may come to join the Theory and Practice, which only can make a Poet, or Judge of Poetry.

We now come to the Rules of POETRY, in which I shall begin with the most inferior Kind, and so ascend by Degrees up to the highest Performance in the Art.

Epigram is the lowest Step of the Temple of the MUSES, or rather the ground nearest to the first Step of its *Ascent*.

Of E P I G R A M.

*The Epigram in Shortness takes Delight,
And tho' all Subjects are its proper Right,
Yet each of one alone can only write.*

An *Epigram* is a short Copy of Verses treating of one only Thing, with *Beauty* and *Points*: All Things are allow'd to be treated of in the *Epigram*, provided that *Brevity*, *Beauty* and *Point* are preserved.

*Two Parts this little Whole must still compose,
Recital of the Subject, and the Close:
To make this Poem perfect, be your Care
That Beauty, Point, and Brevity appear.*

The *Epigram* consists of two Parts, the *Recital of the Subject*, and the *Conclusion*. *Beauty* runs through the whole, but the *Point* is for the *Conclusion* only.

*That you this needful Brevity may claim,
Let one Thing only be your careful Aim;
And in few Words that only Thing express,
But Words that Force and Energy confess.*

To attain this *Brevity*, you must not aim at many Things through the whole *Epigram*, and then take Care to express that *Little* as concisely as possibly you can; that is, in such Words, as that to extend them into more, would enervate and lose the Force and Strength of the Thought, and the *Point* or *Acumen*.

*Beauty's harmonious Symmetry of Parts,
Which to the Whole an Excellence imparts,
Adorn'd with sweet Simplicity and Truth,
The Diction still polite, and ne'er uncouth:
This BEAUTY Sweetness always must comprize,
Which from the Subject, well express'd, will rise.*

The next Quality is *Beauty*, that is, an exact and harmonious Formation of the *Whole*, and the apt Agreement of all the Parts of the Poem, from the Beginning to the End, with

a sweet *Simplicity* and *Truth*. The Language must be *Polite*, not *Pastic*: The *Beauty* must always be accompanied with *Sweetness*, which varies according to the Subject; if that be delicate, soft, tender, amorous, &c. those Qualities will arise from the well expressing of the Subject, that will give *Beauty* and *Sweetness*. But this must not be too visibly sought after; avoid rather what is harsh, and an Enemy to *Sweetness* in the Language, than study too much to increase it.

*The POINT in the Conclusion takes its Place,
And is the Epigram's peculiar Grace;
Some unexpected, and some biting Thought,
With poignant Wit, and sharp Expression fraught.*

The third necessary Quality of the *Epigram* is the *POINT*; and it is much insisted on by the *Epigrammatical* Critics, and is chiefly in the *Conclusion*, where it must end with something biting and unexpected. There are others who ever exclude the *Point* from *Epigram*, because *Catullus* has it not so frequently as *Martial*; but here, as in other Things, we must be guided by the Majority; and if we here exclude the *Point*, we may have it spread still through greater Works, where it is abominable.

*From two to twenty Verses it extends,
But best when two, or four, it not transcends.*

The Number of Verses in an *Epigram* is from two to twenty, or even to fifty; but the shorter the better, because it comes nearest to the Perfection of *Brevity*. We have not many formal *Epigrams* in *English*; but then we run into a worse Error, by scattering the *Epigrammatic Points* through all our Verses, to the Scandal of the *English Poets*, since that wholly belongs to *Epigram*. One Example shall suffice, and that is from Mr. *Brown*—on a Gentleman who took the Oaths, and made three Gods of the Trinity:

*The same Allegiance to two Kings he pays,
Swears the same Faith to both, and both betrays:
No wonder, if to swear he's always free,
Who has two Gods to swear by, more than we.*

Here is the *Brevity*, *Point* and *Beauty* of an *Epigram*, express'd by a Domestic Example: You may find several *Epigrams* of *Martial* translated by the same Author, and by Mr. *Cowley*, and some out of *Catullus*, which are too long to insert in this Abridgment.

Of PASTORAL.

*The Pastoral that sings of happy Swains,
And harmless Nymphs that haunt the Woods and Plains,
Shou'd through the whole discover every-where
Their old Simplicity, and pious Air,
And in the Characters of Maids and Youth,
Unpractis'd Plainness, Innocence, and Truth.*

As every sort of *Poetry* is an Imitation of something, so is the *Pastoral* an Imitation of a *Shepherd's Life*, consider'd under that Character, or rather an Imitation of rural Actions. For this Reason there ought to be an Air of Piety, on all Occasions, maintain'd though the whole Poem; the Persons introduc'd being innocent and simple, without Corruption; such as *Shepherds*, *Goatherds*, *Cowherds*, *Pruners*, and the like. The Characters therefore should represent that ancient Innocence, and unpractis'd Plainness, which was then in the World, and which is visible in *Theocritus* and *Virgil*, as may be seen in the Translations of those *Poets*.

*Each Pastoral a little Plot must own,
Which, as it must be simple, must be one;
With small Digressions it will yet dispense,
Nor needs it always Allegoric Sense.*

Every *Pastoral Poem* should have a little *Plot* or *Fable*, which may deserve the Title of a *Pastoral Scene*; it must be simple, and one, yet not so as to refuse all manner of Digressions, provided they be little. Nor is the Poet obliged always to make it *Allegoric*, that is, to have some real Persons meant by those fictitious *Shepherds* which are introduc'd. This Rule of the *Plot* is every-where observ'd by *Virgil*, particularly in his first, which is the Standard of *Pastorals*. The Plans, or Arguments of this and two or three more, will make this plain: Of the first;

Melibœus, an unfortunate *Spepherd*, is introduc'd with *Tityrus*, one more fortunate; the former addresses his Complaint of his Sufferings and Banishment to the latter, who enjoys his Flocks and Folds in this publick Calamity, and therefore expresses his Gratitude to the Benefactor from whom this Favour flow'd: But *Melibœus* accuses Fortune, Civil War, &c. bidding Adieu to his Native Home. This is therefore a Dialogue—The next—

Is a *Pastoral Complaint* without any Dialogue; for *CORYDON*, in a Courtship wholly Pastoral, complains of the Coyness of *Alexis*, recommends himself for his Beauty, and Skill in playing on the rural Pipe; invites him into the Country, promising

misgiving him the Pleasures of the Place, with a Present of Nuts and Apples. But finding all in vain, he resolves to quit his Amour, and betake himself again to his Business. Here is a visible Plan or Design, which makes every thing depend upon the other.

In the third, *Menalcas*, *Damœtas*, and *Palæmon*, are introduc'd in this manner:—*Damœtas* and *Menalcas*, after some Country Raillery, agree to try which has the best Skill at Song, and that their Neighbour *Palæmon* shall be judge of their Performance; who, after hearing both, declares himself unfit to decide the Controversy, and so leaves it undetermin'd.

We need give no more Examples here of the little Plot or Fable of a Pastoral; you may consult Mr. *Dryden's Virgil*, and the several Translations of *Theocritus*, by which you will confirm the Rule abundantly.

Connexions, and Transitions, pray take care
They are not made too strict and regular.

The *Connexions* should be negligent, and the *Transitions* easy; as may be observ'd in those of *Virgil*; for a too strict Regularity in these will make the Poem stiff and formal.

The Pastoral admits of Vows and Praise,
Of Promises, Complaints, of Mirth and Joys,
Congratulations, Singing, Riddles, Jest,
Of Parables, Sentences, and the rest.

Philosophic Questions, *Riddles*, *Parables*, ought to be eminent in this Poem, which gives a peculiar Relish of the ancient Manner of Writing; and the Writer should show some competent Skill in the Subject-Matter, which makes the Character of the Persons introduc'd; as *Virgil* every-where does, but the Moderns seldom or never.

The Style must still be natural and clear,
And Elegance in ev'ry Part appear;
Its humble Method nothing has of fierce,
But hates the Rattling of a lofty Verse.

The Style ought to be natural, clear and elegant, but nothing sublime or lofty, or set off with such Ornaments as are not at all agreeable to the Humility of the Subject. The Sentence should be short and smart, and the Versification smooth, easy, and harmonious, without Affectation of Grandeur and Majesty, but when akin to the Subject; as in one of *Virgil's* to *Pollio*.

Oppos'd to this, another low in Style
Makes Shepherds speak a Language base and vile.

This

This *Randal* has done in his *Pastorals*, and several others; changing *Damon* and *Phyllis* into *Tom* and *Bess*. Nor must Battles and War be treated of in a *Pastoral*: We must either feign Names according to the Subject, or borrow those which we find already in good Authors. This Poem ought never to exceed one hundred Verses; the best of *Virgil's* is but fifty, that is (in *English*) about seventy.

Of E L E G Y.

*The Elegy demands a solemn Style,
It mourns with flowing Hair at Fun'ral Pile,
It points the Lover's Torment and Delights,
A Mistress flatters, threatens, and invites.*

Elegy was first made on melancholy Subjects, as on the Death of Friends, &c. as *Ovid* on *Tibullus*, which is translated. In Process of Time, Joy, Wishes, and almost every Subject, was made free of the *Elegy*, as Complaints, Expostulations, Prayers, Love, Vows, Praises, Congratulations, Admonitions, Reproaches.

*The Model of this Poem shou'd be made,
And every Step of all its Progress laid,
And all directed to some certain End,
And Verse on Verse perpetually depend.*

This and all other Poems ought to have a plan made of the whole Design before a Line is written: For else the Author will not know where to begin, and where to end, but ramble in the Dark, and give us Verses which have no Relation to each other, or at least have not any Dependance on each other. This is the Fault of those who are ignorant of Art, and are only *Verifiers*.

*No glitt'ring Points, nor any nice Conceit
Must load the Elegy with Foreign Weight;
Passion and Nature here avow their Right,
And with Disdain throw back that mean Delight.*

The *Epigrammatic Point* must never be here admitted; 'tis abominable; none of the fine Things that some are so fond of in all Places, no Conceits, nor the like: These give Place to the Passions, which must here speak with Nature.

*Remember that the Diction ev'ry-where
Be gentle, clean, perspicuous, and clear,
Correct; the Manners all-along express,
In ev'ry Place the Passion still confess.*

The Diction of the *Elegy* should be standard, correct, clean, gentle, perspicuous, clear, expressive of the Manners, tender, full of Passions, or pathetic; but never oppress'd or debauch'd with fine Sayings and exquisite Sentences. It is wonderfully adorn'd with frequent Commiserations, Complaints, Exclamations, Addresses to Things or Persons, Words of feign'd Persons, or Things inanimate made to speak, short Digressions, yet pertinent to the Subject; nor does it receive a little Beauty from Allusions to Sayings: Examples not only from the *like*, but *unlike*, and Contraries. Sometimes Comparisons are made, smart and short Sentences are thrown in, to confirm what is propos'd.

*No cutting off the Vowels must be found,
That wou'd destroy that smooth, that flowing Sound
Which in the Elegy must still abound.* }

There should be no Apostrophe's, by which when one Vowel ends a Word, and the next begins with another, the former is cut off; for that begets a sort of Roughness, which is not agreeable to this kind of Poesy.

*Some to two Verses will the Sense confine,
Consummate in the close of ev'ry other Line.*

The Reason of this Opinion seems to be the sort of Verse this Poem makes use of in the *Latin*, which seems to require a Full point or Period at the End of every *Distich* composed of a Verse of six Feet, and another of five, and so begins again like a short *Stanza*. But this Rule will not always hold in *English*, nor is it always observed in *Latin*.

The LYRIC.

*Sweetness is most peculiar to the Ode,
Ew'n when it rises to the Praise of GOD.*

The Characteristic of this sort of Poesy from all others, is *Sweetness*: For as Gravity rules, and most prevails in *Heroic* Verse, Simplicity in *Pastoral*, Tenderness and Softness in *Elegy*, Sharpness and Poignancy in *Satire*, Humour and Mirth in *Comedy*, the Pathetic in *Tragedy*, and the Point in *Epigram*; so in this sort of Poesy the Poet applies himself intirely to sooth the Minds of Men by *Sweetness* and Variety of the Verses, and the exquisite Elegance of the Words of the whole *Song* or *Ode*, in the Beauty and Agreeableness of Numbers, and the Description of Things most delightful in their own Nature.

*Th' Expression should be easy, Fancy high,
That That not seem to creep, nor This to fly :
No Words transpos'd but in such Order all, -
As, tho' hard wrought, may seem by Chance to fall.
But obscene Words do always give Offence,
And in all Poetry debase the Sense.*

Songs are a Part of Lyric Poetry, for Ode indeed signifies a Song; tho' our common Madrigals degenerate much from their Original the Ode; yet, that we may have better for the future, we here take Notice of them, and they should be most exact in the Propriety of Words and Thoughts; but here, as well as in all manner of true Poesy, Obscurity shou'd with the utmost Care be avoided.

*Variety of Numbers still belong
To the soft Melody of Ode or Song.*

The Verse of the Lyric Poetry in the beginning, was only of one kind, but for the sake of Pleasure, and the Music to which they were sung, they so varied the Numbers and Feet, that their sorts are now almost innumerable.

*Pindaric Odes are of a higher Flight,
And happier Force, and surer is the Delight :
The Poet here must be indeed inspir'd
With fury too, as well as fancy fir'd ;
For Art and Nature in this Ode must join,
To make the wond'rous Harmony Divine.
But tho' all seem to be in Fury done,
The Language still must soft and easy run ;
The bright Transitions and Digressions rise,
And with their natural Returns surprize.*

As the Language, or Expressions should be elegantly soft, so an ill or low Expression clogs and debases the Beauty and Brightness of the Thought. This Poem is distinguish'd from all other Odes by the happy Transitions and Digressions which it beautifully admits, and the surprizing and naturally easy Returns to the Subjects; which is not to be obtain'd without great Judgment and Genius. The supposed Irregularity of Pindar's Numbers, has made our Ignorant Imitators pretend to be Pindaric Poets, by their wild irregular Verses alone, though very falsely. Here the Poet that would excel, should draw the Plan of his Poem, and mark out the Places where these elegant Wandrings may properly be, and how the Returns may justly be made to the Subject; for without that it must be Chaos and

Confusion

Confusion in bold sonorous Verses. Consult and study *Pindar's Odes*, translated by Mr. Cowley; and a Poem entituled, *The Female Reign*; in which the Transitions and Returns are excellent. [a]

CHAP. III.

Of SATIRE and COMEDY.

Satire and Comedy being both directed to lash and ridicule Folly and Vice, may (we think) properly come into one Chapter.

*Folly and Vice of ev'ry Sort and Kind
That wound our Reason, or debase our Mind;
All that deserves our Laughter or our Hate,
To biting SATIRE's Province do relate;
The slothful Parasite, affected Fool,
Th' Ingrateful, and the pert loquacious Tool,
The lustful Drunkard, th' avaritious Slave,
The noisy Bravo, and the tricking Knave;
Satire, by wholesome Lessons, wou'd reclaim,
And heal their Vices to secure their Fame.*

[a] The Ode originally had but one *Strophe* or *Stanza*, but was at last divided into three Parts; the *Strophe*, *Antistrophe*, and *Epode*. For the Priests went round the Altar singing the Praises of the Gods and Goddeses in Verse: So they call'd their first Entrance to the Left, *Strophe*, or *turning to*; the second returning to the Right, they call'd *Antistrophe*, or the *Returning*; and the Songs they call'd *Ode*, or *Antode*; as they call'd their Entrance and Return *Strophe*, and *Antistrophe*. At last standing still before the Altar, they sung the rest, and that they call'd the *Epode*. The *Strophe* and *Antistrophe* consisted of the same Number and Kind of Verses, nay, almost of Syllables; but the *Epode* of Verses of a different Kind, which were sometimes more in Number, sometimes less; and if the Ode contained several *Strophes* and *Antistrophes*, and *Epodes*, the same Rule was followed in all the rest.

The Odes of *Horace* are composed of two, three our four Sorts of Verse, after which the *Stanzas* or *Strophes* begin again, &c.

Satire, like the old *Comedy*, takes Cognizance of, and has for its Subject *Turpitude*, or such things as are worthy our *Laughter*, or our *Hatred*. Whatever therefore is not ridiculous or odious, is not the Subject of *Satire*; as any thing that is full of Grief, Terror, Pity, or other Tragical Passions. *Satire* derides and falls on the Slothful, the Parasite, Affectation, the Loquacious or Talkative, the Ingrateful, Libidinous, Drunkards, the Avaritious Usurers, Bravo's, publick Robbers, Adulterers, &c. He was in the Right, that subjected the Distempers of the Mind to *Satire*, since it is as much employ'd in this, as the Phycician in curing the Body. Both propose to themselves the Health of the Patient, *Satire* by Discourse, the Physician by his Potions and Pills. The Medicines of both are in themselves unsavory and disagreeable to the Palate of the Distemper'd on whom they make Incisions, whom they cauterize and spare not. The Physician gilds his Pill, that it may go down glibly; and *Satiric* Invectives must be sweeten'd with the Mixture of Pleasantry and Wit, and agreeable Raillery, till both the Medicines are swallow'd, and in the Bowels perform their Operation. The Raillery and Biting of *Satire* correct the Perverse, and deter others from falling into Folly and Vice.

*The Latin Writers Decency neglect,
But modern Readers challenge more Respect;
And at immodest Writings take Offence,
If clean Expressions cover not the Sense.
Satire should be from all Obsceneness free,
Not impudent, and yet preach Modesty.*

The *Satiric Poet* should not expose Vice and Lewdness as *Horace* and *Juvenal* have done, in Words and Expressions that may corrupt the Innocent, whilst they strive to correct the Guilty. He must, therefore, carefully avoid all obscene Words and Images.

*Tho' Vice and folly be keen Satire's Aim,
It must not on their Nature here declaim.*

Tho' the Business of *Satire* be to call Men from Vice and Folly, and invite them to Wisdom and Virtue, yet it is by no means to waste itself on Disquisitions on the Nature of Virtue and Vice, which is the proper Business of *Moral Philosophy*. In short, this Poem requires for its Author, a Man of Wit and Address, Sagacity and Eloquence; and a Sharpness that is not opposite to Mirth and Pleasantry.

No Parts distinct does biting Satire know,
 And without certain Rules its Course will go.
 Oft by Insinuation it begins,
 * And oft abruptly falls upon our Sins;
 But this Abruptness must regard the Whole,
 Which must its Words, and Manner too, controul.

Satire has no certain nor distinct Parts; sometimes it begins by insinuating itself by Degrees; but more commonly abruptly, and with Ardour. But tho' the beginning be abrupt, yet it ought to have a Reference and Regard to the Composition of the whole Body of the Poem. Examples you may see in *Juvenal*, translated by Mr. Dryden.

Of well-chose Words some take not Care enough,
 And think they shou'd be (like the Subject) rough.
 But this great Work is more exactly made,
 And sharpest Thoughts in smoothest Words convey'd.

Here, as well as in all Poems, there ought to be Care taken of the smooth flowing of the Verse, which Mr. Dryden in his *Mac Fleckno* has perfectly observed, and ought to be the Model of our Verse in all *English Satires*. [b]

Of COMEDY.

We come now to the *Dramatic Poetry*, which is much the most useful and difficult, as well as delightful of any: We can scarce except a just *Epic Poem*, which has not been seen these 1700 Years; for tho' that be more difficult because of its Length and Variety, yet it is beyond Controversy, less useful, and less capable of giving that strong and lively Pleasure which is to be found in a just *Tragedy*. But we begin with *Comedy*.

* See the first *Satire* of JUVENAL.

[b] Satire is allow'd to be an urbane, jocosè, and biting Poem, form'd to reprehend corrupt Manners, and expose Improbability of Life; but yet there is no Certainty of the Etymology of its Name. Some draw it from a Sort of *Plate* or *Charger*, in which the various sort of *First-fruits* were offer'd to *Ceres*; thus, say they, in *Satire* are handled various and different sorts of Things or Subjects, with which it is, as it were, fill'd to Satiety; so from Fulness or Satiety they draw *Satire*. Others derive it from the Dances of the *Satyrs*, leaping from *side* to *side*, skipping and jumping this way and that. Or perhaps from the *Satyrs* themselves, those Gods having of old been often introduced into this sort of *Poetry*.

*In Comic Scenes the common Life we draw
According to its Humours, Actions, Law,
And Vice and Folly laughing, keep in awe.
But what is yet a nobler, juster End,
To all the Charms of Virtue does commend.*

Comedy imitates common Life in its Actions and Humours, laughing at, and rendring Vice and Folly ridiculous, and recommending Virtue. It is indeed an Imitation of Life, the Mirror of Custom, and the Image of Truth; and whatever Comedy follows not this Track, is unworthy of the Name.

*To four essential Things w' assign a Part
In every Comedy that's writ with Art;
The Fable, Manners, Sentiments are these,
And proper Diction that must all express.
The Fable is the Plot that is design'd
To imitate the Actions of Mankind.
But without Manners these cannot be drawn,
In them the Temper, and the Humour's shown;
As by the Sentiments these are made known.
The Diction is the Language that does show
In Words, the Sentiments that from them flow.*

COMEDY has Parts of *Quality*, and Parts of *Quantity*. Of the first kind there are four essential, the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*; to which two are added, which only relate to the *Representation*, viz. the *Music* and *Decoration*; without the first four Parts no Comedy can be written. For the *Poet* must necessarily invent the *Matter*, or *Subject* on which he writes, and that is what we call the *Fable* or *Plot*: But since the *Fable* imitates, there is a Necessity that it should have the *Manners*, that is, nicely and justly express the *Temper*, *Humours*, or *Manners* of the several *Dramatic Persons* that are represented in Comedy. The *Sentiments* are added, because we must discover by them the Sense and Opinion of them in Words; and because the *Sentiments* are, and must be expressed more plainly by Words, the *Diction* obtains its Place in these four Parts of Comedy.

The Difference of the *Person* much alters the *Manners*, and differences them from one another. For these *Manners* which are praise-worthy in one, are far from being so in another, being not at all convenient to his Character, and therefore to be dispraised. This we find in Arts themselves; for one of the Vulgar gains Reputation by being a good *Fidler* or *Piper*; but this in a King is ridiculous and disagreeable to his Dignity.

A Woman

A Woman has a just Praise for sewing well, and working finely with her Needle; but this being no Manly Quality, is despicable in a Man. The Manners must therefore be agreeable to every Man's Station, Quality, or Years, and the like. And Life is the best Book to study these in, when we are once Masters of the Rules of Art. In the mean while learn these following Verses out of *Horace*, of what is proper to the several Ages and Stations of Man, that you may not err against them: They are found thus in blank Verse, in my Lord *Roscommon's* Translation;

*One that has newly learn'd to speak and go,
Loves Childish Plays, is soon provok'd and pleas'd,
And changes ev'ry Hour his wavering Mind.
A Youth, that first casts off his Tutor's Yoke,
Loves Horses, Hounds, and Sports and Exercise;
Prone to all Vice, impatient of Reproof;
Proud, careless, fond, inconstant, and profuse.
Gain, and Ambition rule our riper Years,
And make us Slaves to Interest and Power,
Old Men are only walking Hospitals,
Where all Defects, and all Diseases croud,
With restless Pain, and more tormenting Fear;
Lazy, morose, full of Delays, and Hopes,
Oppress'd with Riches which they dare not use;
Ill-natur'd Censors of the present Age,
And fond of all the Follies of the past.
Thus all the Treasure of our flowing Years
Our Ebb of Life for ever takes away.
Boys must not have th' ambitious Cares of Men,
Nor Men the weak Anxieties of Age.*

*Observe the Characters of those that speak,
Whether an honest Servant or a Cheat,
Or one whose Blood boils in his Youthful Veins,
Or a grave Matron, or a busy Nurse,
Extorting Tradesmen, careful Husbandmen.*

These are the general Rules for those Characters, that fall under them; but *Humour* being essential to *English Comedy*, we must see what that is.

*Subordinate Passion we Humour name,
By which our Bards have gain'd peculiar Fame,
Each Passion does a double Face confess,
The strong is Tragic, Comic is the less.*

*Here Affectation some to Humour add,
By that are some ridiculously mad.
Whatever Humours you at first bestow,
These to the End your Passions still must show,
These must be uppermost in all they do.*

Humour is said by the Critics to be a subordinate, or a weaker Passion, and that in Persons of a lower Degree than those that are fit for *Tragedy*; and it is more visible in the lower sort of People, whose Characters are therefore fitter for *Comedy*. Every Passion has two different Faces; one that is serious, great, terrible, solemn, that is for *Tragedy*; and another that is low, comical, ridiculous.

Affectation is thought also to be a Character fit for *Comedy*, as being highly ridiculous, and capable of being corrected by it. Your Characters must always retain the same Humour through the Play, which you give them at first, or else 'tis absurd and preposterous.

*Expose no single Fop, but lay the Load,
More equally, and spread the Folly broad;
The other Way is vulgar: Oft we see
The Fool derided by as great as he:
Ill Poets so will one poor Fop devour;
But to collect, like Bees, from every Flow'r
Ingredients to compose this precious Juice,
Which serves the World for Pleasure, and for Use,
In spite of Faction will our Favour find,
And meet with the Applause of all Mankind.*

The Poet should not pick out any one particular Fop he may meet with in his Conversation, but from the general Follies form a Character that may be of Use to many, and a Diversion to all.

*All Fools in this speak Sense, as if posselt,
And each by Inspiration breaks his Jest,
If once the Justness of each Part be lost,
We well may laugh, but at the Poet's Cost.
That silly thing Men call Sheer-Wit avoid,
With which our Age so nauseously is cloy'd:
Humour is all, Wit shou'd be only brought
To turn agreeably some proper Thought.*

'Tis a Breach of Character to make the Coxcombs speak Wit and fine Raillery, and therefore good for nothing. *Humour*
is

is the true Wit of Comedy; the fine Things, the *Sheer-Wit* is only for Epigram.

*The Parts of Quantity are likewise four;
The Entrance does the Characters explore:
And to the Action something does proceed,
The Working up, Action and Warmth doth breed,
The Counter-turn does Expectation cross,
But the Discov'ry settles all i' th' Close.*

The Parts of Quantity of a Comedy are four: the *Entrance*, which gives Light only to the Characters, and proceeds very little into any part of the Action. 2dly, The *Working up* of the Plot, where the Play grows warmer, and the Design or Action of it is drawing on, and you see something promising. 3dly, The *full Growth* of the Plot, which we may properly call the *Counter-turn*, destroys the Expectation, and embroils the Action in new Difficulties, leaving you far distant from the Hopes, in which it found you. 4thly, The *Discovery* or *Unravelling* of the Plot, where you see all things settling again on the same Foundation. The Obstacles, which hindered the Design or Action of the Play, once removed, it ends with the Resemblance of Truth, and Nature, and the Audience are satisfied with the Conduct of it.

But our Plays being divided into Acts, I shall add a Word about them. There must be no more, nor less, than five Acts; this is a Rule of 1700 Years standing at the least.

The first contains the Matter or Argument of the Fable, with the shewing the principal Characters. The second brings the Affairs of Business into Act. The third furnishes Obstacles and Difficulties. The fourth either shews how those Difficulties may be removed, or finds new in the Attempt. The fifth puts an End to them all, in a fortunate Discovery, and settles all as it should be.

C H A P. IV.

Of TRAGEDY.

O
NE only Action, that's entire and grave,
 And of just Length, the Tragic Muse must have
 The Object of its artful Imitation,
 And that without the Help of the Narration,
 By the strong Pow'r of Terror and Compassion,
 All Sorts of Passion perfectly refines,
 And what in us to Passion else inclines.
}

As all other Parts of Poetry are Imitations, so is Tragedy; for the best Criticks define it thus: — “Tragedy is the Imitation of one grave and intire Action, of a just Length, and which without the Assistance of Narration, by the Means of Terror and Compassion, perfectly refines in us all Sorts of Passions, and whatever is like them.”

Thus Tragedy is the Imitation of some one Action, and not of all the Actions of a Man's Life; and 'tis equally plain, that there is no room for any thing in this Poem (the most useful and noble of all Poesy) but what is grave and serious. This Action must be *intire*; it must have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. The *Beginning* is that before which we have no need to suppose any necessary Cause of it; the *Middle* is all that this *Beginning* produces: and the *End* is that after which nothing is necessarily supposed to compleat the Action. It must be of a just *Length*, that is, it must not be so long as that of an Heroic Poem, nor so short as a single Fable. The excluding *Narration*, and the confining it to Terror and Compassion, distinguishes it from an Heroic Poem; which may be perfect without them, and employs *Admiration*. By the refining the Passions, we mean not Extirpation, but the reducing them to just Bounds and Moderation, which makes them as useful as necessary. For by shewing the Miseries that attend the Subjection to them, it teaches us to watch them more narrowly; and by seeing the great Misfortunes of others, it lessens our own, either present or to come.

*There is no Action that does not proceed
 From Manners, and the Sentiments indeed.
 And therefore these, in this sublimer Art
 Of Tragedy, must claim essential Part.*

As *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an *Action*, not of Inclinations or Habits, so there is no *Action* that does not proceed from the *Manners* and the *Sentiments*; and therefore the *Manners* and the *Sentiments* are essential Parts of *Tragedy*, for nothing but these can distinguish an *Action*. The *Manners* form, and the *Sentiments* explain it, discovering its Causes and Motives.

*All Tragedies four Parts distinct do claim,
Fable the first, and Principal we name;
The Manners and the Sentiments succeed,
And the last Place to Diction is decreed.*

There is no Subject of a *Tragedy* where these following Parts are not to be found; the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*. Some add the *Decoration*, because that denotes the Place; and every *Action* requiring some Place, the *Decoration* is, in some measure, the Object of the Poet's Care, that the Place may be proper for the *Representation*. The chief and much most considerable, is the *Fable*, or the Composition of the *Incidents*, which form the Subject of the *Tragedy*. For *Action* being the Object of the Imitation of this sort of Poetry, must be the most considerable; but the *Action* consists of the *Incidents* and their Conduct, which is the *Fable*: The *Fable* must be the most considerable; and all the Beauties of *Manners*, *Diction*, and *Sentiments*, can't make amends for the Defects of this. The general End that Mankind propose, is to live happily, but to live happily is an *Action*; for Man is either happy or miserable by his *Actions*, not *Manners*. *Tragedy* only adds them for the Production of *Actions*. The *Fable* being therefore the End of *Tragedy*, as being the Imitation of the *Action*, it must be of the greatest Importance; for so is the End in all Things.

*The Manners next, by the Dramatic Laws,
As they of Action are the Source and Cause,
Demand our Study, and our utmost Care;
By those the Persons their Designs declare,
And from each other best distinguish'd are.*

}

The *Manners* are the most considerable next to the *Fable*. For as *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an *Action*, so there are no *Actions* without the *Manners*, as no Effect without a Cause. The *Manners* distinguish Character from Character, and discover the Inclinations of the Speaker, and what Part, Side, or Course he will take on any important and difficult Emergence, and let us know how he will behave himself before we see the *Actions*.

Actions. If Pride, Choler, Piety, or the like, be the *Manners* of the Hero, we may know that he will follow the Dictates of the prevailing Passion of his Character.

*The Sentiments obtain the next Degree,
Tho' least in Excellence of all the Three;
The Sentiments the Manners do declare,
But must with Truth and Likelihood cohere.*

The *Sentiments* are next in degree of Excellence to the *Fable* and the *Manners*: For these are for the *Manners*, what the *Manners* are for the *Fable*. The *Action* cannot be justly imitated without the *Manners*, nor the *Manners* without the *Sentiments*. In these we must regard *Truth* and *Verisimilitude*: As when the Poet makes a *Madman* speak just as a *Madman* does; or as it is probable he wou'd do. For this see *King Lear* in *Shakespear*.

*The Diction must the Sentiments unfold,
Which in their proper Language must be told.*

The *Diction* or Language of *Tragedy* can demand but the fourth Place in the essential Parts, and is of the least Importance of any of them; yet must peculiar Care be likewise taken of this, that every Passion speak in such Words and Expressions as are natural to it.

Having thus seen the several Parts of *Tragedy*, and their Excellence in regard of each other, we shall now proceed to give Directions necessary to the making each of them perfect, and to the knowing when they are so in what we read.

*First on a Plot employ thy careful Thoughts,
And guard thyself against its usual Faults:
Turn it with Time a thousand sever'al Ways;
That (as it ought) gives sure Success to Plays.*

As the *Plot*, or *Fable*, is the chief Thing in *Tragedy*, so our first and principal Care ought to be employ'd in contriving this Part with that Care, that each may produce and depend upon the former. This Part being performed with Skill, has given Success to those Plays which have been defective in all the other Parts.

*Besides the main Design compos'd with Art,
Each moving Scene must have a Plot apart:
Contrive each little Turn, mark ev'ry Place;
As Painters first chalk out the future Face.
Yet be not fondly your own Slave for this,
But change hereafter what appears amiss.*

As the main *Plot*, or *Fable*, consists of many *Incidents* or *Scenes*, the Poet must make a Draught of these before he begins to write; which will appear more plainly when we come to discourse of the *Incidents*. In this Scheme we must mark all the fine Touches of the Passions, and all the admirable Turns that produce them. But when we come to write, we may discover Faults in the first Draught, which we must correct.

*Each Tragic Action must be both entire,
And of that Length which Tragedies require.
Beginning it must have, and Middle, and End,
Each to produce the other still must tend.
The Cause of Undertaking and Design
Of Action, to Beginning we confine;
All the Effects and Obstacles we find
In th' Execution, to Middl' are assign'd.
Th' unrav'ling and dissolving of the same,
With Justice we the End do always name.*

Every *Action*, that is fit for a *Tragic Imitation*, ought not only to be *intire*, but of a *just Length*; that is, must have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. This distinguishes it from *momentaneous Actions*, or those which happen in an *Instant*, without Preparation or Sequel, which, wanting Extension, may come into the *Incidents*, not build a *Fable* on. The Cause or Design of understanding an *Action* is the *Beginning*; and the Effects of those Causes, and the Difficulties we find in the Execution, are the *Middle*: The unravelling and dissolving these Difficulties, is the *End*.

An Explanation of this will best appear by an Example, which we will take from the *Plot* of the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*. On the Death of the two Brothers, *Eteocles* and *Polynices*, *Creon*, who succeeds them in the Kingdom of *Thebes*, prohibits the burying the Body of the latter, because he invaded his Native Country with Foreign Troops. This Decree makes *Antigone*, who was betrothed to *Hæmon* the Son of *Creon*, bury him, is discovered, and condemned to be bury'd alive: *Creon* could not be brought to relent by *Hæmon*, or *Tiresias*; and so *Hæmon* kills himself with her: This makes *Eurydice*, his Mother, destroy herself; and *Creon*, in these Miseries seeing the fatal Consequence of his Decree, repents too late, and becomes miserable.

The Beginning of this *Action* has no necessary Consequence of the Death of *Polynices*, since that Decree might have been let alone by *Creon*, tho' it could not have been without that Death; so that the *Action* naturally begins with that Decree.

The

The *Middle* is the Effects produced by that Decree, the Death of *Antigone*, *Hæmon*, and *Eurydice*, which produce the *End* by breaking the Obstinacy of *Creon*, and making him repent, and miserable. Thus the Poet cannot begin or end his *Action* where he pleases, (which is the Fault of most of our old Plays) if he would manage his Subject with true Oeconomy and Beauty. For there must be the *Cause* or *Beginning*; the *Effect* of that *Cause*, which is naturally the *Middle*; and the unravelling or finishing of it, which is the *End* produced by the *Middle*, as that by the *Beginning*; the *Middle* supposes something before it, as its *Cause*, and following, as its *Effect*; the *Beginning* supposes nothing before, and the *End* nothing to follow, to make the *Action* complete.

*The Unities of Action, Time, and Place,
If well observ'd, give Plays a perfect Grace.*

The Subject of a *Tragedy* should be of a just Extent, neither too large nor too narrow, but that it may be seen, viewed, and considered at once, without confounding the Mind, which if too little or narrow, it will do; nor make it wander to distract it, as it will do if it be too large and extensive. That is, the Piece ought to take up just so much *Time* as is necessary or probable for the introducing the Incidents with their just *Preparation*. For to make a good *Tragedy*, that is, a just *Imitation*, the *Action* imitated ought not, in Reality, to be longer than the *Representation*; for this makes the *Likeness* greater, and by consequence more perfect. But since there are *Actions* of ten or twelve Hours, we must bring some of the Incidents into the Intervals of the *Acts*, the better to deceive the Audience.

Next, the *Unity of Action* is such, that it can never be broke without destroying the Poem. This *Unity* is not preserved by representing of several *Actions* of *One Man*; as of *Julius Cæsar*, of *Anthony*, or *Brutus*; for then the Poet has no Reason to begin at any certain Place; and *Shakespeare* might have brought his Play down to the last Emperor of *Rome*, as well as to the Death of *Brutus*.

But this *Unity of Action* does not exclude the various *Under-Actions*, which are perfectly dependent on, and contribute to the chief, and which without it are nothing. Nor does this Exception make for our silly *Under-Plots*, which have nothing to do with the main Design, but is another *Mistake*: as *Idmon* and *Eurydice* in *Dryden's Oedipus*, which are allowable. In the *Orphan* the *Action* is *One*, and every Part or *Under-Action* carries

carries on and contributes to the *main Action* or *Subject*. Thus the different Actions of different Men are not more distinctly different Actions than those of *One Man* at different Times. Whatever can be transposed, or left out, without a sensible Maim to the *Action*, has nothing to do there.

*The Tragic Person is no certain Man,
The Bard PARTICULARS wou'd draw in vain ;
For to no Purpose is that useless Draught,
By which no moral Lessons can be taught.
Great Homer, in th' Achilles, whom he drew,
Sets not that one sole Person in our View ;
But in that Person to explain did chuse
What Violence and Anger wou'd produce.*

The Poet is not obliged to relate Things just as they happened, but as they might, or ought to have happened : That is, the *Action* ought to be *general*, not *particular* ; for *particular Actions* can have no *general Influence*. Thus *Homer*, in *Achilles*, intends not the Description of that *one individual Man*, but to shew what *Violence* and *Anger* would make all Men of that Character say or do : And therefore *Achilles* is a *general* and *allegoric* Person, and so ought all *Tragic Heroes* to be, where they should speak and act necessarily, or probably, as all Men so qualified, and in those Circumstances would do ; differing from *History* in this, that *Tragedy* consults not the Truth of what any particular Person did say or do, but only the general Nature of such Qualities, to produce such *Words*, and such *Actions*. 'Tis true, that *Tragedy* sometimes makes use of true Names, but that is to give a Credibility to the *Action*, the Persons still remaining *general*. The Poet may take Incidents from History and Matter of Fact, but then they must have that Probability and Likelihood which Art requires ; for there are many Actions which have really been done, which are not probable ; and then History will not justify the Poet in making use of them.

*The Tragic Action, to be just and right,
Both Terror and Compassion must excite.*

The Action that must be imitated in *Tragedy*, besides the former Properties, must excite *Terror* and *Compassion*, and not *Admiration* ; which is a Passion too weak to have the Effect of *Tragedy*. *Terror* and *Pity* are raised by Surprise, when Events are produced out of Causes contrary to our Expectation ; that is, — when the Incidents produce each other,

other, and not merely follow after each other. For if it do not necessarily follow, it is no Incident for *Tragedy*.

*Two Kinds of Fables Tragedy allows,
The simple this, the implex that avows.
The simple does no Change of Fortune know,
Or in the End does no Discov'ry show;
The implex either one or both contains,
So greater Beauty and Perfection gains.*

As the *Actions* which *Tragedy* imitates, so are all its *Fables*, *simple* or *implex*. The *simple* is that, in which there is neither a *Change* of the Condition or State of the principal Person or Persons, or a *Discovery*; and the *unravelling* of the *Plot* is only a single Passage of Agitation, of Trouble, or Repose and Tranquillity. The *implex Fable* in which the principal Person or Persons have a *Change* of Fortune, or a *Discovery*, or both; which is the most beautiful and least common. In the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*, the Argument of which we have before given you, there is the *Change* of the Fortune of *Creon*, and that produced by the Effect of his own Decree and Obstinacy; but in his *Oedipus* and *Electra* there is both a *Change* and *Discovery*; the first to *Misery*, the latter to *Revenge* and *Happiness*. *Oedipus*, with his *Change* of Fortune, discovers, that he is the Son of *Jocasta* and *Laius*, and so is guilty of *Incest* and *Parricide*. But *Electra* discovers *Orestes* to be her Brother, and by that changes her *Miseries* into *Happiness*, in the *Revenge* of her Father's Death. In the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of *Euripides* (written by Mr. Dennis in *English*) *Iphigenia* making a *Discovery* that *Orestes* is her Brother, changes both their Fortunes from *Despair* to a happy *Escape* from the barbarous Altars of *Taurica*. But the *Change* can neither be necessary nor probable (without which Qualities it is of no Value) if it be not the natural Result, or at least the Effect of the foregoing Actions, or of the *Subject* itself. As in *Oedipus*: For *Ægeon*, who comes to bring him agreeable News, and which ought to have delivered him from those Apprehensions into which the Fear of committing *Incest* with his Mother had thrown him, does quite the contrary, in discovering to him who and what he is. The Fact is thus,—*A Messenger from Corinth brings Oedipus Word of the Death of Polybus, and invites him to take Possession of that Kingdom; but he, afraid of committing the Incest the Oracle had told him of, believing Polybus to be his Father, declared he would never go to the Place where his Mother was. The Corinthian told him that he did not know himself, and so disturbed*

sturb'd himself about nothing; and so thinking to do Oedipus a signal Piece of Service, by delivering him from his Fears, informs him, that Polybus and Merope were not his Father or Mother; which began the Discovery, that cast him into the most terrible of his Misfortunes.

*What in the Drama we DISCOV'RY call,
May in the Notion of Remembrance fall.
For, by remembring, the chief Persons move
From Ignorance to Knowledge, which or Love
Or Hatred in them always must produce,
And all their Happiness or Misery induce.*

Discovery being here used for a Term of Art, and therefore signifying more than in its vulgar Acceptation, you must know, that here it means a Discovery, which is made by the principal Characters; by remembring or calling to Mind either one another, or something of Importance to their Change of Fortune, and is thus defined.—*The DISCOVERY is a CHANGE, which bringing us from Ignorance to Knowledge, produces either LOVE or HATRED in those whom the Poet has a Design to make either Happy or Miserable.* That is, it ought not to be in vain, by leaving those who remember one another in the same Sentiments they were in before; it must produce either Love or Hatred in the principal, not inferior Characters. But those Discoveries which are immediately followed by the Change of Fortune, are the most beautiful; as that of Oedipus, for the Discovery of his being the Son of *Jocasta* and *Laius*, immediately makes him of the most happy, the most miserable. And this *Catastrophe* or ending, which has a Change of Fortune immediately after the Discovery, will always produce Terror and Pity in the End and Aim of Tragedy. We shall say something of the several Sorts of Discoveries, after the Manners, on which they have some Kind of Dependence.

*Reject that vulgar Error, which appears
So fair, of making perfect Characters,
There's no such Thing in Nature, and you'll draw
A faultless Monster, which the World ne'er saw:
Some Faults must be, which his Misfortunes drew,
But such as may deserve Compassion too.*

The next Thing which we are to consider, are the Characters. Those which are to compose a perfect Tragedy, must be neither perfectly virtuous and innocent, nor scandalously wicked. To make a perfectly virtuous and innocent Character unfortunate, excites

excites *Horror*, not *Terror*, nor *Compassion*. To punish the Wicked, gives indeed a sort of Satisfaction, but neither *Terror* nor *Pity*; which are the Business of *Tragedy*. For what we never think ourselves capable of committing, we can never pity. But the *Characters* of a perfect *Tragedy* should be the Medium between both, but rather good than bad. Thus the *Dramatic Person* should not draw his Misfortunes on himself by *superlative Wickedness*, or Crimes notoriously *scandalous*, but by involuntary Faults, that is, Frailties proceeding from the Excess of Passion. We call them *involuntary Faults*, which are committed either by Ignorance, or Imprudence against the natural Temper of the Man, when he is transported by a violent Passion, which he could not suppress; or by some greater or external Force, in the Execution of such Orders, which he neither could nor ought to disobey. The Fault of *Oedipus* is of the first Sort, tho' he be also guilty of the second. That of *Thyestes*, in the murdering his Nephews, of the second, viz. a violent Passion of Anger and Revenge. That of *Cressida*, in the killing of his Mother for the Death of his Father, of the third; being ordered to do it by the Oracle of the Gods. 'Tis true our *Oedipus* is made sovereignly virtuous; but all that *Sophocles* gives him, are *Courage*, *good Fortune*, and *Judgment*, Qualities equally common to the good and the bad, and to those who are made up of Virtues and Vices. *Sophocles* has indeed shewn him a Character that has a Mixture of Virtue and Vice. His Vices plainly are, *Pride*, *Violence*, *Anger*, *Rashness* and *Imprudence*; so that it is not for his Parricide and Incest that he is punished, for they were the Effect of his Curiosity, *Rashness*, *Pride*, *Anger*, and *Violence*, and the Punishment of them. And those are the Vices *Sophocles* would correct in us by his Example.

*Two sev'ral Ends the Fable may obtain,
 Either the Persons happy may remain,
 Or sink beneath the cruel Hand of Fate;
 Or else it may obtain a double State.
 Good for the Good, and Bad for those who err,
 The single and unhappy still prefer.*

The *Fable* may have either a single *End* or *Catastrophe*, or one that is *double*; one that is happy, or one that is unhappy; or one that is happy for the *Good*, and unhappy for the *Guilty*: But that which is best, is the single and unhappy, for that will most likely produce *Terror* and *Pity*.

*As Incidents the Fable do compose,
 So still we must consider most in Those
 Which Pity will, and Terror most disclose.
 All such Events 'twixt Friends are only found,
 From Others nothing Tragic can redound.
 When the Friend's Hand against a Friend is arm'd,
 We find our Hearts on either Side alarm'd.
 Thus when we see the Son's unhallow'd Knife
 With impious Rage assault a Parent's Life;
 When Ignorance or Rage the Parents move,
 To point the Steel against the Child they love,
 Fear and Compassion ev'ry Breast will prove.*

Terror and Compassion being the chief End of Tragedy, and that being only produced by the *Fable*, let us consider what Incidents (for such compose every *Fable*) are the most productive of those two Passions.

All *Incidents* are Events that happen between some-body or other; and all *Incidents* that are terrible, or pitiful, happen between Friends, Relations, or the like; for what happens betwixt Enemies, can have no Tragical Effect. Thus, when a *Brother* is going to kill (or kills) a *Brother*; a *Father*, his *Son*, or a *Son* his *Father*; the *Mother* the *Son*, or the *Son* the *Mother*; it is very terrible, and forces our Compassion. Now all these Actions or Events may be thus divided, into those which the Actor performs with an intire Knowledge of what he does, or is going to do; as *Medea*, when she kill'd her Children; or *Orestes*, when he kill'd his Mother, and the like: Or those, where the Actor does not know the Guilt of the Crime he commits, or is going to commit, till after the Deed is done, when the Relation of the Persons they have destroy'd is discover'd to them. Thus *Telgonus* did not know 'twas his Father *Ulysses* whom he mortally wounded, 'till he had done it. The third Sort of *Incidents*, and which is the most beautiful, is when a Man or Woman is going to kill a Relation, who is not known to him or her, and is prevented by a Discovery of their Friendship and Relation. The *first* is the worst, and the *last* best; the *second* next in Excellence to the *third*, because here is nothing flagitious, and inhuman, but the Sin of *Ignorance*; for then the Discovery is wonderfully pathetic and moving; as that of *Oedipus* killing his Father *Laius*.

*In Manners we four Qualities do see;
 They must good, like, convenient, equal be.
 The Manners fully mark'd, we here call good,
 When by their Words their Bent is understood;*

What

*What Resolutions they will surely take,
 What they will seek, and what they will forsake;
 LIKENESS to well-known Characters relates,
 For History or Quality abates.
 Convenient Manners we those ever call,
 Which to each Rank, Age, Sex, and Climate fall.
 Those Manners Poets always equal name,
 Which thro' the Drama always are the same.*

We come now to the *Manners*, which are in the next degree of Excellence to the *Fable*. The *Manners* distinguish the *Characters*; and if the *Manners* be ill expressed, we can never be acquainted with them, and consequently never be terrified by foreseeing the Dangers they will produce to the *Dramatic Persons*, nor melt into Pity by seeing their Sufferings. All *Dramatic Persons* therefore ought to have the *Manners*; that is, their Discourse ought to discover their Inclinations, and what Resolutions they will certainly pursue. The *Manners* therefore should have four Qualities, and they must be, (1.) *good*; (2.) *like*; (3.) *convenient*; (4.) *equal*. *Good* is when they are mark'd; that is, when the Discourse of the Persons makes us clearly and distinctly see their Inclinations, and what good or evil Resolutions they are certain to take. *Like* only relates to known and publick Persons, whose Characters are in History, with which our poetic Characters must agree; that is, the Poet must not give a Person any Quality contrary to any of those which History has given him. We must remember, that the evil Qualities given to Princes, and great Men, ought to be omitted by the Poet, if they are contrary to the Character of a Prince, &c. But the Vertues opposite to those known Vices ought not to be imposed, by making him generous or liberal in the Poem, who was avaritious in the History. The *Manners* must likewise be *convenient*; that is, they must be agreeable to the Age, Sex, Rank, Climate, and Condition of the Person that has them: For this you may look back to what is quoted out of my Lord Roscommon's Translation of *Horace*, in what we have said of Comedy. You must indeed study Mankind, and from them draw the Proprieties of Characters or Manners: It would be well if you studied *Moral Philosophy*, to lead you into the Study of Mankind.

They must be *equal*; that is, they must be constant, or consistent, through the whole Character; or the Variety of Inequality of the *Manners* (as in Nature, so in this Draught) must be *equal*. The *Fearful* must not be *brave*, not the *Brave* fearful:

fearful: The Avaritious must never be liberal, and the like. *Shakespear* is excellent in this Distinction of Characters, and he should be thoroughly studied on this Head.

*One Quality essential does remain,
By which the greatest Beauty they obtain.
The Manners must so regularly flow,
That to Necessity their Birth they owe.
No vicious Quality must be their Lot,
But what is needful to promote the Plot.*

Besides the four Qualities we have mentioned, there is a fifth essential to their Beauty, that is, that they be *necessary*: That is, that no vicious Quality or Inclination ought to be given to any Poetic Person, unless it appears to be absolutely necessary, or requisite to the carrying on of the Action; as all those mentioned in *Oedipus* were, to the promoting that Fable.

*Three sorts of Discoveries are found
In the Dramatic Poets to abound:
The first by certain Marks the Bus'ness do,
Whether from Chance or Nature they accrue;
As Scars, or Moles, that in the Body lie,
Or certain Tokens which those Marks supply.*

Having run through the Manners, I now return to the Discoveries, because (well manag'd) they add a wonderful Beauty to the Piece, tho' it is indeed a Beauty almost intirely unknown on our Stage. The *first* sort of *Discovery* is by certain Marks in the Body, either *natural* or *accidental*. Thus *Ulysses* having formerly, before the *Trojan* War, received a Wound in his Thigh, by a Boar, in the Mountain of *Parnassus*, when he returned *incognito* home, the Nurse who wash'd his Legs discovered him by the Scar of that Wound. Tho' these be the least beautiful Discoveries, yet they may be used with more or less Art: As that we have just mentioned of *Ulysses* was artful and fine; but when he is fain to shew it himself to the Shepherds, to confirm them that he is *Ulysses*, it is less artful.

The second Way is by *Tokens*; as, the Casket of Things which the Priest had found with *Ion*, when he was exposed, discovers *Creusa*, whom he was going to kill, to be his Mother. And *Orestes*, when he had found out *Iphigenia* by her Letter, which she was going to send to him by *Pylades*, is fain to tell particular Tokens in her Father's Palace, to make himself be believed to be *Orestes*. For these Tokens are no great matter

matter of Invention, since the *Poet* might have made them twenty other Ways.

*Third from Remembrance takes its pleasing Rise,
And forces the Discov'ry from the Eyes.
The fourth sort we in Reasoning do find,
Which brings the unknown Object to the Mind.
Thus when Orestes saw the fatal Knife
With impious Blow directed to his Life;
Thus to the Goddess in Despair did call,
Ah! must I then like Iphigenia fall?*

The third sort of Discovery is what is made by Remembrance; that is, when the Sight, or Hearing, of any thing makes us remember our Misfortunes, &c. Thus when *Ulysses* heard *Demodocus* sing his Actions at *Troy*, the Memory of them struck him, and drew Tears from his Eyes, which discovered him to *Alcinous*. The fourth sort of Discoveries are made by Reasoning; as *Iphigenia* in *Æschylus*, *Hither is a Man come like me; no body is like me but Orestes; it must therefore be Orestes*. And in the *Iphigenia* of *Polyides*, a Greek Poet, *Orestes* kneeling at the Altar, and just opening his Bosom to receive the sacred Knife, cries out, *'Tis not sufficient that my Sister has been sacrificed to Diana, but I must be so too*.

The finest sort is that which arises from the Subject, or Incidents of the Fable; as that of *Oedipus* from his excessive Curiosity, and the Letter that *Iphigenia* sent by *Pylades*; for it was very natural for her on that Occasion to send that Letter. We have been forced to make mention of Greek Plays, because we have not yet had any thing of this kind, but in those taken from those Poets; but our *Oedipus* and *Iphigenia* will shew this in some measure.

*The Sentiments here next assume their Place,
To which to give their just and proper Grace,
The Poet still must look within to find
The secret Turns of Nature in the Mind.
He must be sad, be proud, and in a Storm,
And to each Character his Mind conform:
The Proteus must all Shapes all Passions wear,
If he wou'd have just Sentiments appear;
Think not at all where shining Thoughts to place,
But what a Man wou'd say in such a Case.*

Having done with the Fable, Incidents and Manners, we come now to the Sentiments,

The *Poet* here must not be content to look into his Mind, to see what he himself would think on such an Occasion, but he must put himself into the Passion, Quality, and Temper of the Character he is to draw; that is, he must assume those *Manners* he gives each Dramatic Person, and then see what Sentiments or Thoughts such an Occasion, Passion, or the like, will produce. And the *Poet* must change the Habit of his Mind, and assume a new Person, as a different Character or Person speaks, or he will make all speak alike, without any Distinction of Character. But this can't be done, but by a strong Imagination, and great Genius.

We shall say no more of the *Sentiments* here, because they are to be learnt from the Art of *Rhetoric*; for the *Sentiments* being all that make up the Discourse, they consist in proving, refuting, exciting, and expressing the Passions, as *Pity*, *Anger*, *Fear*, and all the others, to raise or debase the Value of a Thing. The Reasons of *Poets* and *Orators* are the same, when they would make Things appear worthy of Pity, or terrible, or great, or probable; tho' some Things are render'd so by Art, and some by their own Nature.

*Wise Nature by Variety does please,
With diff'ring Passions in a diff'ring Dress:
Bold Anger in rough haughty Words appears,
Sorrow in humble, and dissolves in Tears.
Make not your Hecuba with Fury rage,
And shew a canting Spirit on the Stage:
There swoln Expressions, and affected Noise,
Shew like some Pedant that declaims to Boys.
In Sorrow you must softer Methods keep,
And, to excite our Tears, your self must weep.
Those noisy Words which in ill Plays are found,
Come not from Hearts that are in Sadness drown'd.
To please, you must a hundred Changes try;
Sometimes be humble, then must soar on high;
In nat'ral Thoughts must ev'ry-where abound,
Be easy, pleasant, solid, and profound.
To these you must surprizing Touches join,
And shew us a new Wonder in each Line.*

The *Diction*, or Language, is that which next comes under our Consideration; and tho' it is confessed, that it is of the least Importance of all those Parts, yet when the Elocution is proper and elegant, and varies as it ought, it gives a great, and advantageous Beauty to a Play; and therefore we will not pass it

it over in silence. Some have been betray'd by their Ignorance of Art and Nature, to imagine that *Milton's* Stile, because noble in the *Epic*, was best for *Tragedy*, never reflecting that he himself varied his Stile in his *Sampson Agonistes*. If you would therefore merit Praise, you must diversify your Stile incessantly; too equal and too uniform a Manner then is to no purpose, and inclines us to sleep. Rarely are those Authors read, who are born to plague us, and who appear always whining in the same ungrateful Tone. Happy the Man, who can so command his Voice, as to pass without Constraint from that which his *gave*, to that which is *moving*, and from that which is *pleasant*, to that which is *severe* and *solemn*. Every Passion has its proper Way of speaking, which a Man of *Genius* will easily derive from the very Nature of the Passion he writes. *Anger* is proud, and utters haughty Words, but speaks in Words less fierce and fiery when it abates. *Grief* is more humble, and speaks a Language like itself, *dejected*, *plain*, and *sorrowful*.

*Soliloquies had need be very few,
Extremely short, and spoke in Passion too,
Our Lovers talking to themselves, for want
Of others, make the Pit their Confidant.
Nor is the Matter mended yet, if thus
They trust a Friend only to tell it us.
Th' Occasion shou'd as naturllly fall,
As when Bellario confis's all.*

There is nothing more common in our *Plays*, tho' nothing so inartificial and unnatural, as the Persons making long Speeches to themselves, only to convey their Intentions and Actions to the Knowledge of the Audience: But the *Poet* should take Care to make the Dramatic Persons have such Confidants, as may necessarily share their inmost Thoughts, and then they would be more justly, and with more Nature, convey'd to the Audience. A lively Picture of the absurd Characters and Conduct of our *Plays*, take from the Duke of *Buckingham's Essay on Poetry*; which being in Verse may be got by Heart, and remembered, and so always about you, for the Test of any new Hero.

*First a Soliloquy is calmly made,
Where ev'ry Reason is exactly weigh'd;
Which once perform'd, most opportunely comes
A Hero frighted at the Noise of Drums,
For her sweet sake, whom at first Sight he loves,
And all in Metaphor his Passion proves.*

But

*But some sad Accident, tho' yet unknown,
 Parting this Pair, to leave the Swain alone;
 He strait grows jealous, yet we know not why,
 And, to oblige his Rival, needs will die :
 But first he makes a Speech, wherein he tells
 The absent Nymph how much his Flame excels;
 And yet bequeaths her generously now
 To that dear Rival, whom he does not know ;
 Who strait appears, (but, who can Fate withstand?)
 Too late, alas ! to hold his hasty Hand,
 That just has gi'v'n himself a cruel Stroke :
 At which this very Stranger's Heart is broke.
 He more to his new Friend than Mistress kind,
 Most sadly mourns at being left behind;
 Of such a Death prefers the pleasing Charms
 To Love, and living in his Lady's Arms.*

OF the EPIC or HEROIC POEM.

*An Epic Poem is a Discourse invented with Art, to form the
 Manners by Instructions, disguised under the Allegory of an Action
 which is important, and which is related in Verse in a delightful,
 probable, and wonderful Manner.*

That is, it is a *Fable* which consists of two Parts ; first of
Truth, its *Foundation*, and *Fiction* which disguises that *Truth*,
 and gives it the Form of a *Fable*. The *Truth* is the *Moral*,
 and the *Fiction* of the *Action* that is built upon it. Its *Importance*
 distinguishes it from the *Comedy*, and its *Relation* from the
Tragic Actions. The *Action* here, as in *Tragedy*, must be *one*,
 and all its *Episodes* or *Under-Actions* are to be dependent on the
main Action. It must be *intire*, that is, have a *Beginning*,
Middle and *End*. It must have the *Manners*, that is, the *Characters*
 must be distinguished, and *Manners* must be necessary,
 and have those *Qualities* inserted already in *Tragedy*. The
Incidents ought to be *delightful*, and to that *End* *various*, and
 rightly disposed and surprizing. The *Episodes* should be *pa-*
thetic. The *Sentiments* will fall under the same *Rules* as those
 of *Tragedy*, but the *Diction* is allow'd to be more lofty and
 more figurative, as being a *Narration*, and having *Admiration*,
 not *Terror* and *Pity*, for its *End*.

We need say no more of this Poem, the *Rules* at large
 would be too extensive for this *Treatise*, and but of little *Use* ;
 the Poem being not to be undertaken but by a *Master*, and by
 a *Genius* that does not appear once in a thousand Years.



R H E T O R I C ;

O R,

The Art of P E R S U A S I O N .

§. 1. **R**HETORIC is the Faculty of discovering what every Subject affords of Use to PERSUASION. And as every Author must invent or find out Arguments to make his Subject prevail, dispose those Arguments, thus found out, into their proper Places, range them in their just Order, and to the same End give them those Embellishments and Beauties of Language which are proper to each Subject; and, if his Discourse be to be deliver'd in Public, to utter them with that Decency and Force, which may strike the Hearer: So this *Art of Persuasion* is generally divided into four Parts, *Invention, Disposition, Elocution* or Language, and *Delivery* or Pronunciation.

§. 2. *Invention* is the finding out such Motives, Reasons or Arguments, as are adapted to *persuade*, or gain the *Assent* or *Belief* of the *Hearer* or *Reader*.

These Arguments may be divided into *artificial* and *inartificial*. The *former* are the proper Object of the *Invention* of him who writes; the *latter* the Author or Writer does not invent, but borrowing them from *Abroad*, applies and accommodates them to his Subject.

The *artificial* Arguments are of three Sorts, *Reasons* or *Argumentations*, the *Manners*, and the *Passions*. The first are to inform the *Hearer's* Judgment; the second, to ingratiate with him, or win his *Inclination* or *Favour*; the third, to *move*.

The *Student*, or *Writer*, is abundantly assisted in finding out these *Arguments*, *Reasonings* or *Argumentations*, by consulting such *Heads*, as contain, by general Consent, or the Rules of Art, such *Proofs* or *Evidences* under them.

Some

Some of these HEADS are *general*, others *particular*: The *general* contain those Propositions which are common to all *Subjects* or *Causes*; and these the Masters of this *Art* have agreed to be *two* in Number, under these two Titles; the first, *possible* or *impossible*; for whether we *persuade* or *dissuade*, *praise* or *dispraise*, *accuse* or *defend*, we must prove that the *Fact* or *Subject* has been, or is *possible* or *impossible* to be done.

The other Title is *great* or *small*, and to this all *Comparisons* relate; as when we shew, that *this* is more or less beneficial or pernicious, more useful or unuseful, more honourable or dishonourable, more just or equitable, unjust and illegal, than *that*.

Every *Subject* has, besides these *general Heads*, common to all, others *particular* to themselves, from whence all Arguments are drawn, which are *peculiar* to each *Subject* or *Cause*; and for that Reason vary according to the Variety of *that*.

All *Causes*, or *Subjects* of any Weight, are recommended to the *Reader* or *Hearer* in one of these three Ways, *viz.* either by *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*; *Praise* or *Dispraise*; *Accusation* or *Defence*. And indeed, a Man can scarce write on any *Subject* that requires or falls under Persuasion, but in a more or less important or extensive Degree falls under one of these *Heads*.

But these differ from each other, as in the *Parts*, and *Office* or *Duty*, as we have just seen; and in the *End* doubly. (1.) In regard of the *Thing* itself; (2.) and the *Hearer*. (1.) In regard of the *Thing*; for the *End* proposed by the *persuasive* or *dissuasive Discourse*, is *Profit*, *Advantage* or *Benefit*; by the *Praise* or *Dispraise*, *Honour*; and *Right* and *Equity*, by the *Accusation* or *Defence*. (2.) In regard of the *Hearer*, because the Object of him who writes in *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*, is *Hope* and *Fear*; in *Praise* and *Dispraise*, *Pleasure* and *Delight*; in *Accusation* and *Defence*, *Clemency* or *Severity*.

The first has to do with the *future*, or *Time to come*; the second most commonly with the *present*; and the third with the *past*. The *Hearers*, in the important *Subjects*, of each kind, may be consider'd thus: A *Man*, or *Men* of *Power* in a *State*, hear the *first*; *Men* of *Pleasure*, or such as are chiefly led by the *Ear*, the second; and a *Judge*, or *Senate*, the *last*.

§. 3. When the Design of our Discourses is to *persuade* or *dissuade*, we must consider the *Matter* or *Subject* of our Discourse, or the *Thing* we would render eligible or odious; and

those *Heads* from whence Motives, Reasons or Arguments are to be drawn, to bring about what we propose.

The *Subject*, or *Matter*, is whatever can be done, either in a public or private Capacity. Those Subjects which have regard to a *public Capacity*, have been divided into five *Heads*. (1.) *Funds, Revenues, and Pecuniary Matters*. (2.) *Peace or War*. (3.) *Garrisons or Forces*, which are the Defence of Countries. (4.) *Trade in Commodities*, exported or imported. And, (5.) the Proposal of *Laws* to be established or abrogated.

Private Subjects are whatever may be of Advantage or Detriment to *Particulars*.

The *Heads* from which Motives, Reasons or Arguments are to be drawn, under this Division of the Art of PERSUASION, are *six*. The chief and most peculiar to this, is the *profitable* or *beneficial*. It farther borrows from the next *Kind*, the *honourable*; and from *Accusation* and *Defence*, the *rightful* or *legal*; and from the *common* or *general Heads*, the *possible*; and frames from all these a Judgment or Conjecture of the *Event*.

§. 4. We come now to *Praise* or *Dispraise*: And this sort of Discourse is threefold; the first of *Persons* real or imaginary; the second of *Facts* or *Deeds*; and the third of *Things*.

In the *Praise* or *Dispraise* of *real Persons*, the Order is either *natural* or *artificial*.

The *artificial* is, when, without regard to Time, we refer what we say to certain *Heads*; as the *Goods* of *Mind*, of *Body*, or *Fortune*.

But the *natural Method* is, when we strictly confine ourselves to the Observation of the Order of History. And this is divided into *three Times*. (1.) That which preceded the Birth of the *Person*, who is the Subject of our *Praise* or *Dispraise*. (2.) The Time of his Life; and, (3.) What follows, his Death.

In the first *Time*, we must consider the *Prognostics*, *Omens*, *Prophecies*, and the like, if any such there were, and his *Family* and *Country*; from which arises a twofold Praise: For if these were really illustrious, we say, that such a Person has come up to the ancient Honour of his *Country* and *Family*; or has done Deeds worthy such a *Country*, and such a *Family*. On the contrary, if his *Country* or *Family*, or both, were obscure, we must shew, that he has ennobled and raised the Obscurity of both, by his own proper *Virtues* and *Worth*.

In the next *Time*, which is that of his Life, we have four Things to consider ; first, The Nature of his *Body*, as *Health, Robustness, Activity, Beauty* ; and of his *Mind*, as *Wit, Capacity, Judgment, Memory, &c.* The second is his *Fortune* or *Riches*. The third his *Education, Institution, and Conduct* of Life. The fourth his *Actions*, and their *Circumstances* and *Rewards*.

In the last place, comes the *Manner* and *Kind* of his Death, the *Funeral Pomp*, and the like ; chiefly the Loss, and the Grief that attended that Loss ; to which may be subjoined a *Consolation* for it. This is the Praise of the *Person*, let it be of an *Alexander*, a *Marlborough*, a *Peterborough*, or the like. From hence we may easily gather the Praise of what we call an *imaginary Person*, as of *Bucephalus*, or the like ; but this is of little use, except a Sport of Fancy.

When we undertake to praise Deeds or Actions, we are to make use of those *Heads* of Arguments which are recurr'd to in the former Divisions ; since we praise that here, which we would recommend or persuade in the other.

There are here eight *Heads*, from which we draw Materials of amplifying and setting off the Subject ; for to the Praise of *Deeds* or *Actions*, it very much imports, that the *Subject* of our Praise did it either *first, singly or alone*, or with *few*, or *chiefly*, or *principally*, or at a necessary *Exgence* of *Time, Place, or Juncture* of *Affairs*, or *often* : Or that the *Action* has a great *Regard* to the *Benefit, Reputation, and Glory* of his Country ; or that he, first of all Men, gained his Country new or fresh *Honours, Dignity, Power, &c.*

When Things are the Subject of our Praise, the Method is not the same in all : For in the *Praise* of *Countries, Cities*, and the like, we pursue very near the same Method, as in that of *Persons* ; for that which in *Men* is *Country* and *Family*, is in *Places* the *Founders*, and the *Princes* who have there governed ; that which in the former is *Beauty* of *Body*, is in these the *Situation* : What in *those* is the *Virtue* of the *Mind*, is the *Fertility, Wholesomeness, wise Laws, &c.*

But in the Praise of *other Things*, as of *Arts* and *Sciences*, we have recourse to the same *Heads* of Argument as in the Praise of *Actions*. The *Honourableness* is shewn in the efficient or productive Causes and Antiquity ; and the *Utility* or *Benefit* from the *Effect* and *Aim*.

§. 5. The last kind or sort of Subject of RHETORIC, is that which *accuses* or *defends*, and the *Heads* of Arguments or Proofs in this vary according to the Variety of the State

of the Cause, which is the Subject of our *Accusation* or *Defence*.

There are four *States*; the first inquires *whether it be so or not*; the second, *what it is*; the third, *its Nature*; the fourth, *its Magnitude*, or *how great any Crime is*.

Every Speech, or Oration of this kind, has one or more of these *States*. If there be more than *One*, they must either be of the same Kind, as if they all inquire *whether it be or not*; or they must be of several Sorts; as, one of the first, and another of the second.

§. 6. There are three *Heads* of Argument which we consult for Proofs in the first *State*, which we may call the *State of Guess* or *Presumption*, viz. The *Will*, the *Power*, and *Signs* or *Tokens*.

The *Will* contains the *Motives* and *Reasoning*. The *Motives* contain the *Affections* or *Passions*, which are urged as the *efficient Cause*. The *Reasoning* is drawn from the *final Causes*; as from the Hope of Advantage and the like: And to the *Power of Faculty*, the Strength of Body, the Inclinations of the Mind, Riches, Capacity, Time, Place, the Prospect or Hopes of concealing the Fact, when committed, relate. Some of the *Signs* or *Tokens* precede; some attend, and some follow the Fact.

§. 7. In the *State*, which inquires by *what Name* the Fact is to be called, we must endeavour to confirm and make out our own *Definition* of it, and confute that of the Adversary. As when the *Accused* shall acknowledge that he had *taken* such Goods from such a Place, but not *stole* them; that he *struck* such a Person indeed, but made no *Affault* and *Battery*. Or should he confess the Robbery, but deny the *Sacrilege*, and the like; in all such Cases the Nature of the Fact must be defined, and the Adversary confuted on that Head by a Confirmation of your own *Definition*.

§. 8. The *State* which inquires into the *Nature of the Fact*, *Crime* or *Cause*, is twofold; the first treats of *what is to come*, and is therefore proper to *Persuasion* or *Disuasion*. The latter of what is already done, and is therefore agreeable to Courts of *Judicature*, or *Accusation* and *Defence*. That which is properly *juridical*, has its Place either in *Judgment*, or before it; we divide the first into *Rational* and *Legal*: The *Rational* relates to the Fact, the *Legal* to the Sense of the Laws, Statutes, or written Authorities.

The *Rational* is divided into the *Absolute* and *Assumptive*. The *Absolute* plainly and simply defends the *Fact*; as when we allow it *done*, and assert it *laudably done*. The *Assumptive* is when the Defence in itself is weak, but is supported

or

or assisted by something Foreign, or out of the Cause assumed. And this is done four Ways, by *Comparison*, *Relation*, *Removing* and *Concession*. *Comparison* is when we shew, that there was a Necessity of doing *One* of two Things; and that what was done was juster, and more justifiably eligible than the *Other* would have been. *Relation* is when we throw the Fault on the very Person who has received the Injury. The *Removing* is, when we throw the Fault on some other Person than he who has received the Injury, or on a Thing that cannot come before the Court, as not falling under its Jurisdiction, as on the Law.

Concession is usually divided into *Purgation* and *Deprecation*. *Purgation* is when we defend not the *Fact*, but the *Will* or *Intention*; as when the Guilt or Fault is thrown on *Necessity*, *Fortune*, *Ignorance*, or *Inadvertence*.

Deprecation is when we acknowledge the Fault, or plead Guilty, and fly to *Pity* and *Mercy*.

§. 9. There are four *States* which inquire into the Nature of the Crime, or what it is. The first is of the *written Letter*, and the *Opinion* or *Intention*; as, when the *Writing* is one Thing, and the *Intention* of the Writer another; and one insists on the *Letter*, and the other on the *Intention* of the Writer. Here *Equity* and the *Rigour* of the Law contend.

The next is *Reasoning*, when from what is written, we gather another Thing that is *not* written, because founded on the same Reason.

The third is the *Contradiction of the Law*; that is, when the Law is either contrary to itself, or to some other Laws.

The fourth is the *Ambiguity of the Discourse*; which arises either from the Change of the Tone or Accent, or from the Division of the Diction; or the various Significations of the Words. To this we may add a Species of it, the examining the Force of the Word, which differs from the former *State*, which inquires into the Nature of the *Fact* or *Crime*, to see what Name is its due. We may here farther consider Exceptions to the Court itself: First, the *Person*; as when he acts who ought not to act, or with him with whom he ought not. Secondly, the *Place*; as when the Action is brought in a wrong Court. Thirdly, to the *Time*; as when we say, we could formerly have accused one whom we cannot at *this Time*. And, Fourthly, to the *Thing*; as when we deny that the *Indictment* can be grounded on this Law, or requires such a Punishment for such a Crime.

§ 10. The *State*, which inquires into the *Magnitude* or *Greatness* of the Crime, examines and informs us what are the *greatest* and most *heinous* Injuries, and which are the *least*. They are shewn to be *great*, either because done on very slight *Grounds* or *Provocations*; or, because they have drawn on in their Consequences very great Damages; or because he who received the Injury, was a Man of great Merit; or because the *Accused* was the first who did commit it, or the *only*; or *with a few*; or *often*; or on *Purpose*; or on many other Causes.

§. 11. Having thus cursorily run over the *Artificial Arguments*, we come now to those which are call'd *Inartificial*; which are such as are not deriv'd from this *Art of Persuasion*, but being pressed in from abroad, are, however, *artificially* treated of: And these in the Accusation and Defence, are five. (1.) The *Laws*. (2.) *Witnesses*. (3.) *Contracts* or *Agreements*. (4.) *Questions*. (5.) *Oaths*. From all which, according to the Nature of the Cause, there are different Ways of arguing.

§. 12. We come now to the other Part of *Rhetorical Invention*, and that treats of the *Passions*. The *Passions* are *Commutations of the Mind*, by means of which those who are moved, judge differently from those who are not; and this is attended either with *Pleasure* or *Pain*.

We must necessarily know three Things, to be able to move the *Passions*. — *Who*, and *to whom*, and *for what Causes* or *Reasons* Men are used to be moved by this, or that *Passion*.

§. 13. *Anger* is a certain *Desire of Revenge*, accompany'd with *Pain* which we seem to ourselves able to execute, caus'd by a disagreeable *Contempt of ourselves*, or of ours.

But this *Contempt* is of three Sorts: *Despising*, *Incommoding*, and *Contumelious*. The first is a meer simple *despising*; the Others require that One oppose Another, not to advantage himself, but merely to oppose the Other. And *incommoding* is in Design, or by depriving him of, or hindering his Advantage; but the End of *Contumelies* is *Shame* and *Ignominy*.

§. 14. The Opposite of *Anger* is *Lenity*, which is the *Ceasing*, or *Remission of Anger*.

§. 15. *Love* is a *Passion* by which we wish heartily well to some One, and would do all the Good we could to that One, not for our own sake, but for his, or hers.

§. 16. *Hatred* and *Enmity* are oppos'd to *Love* and *Friendship*: But these differ from *Anger* in many Particulars. We are *angry* on account of Things which relate to ourselves; but we *hate* without any Regard to our own Affairs, Interest or Advantage: *Anger* is directed to *Particulars*; but *Hatred* rages against

against *whole Kinds* ; *Anger* is a short-liv'd Fury, but *Hatred* and *Enmity* are lasting. He that is *angry*, endeavours to give Pain to the Person with whom he is *angry* ; for he would have *him* feel Evil, on *whom* he wreaks his *Revenge*, He that *hates*, studies to bring Damage or Ruin ; but is not in Pain whether his Enemy feel it, or not.

§. 17. *Fear* is a certain Pain and Trouble of Mind, arising from the Imagination of some impending Evil, which may either be attended with Destruction, or Inconvenience, or Trouble.

§. 18. *Boldness*, or *Confidence*, is opposite to *Fear* ; it is a Hope join'd with an Imagination of Advantages, as if they were near, and all Things and Persons, that might strike us with Fear, being far remov'd, or not at all in Being.

§. 19. *Shame* is a Sort of Grief, Pain, or Trouble arising from an Opinion of *Infamy*, when the *Evils* are either *present*, or *past*, or *imminent*. And *Impudence* is that by which we despise such Things, and receive no Trouble from them.

§. 20. *Favour* is that, by which any one is said to do a *Favour* or *Grace* to any one, who wants it ; not for any Prospect whatever, or that he may get any Thing by it, but that he whom he relieves, may receive a Benefit. *Favour* is amplified or enlarged three Ways ; from the Person who bestows the *Favour*, from the Person to whom it is done, and from the Thing or Gift itself. And the same is lessened three Ways ; first, from the *Effects* ; secondly, from the *Gift* itself, and its *Qualities* ; and, thirdly, from the Tokens and Signs of a Mind not truly benevolent.

§. 21. That *Pity*, which we here only define, is the Pain of *Good Men*, from the Opinion of an Evil that may bring Destruction or Trouble to one that does not deserve it ; and such as any one may think may befall himself or his, and that seems to be impending over him, or coming upon him.

§. 22. *Indignation* is a Pain or Trouble for another's *Success* or *Happiness*, who does not seem to deserve it.

In this it differs from *Pity* ; *that* proceeding from the Sight of the *ill Fortune* of the *Good*, *this* from the *good Fortune* of the *Bad*.

§. 23. *Envy* is a Pain or Grief on account of real Honours or Benefits another enjoys, or which we can't obtain, existing between those who are alike in Temper or Nature ; not that another has them, but that we have them not.

It is contrary to *Contempt*, with which any one is affected against those, in whom he sees not those *Goods* or *Advantages*,

ages, which either he has himself obtain'd, or endeavours to attain.

§. 24. Having thus gone thro' a succinct Account of the Passions, we come to the *Third Part of Invention*, which considers the *Manners*. That *Discourse* therefore, or *Speech*, in which the *Manners* are well mark'd, we call *Moral*; for it discovers the *Habits of the Mind*, and the *Will or Inclination*. In this are seen *Convenience* and *Probity*.

The *Manners* regard either the *Person himself* who speaks, the *Audience* to whom he speaks, or the *whole City or Nation* in which he delivers his *Discourse*.

The *Manners*, which ought to be conspicuous in the *Speaker*, are threefold; *Prudence*, *Probity* and *Benevolence*.

The *Manners* of the *Nation* are known by the Form of the Government: *Liberty* is in a *Democracy*; the *Discipline of the Laws* in an *Aristocracy*; *pompous Wealth* in an *Oligarchy*; *Guards and Arms* in a *Monarchy*.

The *Manners*, in regard of the *Audience*, vary four several ways, according to their fourfold Distinction. 1st, When they differ in the *Passions*, as in *Anger*, *Lenity*, *Fear*, *Pity*, &c. 2^{dly}, When they differ in the *Habits*, as in *Virtues*, or *Vices*. 3^{dly}, In *Years or Age*, which is threefold, *Youth*, *Man's-estate*, *Old-age*. 4^{thly}, In *Fortune*, by which they are either noble or ignoble, powerful or without Power, rich or poor, fortunate or unhappy.

§. 25. Besides these *Seats or Heads of Arguments*, which are peculiar to each *Kind of Cause*, we must have recourse to those which are common to *All*; and those, as we have before observ'd, are two; *Possible* and *Impossible*, *Great* and *Small*, or of *Importance*, and of little *Consequence*.

We must consider the *Head of Possible* and *Impossible* three several ways — for we must shew a Thing *done* or *not done*, that *can* be done, or *cannot* be done; or that *will* be done, or *will not* be done.

Done or *not done* is the Subject of our Proof most in that Kind where we *accuse* or *defend*; but in *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion* our Business is chiefly to prove, whether it *can* or *cannot*, or *will not* be done.

The *Important* or *Great*, and *Small* and of little *Consequence*, belong chiefly to *Praise* and *Dispraise*.

§. 26. Having given the foregoing Rules for the *Invention of Arguments*, we naturally now proceed to deliver the Method of disposing or marshalling the whole in their proper Places and Order; for *Disposition*, the second Division of this

Art, is a proper placing, or ranging of the several Parts of the *Speech* or *Discourse*. These Parts are four in number, the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the *Discourse*, the *Proposition*, the *Proof*, and the *Conclusion*. Others make six Parts; as the *Beginning*, *Narration*, *Proposition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation* and *Conclusion*: Of which the first is to *ingratiate* with the *Hearers*, the last to *move* them, and the middle to *inform* them.

The Order of these is either *Natural* or *Artificial*. We call that *Natural*, when the Parts are disposed in the Order we have laid down.

The *Artificial* is, when the Nature of the Cause requires us to depart from this *Natural Order*.

§. 27. In the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the *Discourse* we set forth the Aim and Scope of what we have to say; and the Minds of the *Hearers* are prepared for the rest that is to come.

The Method of all *Beginnings* is not the same, but vary according to the Quality of the Cause.

For that is either *honourable* or *dishonourable*, *doubtful* or *mean*, *plain* or *clear*, or *obscure*.

In an *honourable Cause* the *Good-will*, *Attention*, and *Docility* of the *Hearers* are prepared plainly, and without disguise or *Insinuation*.

In a Cause that is *dishonourable*, we must take care to *insinuate* into the *Hearers* Minds, and subtilly prepare them to give us a Hearing: And this *Beginning* they call *Insinuation*. But this kind of Beginning is sometimes made use of in an *honourable Cause*, and that when the *Hearers* are either *tired* with hearing, or *prepossess'd* by the *Discourse* of him who spoke first.

In the *dubious* or *doubtful* we make use of a Beginning drawn from the Nature of the Cause itself; that is, from that Face of it which is *honourable*.

In a *low* or *mean Cause* we must endeavour to raise *Attention*; and in an *obscure Cause*, a *Willingness* or *Desire* to be informed.

The Method of *Beginnings* is not the same in the three sorts of Subjects, on which we may speak: For in *Praise* and *Dispraise* it must be taken from the five *Heads* or Arguments proper to that; from the *Praise* or *Dispraise*; from *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*; and from those Things which relate to the *Hearers*.

In *Accusation* and *Defence* there are four *Heads*, from which the Beginning is taken: For the Mind of the *Hearer* is prepar'd, as it were, by certain Medicines, taken either from the *Speaker* himself, or from the *Accused*; or from the *Hearer*; or from the *Accuser*; or from the *Things*.

They are taken from the *Accused*, or the *Adversary*, by objecting or disproving a Crime; from the *Hearer*, by rendering him our *Friend*, or *angry*, *attentive*, or *not attentive*, or *willing* to be inform'd: Lastly, from the *Thing*, by declaring its *Nature*.

§. 28. The *Narration* is a Recital of the Things done, or that seem to be done, adapted to *Persuasion*.

This we make use of in *Accusation* and *Defence* when we do not agree with the *Adversary* about the Manner of the *Fact*: But when we *persuade* or *dissuade*, there is seldom any Occasion for this Part; nor is there any in *Praise* or *Dispraise*, but what has its place in the *Confirmation*.

The *Narration* ought to be *perspicuous*, that it may be understood; *likely* or *probable*, that it may be believ'd; distinguish'd by the *Manners*, that it may be heard with the greater *Willingness*: But to be so, it ought to express those Things which relate to the Proof of our own *Virtue*, and the *Improbability* of the *Adversary*.

Care must likewise be taken, that what is said may be pleasing to the Judges; and it ought, besides all this, to move the *Passions*.

This Part does not always follow the Beginning, but is sometimes deferr'd to another place, and must always be shorter for the Defendant than Plaintiff. We sometimes support the *Narration*, by giving it on the Credit of others, which promotes Security. Sometimes we make use of *Asseverations*, which still procure Belief much stronger; and sometimes we make use of *both*.

§. 29. The *Narration* being over, we propose the *State* of the *Speech* or *Discourse*; and divide the Cause into certain Parts, if it consist of many *States*.

This Division is made either by *Separation* or *Enumeration*.

In the *Separation* we lay open in what we agree with our Adversary, and what is yet remaining in *Controversy*.

In the *Enumeration* we sum up the several Heads, and Kinds of Things, of which we are about to speak.

The *Beauty* of the *Partition* or *Division* is, that it be *full* and *perfect*; *plain* and *perspicuous*; *short* and *certain*; containing not more than three, or at most more than four Parts.

§. 30. The

§. 30. The *Confirmation*, and *Confutation*, are sometimes plac'd under the *Head* or *Title* of the *Contention*. The first confirms our own Cause by Arguments ; the last destroys or confutes those of the Adversary. We must in the *Confirmation* have Regard to the Disposition, as well of the Arguments, as Reasoning or Argumentation.

The strongest Arguments are to be plac'd in the Front or Beginning ; when the *Hearers* being fir'd by the *Narration*, are desirous to know what we have to offer for the Proof or Defence of our Cause. And we must take care to place a Part of the most forcible Arguments at the end, because what we hear last makes the strongest Impression : But those Arguments which carry the least Weight, are to be rang'd in the middle, that those which by their Weight may be inconsiderable, may, by their Number, seem of Importance.

Farther, ——— If the Strength our Cause depend on an Argument that is alien to it, we must introduce it in such a manner, as may make it appear to be proper to the Cause ; but we must shew, that what is offer'd by our Adversaries is indeed foreign to it.

But we must take heed that we do not throng our Arguments, for when the Passions are mov'd, *Sentences* are more taken notice of than *Arguments*.

If the End and Aim of the *Argumentation*, or *Reasoning*, be more to *move* than *inform*, it is call'd *Amplification*, or *Enlarging*. And since this is employ'd partly in lengthening or drawing out the *Speech*, and partly in exaggerating the *Matter* ; the latter is the Chief or Principal in this Place : And this is done by *Argumentation*, *Comparison*, *Reasoning* on the Magnitude or Quantity of the *Things* or *Guilt*, &c.

The *Confutation* is not always made in the same manner ; sometimes we shew, that *Falshoods* are taken for *Truths* ; sometimes allowing the Premisses, we deny the Consequence drawn from them ; sometimes against a firm and strong Argumentation we oppose another, at least of equal, or, if we can, of a superior Force and Energy ; sometimes we debase a Thing, and laugh at the Arguments of the *Adversary*.

But in *General*, we first attack the most firm and valid of the Adversary's Arguments ; that having destroy'd them, the rest may fall of course.

§. 31. The *Conclusion* has two Parts : the *Enumeration*, or *Recapitulation*, and the *Passions*.

The *Enumeration* repeats the *principal* Arguments. But this is seldom made use of in *Praise* or *Dispraise* ; more often in such

such Speeches, or Discourses which are directed to *Persuade* or *Dissuade*, but most commonly in *Accusation* and *Defence*; and there the *Plaintiff* makes more use of it than the *Defendant*. We make the chief use of this when we are apprehensive, that the *Hearers* may (by reason of the length of the Speech) not so well remember them, or their Force; and when the heaping together of Arguments may add Weight to the Discourse.

The *Passions* ought to be *here* more strong and vehement. There are two Virtues of a Conclusion, *Brevity* and *Vehemence*.

§. 32. Before we proceed to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, we shall here add some other *Common Heads*, or *Places* whence the Artists use to draw Arguments.

The first of these is the *General*, or *Kind*; that is to say, we must consider in every Subject, what it has in common with all other Subjects of the same *Kind* or *Nature*. If we speak of the War with *France*, we may consider *War* in general, and draw our Arguments from that *Generality*.

The second *Head*, or *Place*, is called *Difference*; by which we consider whatever in it is peculiar to the *Question* or *Cause*.

The third is *Definition*; that is to say, we must consider the whole Nature of the Subject. The Discourse, which expresses the Nature of a Thing, is the *Definition* of that Thing.

The fourth is the *Enumeration of the Parts* contain'd in the Subject of which we speak.

The fifth is the *Derivation* of the Name of the Subject.

The Sixth, *What are deriv'd from the same Head*, or *Service*, which are the Names that have Connexion with the Name of our Subject; as the Word *Love* has Connexion with these other Words—to love, loving, *Friendship*, lovely, *Friend*, &c.

We may likewise consider the *Likeness*, or *Unlikeness* in the Things of which we treat; and these make the seventh and eighth *Place*, or *common Heads*.

We may likewise make *Comparison*, and in our Comparison introduce every thing to which our Subject is oppos'd; and this *Comparison* and *Opposition*, are the ninth and tenth *Places*, or *Heads* of Arguments.

The eleventh is *Repugnance*, i. e. In discoursing upon a Subject, we must have an Eye upon those Things that are repugnant to it, to discover the Proofs, with which that Prospect may furnish us.

'Tis of Importance to consider all the *Circumstances* of the Matter Propos'd; but these Circumstances have either *preceded*, or *accompany'd*, or *follow'd* the Things in Quest on. So these *Circumstances* make the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth

Places,

Places. All the Circumstances that can accompany an Action, are comprehended in these Words; *who? what? where? with what Help or Assistance, or Means? why? how? and when?* That is to say, we must examine *who is the Author of the Action? what the Action is? where it was done? by what Means? for what End? how? and when?*

The fifteenth *Place* is the *Effect*; and the sixteenth is the *Cause*: i. e. we must have regard to the *Effect*; of which the Thing in Dispute may be the *Cause*; and to the Things of which it may be the *Effect*.

§. 33. We come now to what we call *Elocution*, or the *Language* or *Diſtion* in which proper *Words* are adapted to the just Expression of the Things which we have invented. It consists of *Elegance*, *Composition*, and *Dignity*: The first is the Foundation of this Structure; the second joins, or ranges the Words in such a manner, that the Speaker may rise with Equality; the last adds the Ornaments of Tropes and Figures, to give Importance and Solemnity to what is said.

Elegance comprehends the *Purity* of the *Language*, and the *Perspiciuity*: In the Choice of Words we must have peculiar Regard to their *Purity*; that is, we must take care that they be *genuine*, that is, free of our Tongue, not Foreign; that they be not obsolete, or quite out of Use; for both these will not only affect the *Perspiciuity* of what you deliver, but discover either Rusticity, or great Affectation, and often give an uncouth and rough Cadence to your Sentences, which a good Style refuses; and Care must be taken to avoid vulgar and low Words, (the Language of the Mob.) This robs what you say of that Dignity you should aim at. Sir Roger L'Eſtrange, and some of our Divines too, have been guilty in Subjects of Importance and Majesty. But as you must not affect too great Brevity on one side, so on the other, you must not aspire to too great a Loftiness; both being Enemies to that *Perspiciuity*, which must always be your particular Care.

Elegance is gain'd by reading the best, or most polite Authors, by keeping the best Company, and by Practice; Use in all Things being the best Instructor.

Composition is the apt and proper Order of the Parts adhering to each other: and this teaches partly Things that are common to Speakers in *public*, *Historians* and *Poets*, and partly those Things which are peculiar to a *public Speaker*.

The first *Composition* regards as well the artificial joining of the *Letters*, by which the Style is render'd *soft* and *smooth*, *gentle* and *flowing*; or *full* and *sonorous*, or the contrary of all these;

these ; as the *Order*, which requires, that we place the Grave after the Humble or Low ; and that we set that which is of greater Dignity, and first in Nature, before that which is less and of more inferior Consideration.

Composition relates to the *Period*, but having treated at the End of GRAMMAR on that Head, and forgot to put it in its right Place in this Edition, we shall refer you to that.

Dignity produces a figurative Manner of Speaking, both in the *Words*, and in *Sentences* ; those which affect *Words alone*, have been so long call'd *Tropes*, that the Word is known almost to the very *Fishwives*. Those which affect *Sentences* have been as long, and generally known to be called *Figures*.

§. 34. We shall begin the *Tropes* with *Transmutation*, or the Exchange of one Name for another ; as if we say, Peterborough conquer'd Spain ; every one reads Milton ; London is in an Uproar. 'Tis plain we mean, that Peterborough's Army conquer'd Spain, or he with the help of his Army ; every one reads Milton's Works ; the People of London are in an Uproar. The Relation is so strong betwixt a General and his Army, an Author and his Works, a Town and its Inhabitants, that the Thought of one excites the Idea of the other, and so changing of Names produces no Confusion.

The next is *Comprehension*. This is something related to the former ; for by this we put the Name of a *Whole* for a *Part* ; as if we should say *England* for *London* or *London* for *England* ; as, the *Plague* is in *England*, when only in *London*. Thus by this *Trope* we have the Liberty of quitting the Name of a *Part* for the *Whole*, and that of the *Whole* for a *Part* ; and to this we may likewise refer the Use of a certain Number for an uncertain Number ; as *an Hundred Avenues* to the *House* convey, when there may be more or less ; *an Hundred Years* old, when he may want some Months, or perhaps Years.

Exchange of Names is another *Trope*, and akin likewise to the first call'd *Transmutation* ; for by this we apply a Name proper to one, to several, and common Names to particular Persons ; as when we call a luxurious Prince a *Sardanapalus*, or a cruel one a *Nero*. On the contrary, when for *Cicero*, we say the *Orator* ; or for *Aristotle*, the *Philosopher* ; for *Virgil*, the *Poet* ; and the like.

Metaphor is so well known a Word in our Tongue now, that we scarce have need to explain it by *Translation*. It is a *Trope*, by which we put a strange and remote Word for a proper Word, by reason of its Resemblance with the Thing of which

which we speak. Thus we call the King the Head of his Kingdom ; because as the Head commands the Members of the Natural, so the King commands the Members of the Political Body. Thus we say, the Vallies smile, or laugh upon us ; because there is a Similitude between the agreeable Appearance of one and the other.

Allegory is the joining of several *Metaphors* together, and so extends to several Words ; 'tis likewise call'd *Inversion*. But great Care must then be taken in an *Allegory*, that it ends as it begins ; that the *Metaphors* be continued, and the same Things made use of to the last, from whence we borrow our first Expressions. The famous Speech of our celebrated *Shakespear* is extremely faulty in this Particular.

*To be, or not to be, that is the Question ;
Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to suffer
The Slings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune,
Or to take Arms against a Sea of Troubles,
And by opposing end them ?*

Here the Poet begins the *Allegory* with *Slings and Arrows*, and ends it in a *Sea*, besides the taking Arms against a Sea.

When these *Allegories* are obscure, and the natural Sense of the Words not obvious, they are call'd *Enigma's*, or *Riddles*.

Diminution, or *Lessening*, is the next *Trope*, and by this we speak less than we think ; as when we say, *You are not indeed to be commended*, it implies a secret Reproach, or Reprehension.

Hyperbole, or *Excess*, represents Things greater or less than really they are ; as, *This Horse is swifter than the Wind ; he goes slower than a Tortoise*.

By *Irony*, we speak contrary to our Thoughts, but 'tis discover'd by the Tone of our Voice ; as when we say, *Robert is a very honest Man*, when we mean a *Rogue*.

By the *Trope*, call'd *Abuse*, we may borrow the Name of a Thing, tho' quite contrary to what we would signify, because we can't else express it ; as when we say, an *Iron Candlestick*, or a *Silver Inkborn*.

These are the most considerable *Tropes*, and to one or other of these all others may be reduced. But before we dismiss this Point, we must give a few Rules to be observ'd in the Use of them. First, therefore, we must use *Tropes* only where we cannot express ourselves perfectly without them ; and, secondly, when we are obliged to use them, they must have

two Qualities; (1st), They must be clear, and contribute to the Understanding of what we intend; (2^{dly}), That they hold a Proportion to the Idea we would paint to our *Readers* or *Hearers*.

A *Trope* loses its Perspicuity three Ways; (1.) When 'tis too *remote*, not helping the Hearer to the Intention of the Speaker; as to call a *lewd House* the *Syrtes of Youth*; the *Rock of Youth* is nearer and more obvious; the former requiring our Knowledge and Remembrance, that the *Syrtes* were dangerous Banks of Sand on the Coast of *Africa*. A *Metaphor* is therefore best taken from such sensible Objects as are most familiar to the Eye, which Images are apprehended without Inquiry or Trouble. The ill Connexion of these is the *second* Thing that brings Obscurity on the *Metaphor*, by using Words which are not commonly known, but relate to Places, perhaps at the farthest Parts of the Globe, from Terms of Art, Antiquities, or the like, which ought to be avoided. This *Connexion* is either *Natural* or *Artificial*. That we call *Natural*, when Things signify'd by their Proper and Metaphorical Names have Natural Resemblance to or Dependence on each other; as when we say, *A Man has Arms of Brass*, to signify their Strength, this Resemblance between the *Trope* and Proper Name we may call *Natural*. The *Artificial* comes from *Custom*; a wild untractable Temper has by *Custom* been given to the *Arab*, which makes the Name *Arab* awake the Idea of an untractable Man.

The *third* Thing which renders *Tropes* obscure, is a too frequent Use of them. Lastly, *Tropes* must always be proportion'd to the Ideas they would give.

§. 35. Having said all that we thought necessary about the *Tropes*, their Nature, Virtues, Vices and Use, we now come to the Language of the *Passions*; which is of peculiar Use both as well in *Oratory* as *Poetry*, both which make use of them in a particular Manner.

We shall begin with the *Exclamation*, because by that our *Passions* first fly out, and discover themselves in Discourse. *Exclamation*, therefore, is a violent Extension of the Voice; as, *O Heavens! O Earth! good God! alas!* and the like.

Doubling is the next, or *Irrresolution*, is the Effect of Passion, as, *What shall I do? shall I appear to those I once neglected? or, shall I implore those who now forsake me? &c.*

Correction is a Figure by which one in Passion, fearing he has not expressed himself full enough, endeavours by a stronger Phrase to correct that Error; as, *Nor was thy Mother a Goddess.*

deff.

deſs, nor, perfidious Man! was Dardanus the Author of thy Race, but rugged rocky Caucasus brought thee forth, and the Hyrcanian Tygreſs nurs'd thee up.

Omiſſion, in a violent Paſſion, permits us not to ſay all that we would. When our Paſſions are interrupted, or directed another Way, the Tongue following them, produces Words that have no Reference to what we were ſaying before; as, *of all Men*,—meaning, *the worſt of all Men*.

Suppreſſion, is a ſudden Suppreſſion of the Paſſion, or rather the Threats of a Paſſion; as — *which I—but now we muſt think of the preſent Matter*.

Conceſſion ſeems to omit what we ſay; as, *I will not ſpeak of the Injury you have done me; I am willing to forget the Wrong you have done me; I will not ſee the Contrivances that you make againſt me, &c.*

Repetition is made two Ways: (1.) When we repeat the ſame Words, or (2.) the ſame Thing in different Words. The former, as — *You deſign Nothing, Nothing that is not viſible to me, what I do not ſee, &c.* The ſecond, as — *of ourſelves we can do nothing well; whatever Good we do, is by the Divine Grace*.

Redundance makes us uſe more Words than are abſolutely neceſſary, and is emphatical; *I heard thee with theſe Ears, I ſaw thee with theſe Eyes*.

Like Meanings, are Words of the ſame Senſe, and put together to expreſs one Thing; as, *he departed, he went out, he's gone*.

Description figures the Thing in ſuch lively Colours, as to make its Image appear before us.

Distribution is a kind of *Description*, in which we enumerate the Parts of the Object of our Paſſion; as — *Their Throat is an open Sepulchre; they flatter with their Tongues; the Poiſon of Aſps is under their Lips; their Mouth is full of Curſing and Lies, and their Feet are ſwift to ſhed Blood*.

Opposites place Contraries againſt one another; as, *Flattery begets Friends, Truth Enemies*.

Similes bring a likeneſs to the Thing we are ſpeaking of; — as, *He ſhall be like a Tree placed by the Water-ſide, &c.*

Comparison. The Difference is not great between this and the former Figure, only this latter is more ſprightly and emphatic; — as, *The fineſt Gold to them looks wan and pale, &c.* But two Things are to be conſider'd in *Compariſons*; firſt that we are not to expect an exact Proportion betwixt all the Parts of the Comparison, and the Subject of which we ſpeak; as
when

when *Virgil* compares the young *Ligurian* to a Pigeon in the Claws of an Hawk; adding what relates more to the Description of a Pigeon torn to pieces by a Hawk, than to the Subject compar'd. The second Thing to be observ'd, is, That it is not necessary that the Thing compared to, be more elevated than the Thing compar'd; as the quoted Instance from *Virgil* shews.

Suspension keeps the Hearer in Suspense, and attentive, by Expectation of what the Speaker will conclude in; as, *O God! Darkness is not more opposite to Light, Frost to Fire, Rage and Hatred to Love, Tempests to Calms, Pain to Pleasure, or Death to Life, than Sin to thee.*

Representation gives a Tongue to Things inanimate, and makes them speak in Passion; as, *Hear, thou stupid Creature, hear the very Walls of this sacred Pile complaining of thy Wickedness: Have we, say they, so many hundred Years been consecrated to the sacred Rites of the Immortal Gods, and now at last to be polluted with thy Impieties? Have the most Valiant and the most Wise enter'd here with Awe and Veneration, and shall one so Worthless dare to condemn the Sanctity of this Place? &c.*

Sentences are but Reflections made upon a Thing that surprizes, and deserves to be consider'd; as, *Love cannot long be conceal'd where it is, nor dissembled where it is not.*

Applause is a Sentence or Exclamation, containing some Sentence plac'd at the End of a Discourse; as, *Can Minds Divine such Anger entertain!*

Interrogation is frequently produc'd by our Passions to them we would persuade, and is useful to fix the Attention of the Hearers; as, *Let me ask you, ye Men of Athens, is it worthy the Glory of our City, or is it fit that Athens, once the Head of Greece, should submit to Barbarians, take Measures from a foreign Lord? &c.*

Address is, when in an extraordinary Commotion a Man turns himself to all sides, and addresses Heaven, Earth, the Rocks, Fields, Things sensible and insensible; as, *Ye Mountains of Gilboa, let there be no Dew, &c.*

Prevention is a Figure, by which we prevent what might be objected by the Adversary; as, *But some will say, How are the Dead rais'd up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, unless it die, &c.*

Communication is when we desire the Judgment of our Hearers; as, *What would you, Gentlemen, do in the Case? Would you take other Measures than, &c.*

Confession

Confession is the owning of our Fault, arising from a Confidence of Forgiveness of the Person to whom it is acknowledged; as, *I confess myself to have err'd, but I am a Man, and what is human, is what we are all subject to; let him that is free from human Error cast the first Stone.*

Consent makes us grant a Thing freely that might be deny'd, to obtain another Thing that we desire; as, *I allow the Greeks Learning; I grant them the Description of many Arts, the Brightness of Wit, the Copiousness of Discourse; I will not deny them any thing else they can justly claim: But that nation were never eminent for the Religion of an Oath in their Testimonies, or for Truth and Faith, &c.* And here it has always a Sting in the Tail: But, on the contrary, it has sometimes a healing Close; as, *Let him be Sacrilegious, let him be a Robber, let him be the Chief of all Wickedness and Vice, yet still he is a good General.*

By this Figure we sometimes invite our Enemy to do all the Mischief he can, in order to give him a Sense and Horror of his Cruelty. 'Tis also common in Complaints between Friends; as when *Aristæus*, in *Virgil*, complains to his Mother:

*Proceed, inhuman Parent, in thy Scorn;
Root up my Trees, with Blights destroy my Corn,
My Vineyards ruin, and my Sheepfolds burn,
Let loose thy Rage, let all thy Spite be shown,
Since thus thy Hate pursues the Praises of thy Son.*

Dryd. Virg.

Circumlocution is used to avoid some Words whose Ideas are unpleasant, or to avoid saying something which may have an ill Effect; as, when *Cicero* is forc'd to confess that *Clodius* was slain by *Milo*, he did it with this Address: "The Servants of *Milo* (says he) being hinder'd from assisting their Master, whom *Clodius* was reported to have kill'd, and believing it true, they did in his Absence, without his Knowledge or Consent, what every Body would have expected from his Servants on the like Occasion." In which he avoids mentioning the Words *kill*, or *put to Death*, as Words ingrateful or odious to the Ear.

Thus much we have thought fit to say of the Figurative Expressions of the *Passions*; but they are indeed almost infinite, each being to be expressed a hundred ways. We shall conclude this Discourse of *The Art of Persuasion* with a few Reflections on *Style*, and fewer Remarks on other Compositions, in which the Learner ought to be exercised.

§. 36. What we mean by *Style*, is the Manner of expressing ourselves, or of cloathing our Thoughts in Words: The Rules already given, as to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, regard (as we say) only the Members of Discourse, but *Style* relates to the intire Body of the *Composition*.

The *Matter* ought to direct us in the Choice of the *Style*. Noble Expressions render the *Style* lofty, and represent Things great and noble; but if the Subject be *low* and *mean*, sonorous Words and pompous Expression is Bombast, and discovers want of Judgment in the Writer. *Figures* and *Tropes* paint the Motions of the Heart; but to make them just, and truly ornamental, the Passion ought to be reasonable. There's nothing more ridiculous than to be transported without Cause, to put one's self in a Heat for what ought to be argued coolly: Whence 'tis plain, that the *Matter* regulates the *Style*. When the Subject or *Matter* is great, the *Style* ought to be sprightly, full of Motion, and enrich'd with *Figures* and *Tropes*; if our Subject contain nothing extraordinary, and we can consider it without Emotion, the *Style* must be plain.

The Subjects of Discourse being extremely various in their Nature, it follows, that there must be as great a Variety in the *Style*: But the Masters of this Art have reduc'd them all to *three* Kinds, which they call the *Sublime*, the *Plain*, the *Mean*, or the *Indifferent*.

§. 37. Let the Subject of which we design a lofty *Idea* be never so noble, its Nobleness will never be seen, unless we have Skill enough to present the best of its Faces to the View. The best of Things have their Imperfections, the least of which discover'd, may lessen our Esteem, if not extinguish it quite: We must therefore take care not to say any thing in one Place, which may contradict what we have said in another. We ought to pick out all that is most great and noble in our Subject, and put that in its best light, and then our Expression must be noble and sublime, capable of raising lofty Ideas: And 'tis our Duty to observe a certain Uniformity in our *Style*; tho' all we say have not an equal Magnificence, so far at least as to make all the Parts of a piece, and bear a Correspondence with the whole.

The Danger here is, lest you fall into a puffy *Style*, which some call *Inflation*, or swell'd; for if you stretch Things beyond their Nature, and hunt only after great and sounding Words, you seldom mind their Agreeableness to the Nature of the Subject. And this has been the Fault of many of our modern

modern Tragic Writers, who yet with the Vulgar have gain'd Applause, and settled a Reputation.

§. 38. We come next to the *plain* Style; and this simple and plain Character of Writing is not without its Difficulties, not in the Choice of *Subjects*, those being always ordinary and common, but because there is wanting in this Style that Pomp and Magnificence which often hide the Faults of the Writer, at least from the general Reader or Hearer. But on common and ordinary Subjects there is little room for *Figures* and *Tropes*, so we must make choice of Words that are proper and obvious.

When we call this *Style* simple and plain, we intend not *Meanness of Expression*; that is never good, and should always be avoided: For tho' the *Matter* or *Subject* of this Style have nothing of Elevation, yet ought not the Language to be vile and contemptible; Mob Expressions and Vulgarisms, are to be avoided, and yet all must be clean and natural.

§. 39. The *mean* or *middle* Style consists of a Participation of the *Sublime* on one Side, and of the *Simplicity* of the *Plain*, on the other. *Virgil* furnishes us with Examples of all the three; of the *Sublime* in the *Æneids*, the *Plain* in his *Pastorals*, and the *Mean* (or *Middle*) in his *Georgics*.

§. 40. Tho' the *Style* of an Orator, or one that speaks in Public, of an Historian and Poet, are different, yet there are some Differences in Style of the same Character; for some are soft and easy, others more strong; some gay, others more severe. Let us reflect on the Differences, and how they are distinguish'd.

The first *Quality* is *Easiness*, and that is when Things are deliver'd with that Clearness and Perspicuity, that the Mind without any Trouble conceives them. To give this *Easiness* to a *Style*, we must leave nothing to the Hearer's or Reader's Decision; we must deliver Things in their necessary Extent, with Clearness, that they must be easily comprehended; and here Care must be taken of the Fluency, and to avoid all Roughness of Cadence.

The second *Quality* is *Strength*, and it is directly opposite to the first; it strikes the Mind boldly, and forces Attention. To render a *Style* strong, we must use short and nervous Expressions, of great and comprehensive Meaning, and such as excite many Ideas.

The third *Quality* renders a *Style* pleasant and florid, and depends in Part on the first; for the third is not pleas'd with too strong an Intention. *Tropes* and *Figures* are the Flowers of *Style*; the first give a sensible Conception to the most abstruse Thoughts;

Thoughts ; *Figures* awaken our Attention, and warm and animate the Hearer or Reader, by giving them Pleasure. Motion is the Principle of Life and Pleasure, but Coldness mortifies every thing.

The last Quality is *Severe* : It retrenches every thing that is not absolutely necessary ; it allows nothing to Pleasure, admitting no Ornaments or Decorations. In short, we are to endeavour that our Style have such Qualities, as are proper to the Subject of which we discourse.

§. 41. Having said thus much of *Styles*, we shall only add a Word or two about other Exercises, in which the Learner should be train'd up : The first and most general is the writing of *Letters* ; here an easy and genteel way of conveying our Mind in the shortest and most expressive Terms, is the greatest Excellence. *Business* requires no Ornaments, and a plain and succinct Information is all that is requir'd. Letters of *Compliment* must have Gaiety, but no Affectation. *Easiness* must shine thro' all, and a clean Expression ; here is no room for the Luxuriance of Fancy, or the Embellishments of longer Discourses. The same may be said of *Condolence*, and even of *Persuasion*. The most poignant and coercive Reasons must be us'd, and those that by want of Native Force require the Help of Art to recommend them, laid aside.

ESSAYS have, in these latter Ages, mightily prevail'd ; and here, as in *Letters*, all must be easy, free, and natural, and written just as you think, sometimes leaving the Subject, and then returning again, as the Thoughts arise in the Mind. At least this has hitherto been the Practice ; and *Montaigne*, who has got no small Reputation by this way of Writing, seldom keeps many Lines to the Subject he proposes : Tho' it is our Opinion, that my Lord *Bacon* is a much better Pattern ; for indeed they seem to us to be sudden Reflections on some one particular Subject, not very unlike the common Themes given to Scholars in the Schools, with this Difference, that the Author of these is suppos'd to have gain'd much from Observation and Reflection on those Heads, and that therefore his Discoveries may be of Value ; whereas the proposing such particular Moral Subjects to Boys, is requiring Impertinencies from them, who have no Fund of Observation to furnish out the Entertainment.

As for the Subjects of Poetical Exercises, we have given sufficient Rules for them, in our *Art of Poetry*.

The End of the Art of Persuasion.

LOGIC ;



LOGIC;

OR,

The Art of REASONING.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Of Particular IDEAS.

LOGIC is the Art of Reasoning. The Art is divided into four Parts; the first treats of *Ideas*; the second of *Judgments*; the third of *Method*; and the fourth of *Reasoning*, or *Argumentation*.

An *Idea*, in General, we define—*The immediate Object of the Mind; or that Thought or Image of any Thing which is immediately set before the Mind.*

All *Ideas* become the Objects of our Mind, or are presented to the Judgment by the Perception of the Senses, which we call *Sensation*; or by the Meditation of the Mind; which we call *Reflection*.

1. *Ideas* are either *Simple* or *Compound*. We call those *Simple*, in which the most subtle Penetration of the Mind itself cannot discover any Parts or Plurality; and we call those *Compounded*, which are made up or compos'd of *two* or *more* of those which are *Simple*. Examples of both we shall see hereafter.

2. There are *Ideas* of *Substances*, we know not what obscure Subject, in which there are the Properties of Things which we know; and *Ideas* of *Modes* or *Manners*, which are the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of *Substances*, which we cannot conceive capable of subsisting alone without their *Substances*.

3. There are certain *Relations* between *Substances* and *Substances*, *Modes* and *Modes*, and *Modes* and *Substances*; the Consideration of one including the Consideration of the other, from whence these *Relations* derive that Naine.

4. There are *Ideas*, which are to be consider'd as the Images of something existent, and which convey themselves to, and fix themselves in the Mind, without any Operation of its own. But there are others, which by the *Mind* are join'd to new *Ideas* at Pleasure, and separated from them by Abstraction.

5. Farther, there are *Ideas* of a larger or less Extent, or join'd to more or fewer *Ideas*; whence we call them *Singular*, *Particular*, or *Universal*.

6. There are some *Ideas* that are *clear* and *plain*, and others that are *obscure*. All *clear Ideas* are *simple*, as are those of the *compounded*, all whose Parts are distinctly plac'd before, or represented to the Mind.

7. There are some *Ideas* that are *perfect*, or *adequate*; and others that are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*. Those we call *perfect*, or *adequate*, which contain all the Parts of the Things whose Images they are, and offer them so to the *Mind*; those are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*, which only contain and offer some Parts of the Things of which they are the Images. We call *Ideas* Images of the Things, because there are some Things without us, which are like, and answer to them.

To these *particular Heads* of *Ideas* all others may be referr'd. These therefore we shall particularly examine.

C H A P. II.

Of Simple and Compound IDEAS.

1. **V**ERY many of the *simple Ideas* we have from or by our *Senses*, and very many from the Attention of the Mind turn'd inwards on itself, without regard to *Sensation*.

2. To the *first* we must refer all our *Sensations*; the chief of which may be reduc'd to *five* Classes, Forms or Heads, according to the *five* Parts of the Body, which are affected by them. For they come to us by the Means of our *Eyes*, our *Ears*, our *Nose*, our *Tongue* or *Palate*, and by the *Touch* or *Feeling* of all the other Parts of the Body. *Colours* are *simple Ideas*, (we mean *Colours* themselves, and distinct from colour'd Bodies,

Bodies, which have Parts) as *Blue* for Example, of which the Mind can discover no manner of Parts.

3. The *Ideas* of Sounds are likewise *simple*, as well as those of *Smell*, *Taste*, *Touch*. We speak here of *One simple particular Sensation*, consider'd distinctly from the Variety of *Sounds*, *Smells*, *Tastes*, and *Touches*. Thus—if any one smell to a Rose without mixing any other Scent, he will have a *Sensation* in which he can distinguish no Parts; and this holds of the other *Sensations*.

4. *Pain* and *Pleasure* are the chief and most eminent *Sensations* we have, whose Kinds and Sorts vary according to the *Part* or *Member* affected; but there are no Parts to be distinguish'd in *Pain* and *Pleasure*, which we can conceive to be separated from each other. We speak not of the *Duration* of *Pain* or *Pleasure*, which evidently has Parts, but of the *simple Sensation of a Prick with a Needle*; for Example, none can conceive any Parts of it, the Concourse of which should produce *Pain*.

5. In the *Idea* of *Motion*, which comes to us by our *Senses*, when consider'd in *general*, we can conceive no Parts, tho' we may of its *Duration*, of the Line it describes, and its Quickness or Slowness.

6. Thus in many *simple Ideas*, which arise from *Reflection*, we should in vain seek for Parts, as in *Volition*, or *Willing*, &c. The same may be said of *Existence* consider'd in *general*, tho' there are visible Parts in the *Duration*.

7. *Compound Ideas*, we have said, contain or comprehend several *simple Ideas*, which may be distinguished and separately consider'd. Thus the *Ideas* of all Bodies are *compound*; because in them we can consider some Parts without the others, or distinctly from the others. If we consider a Body, we clearly and plainly distinguish the *higher* and *lower*, the *fore* and *hind*, the *left* and *right* Part of it; and can distinctly think of one without the others. If we consider the *Idea* of *Pity*, we find that it consists of the *Ideas* of *Misery*, of a miserable Person, and of one who grieves for him. Such are the *Ideas* of all *Virtues* and *Vices*, tho' they come to us by *Reflection* of the Mind.

8. Tho' we shall not, in this Part of *Logick*, or the *Art of Reasoning*, treat of those *Judgments* we pass upon *Ideas*, yet it is of Importance to remember never to pretend to define what cannot be defin'd without making it more obscure; for a Definition ought always to be made use of to make the Subject of our Discourse more plain and clear than the bare Name of the

Things would make it; but in *simple Ideas*, we cannot better explain them, than by their very Name, or some synonymous Words, the Knowledge of which depends on the Tongue we use, and the Sense of him we speak to. The contrary Method has made the *Aristotelians* fill us with unintelligible Jargon; as defining of *Motion*, they say, 'tis an *Act of a Being in Power; as in Power*; nor have the *Moderns* much mended the Matter, by defining it the *Change of Situation*. The first labours with inexplicable Obscurity, and the Terms of the latter are not more clear or known than the Word *Motion* itself.

9. *Definition*, indeed, has only to do with *compound Ideas*, for it's an Enumeration, or reckoning up of the several *simple Ideas* of which that consists.

C H A P. III.

Of IDEAS of Substances and Modes.

1. **A**Nother sort of *Ideas* are those of *Substances* and *Modes*; for we consider all Things separately, and by themselves, or else as existing in other Things so much, that we can't allow them Existence without 'em. The first we call *Substances* and *Subjects*, the latter *Modes* and *Accidents*; as when we reflect on *Wax* and *some Figure*, as *Roundness*, we consider the *Wax* as a Thing which may subsist without that *Roundness*, or any other particular Figure; we therefore call *Wax* a *Substance*. On the contrary, we consider *Roundness* so inherent to the *Wax* or some other Substance, that it can't subsist without it, for we are not capable of conceiving *Roundness* distinctly and separately from a round Body. This therefore we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*.

2. We always consider Bodies cloath'd, as I may say, in some certain *Modes*, except when we reflect on the Abstract, or General. The *Substances* the *Grammarians* express by the *Name*; the *Modes* may be render'd by the *Qualities* as *Wax* and *Roundness* is express'd by *round Wax*.

3. We have, besides, certain compound *Ideas*, which consist only of *Modes*; and others which are compounded, or made up only with a sort of Species, or kind of *Modes*. As a *Furlong*, as far as it expresses a Mensuration of the Road; for it comprehends uniform *Modes*, as *Paces* or *Fect*: Others consist

consist of several Sorts of *Modes*; as the *Idea* of *Pity*, which has been already defin'd, and of the other *Passions*, and *Virtues* and *Vices*.

4. We have, farther, *Ideas* compounded of a Collection of Substances of a like Nature; such is the *Idea* of an *Army*, of a *City*, of a *Flock*, consisting of many *Soldiers*, *Citizens*, or *Sheep*, &c. or they are compos'd of a Collection of *Ideas* of unlike Substances; such is the *Idea* of the Matter of which a *House*, a *Skip*, or a *Desart* is compounded. And in these *Ideas* we consider not only Substances, as they are such, but also as attended with certain *Modes*, which produce *Ideas* that are very much compounded.

5. We define Substance in general, *Things subsisting by themselves*, but then they are consider'd abstractly, or without regard to any particular Substance actually existing; and in that Sense it is sufficiently plain what is meant by the Word *Substance*; but since there is no Substance consider'd in general which has any Existence but in our *Ideas*, where we consider existing *Substances*, the Matter is alter'd. The *Ideas* of single or particular Substances are very obscure; nor do we understand any thing by their several Names, but certain, we know not what, unknown Subjects, in which there are certain Properties which constantly co-exist. Thus if any one should ask what that Substance is which we call Body, we can only say, that it is an unknown Subject, in which we always discover *Extension*, *Divisibility*, and *Impenetrability*.

6. 'Tis plain, that nothing more obscure can be meant, than what is express'd by these Terms, *extended Substances*. For all that is here meant, is, that there is an *unknown Subject*, one of whose Properties is to consist of other unknown Subjects or Substances plac'd close to each other, and of that Nature, that we have no *Idea* of any one of those Substances of which we say a Body consists. For we cannot affirm of any *Idea*, that it is the *Idea* of any one Substance of which a Body is compos'd, since we have no *Idea* of corporeal Substances, which does not comprehend or contain innumerable Substances. If therefore we express what we understand by the Name of *corporeal Substance*, we must say, that it is a *Composition of unknown Beings, some of whose Properties we know*.

7. The same we may say of other Substances, as of the *Spiritual*, (we examine not here whether or not there be any more) as whoever will consider with Attention, and not suffer himself to be amus'd and deceiv'd by empty Words, will experience. We find in our Mind various Thoughts, whence

we form the *Idea* of Spirits ; but we are ignorant of what that Subject is, in which these Thoughts are.

8. It will be of great Use to as perfect a Knowledge of Things as we are capable of obtaining, to distinguish in those Subjects which we call Substances, those Things, without which we can conceive those Subjects or Modes from those without which we cannot conceive them. For when we think with Attention on those Subjects, we shall find that there are some Things so essential to them, that we can't deprive them of, without changing their Nature ; and *other* Things which may be taken away from the Subject, and not destroy its Nature.

9. *Modes* are commonly divided into *internal*, which we conceive, as it were, inherent in the Substance ; as, *Roundness*, &c. Or *external*, as when we say any Thing is *desir'd*, *lov'd*, *beheld*, and the like ; which we call *Relations*.

13. There are likewise *Modes* which are also *Substances* ; as, *Apparel*, *Hair*, &c. without which the Subject can subsist, and they can likewise be without the Subject. As for these *Ideas*, which are compos'd of *Modes* and *Substances* variously join'd together, some are call'd *real*, as being the *Ideas* of Things that either really *do*, or are at least believed to exist ; others *rational*, that is, when the Mind compounds various *Ideas* together ; as when we consider a Stick reaching up to the Stars themselves.

11. In compound *Ideas* we ought carefully to observe how manifold, and of how many *Ideas* they consist ; as we shall more plainly see upon the Head of the *Obscurity* and *Perspicuity* of *Ideas*.

C H A P. IV.

Of RELATIONS.

1. **T**Here are, besides *Substances*, and *Modes* which are inherent in *Substances*, certain external Denominations, which tho' they add nothing to the Substance, yet depend on some Mode or Manner of it ; and these we call *Relations*, by which the Consideration of one Thing includes the Consideration of another. Thus when we call any one a *Father*, on this Expression depends this, that he whom we call

call so has begot Children, and so comprehends and includes the Consideration of Children.

2. Every *Idea*, consider'd in a certain Manner, may be the Foundation of a *Relation*, that is, may lead us by some Property of its own to the Consideration of some other *Idea*. So that all Existence may be divided into the *Creator* and the *Creature* ; for the Name of the *Creator* includes the Thought of the *Creature* ; and so on the contrary.

3. *Relations* are innumerable ; for they may be between Substances and Substances, Modes and Modes, Modes and Substances, Relations and Substances, Relations and Modes, Relations and Relations ; for there is nothing that cannot excite our Thoughts on something else, since we can compound or join our *Ideas* together as we think fit. But avoiding too nice a Scrutiny, we shall only make our Observations on those of the greatest Moment, which regard *Relations* consider'd in general.

4. We very often consider *Ideas* as *absolute*, or including no *Relations*, which yet have necessarily a Reference to others. Thus we cannot call any thing *Great* or *Large*, but that the *Idea* which answers that Word must be *relative*. For we call those Things *great*, in a certain Kind, which are the *greatest* among those Things of the same Nature, which we have known. We call that *Hill* or *Mountain great*, which is as *great* as any *Hill* that we have ever seen. That Kingdom is *large*, which exceeds the Bounds of our own Country, or of those Countries we have known, &c. That Tower we call *high*, which is higher than most of the same Kind that we have known. In Number we call that *great*, than which there are not many greater in the same Kind : Thus sixty thousand Men in Arms in *Greece* we call a *great Army*, because *Greece* scarce ever had a greater ; but it had been little in *Persia*, where much larger were assembled. Thus likewise as to *Time*, we call it long or short with Reference to another. We call a hundred Years Life, a long Life ; *Jacob* calls his (130) short, because his Ancestors liv'd so many longer. Sickness, Pain, and Expectation, make that *Time* seem long, which to one in Action, Health, or Pleasure, seems short. That Burden is heavy to a Child, a weak Woman, an old Man, the Sickly, which is light to a Man in Health and Vigour. Thus in the Ornaments of the Mind, we call that Wit great, that Learning profound, that Memory tenacious, that Prudence consummate, which we find excel, after the Manners of our Country, all that we know among us ; tho' by Foreigners

they may be thought but of a moderate Size. Thus *Great Learning* has a very different Signification in the Mouth of a Man of Letters, and of an ignorant Person; it is of a much larger Extent in the former than in the latter.

5. In short, all the Modes both of Mind and Body, that admit of Increase or Diminution, are the Prototypes of *Relative Ideas*. But this is to be observed with the utmost Attention, because their Number is very large, which, if confounded with *absolute Ideas*, will give rise to great Errors, and render us incapable of understanding the Discourse of others.

6. Here we must, in short, remark, that the Judgments that we make, are only the Perceptions of the *Relations* between various *Ideas*; in which *Relations* our Mind does acquiesce. Thus when we judge that two times two make four, or that two times two do not make five; our Minds observe the *Relation* of Equality which is between two times two and four, and the Inequality which is between two times two and five; which Perception, as evident, the Mind does acquiesce or is best satisfy'd in, or gives itself no farther Trouble to consider of its Truth. But of this more at large in the Second Part.

7. *Reasoning* also is a like Perception of the *Relations* join'd with that Acquiescence of the Mind. But it is not a Perception of the Relations which are among various Things, but of those Relations which the Relations themselves have among themselves. Thus, when we gather from this, that four is a smaller Number than six, and that twice two equals four, that twice two is a less Number than six; we perceive the Relation of Inequality, which is between the Relation of the Number twice two and four, and the Relation of four and six; acquiescing in which Perception, we conclude it a less Number than six. But this belongs to the third and fourth Parts. Yet we thought it proper to make this short Remark here, that the Distinction we brought in the beginning of various Relations should not be look'd on as empty and vain; for unless we retain this, we know not what our Mind does in Judging and Reasoning. All our *Ideas* may be referr'd to *Substances, Modes, and Relations*.

C H A P. V.

Of IDEAS which are offered to the Mind without any Operation of its own; and of those, in the forming which some Operation of the Mind does intervene.

1. **T**HERE are certain *Ideas* which are only consider'd by the Mind, without any manner of Addition; such are all *Simple Ideas*, which have not any Dependence on the Will and Pleasure of the Mind, and in spite of that, are always the same. Thus the Mind has no Command over Pleasure, or Pain. Now the other simple *Ideas*, which we have enumerated before, we find to be of that Nature, as that if the Mind endeavour to detract any thing from them, they utterly perish, and cease to be; nor can it add any thing, without the Destruction of their Simplicity.

2. To this same Head we may refer those *Compound Ideas* which offer themselves to the Mind, without our thinking of the Matter, such as the Ideas of Things that exist; which Things affect our Senses, and excite certain Ideas of themselves in our Mind.

3. These *Ideas* are term'd *Real*, because they proceed from Things existing without us. On the contrary, there are other *Compound Ideas*, which are not brought to the Mind from abroad, but are compounded by that, according to its Pleasure. Thus, by joining the Ideas of *half a Man*, and *half a Horse*, the Idea of a *Centaur* is form'd; which is done in no other manner, than by the Mind's Will to have the Image of a *Centaur* the Object of its View; or by considering at once the Body of a *Man* from the Waist to the Head, and the Body of a *Horse* with the Head and Neck cut off: For such is the Force of the Human Mind, that it can join whatever is not contradictory, by its Contemplation, and rescind whatever it pleases. These *Ideas*, thus compounded by the Mind, we call *Phantastic*.

4. As the Mind can consider those Things together, which in Reality, and without itself, are not join'd together in one Existence; so can it consider those Things separately, which do not in Reality exist separately. And this sort of Contemplation, which is called *Abstraction*, is of great Use to the accurate Consideration of *Compound Ideas*. For we cannot, if they consist of a larger Number of Parts, distinctly see them in our

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Mind all together ; 'tis therefore an Advantage to us, that we can examine some of them separately, a little delaying the Consideration of the rest.

5. *Abstraction* is made principally three Ways: *First*, Our Mind can consider any one Part of a Thing really distinct from it, as a *Man's Arm*, without the Contemplation of the rest of his Body. But this is not properly *Abstraction*, since the *Arm* is, without the Interposition of the *Mind*, separated distinct from the *Body*, tho' it cannot live, that is, be nourish'd, increase, or move in that Separation.

6. *Secondly*, We think by *Abstraction* of the *Mode* of a *Substance*, omitting the Substance itself, or when we separately consider several Modes, which subsist together in one Subject. This *Abstraction* the *Geometricians* make use of, when they consider the Length of a Body separately, which they call a *Line*, omitting evidently the Consideration of its Breadth and Depth. And then its Length and Breadth together, which they call the *Surface*. By the same *Abstraction* we can distinguish the Determination of a Motion, towards what Place directed, from the Motion itself.

7. *Thirdly*, We, by *Abstraction*, omit the *Modes* and *Relations* of any particular Things, if from it we form a *Universal Idea*. Thus, when we would understand a *Thinking Being* in general, we gather from our Self-Consciousness what it is to *Think*, and, omitting the Consideration of those Things which have a peculiar Reference to the Human Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general. By this Means particular *Ideas* become general.

8. That we may not err in judging of the *Ideas* mention'd in this Chapter, we must make these Observations: *First*, That those *Ideas* which offer themselves to the Mind without any Operation of its own, must of necessity be excited by some external Cause, and so are plac'd before the Mind as they are. But we must take heed that we do not think that there is always in those Things themselves which excite those *Ideas*, any Thing like them, because it may happen that they are not the true and real Causes, but only the Occasions by which those *Ideas* are produc'd. And this Suspicion ought to heighten by what we experience in our Dreams, when by the Occasion of the Motion of the Brain there are the Images of Things set before us, which are not present themselves, and often have no Existence in Nature. Whence we may gather from such like *Ideas*, that the Cause or Occasion of their Production has an external Subsistence, and not in the Mind.

9. *Secondly*,

9. Secondly, As to those *Ideas* which are compounded by the Mind, we easily imagine, first, that the Originals of such *Ideas* may possibly somewhere exist; and then, that they really do, unless we are manifestly convinced by Experience, that they never did really exist conjunctly, and so join together. And on the contrary, that those Things which the Mind considers separately by *Abstraction*, do really exist in that separate State: As the Mathematical *Point* without any Parts; and *Lines* consisting only of those *Points* join'd together, without Breadth or Depth, and *Surfaces* without Depth; whereas Demonstration shews the contrary, and those Terms are only made use of by the Mathematicians for the sake of the Instruction of the Learners of that Art.

10. We must here farther warn you against another Error too frequent among the *School Men*, that is, not to make those really distinct Things, or different Beings, which we have distinguish'd by *Abstraction*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Individuals, Particular and Universal IDEAS.

1. **W**HAT we have said of *Abstraction* leads us to the Consideration of *Ideas*, as they are *individual*, *particular*, and *universal*; for they are made *particular* and *universal* from *individual*, by *Abstraction*; in which Matter we proceed in this Manner: When we consider ourselves in our Mind, or any one Man before us, then we have the *Idea* of an *Individual*, or an *individual Idea*. But if we omit those Things which are peculiar to us, or that one Man, and consider what is common to us and many others; such as to be born in the same Country, to be of the same Party, and the like, then is the *Idea* of some *particular* Nation, or Family, &c. placed before us: But, lastly, if omitting these particular Distinctions common to us and a certain Number of Men, we consider what is common to us and all Mankind, we have then an *universal Idea*.

2. The Names that signify *individual Ideas*, are called *proper*; as *Alexander*, *Cæsar*. But those which signify *particular* and *universal Ideas*, are called *appellative*, or *common*; as, a *Briton*, a *Christian*, a *Man*.

3. Farther—We may distinguish in those *Ideas* certain Properties which are constantly united in them, and external *Subjects*

jects agreeable to those *Ideas*, or such as the *Ideas* agree with. Thus in the *Idea* of Man we discover or see a thinking Mind, and a Body consisting of certain Organs ; but this *Idea* agrees with the Inhabitants of *Europe*, *Asia*, *Africa*, and *America*.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Perspicuity and Obscurity of IDEAS.

1. **B**EFORE we can pass any certain Judgment of an *Idea*, it is first necessary that it should be *clear* and *perspicuous* ; otherwise, if we should happen to pass a right Judgment on a Thing that is not known, or at least not sufficiently clear, it must be attributed to Chance, and not to Knowledge. The Obscurity and Clearness of *Ideas* are therefore worthy our Consideration in the *Art of Reasoning*.

2. We call that a *clear Idea*, when all it comprehends is so distinctly plac'd before our Mind, that we can easily distinguish it from all others.

3. All *simple Ideas* are *clear*, such as *Sensations* ; such therefore is the *Idea* of Light : For when we have that *Idea* before us, we see all that is in it, nor can we confound it with any other. We may say the same of Sounds, Scents, Tastes, Pleasure, Pain, &c. which can never be confounded or mingled with each other. And these *Sensations* increase in their Clearness in Proportion to the Liveliness of their striking on the Organ proper to them ; for by how much the more vehemently the Mind is strook, with so much the more Attention it applies to the Subject, and so this lively *Idea* is more clearly distinguish'd from all others.

4. These *simple Ideas* are also *perspicuous* or *clear*, which the Mind receives without the Interposition of the Body : Examples of which we have given under the Head of *simple* and *compound Ideas*. But as we can consider the Parts of a *compound Idea* separately, so we view them singly, or one by one as *simple Ideas*, of which they are compounded : Thus also all *abstract Ideas* are *clear*, tho' the Subject in which they exist be unknown. We can in all Substances, of which we know any Properties, select some Property, which being by *Abstraction* separated from all the rest, becomes *simple*, and by consequence *clear*, altho' it exist in a Subject which we do not know. Thus Hu-

manity,

manity, generally consider'd, is made a *simple Idea*, and therefore indivisible.

5. But these same *Ideas* are often made obscure when they are considered without *Abstraction*, together with other *Ideas* that are obscure, and co-exist in the Subject: Thus when the Question is not, what Humanity or Reason is in general, but what Reason is in *Stephen*, or in *Thomas*, and what is its numerical Difference.

6. These *compounded Ideas* are clear, *all* whose Parts, or *simple Ideas* of which they are compounded, are perfectly known to us. But those we call obscure, of which we only know some Parts. Thus when we know all the *Units* of which any Number consists, we certainly know the Number; but if we have gone through but some of the *Units*, we cannot know how much the whole is; and have therefore a confus'd *Idea* of it.

7. Whenever, therefore, we are to judge of any thing, we must first distinguish all its Parts, if it consist of Parts, and then give Judgment: Else we should do as if we should give the Sum Total of an Accompt, and not know the particular Numbers or Figures which make it up. But more of this in the *Third Part*.

8. But if in the Things which fall under our Consideration we cannot sufficiently distinguish their Parts, and give a certain Enumeration of them, we must then fairly confess, that either they are not in the Number of those Things to which the Knowledge of Man can extend, or that it requires more Time to examine into the Matter.

9. It much conduces to the *Clearness* of an *Idea* compounded by ourselves or others, if the Parts which compose it are always of the same Number, and in the same Order; otherwise, if the Number of the *simple Ideas* of which it's composed, can be increased or lessened, or their Order inverted, the Memory; and so the Mind, is confounded. Thus, if any one has with Care cast up any Sums, and placed them in any certain Order, as often as he has a mind to remember them, he easily does it, if there has been no *Abstraction* or displacing in the Accompt. But on the contrary, the former Computation and Disposition is destroy'd, if the Numbers are disturb'd, and thrown out of their Places.

10. In short, the Nature of *Perspicuity* or *Clearness*, is such when it is at its height, that it compels our Assent. We cannot have the least Doubt but that Pleasure is different from Pain, or that twice Two make Four. On the contrary, we find a

Power in our Minds of suspending our Judgment, when there is any Obscurity in the *Idea*. But 'tis certain, that we often rashly yield our Assent to obscure *Ideas*. But still we have Liberty to deny it ; which we cannot do to an *Idea* which has a complete *Perspicuity* or *Clearness*.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Adequate and Inadequate, or Perfect and Imperfect IDEAS.

1. **W**E have observed in the first Chapter, that *Ideas* are the Images of Things which are without us, by the Force or Occasion of which they are excited in us ; but they may be the Images of the whole Thing that excites them, or only of a Part. When they represent the Whole, they are call'd *adequate*, or perfect ; when but a Part, they are call'd *inadequate*, or imperfect. Thus, if we see only the square Surface of a *Cube*, then the *Idea* of a square Figure, not of a *Cube*, is in our Mind ; which, therefore, is call'd an *inadequate* or *imperfect Idea*. On the contrary, if we behold a Triangle drawn on a Piece of Paper, and think of a Triangle in Plane, we have an *adequate* or *perfect Idea* in our Mind.

2. All simple *Ideas* are *adequate* or *perfect*, because the Faculty (be it what it will) that excites them, represents them intire. Thus the Pain that we feel signifies, that there is some Faculty of some Being without us, which excites that *Idea* in us against our Will. But we must proceed no farther, for a *simple Idea* represents a *simple Object* ; but it does not inform us where it is, or whether that Faculty be united to any others. We may therefore, without Fear of Error, gather from any Sensation, that there is something out of our Mind which is by Nature adapted to excite it in us.

3. The *Ideas* of *Modes* are also *adequate* or *perfect*, except of those *Modes* which are likewise Substances. For when we understand no *Modes* separately existing, they are only considered by us separately from the Substances by way of *Abstraction* ; but all *abstract Ideas* are *adequate* or *perfect*, since they represent all that Part of the Subject which we then consider. Thus the *Idea* of *Roundness* is *perfect* or *adequate*, because it offers to our Mind all that is in *Roundness* in general. The *Idea* of

of a *Triangle* in general is *adequate* or *perfect*, because when it is before my Mind, I see all that is common to *Triangles* that can be.

4. Of the same kind are all *Ideas*, of which we know no original or external Object really existing out of them, by the Occasion of which those *Ideas* are excited in us, and of which we think them the Images. Thus, when a Dog is before us, it is the external Object, without us, which raises the *Idea* in our Mind ; but the *Idea* of an *Animal* in general, has no external Object to excite it ; it is created by the Mind itself, which adds to, and detraets from it whatever it pleases ; whence it must of necessity be *adequate* or *perfect*.

5. But here again, we must take heed of what we have before cautioned, that is, that we do not suppose that there are any such Objects really existing without us, because the Mind has been pleased to entertain itself with the *Ideas* : For that would be as if a Painter that had drawn a *Centaur*, or Hundred-handed *Enceladus*, should contend, that there were such Beings really existent in Nature.

6. The *Ideas* of all Substances are *inadequate* or *imperfect*, which are not form'd at the Pleasure of the Mind, but gather'd from certain Properties which Experience discovers in them. This is sufficiently evident from what we have said of *Substances* in the third Chapter. For there we have shewn that we only know some of the Properties of *Substances*, not all ; and therefore their *Ideas* must be *imperfect* or *inadequate*. Thus we know that Silver is white, that it can be melted, and be diminished by the Fire as it melts ; that it can be drawn up to Wire, and dissolved by *Aqua fortis*, &c. but we are wholly ignorant of the inward Disposition or Constitution of the Particles of which Silver consists, and from whence those Properties proceed. Thus the *Idea* of Silver not representing to the Mind all the Properties of Silver, is *inadequate* or *imperfect*.

7. Here the greatest Danger is, lest we confound *inadequate* or *imperfect* *Ideas* with the *adequate* or *perfect*. For we are too apt to fancy, that when we know a great many Properties of any Thing, and cannot discover any more by all our Industry, we have the whole Subject. Thus some ingenious Men of our Times, imagin'd they had discover'd all the Properties of the Mind, because they could find nothing in it but Thoughts ; and therefore said, the Mind was only a *Thinking Substance* ; and so they contend that there is nothing else in Body but *Extension*, *Impenetrability*, and *Divisibility*, because

cause they could discover nothing else ; but they could never yet shew us what those *Substances* were, whose Properties were to think, to have Parts, &c. There is no Existence of *Substance* in general ; and tho' we understand this Word in *general*, it does by no means follow, that we understand it when it is spoke of any particular Subject, which we must be sure to have a particular Regard to.

The End of the First Part of the ART of
REASONING.



T H E



T H E
 Second Part of LOGIC;
 O R,
The Art of REASONING.

 Of J U D G M E N T S.

C H A P. I.

Of Judgment in the Mind, and express'd in Words.

HAVING consider'd *Ideas* and their Properties particularly, we come now to treat of *Judgments*, in which various *Ideas* are compared with each other. We must first accurately distinguish the *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, from the Words in which it is express'd, if we would know what it is.

2. *Judgment*, as it is in the Mind, and unwritten, is a Perception of the Relation that is between two or more *Ideas*. Thus when we judge that the Sun is greater than the Moon, having compar'd the two *Ideas* of the Sun and Moon, we find that the *Idea* of the Sun is greater than that of the Moon, and our Mind perfectly acquiesces in this Perception, nor makes any farther Inquiry into the Matter. When we judge two Members to be unequal, by having observ'd the Inequality of their *Ideas*, our Mind gives itself no further Trouble in their Examination in that respect, but only confines to its Memory that those two Members were found to be unequal.

3. We must here observe, That our Mind can give its Assent to *obscure Ideas*, as well as to those which are *clear*; or acquiesce in a Thing as perfectly discover'd, which yet it has no perfect Knowledge of, and can commit this to the Memory as a Thing perfectly known. Thus we may judge the fixed Stars less

less than the Moon, by comparing the *obscure Ideas* of those Stars and the Moon, and then take it for a Point not to be argued against, as clear and evident. The Mind has also a Faculty of suspending its Assent, till by an accurate Examen of the *Ideas*, the Subject becomes clear and evident; or if it be of such a Nature that we cannot arrive at a perspicuous Perception, we continue in Doubt or Suspense, and commend it to the Memory as a dubious Matter. This *Faculty* which we observe in our Mind, of giving our Assent to *obscure Ideas*, or denying it, is call'd *Liberty*.

4. But we cannot make use of this *Faculty*, when the Subject of our Thoughts has the last and greatest Perspicuity that can be. For Example, we can by no means in the World persuade ourselves, that twice Two do not make Four, or are not equal to Four; or that the Part is no less than the Whole, and the like Maxims of the most evident Truths; for as soon as ever we hear them, the Mind cannot deny its Assent, but necessarily acquiesces, without finding in itself the least Desire or Inclination of making any farther Inquiry into the Matter.

5. This is a *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, which when express'd in Words, we call a *Proposition*, in which something is always affirmed or denied. That Part of the Proposition of which something is affirmed or denied, is call'd the *Subject*; the other Part, which is said by the Negation or Affirmation, is call'd the *Attribute*. Thus when we say that *Poverty is to be reliev'd*, or *Poverty is no Vice*; the Word *Poverty* is the *Subject*; *to be reliev'd*, and *Vice*, are the *Attributes*. But besides these two Parts, we must consider the *Copula*, or *Connective Word*, by which, when 'tis alone, 'tis affirmed that there is some Relation between the *Subject* and the *Attribute*; but by adding a negative Particle, that same Relation is deny'd: In the present Instances we affirm in the first, that there is a Relation between the *Idea* of *Poverty*, and the *Idea* of *Relief*; so that the *Idea* of *Poverty* in our Mind includes the *Idea* of *Relief*; and in the latter Instance we deny that the *Idea* of *Poverty* excites in us the Consideration of any thing base or wicked.

6. *Propositions* are sometimes expressed in many Words, and sometimes in few. *Henry rages*, is an intire Proposition, for 'tis the same as if we should say, *Henry is raging*.

7. *Propositions* are either *simple* or *compound*; the *simple* are express'd in one Word; as, *God is good*: The *compound* in many, as *God, who is good, cannot delight in the Misery of Man*.

C H A P. II.

Of Universal, Particular, and Singular Propositions.

1. **W**E have in the former Part divided Ideas into *Universal, Particular, and Singular*, and said that the Words by which they were expressed, might be ranged under the same Heads. Hence the *Propositions* have the same three-fold Division.

2. When the Subject is *universal*, or taken in its whole Extent, without excepting any subordinate Species or Sort, or any other individual, which is contained under it, than is the *Proposition* called *universal*. This *Universality* is expressed by the Word *all*, when the *Proposition* is affirmative; and by that of *none* or *no*, when it is negative; *all Men are free*, is an universal affirmative Proposition, and *no Man is free*, is an universal Negative.

3. But when the Subject has some Mark or Note by which we shew, that not all the Sorts or Species, or Individuals, which are compriz'd under that Word, are meant; then is the Proposition *particular*; as, *some Man is free*. By the Word *some* we intimate that we do not here understand all that is signified by the general Word, *Man*, but that we only design a Part by the Word *some*.

4. *Singular or individual Propositions* are those in which we affirm only of some one individual Person or Thing; as *Alexander was choleric*. These Propositions have a great Affinity to the *Universals* in this, that the Subject of both is taken in its full and whole Extent. Hence the individual Propositions in the common Rules of Argumentation are taken for Universals.

5. To pass over the trifling of the Schools, which make *Logic* the *Art of Disputing*, not *Reasoning*, and have more regard to make the Student talk of any thing *pro* or *con*, than to find out the Truth, we must observe, that an Observation flowing from what we have before said of Substance, is of more Importance for the Discovery of the Truth, the only just End of *Reasoning*. That is, that universal Propositions, when of the Kinds or Species, or of the Generals and Particulars of Substances, cannot be with any Certainty made agreeable to the Things themselves; because since we do not know the Essences of them, we cannot affirm, that all Substances in
which

which we discover some certain Attributes equally to co-exist, are in those of which we know nothing alike, or the same. As for Example: We discover and observe, that there are certain singular Attributes constantly co-existing in all Men; yet who can assure us whether all their Minds are alike, so far as that, what Difference betwixt Particulars is visible, arises from external Causes in respect of the Mind, as from the Body, from Education, and the like; or that there is really some real Difference between them in the Substance of the Mind itself? The Difference of the Wit and Genius of Men seem to persuade the latter Opinion, which is observable in two Brothers who have had the same Education; but since we know not whether the Brain in both is disposed in the same manner, the Diversity of the Wit and Ingenuity may proceed from that Cause.

5. Thus such as with Assurance affirm, that the inmost Essence of all Bodies is the same; if they are in the right, they owe that more to Chance than to any clear Knowledge of the Matter: For there might be a plain Difference betwixt the inmost Essence of various Bodies, altho' they agree in having several of the same Attributes, which we do know. We should therefore take a particular Care, as to these general Propositions of Substances, not to give up our Assent to such who pretend to have a perfect and clear Knowledge of their inmost Essence.

6. The *Modes*, whose intire Essence is known to us, fall under a different Consideration; for we may form general Assertions of them, of indubitable Truth. Hence it is that *Geometry*, which is wholly conversant with the *Modes*, is built on the most certain Foundation, and delivers universal Rules of all Figures and Magnitudes, which cannot be destroy'd or opposed.

C H A P. III.

Of what is Truth and Falshood, and whether there be any certain Difference between them.

1. **B**Y Reasoning to find out the Truth, being the just Aim of this our Art, we shall pass over the several Classes of Propositions set down by the common *Logicians*, and which are of little Consequence in any thing, but of no man-

ner of Use to this more important End. We shall therefore here treat of the Truth and Falshood in general of all Propositions, that we may learn to distinguish the one from the other.

2. That Proposition is true, which is agreeable, or answers to the Nature of the Thing, of which any being is affirm'd or deny'd. Thus when we say that 4 is the one fourth Part of twice 8, that Proposition is true, because agreeable to the Nature of these Numbers. If we say that twice 4 is equal to twice 3, the Proposition is false, because it is not answerable to the Nature of these Numbers.

3. Whoever will speak seriously what he thinks, will confess, that he necessarily believes, that there is no Medium between *Truth* and *Falshood*. It is certain, that all Propositions, consider'd in themselves, appear to us either true or false; for 'tis a *Contradiction to be agreeable or consentaneous, and not consentaneous and agreeable to the Things*. There are indeed some probable Propositions, or suspected of Falshity; but this has nothing to do with the Nature of Propositions, which is in itself determinately true or false; but to our Knowledge, which is not (in respect of these Propositions) sufficient to enable us to determine with Certainty. Of which hereafter.

4. There have been some who have asserted, that this only was certain, *that nothing was certain*, and that *Truth* had no Criterion or certain Mark to be known from *Falshood* in any thing else but that one Maxim. But since they cou'd not deny but that they held this Maxim for a certain *Truth*, there must be, even according to them, some Mark of *Truth*, by which they excepted that Maxim from the Uncertainty of all other Propositions. And they were of Opinion, that they had found the Marks of Uncertainty in all these Things, which the other Philosophical Sects held for undoubted *Truths*. They therefore determin'd positively of all Things at the same time that they pretended to doubt of all things, while they asserted, that all that was said by others, was uncertain. We cannot therefore condemn the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, as denying that Truth was not at all known to us, while they thought they did truly judge of the Uncertainty of all Things; in which they were as dogmatic and positive as any of the other Philosophers.

5. But that we may satisfy ourselves, we must make it the Object of our Inquiry to know, that what we affirm of Things is consentaneous or agreeable to their Nature. If we
will

will give ourselves the Trouble to look into our own Minds, we shall find that there are some Things which compel our Assent, but other Things of which we can suspend our Judgment. When we clearly and distinctly discover the certain Relation between two Ideas, we cannot but acquiesce in that Perception, or think ourselves obliged to make farther Inquiries about it. Thus the Relation of Equality between twice 4 and 8, is so manifest and evident, that we cannot entertain the least Doubt of the Matter.

6. But should any Man affirm, *that there were Inhabitants in the Moon*, after a long Consideration of this Proposition we shall find that we are by no means compell'd to give our Assent to it; the Reason of which is, that we do not distinctly and plainly discover any necessary Relation between the Moon and any manner of Inhabitants; but that we can doubt of that Relation, 'till it be made evident to our Understanding.

7. Hence we may gather, that *Evidence* alone can remove all our Doubts. What remains is, that we inquire whether it follows, that that Proposition is true, of which we have no reason to doubt.

8. We must *first* in this Question observe, that it is intirely superfluous among Men, because whatever Judgment we make of it, we cannot change our Nature. We necessarily give our Assent to those Things which are *evident*, and we shall always preserve our Faculty or Power of doubting in those Things which are obscure.

9. *Secondly*, If Evidence should be found in Propositions that are false, we must necessarily be compelled into Error, since we necessarily give our Assent to Evidence. Hence would follow this impious Position, That God, who made us, is the Author of our Errors, since he has thus put us under a Necessity of falling into them. But it is only consistent with a wicked Nature to oblige us to be deceiv'd, of which in the least to suspect God, would be the Height of Impiety.

10. *Thirdly*, We necessarily love Truth, and hate Error; for there is no body who is not desirous of knowing the Truth, and no body is willingly deceiv'd. But who can prevail with himself so much as to suspect, that we are made in such a Manner by a Beneficent Deity, that we should love that with the greatest Vehemence, which we either could not obtain, or not know whether we obtain'd it or not; which is much the same?

11. *Fourthly*, If we should err in Things that are evident, as well as in those which are not so, we should sometimes in the evident Propositions find Contradictions, which are commonly found in those which treat of Things that are obscure. On the contrary, evident Things are always agreeable to each other, when frequently evident Things disagree with those that are obscure: Whence we may conclude, that Evidence cannot deceive, but Error is confin'd to Obscurity.

12. *Evidence* is, therefore, the Criterion or Mark of *Truth*; and those Things we ought to think true, to which we necessarily give our Assent. For this is likewise the Mark or Characteristick of Truth, that it necessarily compels our Assent. Whatever, therefore, we see *evidently* agreeable to the Things of which we speak, that we must think true. On the other hand, when we find any Proposition evidently contrary to the Nature of the Thing under our Consideration, we may justly declare that to be false.

13. But to decide peremptorily in a Matter that is obscure, is very rash and inconsiderate, as we have observ'd in the First Part, of the *Clearness* or *Obscurity* of *Ideas*, which we shall not repeat. But since those Things which are really obscure, are often asserted to be evident, whoever would avoid that Error, ought, as much as he can, to suspend his Judgment, and nicely to examine whether he be not influenced by some Inclination, or Passion, or Party, when the finding out the Truth ought to be his whole Aim; and then he will never give his Assent to Things that are false and obscure.

C H A P. IV.

Of the several Steps or Degrees of Perspicuity in Propositions, and of Verisimilitude, or Probability.

1. **B**Ecause all that we believe is not built on any evident Knowledge, the Philosophers have observ'd in our Knowledge several Degrees; all which however may be reduced to these two, *Science* and *Opinion*.

Science is a Knowledge deriv'd from the Introspection or looking into the Thing itself of which we discourse, and which excludes all manner of Doubt. But it may arise from a simple Intuition

Intuition or View of the Ideas; as when we consider this Proposition.—*The whole is greater than a Part*, and the like; whose Truth is known by Evidence alone, without any Reasoning on the Point: Or by deducing certain Consequences, and those more remote from evident Principles; such as are innumerable Geometrical Demonstrations, necessarily deduced by a long Chain of Arguments from their first Principles.

3. *Opinion* is the Assent of the Mind to Propositions not evidently true at the first Sight, nor deduc'd by necessary Consequence from those which are evidently true, but such as seem to carry the Face of Truth. Thus 'tis probable, that the Writers of the Life of *Alexander* magnify'd too much his Exploits. 'Tis not probable, or likely, that he ever receiv'd the Queen of the *Amazons*, or pass'd the Mountain *Caucasus*.

4. Some here add *Faith* or *Belief*, which is an Assent given to any one that tells any Thing which we have not seen ourselves, nor found out by any Argument or Ratiocination. But that Faith or Belief depends either on some necessary Conclusion deduc'd from evident Arguments, or only on a probable Opinion, and so may be referr'd to one of the two Heads already mention'd.

5. To these we might add *Doubting*, or a *doubtful Assent*; tho' this be likewise a Species or Sort of *Opinion*, and uses to be contain'd under the general Name of Opinion. For the Assent is *doubtful* when the Probability is weak, which when strong, produces *firm Opinion*. But to make these clearer to the Understanding, we will make a gradual Rising from Probability to Evidence.

6. Since, as we have seen in the former Chapter, those are call'd true Propositions, which agree with the Nature of the Things of which they are spoken; and those probable, which only seem to agree to the Nature of the Thing under Consideration; that Probability may be greater or less, and so produces either a stronger or weaker Opinion. But it is built, summarily consider'd, on our Knowledge and Experience, whether true or false.

7. But to rise from the lowest to the highest Probability, we must first observe, that the lowest Degree of Probability is built on the Relation of another, where that is the only Motive or Belief; in which yet many Things are to be consider'd.

8. If the Person who gives the Relation be wholly unknown to us, altho' what he tells is not incredible, yet we cannot give an intire Credit to him, when there are no other Circumstances to add a Weight to his Narration, because we have had no other Experience of his Credibility, or whether he be worthy of Belief or not. But if we have some slight Knowledge of him, we are the more ready to believe him, especially if he be a noted Man of great Authority with many, tho' we know not whether he has gain'd that Fame and Authority by his Merits or not. Nay, we rather believe a rich Man, of indifferent Qualifications, than a poor Man, because we suppose the former more conversant with Persons skill'd in Affairs, than the latter. An honest Countenance, and Discourse full of Probity, easily win our Assent.

9. If any one with whom we are better acquainted tells us any thing, the more known that is, the more Instances we have of his Veracity, the more ready he finds us to have Assurance in the Truth of what he tells us, tho' he may deceive us even in that very Narration. 'Tis with Difficulty we can persuade ourselves that we are deceiv'd by a Person whom we have known generally to be a Man of Veracity, since Men who have got a Habit of speaking Truth, or any other Habit, seldom act contrary to the constant Disposition of their Mind.

10. There are, besides, various Circumstances which add Force to the Testimony of others; as if it were a Thing of that kind in which he could scarce be deceiv'd; as if Men of Sobriety and Temper should tell us, that they had seen, touch'd, and accurately examin'd some particular Thing, and not with a transient cursory View. The Probability is heighten'd, if the Belief of their Hearers be of no Advantage to them; or if they incur a considerable Danger by telling it, which they might avoid by saying nothing of the Matter; if to these the Number of Witnesses be increas'd, the *Probability* will be so strong, that unless the Narration be opposite to the Nature of the Thing, we can scarce be able to deny our Assent.

11. *Secondly*, What here affects our Minds, is drawn from the very Nature of the Thing, and our own Experience. Whoever will tell us Stories that are impossible, can never gain our Belief, as long as the Narration labours under that Character; for that is the Mark of Falshood.

12. 'Tis first of all Things necessary, that what is spoken should be thought possible: If we have never seen it, nor heard that any other has experienc'd the like, tho' the Matter

itself be not actually impossible, yet it will find but little Credit with us : For Example, — If any one should tell us, That he had seen in the *Indies* a Brilliant Diamond as big as a Man's Head ; tho' in this our Mind can discover nothing plainly impossible, or contradictory, yet should we scarce believe it, because we never ourselves saw one so large, or ever heard of any one else who had.

13. When we ourselves have seen any thing like it, or have known others who have seen the like, we then consider how seldom, or how often it has happen'd ; for the more frequent a Thing has been to our Eyes, or those of others to our Knowledge, the easier Credit it finds with us ; and on the contrary, the seldomer, the more difficultly believ'd. Thus if any one tell us, that he has seen a Stone Bridge over a River one or two hundred Paces long, he will find no Difficulty in gaining our Belief : But we give Credit more hardly to him who shall tell us that he has seen a Bridge of solid Marble, four Miles in Length over an Arm of the Sea, and another Bridge of four hundred Foot in Length, of only one Arch, as they say there are in *China*.

14. By the Test of the same Experience we examine the Circumstances of the Manner of doing any thing, the Circumstances of the Persons, Place and Time ; and if these agree with what we know, they add a Force to the Relation. We farther are apt to consider and weigh the Causes or Motives which mov'd him, to whom the Action is attributed, to do it. For if the Thing be singular, uncommon, and out of the way, we can scarce believe that it should be done without solid and weighty Reasons, of which while we are ignorant, the Matter of Fact must at least remain dubious in our Minds. But if these solid and cogent Reasons are known, we cease to doubt, or at least we easily believe the Matter of Fact, if withal it appear that the Agent knew these Reasons and Motives. Thus we easily believe the many Prodigies or Miracles of the Old Testament, done by God, because they were of the most momentous Importance to preserve at least one Nation uncorrupted by Idolatry, which could not have been done without those Miracles. But we can scarce persuade our Minds to believe, that God, after the Christian Religion was establish'd, should work Miracles on every trifling Occasion, as the Legends of the old Monks and modern Papists pretend.

15. We must seek the third Motive of our Belief in ourselves : For there are some Events, the Truth of which cannot appear to any, but such whose Minds are first qualify'd by
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some certain Knowledge: As for Example, these are some Events of Ancient History: *There was a King of Macedon, whose Name was Alexander, who subdu'd Asia, having vanquish'd King Darius.* These are so well known to those who are conversant with the *Greek and Roman History*, that they can have no Doubt of the Truth; but it is not so evident to a Man who is wholly unacquainted with History; for the former has read many Writers of various Nations and Times, all concurring in the same Account; he knows the Series of the whole History with which these are connected, and came to that Knowledge by degrees, by much Reading. To satisfy another in this Point, he must lead him up the same Steps by which he mounted, else he will find it difficult to make one obstinate believe him.

16. In this Probability of Relations, the fewer or more of these Circumstances occurring, make it the weaker or stronger. Nay, when they all, or the greatest Part meet, so great is the Force of the joining of those Circumstances, that they affect our Mind like the *highest Evidence*. For Example; he who reads the *Roman History*, can no more doubt but that there was such a Man as *Julius Cæsar*, and that he vanquish'd *Pompey*, than that two Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference are equal.

17. As *Evidence* is the Criterion or Characteristic of Truth in Things of Speculation, which depend on Reasoning, so in *Matters of Fact* the Concurrence of so many Circumstances is an undoubted Proof and Mark of Truth. 'Tis certain, that we can no more deny our Assent to these concurring Circumstances, than to the *highest Evidence*; they therefore either persuade and recommend the Truth, or (which is absurd) God has so form'd us, that we must necessarily be deceiv'd.

18. There is likewise a *Probability* which depends only on our own *Reasoning*, or *Experience*, without the Intervention of any thing else, and omitting those Circumstances, which we have enumerated. And here we may distinguish such various Steps and Degrees of *Probability*, that when we come to the highest, it is no longer a mere *Probability*, but manifest Truth, and compels our Assent without any Reserve or Doubt.

19. I. When we consider Things, of which we have some manner of Knowledge, but not a clear and perfect one, we may make a probable Judgment of them, better than if we were wholly ignorant of the Subject; but this Probability is so weak, that we may be persuaded we have been in an Error. But when the Subject is perfectly known to us by Experiment,

we may make more certain Judgment of some Property of that Subject, which is not so thoroughly understood by us. Thus a Goldsmith, or Refiner, who has often melted Gold, and work'd it in divers Ways, can make better Judgment of some Things which belong to that Metal, than a Man who has never been employ'd about it.

20. II. He who has some time doubted of a Thing, and judges not of it but after a serious and long Scrutiny, will make juster Judgment of it than he who (without Experience) gives a rash and precipitate Judgment. 'Tis certain, we believe ourselves more, after we have made a thorough Inquiry into it, than when we are obliged to make a hasty and unpremeditated Judgment. We call not that a diligent Inquiry or Scrutiny, which leaves us in no manner of Doubt; for the Nature of the Thing of which we judge, does not always allow so nice an Introspection, as to free us from all manner of Doubt; but such an Inquiry we call diligent, which is all that the Nature of the Thing will admit. Thus we can examine few, or rather no Substances, so far, as to assure ourselves that we have a certain Knowledge of most of its Properties. This makes all Natural Philosophy (which is not built on Experiments) a mere conjectural Amusement.

21. III. If we have been used to such Experiments before we give our Judgment, and have frequently given the like Judgments of other Things which have been approved by Experiments, taking thence a certain Assurance of a particular Faculty of finding out the Truth, we hope that with little Pains we have hit the Point; yet this Assurance is often very fallacious, and leads us into Errors.

22. IV. Our Judgments of Things are either more certain or uncertain, as the Experiments were made a shorter or longer Time from that in which we call them to Mind. For when our Memory of any Experiment is fresh, as well as the whole Course and Reasons of the Operation, our Judgments then seem more probable to us. But when we retain but a faint Memory of the Inquiry, then we are apt to entertain Doubts of our Diligence in the Course of the Operation, and we dare not maintain our Judgments with any manner of Confidence.

23. V. When Experience has discover'd certain Properties in the Thing which we examine, which are commonly unknown, and only can be found out by Ratiocination, our Guess seems to us the more probable or likely, the more it agrees with those known Properties. If our Inquiry be
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which of the three Hypotheses of the Disposition of the Solar Vortex in which our Earth is, be most probable, that of *Ptolemy*, *Tycho*, or *Copernicus*; that of the last is preferr'd to the other two, because it accounts for all the Appearances in the Planets and fix'd Stars about us; whereas the other two leave many unaccounted for. In such Inquiries as these, the Simplicity of the Hypothesis is of very great Weight; for the fewer Things we are obliged to suppose, for giving an Account of the Appearances, so much the more plausible is the Hypothesis, provided that by it we are able to account for all Things relating to it.

24. VI. When the Subject of our Inquiry is the Object of our Senses, when we have apply'd our Senses rightly dispos'd, then it is no longer a simple Probability, but an indubitable Truth. There are several Cautions to be us'd in this Affair, which are to be learn'd in Natural Philosophy. We must further observe, that our Senses were given us, not to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of Objects, but only of what is necessary to the Preservation of our Lives.

25. But we give more Credit to some of our Senses than to others; thus we confide more in our Sight than our Hearing, because the Objects of our Eyes strike stronger on them than those of the Hearing on the Ears. But when several Senses concur in the Discovery of any Thing, as when we not only see, but hear and touch, then there can be no other Doubt remain of the Truth. Thus, if we see, hear, and embrace our Friend, we cannot have the least Doubt of the Truth or Reality of what we do. Therefore this Conviction of the Senses is no more to be resisted, than the Evidence arising from *Reasoning*.

26. From all that we have said it is plain, that there is this Difference between a slight or weak Probability, and the strongest or highest Degree, that we cannot deny our Assent to this, but we may in that suspend our Judgment, or give it.

27. But the Use of these probable Propositions is different in common Life, and in Philosophical, and merely Speculative Inquiries. For in common Life we very rarely depend on evident Arguments, but esteem it a sufficient Warrant of our doing any thing, if back'd by no contemptible Probability. For shou'd we not undertake any Action 'till we had the utmost Evidence of what we ought to do, we might soon perish; and yet common Prudence will not allow us always to act on the lightest Probabilities. We ought, as much as

possibly we can, diligently to examine all Things, and to contract such a Habit of judging rightly, that we may judge with all the Dispatch and Address imaginable. We ought to chuse, of two Things that are not certain, that which may do us the least Damage, if we should be deceiv'd.

28. But, in Philosophical Things, we proportion our Assent to the Degree of Probability; so that to a weak Probability we give a weak Assent, a stronger to one that is of greater Force, and a full and perfect one to that which comes up to Evidence. For to acquiesce intirely, as in Truth, in a Proposition which is obscure, by reason of some Appearance of Truth, is to throw ourselves into manifest Danger of Error.

29. But we must not in all Things require a *Mathematical Evidence*, since that can only have place in abstracted or general, and adequate or perfect Ideas, all whose Relations and Parts we know: But we ought in *Matters of Fact* to acquiesce in a *Moral Evidence*, or the highest Step or Degree of Probability, as we have described it in this *Chapter*.

C H A P. V.

Of doubtful, suspected of Falsity, and false Propositions.

1. **T**Hose Things are *dubious* in general, in which there are no evident Marks of Truth or Falshood. We sometimes discover some few Circumstances in Things which use to produce Probality, without being join'd to any others which may excite any Suspicion in us. Such are many ancient Histories, which we cannot reject, because we find in them some Things which have the Appearance of Falshood; nor yet admit as undoubted, because they have not Evidence of Truth. Thus the *Chinese* History of their most ancient Kings, especially of *Fohi*, who liv'd soon after *Noah*, we cannot be certain of its Truth, nor accuse them of Falshood. In like manner, we could neither condemn as false, or assert as true, that there are in the Universe many Inhabitants more than Mankind, and that some Planets are the Residence of happier, and others of more unhappy Natives.

2. There are sometimes certain Circumstances which use to attend a Falshood, mixt with others, that are not improbable;

bable; but in such a manner, that the latter are either more numerous, or of greater Weight. There occur in the Fables of the *Greeks* the most ancient Accounts or Reports of that Nation; there are many manifest Lyes or Falshoods, yet if we narrowly inquire into them, we shall observe many Circumstances, which shew that it is highly probable that most of those Things happened to the old Inhabitants of ancient *Greece*, which gave occasion to the Rise of those Fables; so that those Things which are told by the Poets are not all false, but that it is very difficult to distinguish the Truth from the Falshood.

3. There are other Things in which the Reasons for our believing the Truth or Falshood are equal. Many Authors pass this Judgment of the *Giants*, and Gigantic Bones, which are said to be found in many Places. Of the same Kind are most of those Stories of the Apparitions of evil Spirits, &c.

4. Secondly, Those Propositions are suspected of Falshood, in which there are more and more weighty Marks or Signs of Falshood than of Truth, tho' even those Signs be not forcible enough to compel our Assent. These Signs are opposite to those of Probability, from whence they may be easily gather'd.

5. We must observe here the same Cautions which we have deliver'd about the probable Propositions: That is, that we doubt of the Doubtful, and maintain our Suspicion of those which are suspected of Falshood. It would be equally rash and inconsiderate, to confound them either with those which are evidently false, or evidently true. Nor ought they to be confounded with each other, as if where-ever there were any light Occasion of Doubt, there were a Necessity of suspecting Falshood.

6. We may justly call in doubt those Propositions which are opposite to any *Mathematical* or *Moral Evidence*. It is therefore false, that a Human Body, some Feet in Length, can be contain'd in a thin Bit of Bread; and of the same Nature would that Proposition be, which should deny that there were ever such a City as *Rome*.

7. But tho' this be the Nature of *false Propositions*, yet is it not always equally known; and for that Reason, misled by the Liberty of giving our Assent to obscure Ideas, we often assert that as a Truth, which is false: Yet we can never own that for a Truth, the Falsity of which is fully known to us; for *Truth* and *Falshood* are opposite.

8. The Universal Origin of the Error (and in which all others are contain'd) of believing that which is false to be true,

is deriv'd from that Liberty we have mention'd ; by means of which we give our Assent to Things that are obscure, as if they were perspicuous or plain : But there are other particular Causes of this Error, which are something less general, and which are worth our Notice, that we may be aware of them.

9. *First*, Sometimes those who are to deliver their Judgment think not of such Reasons, or Arguments, which yet are in the Nature of the Thing. If Judgment be given then, it is four to one but he errs. Thus, should any one attempt to judge of the Elevation of the Pole, without proper Instruments, unless he had Information of it some other way, he may well be deceiv'd ; or if he hit on the Truth, it will be more by Chance than any Certainty deriv'd from his Art. The same may be said of determining of Nations without knowing the History of them, and the like.

10. *Secondly*, The Ignorance of those who argue, is another Occasion of Error, who often have not improv'd their Wit and Judgment by Study and Application. These will not give their Assent, tho' the most weighty and forcible Reasons are produc'd, which would prevail with Men of Judgment and Skill, because they have never learnt to reason well, nor ever apply'd their Minds to understand the Rules of Art. Thus we every Day find, that most Mechanic Tradesmen, who employ their Time in Manual Operations for the Support of Life, reason very foolishly on those Things which are out of their own Employments, admitting very silly and trifling Arguments as solid ; rejecting those which are really so, as vain and of no Force. This is most observable in Religion and Party-Matters, in which the Mob listens to any thing that is prodigious with thirsty Ears. Nay, Men of higher Stations, Men of Quality, who waste their Lives in Luxury and Pleasure, neglect their Judgment so far, that they scarce know or remember any thing besides what they learn from that Instructress of Fools, *Experience* ; and are easily drawn into the most absurd Opinions, by the Address of cunning Men, who have Art and Knowledge ; of which we have too frequent Examples, both Ancient and Modern.

11. The *Third* Cause of Error is, That Men often will not make use of those Arguments of *Truth* and *Falshood*, that are or may be known ; which arises from Passions. *Impatience of Labour* (for Example) will not let them give themselves the Fatigue of observing the long Connexion of various Reasons and Arguments, which all make their Dependance on each other, or wait for the necessary Number of Experiments, which

which a thorough Knowledge requires ; and so they pass their Judgment, before they are thoroughly acquainted with the Subject. Another Reason of this precipitate Judgment, is our *Lust of Fame and Reputation*, which we are over-hasty to enjoy, while we would seem to be learned, before we really are so. The *Hate* of some particular Man or Sect makes us condemn them, without Inquiry, or hearing their Arguments on any Account whatever. Of this (not to go so far back as the Heathens) we have frequent Examples, both among the Ancient and Modern *Christians*.

12. The *Fourth* Source of Error is the fallacious Rules of Probability, which may be principally referr'd to four Heads or Classes, which we transiently noted in our Discourse of *Probability*.

13. The First is *doubtful Opinions*, which when admitted as certain, produce various other Errors, when they prove to be false themselves. Thus, allowing that those were real Miracles which are told us by the Monks of former Ages, as being done at the Tombs or Images of some Saints, it follows, that they are in the right who make Pilgrimages to such Shrines, and worship such Images. And from these many more Errors would ensue, for many Consequences are deduc'd from one Principle.

14. The Second is of *receiv'd Opinions*, which are suppos'd to be evidently certain, from our having found them from our Childhood admitted by all those with whom we have liv'd or convers'd, and whom we have lov'd. For 'tis no easy Matter to eradicate, or even render doubtful, an Opinion that has taken Root in us in our most tender Years, before we could form a Judgment of them. But Experience has shewn us, that very many Opinions, which have been generally, even universally receiv'd, by the greatest and most extensive Nations and People, are guilty of the greatest Falshood ; and whence, by Consequence, is born a numerous Race of Fictions. Thus, when most of the *Romans* believ'd that *Romulus* and *Remus* were nurs'd by a Wolf ; that Folly being admitted, it prepar'd their Minds for the Reception of many other such Trifles. Thus *Trogus Pompeius* would enforce the Belief, that one of the most ancient Kings of *Spain* was suckled by a Hart, from what the *Romans* held about *Romulus* and *Remus*.

15. The third may be referr'd to the *Passions*, which prepare us for the Belief of certain Opinions, or arm us against giving Credit to others. That often seems to us probable, to have which true may be of Consequence to our Interest ; for

we easily believe what we desire, and as easily hope that others think as we do. This is easily discover'd in our Wars; we scarce ever believe the blunders of our own Generals, or the Defeats of our own Armies; on the contrary, we magnify our Victories, and the Sloth or ill Conduct of our Enemies. And in these Things we are so possess'd with Passion, that we grow angry at those who would gently endeavour to shew us, on how weak a Bottom we have built those Opinions. Thus in panic Fears, or any general Terror, every little Report is sufficient to throw a People into Consternation and Despair.

16. In *Speculative Opinions*, we believe those true, from the Truth of which we derive Advantage, or imagine we do. There are, and have been, many among the *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Mahometans*, and not a few *Christians*, who pretend to believe, or really do, several Things, the Belief of which conduces to their Benefit. If any Doubts or Scruples arise in their Minds about these Opinions, which we cannot disbelieve without Trouble or Danger, we stifle them in their very Birth, by turning our Mind to, and employing it on, some other Object. We easily are persuad'd to believe those Things which will bring us Honour and Reputation, but with greater Difficulty the contrary: Nay, Men are apt to betray this Passion of the Mind so far in Discourse, that tho' they profess that they see and know the Truth, yet they discover a Willingness to believe the contrary, provided they could be defended by any Authority.

17. When any such Opinion is admitted by the Choice of any Passion, that same Passion will easily persuade us, that whatever is agreeable to that Opinion, and of Use to its Confirmation, is most true. Thus the *Romans* having allowed and receiv'd the superstitious Opinion of Prodigies, they believed any thing of the same Kind, especially in Times of Distress or Difficulty: And the *Papists* having declared for Image-Worship, or the *Pope's* Supremacy, with Eagerness catch hold of any Opinion which may conduce to the Proof of them. But there are infinite Numbers of this Sort of Error, which has its Source from our Passions.

18. The Fourth ill Reason of *Probability*, is drawn from *Authority*, in our too great Credulity in that. We frequently find Men, who indeed ought to know perfectly well the Human Understanding, and the Human Faculties, giving Credit to another who assumes an Infallibility, tho' he has but very vain and empty Reasons for his rash Presumption. Certainly Men ought never to yield their Assent to simple Authority, unsupported

ported by Reason, when the Point is of Things which we can only know by their Relation, even when that Relation has the Marks of Truth.

19. We must lastly observe in all these Particulars, that there is a certain Heap or Complexion of Causes, which throw us into Error; and that we rarely fall into it by the Force of one alone. *Want of Argument; Ignorance in our Inquiries* into those which we have; a *Neglect* of them, by which we are unwilling to consider them; *fallacious Reasons* of Probability; *taking dubious* Opinions on Trust for evident Truths; *Vulgar receiv'd* Opinions; the *Passions* of the Mind; *weak Authorities*; all these sometimes break in upon our Mind at once, and sometimes in divided Bodies, and so with Ease bear us down into Error.

20. Against all this there is one general Caution, which we have already laid down; and that is, That we never give our full Assent to any Proposition, whilst it is dubious or obscure; but we should, as long as we can, deny our Assent, and proportion our Belief of Probability to the Degree, or Approach to Certainty or Truth.

21. But there are some other particular Antidotes to be drawn from our Consideration of the Causes which lead us into Error; that is, we ought, with our utmost Care and Application, to examine, on our Inquiry into the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition, whether our Inclination do admit or reject it, on account of some of those Causes which we have laid down. If we find then never so little Reason to suspect any such Thing, we ought to suspend our Judgment as long as possibly we can, and examine farther into the Matter, and to consult some other, who has not allow'd of this Opinion, from which alone great Help has been deriv'd.

C H A P. VI.

Of Faith, or Belief.

1. **W**E have said that *Faith* or *Belief* may be referr'd to *Science* or *Opinion*, so that what we have said of these two may likewise be applied to *Faith*.

2. *Faith* or *Belief*, in general, is said to be that Assent we give to a Proposition advanced by another, the Truth of which we gather, not from our own immediate Reasoning or Experience,

rience, but believe it discover'd by another. It may be distinguish'd into *blind* and *seeing*. That we call *blind Faith*, by which we give our Assent to a Proposition advanced by another, of whose Veracity we have no certain and evident Reason or Proof ; and this Belief or Faith is altogether unworthy of a wise Man. The *seeing Faith* is that by which we give our Assent to a Proposition advanced by one who can neither deceive, nor be deceived ; but the more evident the Proof of this is, so much the more strong and vigorous is the Faith or Belief.

3. Faith has likewise been distinguish'd into *Divine* and *Human*. By the first we believe what is affirm'd by *God* ; by the latter, what is told us by *Man*. When we are equally convinced they are the Words of God, as of Men, the *Divine Faith* is stronger than the *Human* ; because we have vastly stronger Reasons to believe, that God can neither deceive, or be deceived, than those which would persuade us the same of any Man. But when there is any Doubt, whether or no any Proposition is declar'd by God ; or that God has commanded, that we should believe such a Thing ; the Faith can be no stronger than the Reasons on which it is founded. Yet sometimes the Reasons or Motives of believing Men, are of such Weight and Force, that being perfectly understood, they equal a Mathematical Evidence ; and then the *Human Faith* is as solid and unshaken as the *Divine*, because, on both sides, we find an equal Necessity of giving our Assent.

4. But since that which is properly call'd *Divine Faith* is immediately directed to God himself affirming something, no Man can pretend to such a Faith, but a Prophet, to whom God has immediately spoken. But all our present Faith depends on the Testimony of Men, of whose Veracity, however, we have the most certain Proofs, tho' much of their Force depend on our Knowledge of History.

5. From hence we find, that all Faith or Belief has its Foundation on Reasoning, which cannot deceive us, when it necessarily compels our Assent. Those to whom God immediately reveal'd his sacred Will, believ'd him for certain Reasons, and not with a *blind* Assent ; that is, because they knew he could not deceive. We at this Day believe them, or rather their Writings, for certain Reasons, which oblige us to believe all undoubted Histories.

6. We might here go to farther Particulars about Faith in Revelations, which are neither unprofitable, nor unpleasant ; but since they more properly belong to Divinity, we shall pass them by.

C H A P. VII.

Of Division.

1. **W**HEN we discourse of any compounded Thing, or Idea, we ought to consider its Parts separately ; else, while we confound the distinct Parts and Properties, we produce *Obscurity* : But this is avoided by *Division*, which enumerates the distinct Parts of the Thing that is the Subject of our Consideration.

2. *Division* is defin'd, *The Distribution of the Whole into all it contains* ; but the *Whole* has a double Signification, whence also *Division* is double.

3. That is a *Whole*, which consists of integral Parts ; as those Substances which are composed of various Parts, such as the *Human Body*, which may be divided into its several Members ; and this *Division* is call'd *Partition*.

4. But there is another *Whole*, which is properly a certain abstract Idea, which is common to more Things than one, as the *Universals* ; or a compounded Idea, which comprehends the Substance, and its Accidents, or at least most of its Accidents. The Parts of this *Whole* are called *subjective*, or *inferior*.

5. This *Whole* has a triple *Division*. The first is, when the *Kind* or *General* is decided by its *Species*, or *Particulars*, or *Differences* ; as when *Substance* is divided into *Body*, and *Spirit* into *Extended* and *Thinking*. The second, when any thing is divided into several Classes or Forms, by opposite Accidents, as when the Stars are divided into those which give their own proper and unborrow'd Light ; and those of opaque Bodies, which reflect the Light of the Sun. The third is when the Accidents themselves are divided according to the Subjects in which they inhere ; as when Goods are divided into the Goods of the Mind, Body and Fortune.

6. There are three Rules of a good *Division* : The first is, *That the Members of the Division intirely exhaust the whole Thing that is divided*. Thus, when all Numbers are divided into *equal* and *unequal*, the Division is good.

7. The second Rule is, *That the Members of the Division ought to be opposite* ; as the Numbers *equal* and *unequal* are. But this Opposition may be made by a simple Negation ; as, *corporeal*, *not corporeal* ; or by positive Members ; as, *extended*, *thinking*. And this last *Division* is esteem'd the better of the

two,

two, because by it, the Nature of the Thing is better made known.

8. The third Rule is, *That one Member of the Division ought not to be so contained in another, that the other can be affirm'd of it*; tho' otherwise it may be in some manner included in it, without any Vice or Fault in the *Division*. Thus *Extension* (Geometrically consider'd) may be divided into a *Line*, *Surface*, and *Solid*; tho' the *Line* be included in the *Surface*, and the *Surface* in the *Solid*; because the *Surface* can't be call'd the *Solid*, nor the *Line* the *Surface*. But Numbers would be very faultily divided into *equal*, *unequal*, and the *sixth*, because *six* is an equal Number.

9. For the Sake of Order and Perspicuity, when we have found the *Division*, we must take Care to conceive it, so, that it do not produce Confusion and Obscurity. When we examine into the Nature of any thing, — *the Division must not be made into too many, or too general Members*; for by this Means distinct Things would be confounded together. Thus should any one, who was about to inquire into the Nature of all the Bodies which are known to us, divide them into those which are in this our Earth, those without it, and then, without any other Subdivision, proceed to his Inquiry into their Nature, he must without doubt find himself confounded.

10. *The Members ought by no Means, unless the Subject necessarily require it, to be too unequal*. Such a Division is theirs who divide the Universe into *Heaven* and *Earth*; for the *Earth*, in comparison of that vast Expanse in which the Planets and fixt Stars are contain'd, which is call'd *Heaven*, is less than a Point. For 'tis plain, that such a Division would disturb the Mind, whether we were searching after Truth, or teaching Truth discover'd to another.

11. But we must take heed on the other hand, *lest, while we endeavour to make the Parts equal, we do not, as we may say, offer Violence to the Nature of Things, by joining those which are really separate, and separating those which are really join'd together*. We must, therefore, have a nice Regard to the Connexion of Things, lest we violently break asunder those Things which are closely united; and join those together which have no manner of Connexion with one another.

12. We must farther take Care not to make our Division too minute, lest the Number of the Parts burden the Memory, and destroy the Attention; which is a Vice utterly to be avoided by those who would reason well.

13. Another Fault of *Division* is, when instead of dividing real Parts of a Thing, we only enumerate the different Signification of Words.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Definition ; and first, of the Definition of the N A M E.

1. **D***E*finition is double ; one of the *Thing*, and one of the *Name*. The first we esteem the Nature of the *Thing* ; the second explains what Signification we give to any *Word* or *Name* ; of the last here, referring the first to the next Chapter.

2. Since we do not always think to ourselves only, but are oblig'd frequently to convey the Sentiments of our Minds to others, either in Words spoken or written, or be inform'd in the same Manner of those of other People, which otherwise we know not ; we may lead others, or be led ourselves, by others, into Errors, by the Ambiguity of the Terms or Words that are made use of by either, unless we explain what we mean by such ambiguous Words, by others that are not ambiguous.

3. We mean not here by Definition of the *Name*, the declaring the Use, or Signification of Words according to Custom : We seek not in what Sense others use any Word, but in what Sense we shall make use of it in our future Discourse.

4. We shall observe, that the Signification which we design to give any Word, depends intirely on our Will and Pleasure ; for we may affix what Idea we please to any Sound, which in itself signifies nothing at all. But the Definition of the Thing signified by any Sound, has not this Dependence on our Will and Pleasure ; for since its Nature is certain and determin'd in itself, our Words cannot make any manner of Alteration in it.

5. *Secondly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is intirely at our Will and Pleasure, it cannot be call'd in question by any one else. But then we are to give always the same Sense to the same Word, to avoid Mistakes, for which End we define our Terms.

6. *Thirdly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is not to be call'd in question, 'tis plain, it may be made use of, like an undoubted or self evident Maxim, as the *Geometricians* do, who, more than all Men beside, make use of such Definitions ; but

we must take care, lest we think, therefore, that there is any thing in the Idea affixed to that defined Term which may not be controverted. It is an undoubted Principle, that some one has defined some Word in such a Manner; but what he thinks of the Thing, is no undoubted Principle. Thus, if any one should define *Heat to be that which is in those Bodies which heat us, and that it is like that Heat which we feel*; no Man could find fault with the Definition, as far as it expresses what he means by the Word *Heat*; but this does not hinder us from denying, that there is any thing in the Bodies that warm us like what we feel in ourselves.

7. From what has been said, 'tis plain, that the Definition of the Name is of great Use in Philosophy; yet we cannot conclude from thence, that all Words ought, or indeed can possibly be defin'd; for there are some so clear (to such who understand the Language we use) and of such a Nature, that they cannot be defin'd; as the Names of all simple Ideas, as we have shewn under that Head.

8. Moreover, where the received Definitions are sufficiently clear, they ought not to be chang'd, because those who are accusom'd to the receiv'd Use, will understand us better, and we ourselves run not so great a Risque of Inconstancy in not preserving our Definition. It is manifest, that Words are better understood, to which we have been long us'd to affix certain Ideas, than those to which new ones are to be join'd, and we better remember the Sense of One, than of Two.

9. From hence likewise it follows, that we should, as little as possible, depart from the received Sense, when we are necessarily obliged to forsake it in some measure; for we sooner, and with more Ease, accustom ourselves to Significations of Words that are near, or related to those which are already admitted, than those which are plainly remote, or us'd in a quite contrary Sense.

10. But this, as we have hinted, must be observ'd above all Things, that we always keep to the Definition which we have once made; else we confound our Hearers or Readers, and fall into seeming Contradiction, which renders our Discourse unintelligible.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Definition of the THING.

THE *Definition* of the *Name* depends intirely on our Will and Pleasure, but the *Definition* of the *Thing* we have no Power over; for we can by no means affirm that to be in a Thing or Idea which we consider, which is not in it. *Definition* is usually divided into *accurate*, and *less accurate*; the first is properly *Definition*, the second *Description*.

2. A *Definition*, properly so call'd, explains the Nature of the Thing defin'd, by an Enumeration of its principal Attributes; of which those that are common to others with the Thing defined, is call'd the *Kind* or *General*; but those which are peculiar to the Thing defin'd, the *Difference*. Thus a Circle may be defin'd, *a Figure whose Circumference is everywhere equi-distant from the Centre*; The Word *Figure* is the *Kind* or *General*, as being a Name common to all other different Figures, as well as to a Circle; the rest are the *Difference*, since they distinguish a Circle from all other Figures.

3. But *Description* is an Enumeration of many Attributes, and even those which are accidental. Thus, if any one is describ'd by his Deeds or Actions, or his Sayings or Writings; as if we should, instead of naming *Aristotle*, say, *The Philosopher, who obtains a Monarchy among the School-men without a Partner*.

4. Individuals cannot be defin'd, because tho' we know not their essential Properties by which they differ from others of the same Species, we must remember likewise, that the inmost Nature of Substances is unknown, and therefore they cannot be defin'd. Hence 'tis plain, that only the *Modes* whose whole Nature is known to us, can only be explain'd by a certain and properly call'd Definition.

5. There are three common Rules of a *Definition*; the first is, *that the Definition should be adequate to the Thing defined*; that is, agree to all those Thing which are contained in the Species which is defined. The second, *That the Definition should be proper to the Thing defined*; for when the Definition makes us know the Thing defined from all other Things, it must be proper and agreeable to the Thing defin'd. The third, since we make use of a Definition to make known a Thing to another, which he knew not before, *The Definition ought to be clear, and more easy and obvious than the Thing defined*.

6. Here

6. Here we must again admonish the Reader, not to confound the receiv'd Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing. For this Reason the Definition of the Thing cannot be expressed in Words plainly synonymous ; as if any one should ask what is the Supreme Deity ? And we should answer, the Supreme God : since the latter explains no more the Nature or Attributes of that God, than the former.

7. From these Observations we find, that Definition can only have place in compound Ideas, and is only the Enumeration of the chief simple Ideas of which they are compounded ; but simple Ideas cannot be defin'd, because there can be no Enumeration. He who knows not what that is which we call *Heat*, will only learn it by Experience, or some synonymous Words, or some Word of another Language, or by Circumlocution, by which the Thing is shewn, not defin'd ; as if we should say, *That it was a Sensation, which we find when we sit by the Fire, or walk in the Sunshine* : By this we should shew what Thing it was to which we gave that Name, but never explain its Nature. For, should any one want that Sense by which we have that Sensation, he would no more understand what we meant, than a Man born blind what was a Green Colour, by telling him it was that Sensation we have when we behold the Grass in the Fields.





T H E
 Third Part of LOGIC;
 O R,
The Art of REASONING.

C H A P I.
 Of METHOD, *both of* Resolution *and*
 Composition.

HAVING consider'd our simple Perceptions, and the several Sorts of our Judgments, and shewn how in them we should conduct ourselves to avoid Errors; it remains, that we shew in what Manner our Judgments should be dispos'd, that we may the sooner, and with the greater Safety, arrive at the Knowledge of Truth. This Part of *Logic* is call'd *Method*, which, contrary to the Custom of the Schools, I shall treat with Diligence, as more conducive to the Knowledge of Truth than the following Part of Argumentation, on which, however, they were more prolix.

2. Since most Truths which fall under our Examination depend on the Knowledge of others, from whence they are deduced by a certain Chain of Consequences, it is not sufficient to have deliver'd the Rules by which we know to what Propositions (separately consider'd) we may give our Assent; we must also shew, how they are to be dispos'd among themselves, in regard of each other, that by them we may descend as it were by so many Steps to Truth, plac'd, according to the old Proverb, in the Bottom of a Well.

3. *Method* is twofold; one is of *Resolution*, by which Truth is generally sought after; the other of *Composition*, by which the Truth now found out is taught or imparted to another.

4. In

4. In the Method of *Resolution* we proceed from some particular known Truth, to others which belong to some particular or singular Thing. In the Method of *Composition* we propose some certain general Truths, from which we deduce particular Truths.

5. If in the Method of *Resolution* we propose any Maxims, it is not immediately in the beginning, and all together, and but once, but only as they are necessary for the finding out the Truth; on the contrary, in the Method of *Composition* they are propos'd all together in the beginning, before there is any need of them.

6. These two Methods differ from each other, as the Methods of searching our Genealogy, descending from the Ancestors to their Posterity; or on the contrary, by ascending from the Posterity to the Ancestors. Both of them have this in common, that their Progression is from a Thing known, to that which is unknown: Those Things which are known, by both are set in the Front, or first Place, that by them we may (by certain Consequences deduced from them) be able to arrive at those which are not known; and then all this Chain of Consequences in both, consist of Propositions connected with each other.

7. And these following Things are summarily requir'd in Both, that Error may be avoided. First, That no Proposition be admitted as true, to which you can deny your Assent, or which is not evident. Next, the Connexion of the following Proposition to the foregoing, in every Step of the Progression, be likewise evident or necessary; otherwise, if in a long Chain of Propositions we admit but one Proposition or Consequence that is doubtful or false, whatever was directly deduc'd from thence, must of necessity be either dubious or false.

8. To make this plainer, we shall first propose an Example of the Method of *Resolution*, and then one of that of *Composition*. Let us suppose this to be the Question, *Whether on the Supposition of Man's Existence, we can prove, that God does exist?* To resolve this, our Method must be thus: (1.) Human Kind, which now inhabit the Earth, did not always exist, all History whatever still fixing a Beginning to Mankind: This they do not only assert in express Words, but by the whole Series and Course of what they treat, make it manifest, since there is no History which pretends to give us an Account of more than about 6000 Years. (2.) If human Kind did not always exist, but had a Beginning, there is a Necessity that there should be some other Cause of its Existence; for from nothing, nothing can
arise,

arise. (3.) Whatever that Cause is, it must have at least all those Properties, which we find in ourselves ; for none can give what he has not himself. (4.) Farther, there is a Necessity that there should be in this Cause Properties which are not in us, since he could do that which we cannot do ; that is, make Man exist, who before had no Being, or that the Mind and Body of Man should begin to exist, which Power we by no means find in ourselves. (5.) We find that we have the Power or Faculty of *Understanding* and *Willing*, and a Body which can be mov'd various ways. (6.) Therefore, there must be those Properties, and many far more excellent in the Cause of Human Kind, such as the Power of drawing out of nothing or making something to exist, which had before no Existence at all. (7.) But this Cause either exists still, or has ceas'd to be. (8.) If he does not still exist, he did not exist from Eternity ; for whatever existed from Eternity, can neither by itself, or by any other Cause, be reduced to Nothing. (9.) If it did not exist, it must have been produced by some other ; for whatever has a Beginning, must be generated by some other. Then would the same Question return of the Producer, which may be thus generally resolved : All Things that are, had a Beginning, or they had none. Those which had a Beginning, were produc'd by Causes which had none ; therefore, if there be any Thing that does exist, there are eternal Causes. (10.) It must therefore be confess'd, that there is some eternal Being, which has in itself all those Properties which we find in ourselves, and infinitely more, whether he immediately created us by himself, or by any other Nature ; which is not here the Question. (11.) If this Cause of Human Kind do still exist, the same Reasoning would return which we used in the 9th and 10th Steps of our Progression. (12.) Therefore, it necessarily follows from the Existence of Human Kind, that God does exist, or some eternal Cause, which mediately or immediately created Mankind.

9. Thus by the Method of *Resolution* we prove, or rather find out the Existence of a God. And we may teach or convey this Truth thus found out to others, by the Method of *Composition*, in this manner : (1.) All Beings have a Beginning of Existence, or they have none. (2.) Nothing can come out of nothing, or begin to exist by its own Power, when it had no Existence. (3.) All those Things, therefore, which had a Beginning, must be produced by some Being that had no Beginning, (4.) Human Kind had a Beginning. (4.) It was therefore produced mediately, or immediately by some eternal Cause. (6.) That Cause we call *God* ; and therefore *Human Kind were created by God*.

10. All these Propositions, as we have observed, ought in both Methods to be nicely examined, that none be admitted as certain and known, which is not so ; and that no Consequence be slid in, which is not necessary. Having so done, we may know that we have found the Truth, or are taught the same by others.

11. There are some Helps to be had for the more easy Performance of this Task, and which are to be taught more distinctly, or with greater Care and Confirmation, because on them depend the whole Easiness and Certainty of such Reasons or Arguments as are alledg'd. First, what ought to be the Disposition of the Mind for the more happy Discovery of Truth : Secondly, we shall deliver the Rules of the Method of *Resolution* ; and, Thirdly, those which belong to the Method of *Composition*.

C H A P. II.

Of the Necessity of Attention, and the Means of obtaining it.

1. **W**E have more than once asserted, that Evidence is the Main, or Criterion of Truth. But this Knowledge is not enough to direct our Inquiry after Truth because that Evidence is not always to be had, nor does the Mind discover it sometimes, without a long Labour and Fatigue. We must, therefore, inquire by what Means we may obtain this Evidence in our Thoughts.

2. It is not enough that we can form Ideas of all things, which we can conceive in our Minds to come at the Knowledge of Truth, but the Mind must consider them with the greatest and most lively Attention, if we would obtain a thorough Knowledge of them.

3. We have shewn, that our Judgments are the Perceptions of certain Relations, in which the Mind does acquiesce, and that our Errors of Judgment arise from it, when it does acquiesce in obscure Perceptions, as if they were clear, before it has with sufficient Care examin'd into their Nature.

4. In Judgments of the Mind we should use the same Method as in Judgments of the Eyes, which approach the obscurer Objects nearer, and employ the Help of artificial Lights, narrowly looking into them ; so should the Mind in Judgments
restrain

restrain its Assent, till it has with the utmost Attention consider'd according to the Nature of the Thing into which it inquires. Hence it appears of how great and necessary use Attention is, which is only a long and uninterrupted Consideration of any one Idea, without the Interposition of any others.

5. We find that we are much more attent, and with greater Ease apply our Thoughts to the Consideration of those Things which affect us by the Intervention of our Senses, certain Images of which are before the Mind, and such as excite some Affection or Passion, than to those which came into the Mind without any of these Things. Thus we are attent in the Consideration of any enlighten'd Body, in some Image of a corporeal Thing offer'd to the Inquiry of the Mind ; and in the Consideration of a Thing that may bring us Advantage or Damage, which strikes us with Fear or Desire.

6. Every one who has try'd it before Use has bred a Facility, knows, that 'tis much more difficult to fix the Mind on abstract Ideas for any Time. The Reason of the Difference is plain, because the Mind in other Things finds Assistance from the Intervention of the Body, as 'tis affected with more sprightly and lively Sensations and Images, which will thrust themselves on it whether it will or not : On the contrary, in abstract Contemplations, and which derive nothing from the Body, corporeal Motions obstruct the Attention while they perpetually recal the Mind to Bodies, at the same time that the Object of the Mind has nothing in itself that can much affect it, or engage the Attention ; nay, when the Mind is employ'd in these abstract Considerations, it must with all its Force banish all corporeal Images, which croud perpetually upon it. Nor can this be perform'd without Pain, since the Law of Nature has oblig'd the Mind to be in Pain, when Force is offer'd to the Body.

7. Having laid down this, we must try whether or no we cannot increase the Attention by the Help of the Senses and Imaginative Faculty, even in Things that are merely incorporeal. By what Art this may be done, we shall shew hereafter ; but above all Things we should take care that the Inconvenience do not arise, which usually follows the Commotions of the Mind by the Senses, Imagination, or Passions ; that is, when the Mind is something more vehemently affected, it is turn'd in such a manner to the Object which affects it, that it takes notice of nothing else. Then is this Motion so far from assisting the Attention to Ideas of incorporeal Things, that, on the contrary, it proves an Obstacle to it.

8. Hence

8. Hence this important Consequence in our Inquiry after Truth is drawn, that they, who would seriously apply themselves to the Search after Truth, should avoid, as much as they possibly can, all the more strong and vehement Sensations; such as great Noises, Light too strong and glaring, Pain, Pleasure, &c. They should likewise take care that their Imagination be not too vehemently moved by any Object, which should infect it so far, as to make them think of it whether they will or not; for by this means the Attention will be frequently interrupted. First they ought not to be accustomed to the stronger Emotions of the Passions; for those who experience frequently these Perturbations, contract such a Habit of Mind, that they can scarce think of any thing else but the Objects of the Passions, or those things which have some Connexion with them; but since, for Reasons which we shall not touch on here, no Man can be intirely exempt from them, they must make it their Endeavours to seek some Assistance from those unavoidable Evils to their Inquiries after Truth.

9. The Senses may be of advantage to the promoting the Attention, if we make use of them as the *Geometricians* do, who express invisible Quantities by Lines, Numbers, and Letters; for by this means the Mind more easily adheres to, attends, and is fix'd to the Thing which it inquires after; for while the Eyes are fix'd on the Figures, the Mind contemplates the Thing whose Signs they are. And this is done with the more Safety, because there is no Danger of confounding the Figures with the Thing he seeks, there being no Relation between them, but what he makes. Thus the Swiftness and Duration of any Motion can be examined by the Description of certain Figures, which the *Geometrician* can never believe to be the Thing that is the Subject of his Inquiry.

10. By this means we may, without Danger, make use of our Senses in Ratiocination. That is, that we may not be oppress'd by the Multitude of the Relations that are to be considered, they may be express'd on Paper by certain Words. Besides, we give more easy Attention to Propositions already express'd, and set down on Paper, than to their Ideas. We can review more often, and with more Ease, our Marks in long Arguments, when we have fix'd the Signs of them on Paper, than when we have them only in our Minds.

11. But these ought to be look'd on as Helps, which may be made use of by young Beginners, but should not be offer'd to those of riper Understanding, lest they should accustom themselves too much to them, so that it render them incapable of

of understanding any thing without the Assistance of some corporeal Image.

12. The Faculty which brings the Images of corporeal Things to the Mind, is most strictly united to the Senses; and therefore belongs to what is said of the Senses, and yet affords a particular Help to assisting the *Attention*. For Example, when we in silent Contemplation compare the Ideas with the external and corporeal Objects, we may observe the like in the Operations of the Eyes, as in the Actions of the Mind.

13. If we are to explain to others what we have found out, they will give more Attention to a Comparison, than to a bare and naked Exposition of the Thing; they will sooner apprehend and understand us, and remember it better. Hence arose the Manner in the remotest Antiquity of using Fables, which was long in Vogue among the oriental Nations.

14. But here we must beware of the Error of the Ancients in this Particular, which was, while they with too much Zeal fought the Attention of the Unskilful, they had recourse to so many Figures and Phrases drawn from corporeal Things, that they offer'd to their Minds scarce any Thing but the Ideas of corporeal Beings: So that the Truth being overwhelm'd with those Figures, was perfectly hid, and cannot, without the utmost Difficulty, be freed from them by the Learned themselves.

15. We must farther be very cautious of avoiding an Error too common to the Ancients and Moderns, who fancied the Comparison, or some other Figure, which was only to illustrate the Things, was really an Argument to prove them.

16. That the Passions often are Enemies to the Knowledge of Truth, no body can doubt, and we have shewn; many have made a Doubt whether they are ever of any Use to it; yet since they are not evil in their own Nature, they may, by good Management, be of great Help to the increasing the Attention; nay, perhaps we may say, that this is never extremely sharp without some Passion. Thus we may make a happy Use of the Desire of Glory, if we keep it within its due Moderation. When this Passion is alone, it is dangerous; other Passions are therefore to be excited in us, which should hinder us from suffering ourselves to be borne down by the Desire of Glory: And this is the very Desire of knowing the Truth, which is in the Minds of all Mankind; for there is no Man that loves to be deceiv'd, nor any Man that is pleas'd with Ignorance.

17. But we must, even here, take care that the Desire of finding out the Truth be not the only Cause of our Judgments;

for the Passions never give any Light to the Judgment, but only excite our Inquiry after what is advantageous for us to know: But the Judgment ought not to be given as long as we can with-hold it, in Things of which we can have an evident Knowledge.

C H A P. III.

Of the Capacity of the Mind, and the Means of enlarging it.

1. **W**E call that Mind *capacious* that has many Ideas before it at once; and the more of those it can have a distinct Perception of at once, the larger or more capacious is the Mind; and the fewer, the more narrow we esteem it. The *Capacity* therefore of the Mind is enlarged, by contracting a Habit or Custom of considering many Ideas at once, without Confusion. We mean not all *together*, and at *once*, that in one numerical individual Moment, and one only Perception of the Mind, many Things can be distinctly understood, since 'tis certain that few Things can be distinctly view'd together. But this Expression is to be allow'd the Latitude of meaning a very short Time; and the Reason we used the Term *together*, is, that there is no external Mensuration of Time, to divide the Rapidity of the Mind's Motion from one Thought to another.

2. If any one should demand, whether the Minds of all Men were alike, except what Difference is made by Education? we should only answer, That we do not certainly know, but that Experience gives us a certain Confirmation of two Things.

3. That some have so unhappy a Genius, that it is with Difficulty they conceive the Connexion of two Propositions, unless they fall on Subjects with which their Experience has been conversant; but are perfectly blind in Contemplation, nor can in the least discover any Difference betwixt a good and bad Ratiocination. Others again have a Mind something larger than this, and can by one View of the Mind comprehend more than one Connexion of Propositions; but if the Deduction of Consequences be something longer than ordinary, they cannot extricate themselves. But then there are some happy Genius's, which can with Ease, if not at one View, yet in a very little Time, and few Thoughts, comprehend a long Chain of Propositions.

positions. They are neither fatigued nor disturbed with that Number of Propositions which would absolutely confound some others.

4. It is apparent from Experience, in the second place, that the *Capacity* of the Mind can be enlarg'd by a frequent Use of thinking of many Things at once. 'Tis sufficiently known, that the young Learners of *Geometry*, *Arithmetic*, or *Algebra*, are at first disturb'd with the Number of Ideas to be consider'd together; nor can they, without a very painful Attention, understand what they read, or are taught, by reason of the Number of Ideas which are to be consider'd: As for Example,—Those who at first endeavour to learn the *Rule of Division*, are confounded or puzzled by the manifold Comparifon of the *Divisor* and *Dividend*; and they are surprized to consider how the Master that teaches them shall be able at one View, or at least with very few, to comprehend the Connexion of so many Propositions as are form'd in a long Arithmetical Operation; yet the same Students of this Art, after they have apply'd themselves to the Study of Accounts for some Months, comprehend many Operations with Ease in their Mind, when before they could not take one. Whence 'tis evident, that the Capacity of the Mind will admit of an Increase.

5. If it should farther be ask'd, whether the Capacity of all Men could be improv'd by the same Method; we may answer, That Experience has shewn us, that all such who can that way improve their Minds, have by it enlarged their Capacity; for there are some, who, from their first Application, could never make any Progress in these Studies; but among those who are not wholly incapable of these Studies, some make a swifter and greater Progress than others, even from the Beginning, whether this be the Effect of the Nature of the Mind or the Body.

6. To come to the Point itself; whoever has a Desire to enlarge the Capacity of his Mind, must make it his Endeavour to have his Attention at his Command, so as to apply it when and to what he pleases, which may be obtain'd by the Means propos'd in the former Chapter. For he that cannot be attentive to a few, will much less be capable of understanding many together, and not be confounded by the Multiplicity of the Objects.

7. But since the Capacity of the Mind, as we have seen, is a Faculty within us by Nature, whatever we do to acquire it, as we have express'd it, comes only to this, that by frequent

Exercise we render its Use easy to us. We must only examine on what Objects it is chiefly exercis'd.

8. Objects are of two kinds; one are Mathematical, the other cannot be treated mathematically. Whatever can be examin'd in a Geometrical Method (which we shall deliver when we shall treat of the *Method* of Composition) are Mathematical; and of this kind are all Things of which we can have a perfect Knowledge, that is, whatever belongs or relates to *Modes*.

9. All who have apply'd themselves to the enlarging the Capacity of the Mind, tell us, that it is acquir'd by the Consideration of these Things. And 'tis certain, that in *Arithmetic* (to instance one Part of the *Mathematics* for all) the manifold Parts of the Object are so distinctly noted, and so clearly perceiv'd, that provided the Attention be apply'd, there is no manner of danger of our being confounded. In Computation or Accompts, there are, first, as many *Objects* as *Units*; next, certain *Names* are impos'd (for Brevity's sake) on certain Collections of *Units*, without producing any Confusion, how great soever the Collection of *Units* may be; as one *Hundred*, a *Thousand*, an *Hundred thousand*, a *Million*, &c. Lastly, there are long Comparisons of Numbers made in the gross, without coming to any one particular, or alone, but of many collectively together, and at one. For whether we add or subtract, multiply or divide, to which all *Arithmetic* is reduc'd, many Numbers are consider'd at once, except only the Number *Two*, which consists only of two *Units*; but in the Computation of that, there is not any need of Art.

10. In Computation therefore, we exercise the Faculty of distinctly understanding many Things together, which we call the *Capacity of Genius*; for we should still remember, that this Capacity we speak of, ought always to be join'd with this distinct Perception, since a confus'd Understanding of Things is of no Use to the finding out of Truth.

11. The Consideration of Substances cannot be mathematically discuss'd; and we should in vain imagine, that in these the Capacity of the Mind could ever be acquir'd; for since we have no clear Knowledge of particular Substances, much less can we know with Perspicuity a Collection of Substances together; we can only consider their Properties, and the Relations that there are between them.

12. Hence we may gather, that the Mind cannot be render'd more capacious by the Consideration of *Genus* and *Species* of the old Philosophers, who rang'd all Substances under those Heads, because it is an uncertain Division of unknown Objects.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Laws of the Method of Resolution.

1. **B**Efore we proceed to the Laws of the Method of *Resolution*, we must recal to our Memory certain Maxims on which they are built. The first is what we have more than once taken Notice of, *viz. That we must consider Evidence in every Step or Degree of our Progressions in our Reasoning or Arguments*; unless we would run the Risque of falling into Error.

2. The next is the Consequence of this, *That we ought to reason on those Things only, of which we have clear and perspicuous Ideas*; or on *obscure Things, only so far as we know them*. Whence we may gather, that our Reasoning ought to be only conversant about the Properties and Modes of Substances and abstract Ideas, and not about the inmost Nature of Things extremely obscure.

3. The third Maxim is, *That we ought always to begin from the simple and easy, and to dwell on them a while, before we proceed to Things compounded and more difficult*; For we ought first to have a clear Perception of simple Ideas, else we can never have a sufficient Knowledge of the Compounded.

4. These general Maxims are the common Principles of both the Method of *Resolution* and *Composition*. For in both Methods are equally requir'd Evidence in the Degrees or Steps of Progression, Choice of the Subject of our Inquiries, and the Knowledge of Things simple before those that are compounded; as will appear from what follows. But now we shall proceed to those Laws which are peculiar to the Method of *Resolution*.

5. The first is, *That we must clearly and perfectly understand the State of the Questions propos'd*. If we propose any thing as the Subject of our Inquiry, it is necessary, to avoid rambling from the Point, that we have a distinct Knowledge or Idea in our Mind of the Thing we examine. If the Question be propos'd by others in certain Words, we ought, before we proceed to the Solution, to have a distinct and clear Knowledge of the Meaning of every Word in which it is express'd.

6. Having now a distinct Knowledge of the Subject of our Inquiry, and the Ideas which are contained in the Question being now to be compared, another Law is, *That with some Force and Effort of the Mind, one or more middle Ideas must be discover'd, which should be like a common Measure or Standard,*

by whose Help the Relations between the Ideas to be compar'd be found out.

7. But when the Questions are difficult, and stand in need of a long Discussion, the third Law is, *That we cut off all that has no necessary Relation to the Truth sought after, from the Thing which is the Subject of our Consideration.*

8. When the Question is reduc'd to its narrowest Bounds, that is, when we distinctly perceive the Matter in dispute, having rejected all that does not necessarily belong to it, the fourth Law is, *That the compounded Question be divided into Parts, and those to be separately consider'd in such Order, that we begin with those which consist of the more simple Ideas, and never proceed to the more compounded, till we distinctly know the more simple, and by Reflection have render'd them easy to our Consideration.*

9. When by Reflection we have obtain'd a distinct Knowledge of all the Parts of the Question, and manage it with Ease in our Minds, thus the fifth Law is, *That certain Signs of our Ideas, comprehended in establish'd Figures, or in the fewest Words that can be, be imprinted in the Memory, or mark'd on Paper, lest the Mind have any more Trouble about them.* This Law ought chiefly to be obey'd when the Questions are difficult, and consist of many Heads, tho' it be not unuseful even in those that are more easy. By the Help of this Law the Reasoning is sooner concluded, than if they were conceiv'd in many Words and other Signs; and we thus likewise sooner discover the Connexion of the Parts.

10. When those Things which are necessary to the Question are clear to us, and marked with compendious Signs, and disposed in Order; then *must the Ideas* (by the sixth Law) *be compared with each other, either by Reflection alone, or by express Words.* When more Things than one are to be compared, the Memory and Judgment receive great Assistance from Writing, which are easily otherwise confounded, and we can make but an ill Judgment of Things confused.

11. If, after we have compared all the Ideas, whose Signs we have committed to Paper, we cannot yet find out what we seek, then the seventh Law suggests, *That we cut off all the Propositions, which after a full Examination we find of no Use to the Solution of the Question; then we may again proceed in the same Order in the rest, which is delivered in the six preceding Laws.*

12. If, after we have repeated this Examination as often as it is necessary, nothing of what we have marked seems to con-
duce

duce to the Solution of the Questions, we must confess, that as to us, it is not to be resolv'd, since whatever we could discover in its Parts, prove insufficient to solve it. We ought therefore to throw it intirely aside, or consult some Person more knowing in the Subject, or better skill'd in Inquiries.

13. These are the Laws of the Method of *Resolution*, all which are not to be observ'd in all Questions; for one or two of them are sufficient for simple Questions, or those which consist of but few Propositions. But when they are very much compounded and intricate, we must often come to the last, and that to be repeated more than once. But this being a Matter of very great Importance, we shall discourse of them separately in several *Chapters*.

C H A P. V.

Of the three Maxims on which all Method is built.

1. **W**E shall say nothing more than we have already on the first Maxim about *preserving Evidence in every Step or Degree of Knowledge*; but we could not but take Notice of it in this Place, both to make appear the Connexion of those that follow with it, and also because it cannot be too much inculcated to Men who have been used to give their Assent to Things that are obscure.

2. The next, which is the Consequence of the former, is, *That we ought not to reason on Things of which we have no clear Ideas, or of obscure Things, as far as they are obscure.* We must not take this Maxim in a Sense that should exclude the Nature of all Things which are yet unknown to us from our Inquiries; for this would be directly opposite to our Design, by which we aim to open a way to the Discovery of Truths unknown to us.

3. But we are of Opinion, that a Philosopher ought not to reason on obscure Things, in a double Sense: The first is, That he ought not to chuse such Objects of his Contemplation, which, it is plain, cannot be discovered by evident Demonstrations. (1.) Thus, as several *Geometricians* have demonstrated, the *squaring of the Circle*, and the *doubling the Cube*, cannot be found out. (2.) Thus we cannot discover what is the inmost Nature of Things; all we can know of that, is, that Experience has shewn us, that there do co-exist in Substances certain

Properties : We should therefore reject the Inquiry into Substances, and only consider their Properties. (3.) If we cannot find out the inmost or whole Nature of any one created Substance, much less must we pretend to discover the Substance of that Supreme Nature which created all the rest. We may gather, as it were by Experience, from those Properties which we see in the Creatures, that they are in the Creator, since no body can give what he has not ; yet we cannot conceive how all the real Properties of all-Creatures can co-exist in God.

4. The other Sense of this Maxim is, That no certain Consequence can be drawn from a Principle that is unknown or uncertain. Tho' this be a Maxim allowed by all Philosophers, both ancient and modern, yet have they all offended against it, persuading themselves that they do know their Principles to be clear and certain, which yet are often very uncertain, and many times not known at all. Thus all that we have any clear Perception of in our Minds, is the Property of Thinking ; and therefore we cannot positively affirm, that there is any other in it ; nor, on the other side, can we deny that there is, because there may be some of which we are ignorant.

5. But it is here necessary to take Notice (lest any one should wrest what we mean by our Mind into another Sense) that what we say is not to be understood as if we could not deny Contradictions. For 'tis one thing to deny that any Particular is not in a Subject besides what we see, and another to deny that the same Thing can be, and not be, in the same Subject at the same Time. Thus we cannot affirm, that there is nothing else in our Mind besides the Faculty of Thinking, because we discover nothing else in it ; but we may, without danger of Error, deny that the Mind, whilst it is thinking, is destitute of Thought, since we clearly perceive that one of these two Propositions is necessarily false.

6. To observe the second Caution which we have mentioned, we must necessarily examine with our utmost Diligence into the Principles laid down, before we proceed to the Consequences of them. We are taught by the third Maxim, *That we must begin with the simple and easy Things, and dwell on them some time, before we proceed to the compounded and difficult.* Thus we learn *Arithmetic* ; the Student must be perfectly acquainted with, and fix in his Memory the first four Rules of *Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division*, before he can, to any purpose, proceed to the Rule of *Three*, and the following Rules,

C H A P. VI.

Of the first Rule of the Method of Resolution.

1. **A**LL our Judgments being only the Perceptions of Relations, in which Perceptions we acquiesce, it is manifest, that when we inquire into any thing which is unknown to us, we only seek after an unknown Relation. When therefore we say in the first Rule, *that we must perfectly and clearly know the State of the Question propos'd*; 'tis the same thing as if we should tell you, that you are to take particular Care lest you suppose that Relation the Object of your Inquiry, which does by no means come under our Consideration; for unless the sought Relation be mark'd with some certain Note, we shall neither know what we seek, nor know it when found out.

2. But if such a Relation be plainly and clearly known, you may say, How can we then make any farther Inquiry about it? But then, say we, can there be any Desire of knowing any thing of which we have no manner of Knowledge? None at all. That which is sought, therefore, ought necessarily to be distinguish'd from all things else, that we may know it when we find it, and so far know it, before we make any Inquiry about it. No Question can ever be solved, whose Terms are not in some measure known to us. Thus for Example, we inquire, *What those two Numbers are, between which there is such a Relation, as if you take a Unit from one, and add it to the other, they shall be equal*; but, on the contrary, *if you add the Unit taken from the other to that from which you subtracted, the Number shall be double to the other*? 'Tho' the Numbers between which there is this Relation be not known, yet they are so far known, that that Relation ought to be between them, whence they are acknowledged as soon as ever they are found out.

3. When a Question is conceived in Words, those Words ought to be distinctly understood; or the Ideas which are signified by every Word ought to be thoroughly known to us. All Equivocation in the Terms must therefore be intirely removed, lest, for one Question, as many arise as there are different Senses of the Proposition; nor can we apprehend what Sense he that proposes it (if propos'd by another) gives his equivocal Proposition.

4. If we cannot understand all the Senses of the Words in which a Question is conceiv'd, we can never know whether we have given it a Solution in the Sense in which it was proposed

posed, which often happens in general Questions, and the Occasion of which is not sufficiently known: Thus we can only guess at the Places in old Authors, which cannot be solv'd but by the Series of the Context.

5. When we have rendered the Terms in which any Question is conceived as plain and clear to us as we can, we must apply our Attention to the Consideration of the Conditions, if there be any in it. If we understand not them, the Question remains obscure; for they often shew us the way to solve the Question. If there be none expressed or understood, then is the Question general, in which we must observe those Things which we have already delivered on that Head: But if the Conditions are not expressed, but understood, tho' necessary, it can never be solved, if we have not the Opportunity of asking the Proposer of it what they are. If the Conditions added to the Question be superfluous, and of no Use, they must be distinguished from those which are necessary; for without this, we often run after things of no moment, and leave those which are of Importance and necessary, without any Notice.

6. This Question may be proposed—*To find out two Numbers, one of which designed by the Letter A, shall be two Units greater than another design'd by the Letter B; so that taking a Unit from B, and adding it to A, A shall be doubled.* The Condition of the Question is conceived in the Words *so that*, &c. those therefore must have our Attention, because without them the Question is not understood: For the Question is not simply, how a Number may be found out greater by two Units than another, but such Numbers in which that occurs which is in the Condition, which are 7 and 5.

7. The necessary Condition would be omitted in this Question, *Whether a Man, by putting his Finger in his Ear, could be render'd so immoveable, as not to be able to walk till his Finger be taken out of his Ear?* A Question proposed in these Words would be deny'd, because the putting the Finger in the Ear cannot render any one immoveable. But this Difficulty is removed by adding, *That the Man shall be so placed, that his Arm shall embrace a solid fixt Pillar, when he puts a Finger of that Arm into his Ear.*

8. Farther, sometimes there are idle Conditions annexed to the Question proposed, which conduce nothing at all to the Matter; as if we should propose, *To make a Man, anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland, not able to lie still, tho' he see not any thing that can move him.* Should any one stop at, and consider the meaning of this part, which says,
anointed

anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland, he would spend his Pains to no manner of purpose, since those Words have nothing to do with the Matter: But this is done by putting a Man into a Ship driven on by the Winds ; or if he fall from a Tower, or any other high place ; for he will of necessity be moved, tho' he see not what it is that gives that Motion, since he is driven on by a Matter that does not fall under the Sense of Seeing.

9. Nor is this only to be regarded in such Questions as are only feign'd for the Exercise of the Mind, for the like Cases occur in Things drawn from the Critical Art, and from Natural Philosophy, and all other Parts of Learning. Thus if we examine, what any particular Word does signify generally considered? The Answer, tho' true, is very rarely of any consequence to the Solution of the particular Question of, what that Word does signify in any one certain place. If, therefore, any one desires to know the latter, he ought not to propose the Question in general Terms, but to repeat the Place in which the Sense of that Word, which is sought, occurs ; for Words often vary their Sense by their Situation to another, which when they stand alone, they do not signify.

C H A P. VII.

The Explanation of the second and third Rules of the Method of Resolution.

1. **A**LL Questions may be referred to two Kinds, or Sorts ; that is, Simple or Compounded. All that is necessarily required to the Solution of the first, is a diligent comparison of the Ideas of which they are composed. Thus when 'tis said, that a Circle has this Property, that all the Lines that are drawn from its Centre to its Circumference, are equal : If any one doubt of the Matter of Fact, and would inquire into the Truth or Falshood of that Maxim, he need only compare the Idea of a Circle, with the Idea of this Property.

2. But a Compounded Question cannot be solv'd without comparing the Ideas of which 'tis compos'd, with some third Idea, or many Ideas, for no Man can find out the unknown Relations which are the Subject of this Inquiry, by an immediate Comparison of the Ideas of the Question proposed. There

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is, therefore, a Necessity of finding out some third Idea, or more, with which the Terms of the Question must be compared; but these Ideas ought to be clear and perspicuous, at least, as to their Relation by which they are compared with others. And hence is drawn the second Rule of the Method of Resolution.

3. Examples will make this Matter more plain. If this Question was proposed, *Whether a Thief ought to suffer Death?* Since the Idea of a *Thief* cannot be immediately compared with the last Punishment, no natural Connexion being between those two Ideas; so that the Idea of a Thief should necessarily excite the Idea of that capital Punishment: We can't solve that Question without the Intervention of some third Idea, with which both the others should be compared, and that is of *Vindictive Justice*, or the *Knowledge of the Law*. And when we have made this Comparison, we shall say, 'Tis Justice, for the Good of the Commonwealth, that the Thief be put to Death, or undergo some milder Punishment.

4. If again we put the Question, *Whether a Boy of fifteen, being guilty of Theft should be put to Death?* The former Question is contain'd in this: for we must first inquire, whether any Thief deserve Death, before we see whether such a Thief should suffer in that manner. For unless the first Question be solv'd, the latter never can. But having found, by the Laws, that a Thief at Man's Estate, by the Law, is to be put to death, we must farther inquire, whether a Thief of fifteen be liable to the same Punishment. Here, therefore, would be another Comparison, not of the Boy with the Punishment, but of the Punishment that is to be inflicted, with Justice, or the Law.

5. There may, in this very same Question, occur several other Ideas, which must be compared, because the Benefit of the Commonwealth is not a simple Thing; but here, for the sake of Instruction, we make the Idea of Justice a simple Idea, and of the highest Clearness and Perspicuity. We farther suppose, that there is no Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Fact, which yet most commonly come into the Consideration of the Thing.

6. But if the Question was, *What Punishment should be inflicted on Peter, who, without the Award of Law, had by Force taken away what he pretends is his Due?* Then, at first hearing very many Things offer themselves to our Consideration. (1.) We must nicely examine, whether he were really the Creditor or not, of him from whom he had taken this Thing; in which Inquiry

Inquiry his Affirmation is to be compared with the Bond, Writing, or other Instruments, if there be any, or with the Affidavit, or Oath, or Witnesses, &c. (2.) Next, we must examine whether the Sum he lent be as great as he pretends, which is by comparing his Oath with the Words of the Deeds, or Instrument, or of the Witnesses, &c. (3.) We must inquire whether he took it away, or not. (4.) Whether by Force, where we must hear Witnesses, whose Evidence must be compared with manifold Ideas to make out the Truth. (5.) We must examine, whether the Laws condemn all manner of Force on such an Occasion, where we must compare the Fact with the Words of the Laws. (6.) What Punishment the Laws inflict on that Force, which we here suppose to have been used, without the Intervention of the Sentence of the Judge. Before, therefore, we can solve this Question, *What Punishment Peter must undergo?* we must many ways compare the middle Ideas with the Terms of the Question.

7. But if in this Comparifon we take in Ideas that are not very clear, there is the greatest Danger imaginable of Error, of which if any one slip in, all the following Propositions are either false, or nothing to the Purpose, and the Conclusion must be absolutely false.

8. The third Rule is, *To throw away every Thing from the Question to be consider'd, which doth not necessarily belong to the Truth that is sought after.* This Rule is of manifest Advantage and Use ; because whoever does not observe it, either wanders wide of the Matter, and finds not what he seeks, or forms his Judgment by foreign Ideas, and gives his Mind a profitless Fatigue. Thus, in the former Question, if we should inquire, whether *Peter* were a Denizen or Foreigner, or what are the Laws of other Countries on that Head, or the like, 'tis plain there could nothing be drawn thence to the Solution of the Question.

9. We make use of this Caution in Questions that are conceived in many Words, either by the Ignorance or Design of him who proposes them, to make them the more intricate ; or those which are taken out of any Writing, which the Writer never designed to propose with Clearness and Perspicuity.

C H A P. VIII.

An Explanation of the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh Rules of the Method of Resolution.

1. **W**HEN we have taken away from the Question proposed all that did not, or appeared not necessarily to belong to the Thing inquired after, if it yet remains compounded so far as to fall under two or more Heads, since we cannot with Attention examine several Things at once, by the fourth Rule we are obliged, (1.) *To divide the Question into its several Heads.* (2.) *To examine those Heads separately, in such a Manner, as to begin with those which consist of the more simple Ideas.* (3.) *And never to proceed to those Heads which are more compounded, 'till we have by our Consideration made them more simple, perspicuous, and easy to ourselves.*

2. The Necessity of this Rule is manifest in the Solution of compounded Questions ; for, first, if we confound their several Heads, we can never have distinct Ideas of them ; for Distinction and Confusion are inconsistent. By that means we can never compare the Ideas with each other, as they ought to be compared to find out the Truth ; which if we should otherwise hit on, it would be more the Effect of Chance, than our Skill or Understanding.

3. We sometimes give the same Judgment of several Ideas, tho' generally speaking, the same Judgment will not agree to several. But if we form a Judgment of various Things mixt together, without considering each singly, we give a general Judgment of different Things, which is seldom free from Error in some thing or other. We may discover that an Author has neglected his Rules, when, upon a diligent Perusal of his Works, we cannot (tho' the Argument he writes on be not unknown to us) reduce what he says to certain Heads : And this we may find in several of the ancient as well as modern Writers ; who for that Reason are not read without Difficulty and Pains.

4. The same Inconveniencies arise from the Neglect of the second and third Cautions of this our fourth Rule. Having said something of this in the fifth *Chapter*, we shall only add here, that when we are grown familiar and acquainted with the more simple Principles of the Question proposed, so far as to have them distinctly in our Minds, we never, in the least Consequences drawn from them, affirm any thing contrary to them. On the

contrary,

contrary, when we take but a transient View of the more simple, and pass on so swiftly to the more compounded, we surely forget them, and the last prove often contradictory to the first.

5. The fifth, sixth, and seventh Rules seldom come into Use in any Art but *Algebra*, Examples taken from whence would soon and clearly declare their Use: But they being too difficult for those who are unacquainted with them, and because we are of opinion that the same Rules can beneficially be adapted to other Arts, we shall draw our Examples elsewhere.

6. When we go about the Solution of any proposed Question, and to set down in Writing what seems to us may be answered to it, it will be of the greatest Use imaginable to write the Heads of the Question down in the fewest Words that may be, especially if they are many, lest while we consider of one, the rest, as it often happens by the Multiplicity of the Questions, slip out of our Mind. By this Means even an unhappy Memory which with difficulty retains many Heads, would find a great Assistance; and the Mind, unincumbered with other Things, with less Pain attends the Consideration of Particulars. 'Tis very seldom that all the Parts of a compounded and difficult Question, which must be considered, offer themselves together, and at once. Most commonly we must consider some time before we discover all; and then, if we write not all that down which we have first found out, while we seek others, that slips out of our Memory. But because it would be very troublesome to write down many Things, therefore the various Relations which are to be considered, may be expressed by some certain Words.

7. Hence arise two Advantages which are not by any Means to be despised. The first is, that before we write down more fully what we have found out on any Question, either by Consideration, or that help'd by Reading, by this Art we easily conceive the Order of the Things to be written, and change it with equal Ease, if perchance we find any thing amiss in it: The other is, that both the Order and Parts of our Treatise are so fixt in our Memory, by reading over sometimes what we have written, that when we come afterwards to set down our whole Dissertation, we do not depart from that Order, nor omit any thing which is worthy of our Consideration. Otherwise by having too great a Confidence in our Memory, we sit down to write with our Order and Heads of our Discourse only in our Mind, many things which occur to us while we are writing, like those which we have thought, insensibly divert us from the right Track which we designed to pursue, and make us omit
what

what we should have discoursed of, and meddle with those Things which have nothing to do in the Question before us.

8. When we have, according to the fifth Rule, express'd the Order we have conceived with certain Marks and Signs, then, according to the sixth Rule, we diligently consider every Proposition that is to be examined. There are never more than two Terms of one Proposition to be compared, before we find what Relation is, or is not, between them. This thus found out, should in few Words be written down, that the Memory be unburden'd of it, and that we may without any Pains read over our Traces, and see what we have found out, and what is the Connexion of our Arguments.

9. When we have written down all the Propositions that were to be examined, and have not, however, found out what we sought; the seventh Rule ordains, that we with greater Application peruse what we have written, and cut off whatever we find of no Use to the Solution of the Question; and commands us then to examine any thing that may seem of Use, according to the former Method: For we often, on the first View, imagine several Things to be plainly necessary to the Solution of the Question, especially in those which are intricate, which afterwards we find on our Experiments, by an accurate comparing of the Ideas, to be of no manner of Use; and on the contrary, that some Things, which at first seem'd of no Importance to the Question, on a repeating the Examination, to be of that Use, as to open the Way to our Discovery of Truth. And this every one will better know by Experience, than by any Examples brought from others.

10. Lastly, If on a frequent Repetition we can discover no way of solving the Question propos'd, we ought to dash it out with our Pens, as beyond our Power. Or, if in our Inquiries we have discover'd, that there are no Ideas in it by which it can be solv'd, we ought to shew, that it is insolvable in its Nature, that no body throw away their Time any more about it.

11. Perhaps some may object to this Method, that it is difficult: But then they must reflect that there is no easier, and that all these Rules are not made use of in Truths more easy to be discovered, but only in those which are more difficult and intricate. But it is much more difficult without this Method to find out the Truth, and to know it when discovered, than to use this Method, and gather the Certainty of our Discoveries.

C H A P. IX.

The Rules of the Method of Composition.

1. **W**E hope 'tis plain, from the Comparison we made between the Methods of *Resolution* and *Composition*, in the first Chapter of this Part, what we mean by *Composition*. That is, that after we have found out the Principles of any Truth, or whole Art or Discipline, we must seek some Order, by which the Connexion of its Parts may be easily understood, and the Thing itself so prov'd, that having granted the Beginning, you must of necessary Consequence grant also all that follows.

2. There has been no better Way found out, than that the general Principles be first propos'd, and, if Necessity require, be prov'd ; and that their Consequences be so dispos'd, that those which follow seem to flow as much as possibly they can from those which went before. Besides the gaining by this Means the Order and Force of a Demonstration, we avoid a great Inconvenience of teaching or conveying any Knowledge, which is the Necessity of Repetition : For if we should begin from Particulars to come at last to the Generals, we must be forced to repeat what we know of its General, when we speak of every Particular, because without the Knowledge of the *General*, you can never have a certain Knowledge of the *Particular*.

3. But we must here put you in Mind, that this Method can only be preserv'd in those Things whose Principles we perfectly know ; as for Example, *Geometry*, which is wholly employ'd in the Consideration of abstract *Modes*, of which our Mind has clear and adequate Ideas ; but when the Inquiry is into *Substances*, as in Natural Philosophy, we cannot make use of the Method of *Composition*, because the Kinds of *Substances* are not known to us, nor can we find out their inmost Essences.

4. This Method of *Composition* has been by none so justly and accurately observ'd hitherto as by the *Mathematicians*, whose Principles are perfectly known ; we can therefore draw its Rules from none better, than from the Teachers of *Geometry*.

5. Since they design'd to propose nothing that could be contradicted, they thought they could obtain this chiefly by three Ways. (1.) By offering nothing but what was couched in
Words

Words or Terms perfectly understood: And for this Reason they always carefully define the Words they make use of; of which we have spoken in the *Second Part*. (2.) By building only on *evident and clear Principles*, so that they could not be controverted by any one who understood them. They, therefore, first of all propound their *Maxims or Axioms*, which they demand to be granted them, as being self-evident, and in need of no Proof. (3.) By *proving demonstratively* all their Consequences; and for this Reason they only make use of, in their Arguments or Proofs of *Definitions, Axioms* that have been granted, and *Propositions* which they have already proved, which are Principles to those Things that come last.

6. To these three Heads may be referred all the Observations of the *Geometricians*, in the Demonstration of those Truths which they have discovered.

7. These are the Laws or Rules of Definitions: (1.) *Never to use any Word doubtful, or the least obscure, without a Definition.* (2.) *To make use of no Words but such as are of a very known Signification, or such as have been already explained.*

8. The Rule of their Maxims or Axioms is, *To allow nothing for a Maxim or Axiom, but what is most evident.*

9. These are the Laws or Rules of their Demonstrations. (1.) *To prove all Propositions that have the least Obscurity, and to admit nothing to the Demonstration of them but constituted Definitions, granted Axioms, Propositions already proved, or the Construction of the Figure which is under Consideration, when any such Thing happens to be done* (2.) *Never to abuse the Ambiguity of a Word, by not affixing those Definitions by which they are explained.*

10. These are Rules which the *Geometricians* have thought necessary to be observed, to give those Truths which they designed to prove, the last and greatest Evidence.

C H A P. X.

The Explanation of the Rules of Definition.

1. **W**E have already discoursed of the Definition of *Names*; but it being a Thing of no small Consequence, and without which the *Geometrical Method* cannot be understood, we shall add some few Things on the same Subject, avoiding as much as possible a Repetition of what we have said.

2. The

2. The first Rule forbids us *admitting any Word that is the least obscure without a Definition*. The Necessity of this Rule is built on this Foundation: I. *That to prove any Thing with Evidence, there is a Necessity that what we say be perfectly understood*. For how can that Demonstration be evident, which we do not fully understand? But there are a great many Words which cannot be perfectly understood unless they are defined, since the Use of the Tongue from whence they are taken, has not fix'd any certain and determinate Sense upon them, and so leaves them obscure; as we may find in studying the Art of Criticism. But when Words of this Nature are made use of in the delivering, especially the Principles of Arts or Sciences, we understand neither the Principles themselves, nor the Consequences drawn from them, nor the Order of the Argumentation, or the Connexion of the Propositions; whence it follows, that we cannot certainly conclude, whether what is said be true or false.

3. II. The Definition of Words has this Effect on ourselves, that it makes us more constant and consistent with ourselves by giving always the same Sense to the same Word. For when we have not a distinct Notion of that Signification which we have at first given to a Word, we are apt by Inadvertence to recede from it, especially in long Disputes, and when the Discourse is of Things of different Kinds; for on these Occasions we ourselves are not sufficiently conscious of what we mean, and of the Order of our Argumentation; much less can another understand us. But if we define our Terms or Words, their Signification makes a deeper Impression on our Minds, and by that we are the more easily brought into the right Path, if in our Discourse we have by Accident stray'd from it.

4. The second Rule of Definitions forbids us *to make use of any Words in them, whose Signification is not distinctly known, or already explained*. The Reason of this is plain; for how can that which is obscure be explained by what is obscure?

5. But to avoid too great a Multiplicity of Definitions we must never make use of obscure Words but when we cannot find any others; else we shall be obliged to make Definitions of Definitions.

C H A P. XI.

An Explanation of the Rules of Maxims or Axioms.

1. **T**HERE are some Propositions of so great Perspicuity and Evidence, and so universally known, that as soon as we hear the Words that express them, we perfectly know and allow their Truth ; as, *That Nothing cannot produce Something. No Cause can give what it has not itself.* These, and others of the same Nature, have no need of Demonstration, because no Demonstration can be more evident than they are. And whatever has not this Evidence, is not to be admitted as a Maxim.

2. But we must be cautious of believing that there are none clear and evident but those which have never been deny'd, because there are several that have been of old deny'd, by the Violence of some of the ancient Sects, especially the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, which are now beyond Controversy. For, should the Majority of Mankind conspire to deny that *One* is less than *Two*, no Man in his Senses can deny that Truth.

3. There are two Rules of Maxims or Axioms, which contain all that belongs to this Matter. The first is, *Whenever we plainly and evidently see that any Attribute agrees with any Subject, as we see that of the Whole being bigger than its Part, we have not need of any long Consideration of the Attribute and Subject, for the Mind to discover that the Idea of the Attribute has a Connexion with the Idea of the Subject ; we may well, therefore, give the Name of a Maxim to such a Proposition.* But this may be put into fewer Words : *Whatever Proposition expresses the immediate clear Comparison of two Ideas, without the Help of the third, is an Axiom.*

4. The other Rule opposite to the former, is thus expressed. *When the bare Consideration of the Ideas of the Subject and the Attribute are not sufficient to discover the Agreement of the Attribute to the Subject, such a Proposition is not to be admitted as an Axiom, but must be demonstrated by the Help of other Ideas.* In fewer Words, thus : *Every Proposition, the Proof of which requires some third Idea, besides the Attribute and the Subject, is not an Axiom.* Or shorter yet : *A Truth which does not arise from an immediate Comparison of two Ideas, is no Axiom.*

C H A P. XII.

An Explanation of the Rules of Demonstration.

1. **T**HERE are two Things requir'd in a right *Demonstration* ; first, that every Proposition of which it consists, consider'd separately, be true ; the second, that the Consequences drawn from other foregoing Things, necessarily flow from them ; or that all the Consequences be contain'd in the Antecedents or Premisses ; both which will be certainly gain'd, by following strictly the two Laws deliver'd in the 9th Chapter.

2. All the Propositions will be true, if none are admitted except *Definitions*, which cannot be call'd in question ; or *Maxims* or *Axioms*, which must always be evident ; or Propositions already demonstrated, which by *Demonstration* are freed from all Doubts, or the Construction of Figures, if we make use of any. If therefore we reduce the former Rule to Practice, all the Propositions of which we make use, will be free from any manner of Doubt, since we can by that Rule make use of only those Things which we have reckon'd up.

3. The Consequences likewise will be truly drawn, if we sin not against the *second Rule*, which orders us to avoid all manner of Ambiguity in our Words : For no Man in his Wits can believe falsely, that any Proposition follows from another, or is contain'd in another, if he have a perfect Knowledge of both : Almost all the false Consequences that are made, depend on Words ill understood ; those that are not so, are so evident and obvious, that no Man of a sound Head can fall into them.

4. To avoid some Errors, we must remember, I. *Not to prove a Thing to be true, without giving the Reason of that Truth.* II. *Not to prove that which does not need a Proof.* III. *Not to argue from Impossibility.* IV. *Not to demonstrate by Reasons too far fetch'd.*



T H E
Fourth Part of LOGIC;
O R,
The Art of REASONING.

Of the Socratic Method of Disputing.

1. **S**INCE 'tis certain, that the Aim of every honest Man is to find out the Truth, and to convey the Truth thus found out to others; and not to make a vain Shew of his own, and expose the Slowness of Apprehension of another: It follows, that the Art of Squabbling, which has so long obtained in the Schools, and which only Mr. *Locke* condemns under the Name of *Logic*, and which has nothing in it but an empty Ostentation of Wit, is absolutely unworthy of a Man of Wisdom. But since Truth cannot be distinctly known or prov'd without Art, it is necessary, to do this rightly, that we apply ourselves to the Study of this Art. 'Tis often likewise necessary, to silence the *Sophists*, who boast their Knowledge of that of which they are really ignorant, to make use of a great deal of Diligence, that, by making them see their Ignorance, they may be better inform'd.

2. *Greece*, which always was pester'd with abundance of these Sophists, was never more plagu'd with them than about the Time of *Socrates*, when Philosophy began to find a more than usual Cultivation. This great Man, form'd by Nature for the confounding the Pride of this sort of Men, has shewn us a Way by which we may attain the same End against them in our Times, if they happen to fall in our Way: And though this Way ought to have been pursu'd by former Ages, yet has it been intirely neglected; perhaps because this Pride of seeming to know more than we really do, had got the Ascendant of the Followers of *Socrates* themselves, which made them take to
the

the subtle Arts of the *Sophists*, and reject the most admirable Method of a Man of that consummate Wisdom.

3. But we design to revive with some short Explanation this Method, both in Consideration of the Reason we have given, and also because it is most agreeable to that Candor and Sincerity which every honest Man ought to propose. 'Tis true, this Method requires a Genius, and Acuteness of Wit; but without these Qualities, the Mind cannot in any other Art be provided for extempore Disputes.

4. The first Rule of this Method orders the Man who is to make use of it, *To conduct himself in such a Manner, as if he desir'd to learn something of him with whom he argues.* And indeed every one of us ought to have a Disposition to hear and allow the Truth, let it come from what Hand soever. Nor ought any Man to think so well of himself, as to imagine he cannot be informed by another, or at least be excited to think of a Thing of which perhaps he thought not before. But besides that every Man owes this Duty to himself, such a Disposition of Mind, which appears in the Countenance and Words, is most adapted to create in the Minds of those who hear us, an Opinion of our Modesty, which goes a great and sure Way to persuade them.

5. Secondly, Before we proceed to any Objections, *We ought, if the Person with whom we argue make use of any obscure or doubtful Words, to ask him to explain what he means by them:* For it often happens, that Men have used themselves to some Words which they do not perfectly understand themselves; and then they will, by such modest Questions, discover their Ignorance much better than by a direct Opposition, which often raises the Passions. If the Person happen to be a Man of Sincerity, and Lover of Truth, he will own that he did not sufficiently understand the Matter, and then the Dispute is at an end. But if we meet with a pertinacious and obstinate Person, who will obtrude his Words upon us without defining them, we ought to proceed no farther in the Dispute, till he has made plain what it is he means. We ought to press him with little Questions, not as the Effect of his want of Skill in Arguing, but our Dulness of Apprehension of what he understands and delivers in his Speech. In the mean while, we must not admit any one thing that is obscure, though it stir up his Anger; which yet may be done by a happy Address, of telling him, that we are ready to yield to Truth, but that we first ought to know it; since no Man in his Senses can give his Assent to a Proposition which he does not understand. But if

we can by no Means prevail with him to speak plainly, we must put an end to the Dispute ; for thence it is evident that he knows not what he would be at. By this Means, those that hear us will discover the Man's Vanity who talks of Things which he does not understand, and many times leaves a Sting in the Mind of a Man otherwise too pertinacious.

6. Thirdly, If we bring him at last to speak plainly and clearly what he means, *We must ask him Questions on the Particulars of all the Parts of the Doctrine he advances, and their Consequences ; not as reproving them, but for a fuller and more clear Information of the Matter ; so that he should appear the Instructor, and we the Learners.* The Absurdity of the Doctrine will appear from these Questions, if it labour with any, much better than by an open Opposition, provided it be done with Dexterity, and the Questions pretty numerous, and be obliged several Times to repeat the same Thing, lest he should afterwards deny that he had said so. Here, that the Explanation may be the more ample, it would not be amiss to make use of Examples and Similitudes, and ask him, whether he means this or that? The more copious we are in this Particular, the more evident will the Falsity of the Opinion appear.

7. The perspicuous Exposition of any Doctrine, with its Consequences, if it be not true, shews generally its Absurdity : But if this be not sufficient, then we must ask him, *on what Arguments or Proofs he builds his Opinion?* And we must use the same Conduct in regard of the Arguments as to the other Parts. We are to inquire of him with whom we dispute, as if we were by him to be inform'd of a Point of which we are ignorant ; but we must not allow him the least Obscurity. In short, we must hear the whole Series of his Argumentation in such a manner, that there remain no Difficulty either in understanding his Doctrine, or the Foundation on which it is built.

8. When we have done this with Diligence, the Person who proposes his Doctrine, must plainly see its Falsity, or on what Proofs it depends. If Passion blind his Eyes, yet the Hearers will excuse any farther Dispute with a Man who is angry, that we receive not his Opinion tho' labouring with Absurdity.

9. We shall give one Example of this Method on a Modern Controversy, by which it will be better explained, betwixt a *Thomist*, and another, disputing upon the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

10. A. *I wonder you are so obstinate, as to deny that God has an Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men, which the Scriptures in many Places so openly and plainly testify.*

B. I only deny'd that I understood how this is done. Perhaps my Dulness makes that a Difficulty to me, which is obvious to another. But I would willingly be inform'd by you, because I can neither believe nor condemn what I do not understand; what, therefore, do you mean by an *Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men*? do you mean that he makes them sin?

A. *Far be it from me, for so God would be the Author of Sin. 'Tis Man commits Sin, not God.*

B. Do you mean, that God *makes Men to commit Sin, or forces Men to commit Sin*?

A. *I would not have express'd this in so rude a Manner; but God, in a dark and unknown Manner, so permits Sin, that it must necessarily be committed.*

B. You us'd before the Word *Operation*, now you use *Permit*; pray do they mean the same Thing?

A. *These Words do not absolutely mean the same Thing, but they must be join'd together, so that what God does should be called an efficacious Permission; for God neither makes Sin, nor does he simply permit it.*

B. You therefore mean, that God permits something, and does something, so that Sin necessarily follows?

A. *That is what I mean.*

B. Perhaps then God does, in this, what he does, who cutting down the Dykes, lets the Waters in to overflow the Fields. For he *does* something in breaking the Dyke, and he *permits* something in suffering the Sea to pass through the Breach.

A. *My Mind could not have been express'd by a more happy Similitude.*

B. But according to our common way of Speaking, we should say, that he who made a Breach in the Dyke, had let in the Waters; nor would any one accuse the Dyke or the Sea of any manner of Fault; but you, if I mistake you not, accuse Man of the Fault, and say Man, not God, committed the Sin. Wherefore your *efficacious Permission* seems unintelligible to me.

A. *Do you not observe, that, as to the Things themselves, there is a vast Difference between them? For Men are endow'd with Understanding and Will, which the Dyke and the Sea have not; and, for that Reason, that is a Crime in Man, which is not so in the Sea and the Dyke.*

B. But I ask of you, whether that which God *does* or *permits*, has that Efficacy (for that Word you have likewise used) that Men can no more not sin when that has ordered it, than the Sea not overflow the Fields through the Breach which affords a free Passage?

A. *You have my Meaning.*

B. According therefore to you, there is the same Relation in that Sense between God and Sin, as there is between the Man who made a Breach in the Dyke, and the Destruction of the Fields.

A. *There is, as to the Event; for both are equally necessary.*

B. The Action therefore of both, according to the Custom of Speech, may be expressed in the same Manner: That is——As he who broke down the Dyke is called the Cause of the Loss of the Fields, because he did that which necessarily produc'd that Loss; so God is the Author of Sin, since he has put Man under a Necessity of Sinning.

A. *I told you before, that I will not make use of those rude Expressions.*

B. But either I do not understand what you say, or it comes to that Point; for we must not regard the empty Sounds of Words, which signify nothing, but mind the Ideas to which they are annex'd.

A. *What! you'll prescribe Rules to me of Speaking, as if I did not know how to hold a Discourse?*

11. If the Dialogue once comes to this, there must be an end of it; and hence it will appear, that he (designated by the Letter *A*) either knows not what he means, or else has a greater Regard to Words than Things. That Opinion is look'd on as sufficiently confuted, which its Defender is ashamed to express in clear and intelligible Words. Having in the former Dialogue sufficiently explain'd the first and second Rule, to explain the third, we shall suppose the same Dispute again.

12. A. *You sufficiently understand, that my Opinion is, that God has to do with Evil; that he is not a mere bare Spectator, but is so far an Agent, that on his acting Man commits Sin.*

B. If God did nothing before the Sin, would not the Sin be committed?

A. *No, for nothing is done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

B. What! do you believe that Man alone cannot violate Laws?

A. *That he can, I deny, when I deny that any thing can be done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

B. God, therefore, helps us to do wickedly in the same Manner as he helps us to do well?

A. *You mistake, for in Evil we must distinguish the Action, and the Viciousness of the Action. God helps us to the doing the Action, but not to the Vice. But, in good Actions, he helps us to the Good that is in the Actions.*

B. I beg you, inform me, what you mean by the Words *an Action*, and what by the *Viciousness of an Action* ?

A. *I will make it plain to you by this Example: In the Hatred of our Neighbour, there is the Action of the Hatred, which in itself is indifferent, and is only call'd bad, when directed to an unlawful Object, and good when to a lawful. Next, there is the Relation of that Action to the Object, which is Evil. God does not concur to this Relation, tho' there is a Necessity of his concurring to the Action, without which it could not be done.*

B. By what you have said, I suppose you mean, that God first generates in the Mind of Man Hatred in general ; which is in itself neither Good nor Evil : Then there comes another Relation of the Hatred to the Object, as in the Example to our Neighbour. Do I understand you ?

A. *Partly you do, but not entirely ; for I do not think there is any such Existence as Hatred in general, which should afterwards be determined to a certain Object ; this is contrary to Experience.*

B. Does God then create that very Hatred that is directed against our Neighbour ?

A. *Most certainly the Hatred, but not the Relation.*

B. But does that Hatred exist without that Relation ?

A. *Not at all ; for the very Moment that it is created in our Minds, 'tis the Hatred of our Neighbour.*

B. According therefore, to you, God creates such an Hatred which co-exists in such a manner with a vicious Relation, that it cannot be separated or distinguish'd from it but by Abstraction.

A. *He does so.*

B. Can this Hatred, thus generated in the Mind of Man, be by the Man directed to a lawful Object, as *Vice*, for Example ?

A. *It cannot ; for the Action of God being past, the certain Event must necessarily follow.*

B. I beseech you, Sir, if a Man should put a Burthen on another's Shoulder, which he that bore it could not afterwards throw off, and by that Means he should break his Ribs, would not he that put on such a Burthen be look'd on as the Breaker of his Ribs, if he had known the Event of his Action ?

A. *Most certainly.*

B. Should a Man push another, walking by a River-side, into the Water, who should there be drown'd, should we not say that he who thrust him in drown'd him ?

A. *Certainly.*

B. Yet there are some Men who would say, that you are in an Error in this Particular ; that the *imposing* and the *thrusting* was produced by both ; but not the breaking the Ribs, and the drowning, as God generates the Hatred which is directed against our Neighbour without that evil Relation.

A. 'Tis indeed most evident, that the Men instanced, were guilty of the Fracture and the Drowning ; but the Matter is otherwise with God, who is not obliged to give an Account to poor miserable Men of his Administration.

B. But if he did, what you would wickedly persuade us, either all Sinners must be acquitted of any Crime, or God himself, who compels the Sins, condemn'd.

A. Don't you know, that God's Ways are not our Ways, nor his Thoughts ours ? Shall the Pot complain, that it was not made in such and such a Manner ?

13. Hence it is evident to all that hear it, that the *Thomist* (noted by the Letter *A*) either knows not what he means, or makes God the Author of Sin.

The End of LOGIC.



T H E



THE Useful COMPANION.



THIS Table is divided into Ten Circles; the outward Circle is the 12 Signs, divided each into 30 Degrees, in all 360.

The second Circle is divided into 365 Days and 6 Hours, being the Days of the Months throughout the Year.

The Third is a Circle containing the Time of the Sun's Rising and Setting for every Day in the Year.

In the Fourth are the Degrees of the Sun's Declination, for every Degree of the Ecliptick.

The Fifth has the fix'd Feasts and Terms.

The Sixth, the Golden Number.

The Seventh, the Dominical Letter.

The Eighth, the Day of the Month on which *Easter* falls.

The Ninth, the moveable Feasts; with the Number of Weeks, as they fall before or after *Easter*.

The Tenth, the moveable Terms, with the Time of their Beginning and Ending.

The Use of it is thus.

TO find the Day of the Month, you must observe that against the first Day of *January* stands a Point, another against the 8th, also against the 15th, the 22d, and the 29th, and so in every Month are four or five Points. Now, if the Dominical Letter be *A*, all the Days in the Year against which those Points stand, are *Sundays*; if *B*, *Saturdays*; if *C*, *Fridays*, if *D*, *Thursdays*; if *E*, *Wednesdays*; if *F*, *Tuesdays*; if *G*, *Mondays*. If therefore you would know on the third *Wednesday*, in *January*, what Day of the Month it is, (the Dominical Letter being *A*) you must count the first Day of *January*, against which the Point stands, *Sunday*; the 8th, *Sunday*; and the 15th, *Sunday*; and the *Wednesday* following, being the third *Wednesday*, is the 18th Day; but if the Dominical Letter had been *E*, then you must have begun *January* with *Wednesday*, and then the third *Wednesday* had been the 15th Day, and so of the rest.

To know what Sign the Sun is in.

Look out the Day of the Month, and against it, in the Circle of Signs, stands the Degree in which the Sun is on that Day.

To know the Sun's Rising and Setting.

Find the Day of the Month, and against it in the third Circle, is the Hour of the Sun's Rising, and opposite to it in the same Circle is his Setting. As, if you would know the Time of the Sun's Rising on the Tenth of *March*, you will find against it in the third Circle 6, and opposite to it in the same Circle 6, so that on the Tenth of *March* the Sun Rises and Sets at 6;

but

but against the 10th of *April* you will find 5, and opposite to it 7; and so on the 10th of *April*, the Sun rises at 5, and sets at 7.

To know the Sun's Declination.

Against the Day of the Month, in the fourth Circle, stands the Degree of the Sun's Declination, as on the 10th of *March* stands a Cypher, then being no Declination; but on the 11th of *June* stands 23 Degrees North Declination, and against the 11th of *December* stands 23 Degrees South Declination.

To find the fixt Feasts and Terms.

In every Month, from the Day on which a Feast falls, a small Line is drawn to the 5th Circle, where you will find the Name of the Feast, as from the 25th of *December*, a Line is drawn to the fifth Circle, where you find *Christmas*, another from the 26th, where you find *Stephen*, a third from the 27th, where you find *John*, &c.

To find the moveable Feasts.

In the sixth Circle find the Golden Number for the Year; in the seventh find the Dominical Letter for the same Year, next following the Golden Number, and under in the eighth Circle you have the Day on which *Easter* falls; as if the Golden Number be 16, and the Dominical Letter *D*, you find 16 in the sixth Circle, and *D* in the 7th Circle next following 16, and under *D* in the eighth Circle you find *March* the 22d, which is the Day on which *Easter* falls that Year.

The rest of the moveable Feasts depending on *Easter*, you have in the 9th Circle their Names and Distances from *Easter* before and after; as *Septuagesima*, nine Weeks before *Easter*; *Trinity Sunday*, eight Weeks after *Easter*, &c.

To find the Roman Indiction.

To the Year of our Lord add 3, and divide the Product by 15, the Remainder is the Indiction, counted from *September*.

To find the Dominical Letter.

Add to the Year its Fourth, and 4; divide those three Numbers by 7, and subtract what remains from 7, the Remainder is the Dominical Letter, counting A 1, B 2, C 3, D 4, E 5, F 6, G 7.

To find the Cycle of the Sun.

Add to the Year of our Lord 9, (for our Saviour was born when the Number was 9) which divided by 28, the Quotient is the Number of Revolutions of the Cycle, and the Remainder is the Cycle of the Sun.

To find the Golden Number.

To the Year of our Lord add 1, (for so much was the Prime when Christ was born) which divide by 19, the Remainder is the Golden Number.

To find the Epact.

Multiply the Prime by 11, and divide the Product by 30, the Remainder is the Epact; or add 11 to the Epact of this Year, so have you the Epact of the next; or see the Age of the Moon the 11th Kalends of *April*, for that is the Number of the Epact.

To find the New, Full, and Quarters of the Moon.

Add to the Day of the Month the Epact, and the Number of Months from *March*, to the Month you are in, including both Months, the which take from 30, and the Remainder is the Day of the Change or new Moon. But if the Sum of Addition exceed 30, subtract from 59, and the Remainder is the Day of the Change; to which, if you add 15 Days, you have the full Moon; and by adding 7 Days and nine Hours to the new or full Moon, you have the first or last Quarter.

To find the Moon's Age at any Time.

Add to the Day of the Month, the Epact, and the Number of Months from *March*, to the Month you are in, including both Months, so have you the Moon's Age. But if the said three Numbers added together exceed 30, you must take away 30, as oft as you can, and the Remainder is the Moon's Age; this is when the Month hath 31 Days: But if the Month hath but 30 Days, (or less, as in *February*) you must take away but 29, and the rest is the Age of the Moon.

Example.

I desire to know the Age of the Moon the first Day of *January* 1713. Now, because the Epact changeth not till the 1st of *March*, I add the Epact of the Year before, which is 3, and the Day of the Month 1, together, which makes 4; then *January* being the 11th Month from *March* added thereunto, makes 15, which is the Age of the Moon, the said first Day of *January* 1713. You thus knowing the Moon's Age in any Month at Pleasure, and are desirous to know what Age she will be the same Day of the Month the next Year, 'tis but adding 11 to her present Age, and you have your Desire, and to that Age add 11, so have you her Age the second Year ensuing, and so infinitely; remembering to reject 30, as above. Likewise, if you add 19, as before 11, you have the Moon's Age the last Year, remembering to cast away 30.

To find the Moon's Southing.

Multiply her Age by 4, and that Product divide by 5, the Quotient will be the Hours, and the Remainder of the Division the Minutes that the Moon is South; to which add 3 Hours, and you have the Time of high Water at London-Bridge, any Day in the Year for ever.

A Rule to know the Sun's Rising and Setting.

The first of January the Sun Rises 4 Minutes after 8, and Sets 4 Minutes before 4, which is 12 Hours; and so many Minutes as the Sun rises after any Hour, so many Minutes it Sets before, to make just 12 Hours. If it Rises at 8, it Sets at 4; if at 6, it Sets at 6; if at 7, it Sets at 5. In the midst of May it Rises at 4, and Sets at 8. It Rises in the East, and it Sets in the West, and at Noon, or 12 o' Clock, it is full South. Set your Face to the North, your Back will be South, your Right-Hand East, and your Left-Hand West.

To find the Moon's Rising and Setting at any Time.

Before the Full, add the Quantity of her Shining, to the Time of the Sun's Setting, so have you the Moon's Setting, and for her Rising, add the said Quantity of her Shining to the Sun-rising, and you have the Moon's Rising. But after the Full, subtract the Length of her Shining from the Hour of the Sun-rising or Setting. See the Table.

Seek the Moon's Age in the first or third Column, and in the Middle, right against her Age, you will find the Quantity of her Shining in Hours and Minutes; if it is her Increase, she shines so many Hours and Minutes after Sun set; if her Decrease, she Shines so many Hours and Minutes before Sun-rising.

To know the Time of her Setting; add the Hours and Minutes against her Age, to the Hour of the Sun-setting, and that is the Time of her Setting; for her Rising, add the same to the Time of the Sun rising. Do thus all the Increase. After the Full, subtract the Hours and Minutes in the Table, from the Hour of the Sun's Rising or Setting; and if the Subtraction cannot be made, add 12, and then subtract, and the Remainder shews the Time of the Moon's Rising or Setting.

The Moon's Age Increase.	The Hours she shines.	Decreasing.
[H.M.]		
1	0.48	29
2	1.36	28
3	2.24	27
4	3.12	26
5	4. 0	25
6	4.48	24
7	5.36	23
8	6.24	22
9	7.12	21
10	8. 0	20
11	8.48	19
12	9.36	18
13	10.24	17
14	11.12	16
15	12. 0	0

To know what 'tis o' Clock by the Moon's shining upon a Sun-Dial.

See what the Shadow of the Moon, upon the Sun-Dial, wants of 12, which take from the Time of her coming to the *South*, the Remainder is the Hour of the Night; but if the Shadow be past 12, add those Hours to the coming to the *South*, and the Sum is the Hour of the Night.

To find the Length of the Day and Night.

Double the Hours and Minutes of the Sun's Rising, so have you the Length of the Night; and doubling the Hours and Minutes of his Setting, gives the Length of the Day.

Of Days, Weeks, Months, and Years.

The Day is either Natural or Artificial; the Natural Day is the Space of 24 Hours, (including both the Dark and Light Part) in which Time, the Sun is carry'd by the first Mover, from the *East* into the *West*, and so round the World into the *East* again. The Artificial Day consists of 12 Hours, *i. e.* from the Sun's Rising to its Setting, and the Artificial Night is from the Sun's Setting to its Rising. The Day is accounted with us, for Payment of Money, between the Sun's Rising and Setting; but for Indictments for Murder, the Day is accounted from Midnight to Midnight; and so likewise are Fasting Days.

The *Hebrews* and *Chaldeans* begin their Day at Sun-rising, and end at his next Rising.

The *Jews* and *Italians*, from Sun-set to Sun-set. The *Romans* at Midnight. The *Aegyptians*, from Noon to Noon; which Account Astronomers follow.

A Week consists of 7 Mornings, or 7 Days, which the *Gentiles* call'd by the Names of the 7 Planets, (whom they worshipp'd as Gods) the First the Day of the Sun; the Second the Day of the Moon, &c. In a Week God made the World, *i. e.* in Six Days, and rested the Seventh.

All civiliz'd Nations observe one Day in Seven, as a stated Time of Worship; the *Turks* and *Mahometans* keep the Sixth Day of the Week, or *Friday*; the *Jews* the Seventh, or *Saturday*; the *Christians* the First, or *Sunday*.

Of Months there are various Kinds; a Solar Month is the Space of 30 Days, in which Time the Sun runneth through one Sign of the Zodiack.

A Lunar Month is that Interval of Time which the Moon spendeth in wandering from the Sun, in her oval Circuit through the 12 Signs, until she return to him again, (being sometimes nearer, sometimes farther from the Earth) *i. e.* from the first Day of her appearing next after her Change,

to

to the last Day of her being Visible, before her next Change, which may be Greater or Lesser, according to her Motion.

The usual or common Months are those set down in our Almanacks, containing some 30, some 31, and *February* but 28 Days, according to these Verses.

*Thirty Days hath September,
April, June, and November;
February Twenty-eight alone,
All the rest have Thirty-one.
But when Leap-Year comes the Time,
Then February has Twenty-nine.*

A YEAR is the Space of Time that the Sun runs through all the 12 Signs of the Zodiack, containg 12 Solar Months, 13 Lunar Months, 52 Weeks, 365 Days, 6 Hours, and 6 Minutes; which six Hours, in four Years Time, being added together, make one Day, which we call Leap-Year; which Day is added to *February*, making that Month every fourth Year 29 Days, which other Times is but 28.

To find the Leap-Year.

Divide the Year by 4, and if there be no Remainder, it is Leap-Year; but if there remains 1, 2, or 3, then one of those are the first, second or third after Leap-Year.

The remarkable Days, fixed Feasts, and Terms.

1 Jan. Circ. or New-Ye. Day.	21 Sep. St. <i>Matthew</i> Apostle.
6 Jan. Epiph. or Twelf. Day.	29 Sep. St. <i>Michael</i> Archangel.
25 Jan. Conv. of St. <i>Paul</i> .	18 Oct. St. <i>Luke</i> Evangelist.
30 Jan. K. Ch. I. Mart. 1648.	28 Oct. St. <i>Simon</i> and <i>Jude</i> .
2 Feb. Purif. Virg. <i>Mary</i> .	1 Nov. <i>All Saints</i> .
24 Feb. St. <i>Mat.</i> (in Lp. Ye. 25.	5 Nov. <i>Powder Treason</i> .
25 Mar. An. V. M. or <i>Lady-day</i> .	30 Nov. St. <i>Andrew</i> Apostle.
25 Ap. St. <i>Mark</i> Evangelist.	21 Dec. St. <i>Thomas</i> Apostle.
1 May St. <i>Phil.</i> and <i>Jac. M. D.</i>	25 Dec. Christ's Nat. or <i>Chr. D.</i>
11 June St. <i>Earnab.</i> Long. Day.	26 Dec. St. <i>Stephen</i> .
24 June St. <i>John Bap.</i> Midsum.	27 Dec. St. <i>John</i> Evangelist.
29 June St. <i>Peter</i> and <i>Paul</i> .	28 Dec. <i>Innocents</i> .
25 July St. <i>James</i> Apostle.	13 Jan. St. <i>Hillary</i> .
24 Au. St. <i>Bartholomew</i> Apost.	20 Jan. Oct. <i>Hill.</i> 1st Return.
	23 Jan.

23 Jan. <i>Hillary Term begins.</i>	28 Sep. Sheriffs of <i>Lond.</i> sworn.
27 Jan. <i>Quind. Hill.</i> 2d Ret.	29 Sep. <i>Ld. Mayor of Lond.</i> El.
3 Feb. <i>Craf. Pur.</i> 4th Ret.	20 Oct. <i>Tres Michael.</i> 1st Ret.
9 Feb. <i>O&ab. Pur.</i> 3d Ret.	23 Oct. <i>Michael. Term begins.</i>
12 Feb. <i>Hillary Term ends.</i>	25 Oct. <i>Crispin.</i>
14 Feb. <i>Valentine.</i>	27 Oct. <i>Mensf. Mich.</i> 3d Ret.
10 Mar. equal Day and Night.	29 Oct. <i>Ld. Mayor of Lond.</i> fw.
17 Mar. <i>St. Patrick.</i>	2 Nov. <i>All Souls.</i>
23 Ap. <i>St. George.</i>	3 Nov. <i>Craf. Anim.</i> 3 Ret.
24 June Sheriffs of <i>Lond.</i> Elec.	11 Nov. <i>St. Martin.</i>
15 July <i>St. Swithen.</i>	12 Nov. <i>Craf. Mar.</i> 4th Ret.
19 July <i>Dog-Days begin.</i>	18 Nov. <i>O&st. Mar.</i> 5th Ret.
1 Aug. <i>Lammas.</i>	25 Nov. <i>Quin. Mar.</i> 6th Ret.
27 Aug. <i>Dog-Days end.</i>	28 Nov. <i>Michael. Term ends.</i>
2 Sep. Fire of <i>London</i> 1666.	11 Dec. Shortest Day.
10 Sep. Equal Day and Night.	

A TABLE of the Revolution of *Easter*, shewing, the King's Reigns, the Prime, Epact, Dominical Letter, *Easter-Day*, the Terms, and moveable Feasts and Fasts, for ever, by Inspection.

Year of our LORD.	Beg. of Ye.	Months.	Ye. of Kin.	Kings.	Year of our LORD.	Beg. of Ye.	Months.	Ye. of Kin.	Kings.
1066	25	Mar.		Will.	1067	25	Mar.		Will.
1598		Apr.		Conq.	1599		Apr.		Conq.
Prime 3.		May			Prime 4.		May		
Epact 3.		June			Epact 14.		June		
Dom. Le. A.		July			Dom. Le. G.		July		
<i>Easter</i> A. 16.		Aug.			<i>Easter</i> Ap. 8.		Aug.		
<i>Easter</i> Ter.		Sept.			<i>Ea. Te.</i> beg.		Sept.		
beg. <i>May.</i> 3.		O&st.	14		<i>Ap.</i> 25. ends		O&st.	14	
ends 29.		Nov.	1		<i>May</i> 21.		Nov.	2	
<i>Trin.</i> Term		Dec.			<i>Trin.</i> Term		Dec.		
beg. <i>Jun.</i> 16.		Jan.			beg. <i>Jun.</i> 8.		Jan.		
ends <i>July</i> 5.		Feb.			ends 27.		Feb.		







